ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT IX
(JAN - OCT 73)

2

## DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | memo | Colby to HAK | 8/18/73 | B |
| 2 | memo | Schlesinger to HAK | 4/20/73 | B |
| 3 | report | re: Egypt | 4/14/73 | B |
| 4 | telegram | USINT Cairo to Sec State | 12/10/73 | B |
| 5 | telegram | USINT Cairo to Sec State | 8/22/73 | B |
| 6 | telegram | USINT Cairo to Sec State | 7/13/73 | B |
| 7 | telegram | USINT Cairo to Sec State | 10/12/73 | B |
| 8 | telegram | USINT Cairo to Sec State | 10/11/73 | B |
| 9 | telegram | Sec State to Amemb Athens | 10/19/73 | B |
| 10 | telegram | Sec State to USINT Cairo | 10/8/73 | B |
| 11 | telegram | Sec State to USINT Cairo | 2/22/73 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE: NSC

BOX NUMBER: 638

FOLDER TITLE: 2

[1]

**RESTRICTION CODES**

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

## DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

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|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12 | telegram | Amemb Amman to Sec State | 10/11/73 | B |
| 13 | message | for McManis | 3/14/73 | B |
| 14 | report | Intelligence Information Cable | 7/9/73 | B |
| 15 | report | Intelligence Information Cable | 4/10/73 | B |
| 16 | report | Intelligence Information Cable | 4/10/73 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE: NSC

BOX NUMBER: 638

FOLDER TITLE: 2 [2]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH ISMAIL FAHMI
SPECIAL EGYTPIAN EMISSARY
Wednesday, October 31, 1973
3:00 p.m. (45 minutes)
The Oval Office

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

To summarize our effort to consolidate the Middle East ceasefire and to persuade Egypt to have confidence in US determination to engage actively in Mid-East peace negotiations and to enter those negotiations without preconditions.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, PRESS PLAN

A, Background: President Sadat sent Fahmi to Washington for an exchange of views on consolidating the Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire and on peace negotiations in order to prepare the way for my talks in Cairo November 6. Fahmi is normally Minister of Tourism but has been Acting Foreign Minister while Foreign Minister Zayyat was at the UN during the war.

Most of my talks with Fahmi have concentrated on a package to consolidate the ceasefire. It would be useful for you to summarize this, and it is detailed in your talking points below. We put this proposal to the Israelis so that Mrs. Meir would have it before her departure.

Beyond summarizing the ceasefire package, I would suggest that you focus on what the US can and cannot do in the peace negotiations.

The problem we face with the Egyptians is the familiar one of persuading them to negotiate seriously on the terms of a peace agreement, ~~before they are assured that they will get all their territory back. They have talked~~ of having a US-Soviet guarantee of total Israeli withdrawal. I told them immediately after my visit to Moscow that all we guaranteed was to engage actively in an effort to achieve ~~a durable peace~~.

without insisting that we deliver it in advance of negotiations the total Egyptian package.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

On the other side, ~~the main~~ a peripheral Israeli request is to give them a chance to negotiate ~~border changes~~ some of the Arab territory. When you talk with Mrs. Meir, you will want to be in a position to say that we have done nothing to foreclose that opportunity even though we cannot be optimistic that peace can be achieved if they maintain that position.

Given these two positions, it is likely that the peace negotiations will deadlock very quickly. Our strategy will be to try to segment the negotiations so attention can be focussed in the early stages on a first step that--difficult as it may be--might realistically be taken in the next few ~~months~~ weeks while terms of a final settlement are still being negotiated.

If we are to succeed in this course, we will have to develop Egyptian confidence without ~~promising anything specific now on the final borders.~~ going into the most detail.

One other issue is our desire to have Sadat, once the ceasefire is consolidated, urge Faisal to relax the oil boycott when negotiations begin.

B. Participants: Egyptian Emissary Ismail Fahmi accompanied perhaps by Ambassador Abdallah El Erian (Egyptian ambassador to Paris) and Ahmed Khalil, head of the Egyptian Interests Section in Washington. I will sit in on the US side.

C. Press Plan: Press photo opportunity at the beginning. Press Secretary to brief in very general terms.

III. TALKING POINTS

A. I understand you (Fahmi) and Secretary Kissinger ~~have developed~~ are working on a proposal for consolidating the ceasefire. As I understand it the main points are:

--The UN would assure that only non-military shipments reach the Egyptian Third Army when Israeli troops pull back.

--Israeli troops would move back to the October 22 ceasefire line. Prisoners of war would be released immediately.

--The Egyptian naval blockade at the mouth of the Red Sea would be raised.

B. It is important to consolidate the ceasefire, but it will be even more important to establish momentum in the peace negotiations.

C. The US will support those negotiations actively. I want you to understand what we can and cannot do.

--We cannot deliver a final settlement in advance of negotiations. We understand Egypt's need to regain control over its territory. But we will not promise at any stage of the negotiations what we cannot deliver.

--We can help devise a negotiating process that has at least a reasonable chance of succeeding. This may require that the negotiations be broken down into manageable units and steps. Patience will be required.

--We will use our influence with Israel. The convening of a peace conference will provide a framework. But we will need realistic proposals that have some chance of being agreed.

--In short, we have promised to engage in a process with good faith. ~~not to produce a specific result.~~ We want the closest possible cooperation with Egypt.

D. Egypt has an interest in urging the oil producers to relax their boycott. The US will find it difficult to sustain the kind of role that will be required under threat of prolonged boycott.

5974X

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
Outside System

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

October 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ismail Fahmi

The main purpose of your talk with Ismail Fahmi is to hear the opening Egyptian position and procedural proposals for peace negotiations. Although we would not want to advance substantive proposals of our own now, it would be useful to state your general views on what may be possible in negotiation. This talk will provide the starting point for your talks in Cairo.

The Egyptian Position

We do not know what Fahmi will bring. The main points in the Egyptian position as stated October 10 were:

--A ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces in a specific period to the pre-June 5, 1967, line under UN supervision. [Sadat in his speech on October 16 said "ceasefire on the basis of the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the occupied territories under international supervision to the pre-June 5, 1967, lines."]

--Freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran, to be guaranteed by a UN presence at Sharm al-Shaikh for a specific period. [Sadat on October 16 said Egypt is ready "to begin clearing the Suez Canal and to open it for world navigation..."]

--Upon complete Israeli withdrawal, the state of belligerency would come to an end.

--Gaza, after Israeli withdrawal, would be under UN supervision pending the exercise by its population of the right to self-determination.

XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

--Within a specific period of termination of the state of belligerency, a peace conference would be convened under UN auspices with participation of all interested parties, including Palestinians and major powers. This conference would essentially deal with the reaffirmation of the questions related to sovereignty, security and freedom of navigation. [Sadat on October 16 said: "We are prepared, as soon as the withdrawal from all these territories is completed, to attend an international peace conference at the United Nations.... I will also try my best to convince the Palestinian people's representative about this...."]

In other messages, the Egyptians made these more general statements:

--Peace cannot be realized while Egyptian territories are occupied.

--There are two key Egyptian principles--that Egypt cannot make any concessions of land or sovereignty.

--Egypt is willing to talk about an international presence, or even an American presence, in the Sinai, at Sharm al-Shaikh or wherever, for a period until Egyptian and Israeli confidence increases.

--"There has never been any talk about placing the territories evacuated by Israel under international or any other 'control.' This would infringe on Egypt's sovereignty."

If the position Fahmi brings is based on what the Egyptians have already said, then the following may be principal points of difficulty:

--The sequence of events leading to a peace conference. While it may have changed, the earlier Egyptian position suggests that the sequence would be (1) ceasefire, (2) total Israeli withdrawal, (3) end of state of belligerency, (4) peace conference within a specific period of termination of the state of belligerency. Note: Egyptian acceptance of Resolution 338 theoretically advances the peace conference in this sequence, but the Egyptians may well insist that the agenda address withdrawal first and the issues of the final peace only after that.

--Participation. The Egyptian position raises the question of Palestinian representation at the peace conference. Note: This is a subject that we should discuss first with King Hussein.

--Peace is still contingent on the completion of total Israeli withdrawal.

The following may be points that could be used positively:

--Navigation. Sadat has said Egypt is ready to clear the Suez Canal for world navigation. Note: If some concrete Egyptian concession is needed in the early stages of negotiation to parallel an Israeli pullback, this could be one.

--Security. The door seems open to at least an international presence in the Sinai.

The Problem

The immediate tactical problems are (1) to get Egypt to the peace conference and (2) to enlist Sadat's help in persuading Faisal to relax the oil boycott.

Beyond those problems, it is worth looking at what will be required to establish some momentum for the peace negotiations. Looking ahead at least in a general way helps to focus attention on what needs to be said now.

The difficulty in establishing momentum for the peace negotiations will be to break the overall problem--even on the Egyptian front alone--into segments:

--Presumably the talks will deadlock quickly as each side tables its maximum position on a final settlement. Israel will seek boundary changes, and Egypt will not agree to a peace in which it loses land. The issue will be whether there is a first step that can be agreed that will give the negotiations some momentum without requiring commitment to final arrangements. The dilemma to be solved will be the familiar one of what concessions Egypt can make that will be concrete enough to compensate for Israeli evacuation of good military positions. You will not want to get into this with Fahmi, but the views we develop on this subject may suggest some of the points you may make in Cairo.

--If a reasonable first step can be identified to start the process of withdrawal, then it will be necessary to move to final arrangements which themselves could be spread through stages over some specified period.

--Finally, there is the relationship between the settlement of issues on the Egyptian front and settlements involving Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians.

A US Position with Fahmi

It is not clear to me--perhaps it will not be until we hear Fahmi--at what point we start. The Egyptian position could be that Egypt will not attend a peace conference until the Israelis go back to the October 22 line. Or it could be that they will say they will not attend until there is some assurance that the US will support the view that Israel should withdraw to pre-1967 lines. Allowing for adjustment to meet these issues, it will be useful to make certain general points to him:

--We will continue to do what we can to help stabilize the ceasefire. We do not condone any moves since the passage of Resolution 338. However, engaging in a major argument over where the ceasefire lines should be can only serve the interests of those who would delay negotiations that can lead to withdrawal and peace.

--Explain to him as you have to others your sense of the diplomatic process required to enable each side step-by-step to move through the exchange of concessions that will be required. The main point is simply your statement that the Egyptians cannot expect you to give them on the first day of negotiations what can only be achieved through patient negotiation.

--Discuss the need to find ways to segment the negotiations. This means that the peace conference cannot be expected to resolve all issues at once. The idea of a phased settlement has been part of Egyptian thinking for some time. We hope they could develop it further to meet the needs of the present situation.

--The convening of a peace conference is a step of major significance. To realize that significance, it is important now that both sides introduce negotiable positions. In any case, this for the first time gives the US a framework within which to use its influence. If in that context Egypt can put forward workable proposals, this will be a major factor in enhancing the US ability to work effectively.

--The US, as we have repeated on numerous occasions, is prepared to play an active role in the negotiations. But we cannot produce a miracle. Positions of all parties must provide the basis for a real negotiation.

--In Cairo, you would like to reach agreement on how to proceed in the peace negotiations, particularly on our general approach. We do not expect to put forward an American plan.

--There is one other point that needs to be made. The Egyptians have an interest in urging the oil producers to relax their boycott, perhaps using the beginning of negotiations as an occasion. The US cannot sustain the kind of role required in the negotiations under threat of prolonged boycott.

NSC 5658

October 9, 1973

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MARION H. SMOAK
ACTING CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

FROM: FRED F. FIELDING
DEPUTY COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Egyptian Embassy & Residence

We are advised that the Egyptian Ambassador has requested that the USC provide fixed post protection to his Embassy and his residence during the present period of controversy.

It is our understanding that the Executive Protective Service (E.P.S.) already has a fixed post at the Embassy. However, this will be verified and, pursuant to 3 USC 202 the E.P.S. has been directed to provide a fixed post at each location. This coverage should be reviewed on a periodic basis to determine if the need is continuing.

cc: Hon. James J. Rowley
Hon. Edward Morgan

bcc: Brent Scowcroft

PONDENCE PROF E

| DOC MO | DOC DA | RECD MO | RECD DA | RECD HR | ...G NBR | INITIAL ACTION O |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | 69 | 10 | 70 | 15 | 5658 | |

Fielding, J

LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

**SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIP**

TO: PRES _____ KISSINGER _____ SCOWCROFT ✓

FROM: ROGERS _____ RICHARDSON _____ SCHLESINGER _____ ELIOT _____

UNCLAS _____ LOU _____ C ✓ S _____ TS _____

NO FORN _____ EYES ONLY _____ CODEWORD _____ SENSITIVE _____

NODIS _____ EXDIS _____

SUBJECT: Egyptian Amb requests fixed post protection for residence & Embassy during Middle East war

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

**DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT**

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

| | ACTION | INFO | REC CY FOR |
|---|---|---|---|
| ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT | [redacted] | ✓ | |
| STAFF SECRETARY | | | |
| FAR EAST | | | |
| SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA | | | |
| MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA | ✓ | | |
| EUROPE / CANADA | | | |
| LATIN AMERICA | | | |
| UNITED NATIONS | | | |
| ECONOMIC | | | |
| SCIENTIFIC | | | |
| NET ASSESSMENT GROUP | | | |
| PROGRAM ANALYSIS | | | |
| NSC PLANNING | | | |
| CONGRESSIONAL | | | |
| OCEANS POLICY | | | |

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( )
REPLY FOR _____ ( )
APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( )
MEMO _____ TO _____ ..... ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
JOINT MEMO ..... ( )
REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... ( ✓ )
CONCURRENCE ..... ( )
DUE DATE: (10/14)

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

**SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS**

| DATE | FROM | TO | S | SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): | CY TO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10/24 | Saunders | NSC/S | | Copy has gone to Scowcroft. No action necessary. | |
| 10/24 | | | C | NAN per Saunders | |
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**NSC/S DISP INSTR**

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____
SPECIAL DISPOSITION) _____
OR RECORD COMMENT:) _____
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____

SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ✗

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D _____ BY _____

CYS FOR ) SA _____
) HP _____
ORIG ) WH _____
TO ) PA ✗
) SF _____
) NS _____
) EP _____
DESTROY) DY _____

★ GPO: 1973-489-668

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 1 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

ACTION
5183

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

September 15, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal

SUBJECT: Egyptian Action Against Acting Head of Our Interests Section in Cairo

Hal - As you can see, I changed yours slightly. Burt

Background. On August 18, Zayyat told the Spanish ambassador in Cairo, who formally represents our interests, that Egypt would PNG our acting head of the interests section if he did not leave by September 20. The Egyptians have alluded to the fact that Wiley had social contact with a retired general who was arrested over a year ago, but they have never come up with a satisfactory explanation of the grounds for their action. Our best guess is that they were provoked by press reports from Washington that we were not planning to replace Jerry Greene with another senior diplomat and were thus downgrading our presence in Cairo. State informally told the Egyptians that our man was scheduled for transfer anyway after four years, that we were trying to indentify the right man to replace him but wanted to wait until you were in place, and that we would like to leave him there for a short time until we had an appropriate replacement ready to go. The Egyptians have just replied that they want Wiley out by September 20.

The issue today is simply to clear instructions to Wiley telling him to give the Egyptians a date for his departure before September 20, rather than leaving him there and forcing the Egyptians to PNG him. A telegram for this purpose is under the attached State memo.

The issue over the longer term is how to deal with the Egyptians on this. These are the choices open to you:

- --We could in due course send a new #1 and a new #2 to Cairo.
- --We could simply replace the #2 who is coming out now and leave the top spot vacant.
- --We could leave both spots open for the time being.
- --We could ask the Egyptians to withdraw one of their top two people here.

State is recommending that no decision be made on any of these until after your talk with Zayyat and until you have a chance to think about the matter. The only decision being sought today is approval of Wiley's departure without forcing PNG action.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

9/16 Gen Scowcroft called State Op. Sr. Officer (Peter Sonnos) and cleared cable.

The only nuance in the attached telegram is whether Wiley in departing should tell the Egyptians that you will want to discuss the question of the status and level of our representation when you see Zayyat. I do not see any objection to this since it would seem strange to avoid the subject. However, the language in brackets in the first paragraph in the attached draft could be dropped.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve clearance of the attached telegram with only the change noted in paragraph 2 (to leave all your options open).

Approve_____

Clear cable dropping mention of my talk with Zayyat from paragraph 1 _____

Leave Wiley there and force the Egyptians to expel him _____

7316907
5183

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 14, 1973

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Egyptian Action Against our Acting Principal Officer in Cairo

BACKGROUND

On August 18 Egyptian Foreign Minister Zayyat called in the Spanish Ambassador (Spain is our Protecting Power in Egypt) to inform him that unless Marshall Wiley, our Acting Principal Officer in Cairo since Jerry Greene left, departed Egypt by September 20, the Egyptian Government would PNG him. Zayyat then alluded to a "security matter" as the cause for the expulsion, and subsequently we heard informally from the Egyptians that this reference was to Wiley's association more than a year previously with a retired Egyptian general and ambassador, Muhib Abdul Ghaffar, who had been subsequently arrested and sentenced to prison on state security charges. The Egyptians have not come forward with any specific allegations of impropriety on Wiley's part, and in fact, we do not believe any took place. Wiley is a highly competent officer, and we have complete confidence in his discretion, integrity and judgment. Furthermore, if there had been any substance to their allegations, the Egyptians would almost certainly have acted against Wiley at the time they arrested Abdul Ghaffar.

We believe the Abdul Ghaffar case is the pretext rather than the main cause for Wiley's expulsion. The real reason, we think, is that Sadat has been irritated by press reports



XGDS-1

appearing several months ago that, because the USG was not moving promptly to name a new Principal Officer for Cairo, Washington was attempting to "downgrade" its relationship with Cairo.

We went back to the Egyptians earlier this month with the reasonable request that Wiley be left in place for a limited time until Secretary-designate Kissinger could be installed and focus on the question of selecting a new Principal Officer, after which Wiley would be transferred. The reply we have just received, through the Spaniards, disregards our request and insists on Wiley's removal by the specified date (i.e., next Thursday, September 20).

We have basically three ways of responding to this Egyptian action:

1. downplaying the matter, by which we would quietly acquiesce in the Egyptian request and remove Wiley by the specified date. If we wanted to preserve the appearance of normalcy, we could then move in due course to replace him or to appoint a new Principal Officer or both. Alternatively, we could simply leave both positions vacant indefinitely.

2. taking reciprocal action, by which we would ask that the Chief of the Egyptian Interests Section here be recalled within 30 days (alternatively, we could ask for the recall of the Egyptian number two, though this would have less impact and not be fully comparable to the Egyptian action in the circumstances). At the same time, we would remove Wiley and leave our representation in Cairo at a low level until we see what atmosphere emerges.

3. deferring a decision on which course to follow until after Secretary Kissinger sees Zayyat, meanwhile quietly recalling Wiley as the Egyptians request.

The downplaying approach has the advantage of our taking no action that in the least might further impair the atmosphere of our relations with Egypt as a new Secretary assumes office

and begins to explore the Middle East situation with the area Foreign Ministers, including Foreign Minister Zayyat whom he will see in New York in a few weeks. On the other hand, the Egyptians have a bad record of victimizing our diplomats for the sake of proving a political point, and a case can be made for demonstrating firmly to the Egyptians that our dialogue must be based on the principle of mutual respect. We are not convinced, moreover, that our taking reciprocal action against the Egyptian presence here would seriously impair any subsequent explorations with the Egyptians.

RECOMMENDATION

We favor the third course, which keeps Secretary-designate's options open until he has tested the water with Zayyat. We would remove Wiley within the next few days, leaving the post in the hands of the administrative officer for the time being. We would defer taking any action either to fill our own vacancies in Cairo, or to expel one of the Egyptians here, until the Secretary has a chance to take up the matter with Zayyat in New York. At that time he could sound out Egyptian intentions in broad terms about the level, purpose and treatment of our diplomatic establishments in each other's capitals.

The attached telegram, for White House approval, would instruct Wiley to close out his affairs and notify the Egyptian Government that he will be leaving Cairo on a date prior to September 20. To assure that the Egyptians do not assume we consider this a closed chapter, Wiley would at the same time indicate to them that Secretary Kissinger will want to discuss with Zayyat in New York the status and level of both our interests sections.

Wiley's departure will quickly become public knowledge, thereby posing some difficulties for us in terms of public line. If left to assume that this is being done at our initiative, the press will speculate we are further downgrading our representation in Cairo. On the other hand, should we indicate or intimate it is at the Egyptian initiative, the question immediately arises: are we

taking this lying down? Our best course, until the Secretary has a chance to discuss the matter with Zayyat in New York, would appear to be to state if asked only that Wiley is departing on home leave and transfer to another assignment, and a replacement has not yet been selected, firmly declining any further comment. If the Egyptians play it differently, we can develop any further public line in light of prevailing circumstances.

Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Proposed telegram to Cairo

FORM DS 322{0CR}

SECRET

NEA/EGY:MSTERNER:HLK
9/14/73 EXT 22365
D - ACTING SECRETARY

NEA - MR. SISCO
WHITE HOUSE

NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S/S

IMMEDIATE CAIRO

NIACT

NODIS

KR
MS
JJS
ALA
WH

S/S

E.O. 11652 - XGDS-1
TAGS: APER, EG
SUBJECT: GOE REQUEST FOR WILEY TRANSFER

REF: CAIRO 2739

1. GIVEN EGYPTIAN RESPONSE CONTAINED REFTEL, WE HAVE DECIDED TO MOVE YOU OUT PRIOR TO DEADLINE SET BY EGYPTIANS. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE CLOSE OUT YOUR AFFAIRS AND NOTIFY GOE OF YOUR INTENDED DATE OF DEPARTURE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, [INDICATING EXPLICITLY THAT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE WILL WANT TO DISCUSS QUESTION OF STATUS AND LEVEL OF OUR INTERESTS SECTION IN CAIRO AND EGYPTIAN INTERESTS SECTION HERE WITH ZAYYAT IN NEW YORK.] HOME LEAVE AND TRANSFER ORDERS COMING TO YOU BY SEPTEL.

2. FYI ONLY. FOR TIME BEING WE DO NOT INTEND TO TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST EGYPTIAN DIPLOMATS HERE, ALTHOUGH THIS WILL BE KEPT OPEN [PENDING SECRETARY-DESIGNATE'S MEETING WITH ZAYYAT IN NEW YORK] END FYI.

3. YOUR DEPARTURE WILL OF COURSE BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE IN FEW DAYS' TIME. WE PROPOSE TO SAY NOTHING ABOUT REASONS FOR YOUR DEPARTURE BEYOND FACT THAT YOU ARE PROCEEDING ON HOME LEAVE AND TRANSFER TO ANOTHER ASSIGNMENT.

SECRET

IF ASKED ABOUT REPLACEMENT FOR YOU AND/OR GREENE, WE WILL SAY NO ONE HAS YET BEEN SELECTED. YOU SHOULD ALSO ADHERE STRICTLY TO THIS MINIMAL LINE AND INSTRUCT YOUR STAFF TO DO SO SIMILARLY. PRESS SPECULATION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ENSUE, AND ANYTHING ADDITIONALLY THAT MIGHT HAVE TO BE SAID WILL COME OUT OF WASHINGTON. YY

# NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

| DOC MO | DOC DA | RECD MO | RECD DA | RECD HR | LOG NBR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | 14 | 9 | 15 | 10 | 5,83 |

INITIAL ACTION O

**SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION**

TO: PRES ____ KISSINGER ____ SCOWCROFT X

FROM: ~~ROGERS~~ Richardson X ____ RICHARDSON ____ SCHLESINGER ____ ELIOT ____

UNCLAS ____ LOU ____ C ____ S X ____ TS ____

LOG IN/OUT ONLY ____ NO FORN ____ EYES ONLY ____ CODEWORD ____ SENSITIVE ____ NODIS X ____ EXDIS ____

SUBJECT: Proposed telegram recommending deferred decision re Egyptian action against acting US principal officer in Cairo

REFERENCE: S/S 7316907 OTHER ____ NOT XEROXED ____

**DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT**

| INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION | ACTION | INFO | REC CY FOR |
|---|---|---|---|
| ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT | ■ | | X |
| STAFF SECRETARY | | | |
| FAR EAST | | | |
| SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA | | | |
| MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA | X | | X |
| EUROPE / CANADA | | | |
| LATIN AMERICA | | | |
| UNITED NATIONS | | | |
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| PROGRAM ANALYSIS | | | |
| NSC PLANNING | | | |
| CONGRESSIONAL | | | |
| OCEANS POLICY | | | |
| Eagleburger | | | X |

ACTION REQUIRED

- MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( X )
- MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( ____ )
- REPLY FOR ____ ( ____ )
- APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( ____ )
- MEMO ____ TO ____ ..... ( ____ )
- RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( ____ )
- JOINT MEMO ..... ( ____ )
- REFER TO ____ FOR: ____ ( ____ )
- ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... ( ____ )
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- DUE DATE: 9/24

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

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| 9/15/73 | HH Saunders | HAK | X | Clear cable | |
| 9/16 | ____ | ____ | | Sent | |
| | | | | Approved w/ changes | |
| 9/16 | | | C | State notified by Scowcroft | |
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**NSC/S DISP INSTR**

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★ GPO: 1973-489-668

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C 20520

CONFIDENTIAL

September 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Egyptian-Libyan Merger

Attached is a memorandum on the Egyptian-Libyan merger for your information.

George L. Ward
for Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Memo on Egyptian-Libyan merger.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY RODGER P. DAVIES
GDS -- DECLAS. DEC. 31, 1979

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S AUG 31 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

## Egyptian-Libyan Merger

The Egyptian-Libyan statement on unity issued on August 29 by Sadat and Qadhafi amounted to little more than an agreement to continue discussing the matter. Sadat's preference for a gradual approach has thus prevailed over Qadhafi's call for quick, complete unity. Qadhafi gained only minor concessions in the form of "revolutionary" rhetoric in the text of the statement. Sadat and Qadhafi will continue to run their respective jurisdictions "until the building of the state is completed." A joint constituent assembly is to draft a constitution and nominate a president for the new state, and then a referendum will be held to decide on the constitution and president. No deadlines were set. Because of the practical problems involved, and the differing philosophies of the two leaders, the process is likely to take some time.

Sadat has maneuvered with considerable skill, his position no doubt strengthened by promises of Saudi financial aid, which has helped relieve him of dependence on Libya. His firm but tactful handling of Qadhafi should win him favor at home and increase somewhat his prestige in other Arab countries. In inter-Arab affairs Sadat has succeeded in carrying water on both shoulders by developing good rapport with Faysal while at the same time keeping Qadhafi on the string. Sadat thus continues, with some success, the traditional Cairo policy of seeking to occupy and control the central ground of Arab politics. Qadhafi's reaction, not yet clear, may emerge in his major speech scheduled for the fourth anniversary of the Libyan revolution on September 1, at which time he could either publicly endorse or criticize the merger. Another possibility

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GDS - DECLAS. DEC. 31, 1979

is that he might announce measures against U.S. interests as a way to compensate for the setback to his ideas on the merger.

Otherwise, there appear to be no immediate consequences for U.S. policy. We assume the two states will continue on their separate paths, with Libya persisting in greater militancy on such issues as oil and the Arab-Israel conflict. The question of U.S. recognition of the new state does not arise at this early stage. Meanwhile, Sadat can be expected to pursue his strategy of trying to mobilize the Arab oil producing states--Saudi Arabia in particular--to exert pressure on the U.S. We do not think the latest arrangements with Libya preclude Sadat taking a careful look at any negotiating opportunities that may arise; however, his successful handling of the association with Libya may give him a somewhat greater feeling that things are beginning to work for him and that he does not need to deal with Israel out of desperation.

# NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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**SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION**

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UNCLAS ____ LOU ____ C X S ____ TS ____

LOG IN/OUT ONLY X ____ NO FORN ____ EYES ONLY ____ CODEWORD ____ SENSITIVE ____ NODIS ____ EXDIS ____

SUBJECT: State Info memos on Egyptian - Libyan Merger

REFERENCE: S/S 7316042 OTHER ____ NOT XEROXED ____

**DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT**

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ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( )
REPLY FOR ____ ( )
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★ GPO: 1973-489-668

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4045

CONFIDENTIAL

July 26, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Sadat

We understand NEA, on reading the full text of President Sadat's July 23 anniversary speech, has recommended that no Presidential message of congratulations be sent to the Egyptian President on the anniversary this year.

We concur in that recommendation.

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL/GDS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
4045

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

July 23, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Sadat on July 23 Anniversary

Ever since President Sadat has been in power, we have sent a routine Presidential message of congratulations on the July 23 anniversary. We have normally waited until after Sadat's anniversary speech to send the message in order to keep open the option of not sending anything if his remarks are highly offensive.

Our preliminary reading of Sadat's speech suggests that he expressed fairly strong criticism of the United States for its all out support of Israel but he did not engage in personal or offensive attacks on the President. While acknowledging differences with the Soviet Union, Sadat did not attack Moscow or announce any measures that are likely to increase the present strain in US-Egyptian relations. On balance, it seems as if we should go ahead with routine congratulations, but not try to inject any added warmth as a signal to Sadat of our desire to keep lines of communication open. Nor does it seem appropriate to refrain from sending a message in protest over the critical tone of Sadat's speech.

State has proposed the following message:

> "On behalf of the American people, I am pleased to extend to you and the people of Egypt sincere congratulations on the occasion of the twenty-first anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution of July 23. I hope you and your country will prosper in the years to come."

Mr. Gergen has cleared this message.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the proposed message from the President to Sadat.

Approve _____

Revised as indicated _____

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

7313323
4045

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 19, 1973

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Congratulations to Sadat on Egyptian July 23 Anniversary

Attached is a draft Presidential message of congratulations to President Sadat on the occasion of the twenty-first anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, which falls on July 23. Despite the ups and downs in the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, similar Presidential greetings have been sent to Sadat on this anniversary since he has been in power. Sadat, in return, has expressed appreciation. We believe a routine congratulatory message will probably again be appropriate this year. In the past, we have delayed sending our congratulations until we have had a chance to review Sadat's customary July 23 speech for anti-U.S. content. We would plan to follow the same practice once again, and to be in touch with your staff regarding our assessment as to whether anything Sadat said would affect going ahead with our congratulations.

Samuel R. Gammon
for Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Message to President Sadat

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SUGGESTED TELEGRAM

TO: CAIRO

SUBJECT: July 23 Anniversary

1. Please deliver following message from President Nixon to President Sadat:

QUOTE: On behalf of the American people, I extend to you and the people of Egypt sincere congratulations on the occasion of the twenty-first anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution of July 23. I hope you and your country will prosper in the years to come. END QUOTE.

2. We do not plan to release text, but have no objection if Egyptians wish to do so.

FORM DS 322{OCR}

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NEA.EGY:GNANDERSON:DD
7/17/73 EXT 22660
NEA:JJSISCO

NEA/EGY:MSTERNER
S/S:

NEA:ALATHERTON
WHITE HOUSE:

ROUTINE CAIRO

JJS
GNA
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ALA
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WH:

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PDEV, EG
SUBJECT: JULY 23 ANNIVERSARY

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO PRESIDENT SADAT:
QUOTE: ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, I EXTEND TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF EGYPT SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION OF JULY 23. I HOPE YOU AND YOUR COUNTRY WILL PROSPER IN THE YEARS TO COME. END QUOTE.

2. WE DO NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT, BUT HAVE NO OBJECTION IF EGYPTIANS WISH TO DO SO. YY

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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TO: PRES _____ KISSINGER ✓ SCOWCROFT _____

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SUBJECT: State suggests Pres congratulations to Anwar Sadat on Egyptian July 23 anniversary

REFERENCE: S/S 7313323 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

**DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT**

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| ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT | | | |
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MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( )
REPLY FOR _____ ( )
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JOINT MEMO ..... ( )
REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... ( )
CONCURRENCE ~~to~~ QWD to notify State ..... ( ✓ )
DUE DATE (7/22)

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

**SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS**

| DATE | FROM | TO | S | SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): | CY TO |
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| 7/23/73 | Saunders Quandt | HAK | X | Approve message to Sadat (7/24) | Farar |
| 7/25 | | Saunders | S | Returned per Scroft (7/30) | |
| 7/26 | Saunders | Davis | | State/NEA after reading Sadat speech has decided this should not be sent. Scowcroft concurs. Inform S/S. HHS | |
| | | | | | |
| 7/26 | | | C | Davis sgd memo to Eliot | |
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**NSC/S DISP INSTR**

DISPATCH ✓ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____
SPECIAL DISPOSITION) _____
OR RECORD COMMENT:) _____
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: ✓

JUL 28 1973

CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____
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★ GPO: 1973-489-668

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 25, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Sadat's July 23 Speech

Sadat's July 23 speech on the anniversary of the 1952 Egyptian Revolution, while reflecting persistent deep frustration, looked basically to a long-term strategy and eschewed threats of military moves. Displaying near-obsession with the U.S., Sadat referred to this country as a "big gangster" and reiterated his negative attitude toward U.S.-supported diplomatic efforts and the idea of negotiations with Israel. U.S. tactics in the UN Security Council review of the Middle East were singled out for particular attack, and the U.S. approach characterized as one of "conceit" and "arrogance." Sadat stressed that Egypt did not fear an American veto, presumably signalling a continuing hard Egyptian line in that forum.

As to broader Egyptian strategy in the Arab-Israel conflict, Sadat emphasized the need to bolster Egyptian strength at home, develop inter-Arab cooperation, and continue reliance on Soviet support. He focussed on potential future Arab leverage on the U.S. because of the "energy" and "monetary" crises. In light of changing circumstances, he invited Egyptian officials and the people to participate with him during the rest of the summer in a policy reexamination on the issue of liberating Egyptian territory. Sadat cited an overall planning time-frame encompassing 20 to 30 years, while also, in anticipation of possible criticism, defensively asserting he did not intend any postponement of the "battle."

In addition, Sadat conveyed some insights into relations with Moscow and Qadhafi. He noted that Soviet support had not been up to Egypt's hopes, but portrayed matters as now having become more normal after extended strains. His

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CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL STERNER
GDS - DECLAS. DEC. 31, 1977

comments on the USSR belied earlier rumors that he might express pique or worse because of disappointment over lack of firm Soviet support for the Arab cause at the recent U.S.-Soviet summit. As for Libya, Sadat reiterated firmly his view that an Egyptian-Libyan merger should be well prepared and gradual, and not based solely on national emotions. Although Sadat chided Qadhafi paternalistically over his recent "resignation" and the Libyan unity march into Egypt, Sadat was clearly at pains not to arouse further Egyptian-Libyan antagonisms.

In sum, Sadat obviously continues to accord the U.S. a central position in his thinking. Furthermore, he may well tend to place exaggerated hopes on potential Arab influence on U.S. policy through oil and money. In any case, he seems to recognize that Egypt cannot alone change U.S. policy and that any viable Egyptian strategy will depend heavily on the desire and ability of oil-producing Arab states to work on Cairo's behalf. This recognition is no doubt a prime factor in Sadat's ongoing cultivation of Saudi Arabia in particular, as well as in his apparent aim of softening difficulties with the quixotic Qadhafi.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

# NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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SUBJECT: State Comment on July 23 speech by Egyptian Pres ANWAR SADAT

REFERENCE: S/S 7313583 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

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DUE DATE: 8/02

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

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| 7/26/73 | Saunders | NSC/S | | Covered in daily brief. Close file. HAS | |
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★ GPO: 1973-489-668

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 26, 1973

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Egyptian Role in Recent UN Security Council Debate

In the final twenty-four hours of behind-the-scene negotiations for a resolution on the Lebanese item in New York, a softening of Egyptian tactics probably enabled us to avoid a veto and achieve a reasonably satisfactory outcome. The Egyptians could have pressed the issue to a US veto if they had wanted to play it that way; in fact, their last-minute agreement to our changes, which avoided this outcome, incurred the displeasure of the USSR, China, and a number of Arab and other non-aligneds who preferred the tougher draft. This Egyptian support was important to the Lebanese, who wanted to avoid a US veto, but it was also important to us.

Sadat's decision to send Zayyat to mastermind the Lebanese resolution, and Zayyat's early hard-lining insistence on language we would have had to veto, gave us the initial impression that Cairo's strategy was to isolate the US in support of Israel from the rest of the Council. We can only speculate about the reasons for Zayyat's subsequent change in tactics. In part it may have been out of consideration for Lebanese sensitivities. It also suggests, however, that in spite of the recent belligerent tone of Sadat's public statements and his actions to bolster his military position, he decided that tactics short of confrontation with the US still stood a chance of motivating us into taking action on a peace settlement, making it unnecessary for Egypt to resume hostilities. Zayyat's decision may also have been influenced by our keeping him in doubt as to whether we would pose an objection to Egypt's proposal for a full-scale Council review of the Middle East situation. This proposal, with which we subsequently went along,

was undoubtedly a more important objective for Cairo than the precise outcome of the Lebanese resolution, and the main reason Zayyat was sent to take charge of Arab tactics.

The Egyptians can be reasonably pleased with the outcome. They achieved a resolution condemning Israel and got a consensus in favor of an early meeting on the Middle East. Using hard bargaining tactics the Egyptians began with an extreme position, let us savor the difficulties that might ensue in Lebanon and elsewhere if we vetoed, and when they found that the Lebanese and we were in agreement on a resolution that would avoid an American veto, settled for something good if less than maximum.

Sadat's military preparations serve the double purpose of lending credibility to his political efforts and providing insurance should these efforts fail and he be left with no alternative but a test of military strength. He has become increasingly disillusioned with the likelihood that political efforts can succeed, but for the time being he seems prepared to see a further political scenario unfold before facing up to the decision on whether to resort to military action. With a Security Council consideration of the Middle East now on the agenda, the chances of Sadat launching military action against Israel before or while this exercise is under way have lessened. The Council discussion in late May or early June can be expected to take some time, and after that there may be some further political action that the Council sets in motion. By then it could be mid-summer and Sadat may find it expedient to defer final decisions about war and peace until (a) he gets through or around the Egyptian-Libyan merger in some fashion on September 1, (b) the Israeli elections take place later in the fall, and (c) any US-Soviet summit has occurred.

Harry G. Barnes, Jr.
for
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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SUBJECT: State's analysis of Egyptian role & Anwar Sadat's decision in recent UN Security Council Debate

REFERENCE: S/S 7307766 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

**DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT**

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DUE DATE: (4/30)

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

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| 30 Apr 73 | QUANDT | Secretariat | C | Close out – subject covered in daily briefing with copy of memorandum attached for HAK | |

**NSC/S DISP INSTR**

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★ GPO: 1973–489-668

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WASHINGTON

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B

Henry -

I recommend that we not modify the State words to the Israelis. They are not really inaccurate and the Israelis can in any case put the message in proper perspective.

Brent

Agree - K

MEMORANDUM

SECRET NODIS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
1847X

SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR PLUS

April 4, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: Press Guidance on President Sadat's Newsweek Interview

Now that President Sadat's Newsweek interview is on our news stands and, in a slightly different version, has been published in Cairo's al-Ahram, it is desirable to provide some stand-by guidance for those who may receive questions.

The main difference between the al-Ahram and the Newsweek versions is that the former includes Sadat's comment that, before Ismail came to Washington, he put four questions to us dealing mainly with US-Israeli relations. You will recall that he said he initially received an unsatisfactory reply and then forty-eight hours later a more satisfactory one.

The State Department's recommendation for draft guidance is contained in the attached memo and the telegram to Cairo underneath it. The approach suggested is based on the premise that we should avoid provoking a confrontation over this interview. I agree.

The one issue that you will want to look at very carefully is in the final paragraph of the draft telegram. This paragraph deals with what we would tell the Israelis, and we will want to be scrupulous in that. The last sentence of that paragraph was drafted by State, I feel, to smoke out the White House on the general issue of what exchanges may have preceded the Ismail visit. The question boils down to a choice between the categorical State Department formulation and a more precise but less categorical alternative:

--State formulation: "We would say that there were no exchanges of a substantive nature between Egypt and the US prior to Ismail's visit to Washington."

SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR PLUS

SECRET NODIS

--Alternative: "We would say that there were no substantive exchanges between Egypt and the US on the nature of the US-Israeli relationship prior to Ismail's visit as Sadat's statement indicated."

The argument for the State formulation is that it is categorical and therefore more reassuring both bureaucratically and to the Israelis. The argument for the alternative formulation is that it addresses the main Israeli concern--that we may have been bargaining with Sadat about our relationship with them--while leaving room for there having been a general semi-substantive discussion of the kinds of subjects that would be dealt with in talks with Ismail.

RECOMMENDATION: That the State Department telegram be cleared indicating below your choice between the two formulations above.

Approve State Department formulation _____

Approve Alternative formulation _____

Concurrence: Richard T. Kennedy

SECRET NODIS

SAUNDERS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7306099

SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR/PLUS

April 3, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Egyptian President Sadat's NEWSWEEK Interview

In an interview published in the current issue of NEWSWEEK, President Sadat makes several inaccurate statements about what was said in Washington to his National Security Advisor, Hafez Ismail, as well as about earlier U.S.-Egyptian exchanges. In addition, in the version of the interview published in Cairo's al-Ahram, Sadat is quoted as describing four questions dealing largely with U.S.-Israeli relations which he says he put to Washington prior to Ismail's visit. Sadat claims he initially received an unsatisfactory reply, followed 48 hours later by a satisfactory answer, after which he agreed to send Ismail to Washington.

We see no useful purpose in entering a public or private debate with Sadat, which could only further complicate the U.S.-Egyptian diplomatic dialogue that we think it is desirable to keep going. We do anticipate, however, that Sadat's allegations about a pre-Ismail visit exchange between us about U.S.-Israeli relations will arouse Israeli suspicions and that we need to set the record straight with the Israelis. We have, therefore, prepared for White House clearance the attached telegram, in response to a request for clarification from our Mission in Cairo, which contains the following:

A. Press guidance for use by the Department's spokesman designed to turn aside in a dignified manner press queries to us about Sadat's allegations;

SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR/PLUS

XGDS-3

SECRET NODIS

B. Guidance for use privately with the Israelis to reassure them that those allegations are untrue. Since there was to our knowledge no exchange of a substantive nature with Sadat prior to the Ismail visit, we would propose saying so explicitly to the Israelis.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Suggested Telegram

FORM DS 322(OCR)

SECRET

NEA:JJSISCO:ALATHERTON, JR.
4/3/73 EXT 29588
D - MR. RUSH

WHITE HOUSE - MR. KISSINGER | S/S

ROUTINE CAIRO

ROUTINE TEL AVIV

NODIS/CEDAR/PLUS

KR
JJS/ALA
HK
S/S

E.O. 11652 - XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG
SUBJECT: SADAT INTERVIEW WITH DE BORCHGRAVE - NEWSWEEK
REF: CAIRO 951

1. WE DO NOT WISH TO ENGAGE IN A PUBLIC OR A PRIVATE ARGUMENT WITH SADAT OVER THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS INTERVIEW WITH DE BORCHGRAVE.

2. IF ASKED ABOUT SADAT'S COMMENT TO DE BORCHGRAVE THAT HE HAD RAISED FOUR QUESTIONS PRIOR TO MR. ISMAIL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON OR SADAT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF U.S. POSITIONS TAKEN IN THOSE TALKS, DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WILL TAKE FOLLOWING LINE: "WE ARE NOT GOING TO COMMENT ON THE POSITIONS TAKEN PUBLICLY BY PRESIDENT SADAT RECENTLY. WE CONTINUE HOWEVER TO HAVE AN INTEREST IN A SERIOUS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. ON THE MATTER OF MR. ISMAIL'S VISIT, BOTH SIDES FELT THAT SUCH AN EXCHANGE WOULD BE USEFUL. WE TOLD MR. ISMAIL HE WOULD BE WELCOME IN WASHINGTON AND HE CAME. NEITHER SET ANY CONDITIONS FOR THE MEETINGS. THE USG CONTINUES TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTIES TO SEARCH FOR A BASIS FOR BEGINNING A NEGOTIATING PROCESS THAT COULD LEAD TOWARD A PEACE AGREEMENT AND REMAINS PREPARED TO HELP IN SUCH A PROCESS IF A U.S. ROLE WOULD BE USEFUL." YOU SHOULD AVOID PUBLIC COMMENT IN CAIRO BUT MAY TAKE THIS LINE PRIVATELY AS NECESSARY.

3. FYI: SADAT'S ACCOUNT OF THE FOUR QUESTIONS WHICH PRECEDED ISMAIL'S VISIT IS NOT TRUE, AND WE CANNOT FIGURE OUT WHAT, IF ANYTHING, HE MAY HAVE HAD IN MIND. WE WILL TELL THE ISRAELIS DIRECTLY THAT SADAT'S ACCOUNT OF THE FOUR QUESTIONS IS NOT TRUE BUT ASK THAT THEY LEAVE ANY COMMENT TO THE PARTIES INVOLVED. WE WOULD SAY THAT THERE WERE NO EXCHANGES OF A SUBSTANTIVE NATURE BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE U.S. PRIOR TO ISMAIL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. END FYI. YY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 7306099

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR/PLUS April 3, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Egyptian President Sadat's NEWSWEEK Interview

In an interview published in the current issue of NEWSWEEK, President Sadat makes several inaccurate statements about what was said in Washington to his National Security Advisor, Hafez Ismail, as well as about earlier U.S.-Egyptian exchanges. In addition, in the version of the interview published in Cairo's al-Ahram, Sadat is quoted as describing four questions dealing largely with U.S.-Israeli relations which he says he put to Washington prior to Ismail's visit. Sadat claims he initially received an unsatisfactory reply, followed 48 hours later by a satisfactory answer, after which he agreed to send Ismail to Washington.

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B. Guidance for use privately with the Israelis to reassure them that those allegations are untrue. Since there was to our knowledge no exchange of a substantive nature with Sadat prior to the Ismail visit, we would propose saying so explicitly to the Israelis.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Suggested Telegram

FORM DS 322{0CR}

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4/3/73 EXT 29588
D - MR. RUSH

WHITE HOUSE - MR. KISSINGER | S/S

ROUTINE CAIRO

ROUTINE TEL AVIV

NODIS/CEDAR/PLUS

KR
JJS ALA
HK

S/S

E.O. 11652 - XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG
SUBJECT: SADAT INTERVIEW WITH DE BORCHGRAVE - NEWSWEEK
REF: CAIRO 951

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SECRET

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SECRET NODIS

IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE

CEDAR PLUS
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

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DTG 041730Z

FROM: DICK KENNEDY

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

INFO:

RELEASED BY:

TOR:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

TOHAK 97

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION
1812

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS) April 2, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal

SUBJECT: Comment on Sadat's Interview with de Borchgrave

The most troublesome operational problem created by Sadat's interview with de Borchgrave is somewhat reduced by the fact that Newsweek dropped from its published text the part about the four questions he put to the US before Ismail's visit and the change in the second US reply forty-eight hours after the first. However, the Arabic text released by the Egyptian domestic news service includes the questions. But this operational question will be handled separately.

Any comment on Sadat's talk with de Borchgrave is quite subjective because the interview is more significant in what it reveals of Sadat's present attitude than in substance. The following are some impressions:

1. Sadat is disappointed with the results of the Ismail visit. He engages in considerable exaggeration both in describing the prelude to the visit and in what he says about the "ridiculous" US positions taken during the visit. "Complete failure and despair sums it up." There are two possible interpretations:

--This may reflect genuine feeling that he cannot pay the price of increased flexibility that he feels we are asking. De Borchgrave seems inclined to this view. He cites both Ghorbal and Heikal as feeling Sadat is "ignoring all moderate counsels." Sadat himself may realize that we are asking for considerable additional flexibility and may feel he cannot go that far.

--There is also the possibility that, even though he may be genuinely disappointed, he has not foreclosed additional diplomatic dialogue and is taking a negative line now to pave

the way for a less flexible response than we are hoping for. One must couple his comments with the fact that his March 26 speech centered all its critical comments on Secretary Rogers -- none on the White House. He may still want to engage the President, but he may have been disturbed that the President's apparent price for involvement, if any, seems to be an Egyptian flexibility which Sadat had not envisioned. So whether he is partly posturing or not, a settlement has not become much easier.

The test of which of these interpretations is more valid will be whether or not there is further serious dialogue. Sadat may have judged that he cannot afford to accept the frame of reference we are talking about.

2. Sadat talks quite openly about willingness to make peace with Israel. He talks about "a complete solution and a vision of the future for the area for decades to come." He says, "Yes, I want a peace agreement with Israel." All of this is on the assumption that full -- not just nominal -- Egyptian sovereignty is restored in the Sinai. He regrets that "the fact that we want a new era of peace with Israel after they give up their occupation hasn't made a dent" in Israeli attitudes.

3. Sadat, in his speech and here, seems to understand what we mean by shifting the discussion to Egyptian sovereignty and Israeli security. He says, "Washington is talking about nominal Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai." He does not like this, nor does he acknowledge that this would be the starting point, not necessarily the end of the process. He appears to be grappling with what this formulation requires of him. On Sharm al-Shaikh, he is willing to consider "any formula" the international community thinks desirable, except Israeli occupation. The issue is whether he can accept the concept of restricted Egyptian sovereignty as a framework for discussion. At the moment, he is talking as if he sees this as capitulation to the Israeli position, although he has not ruled it out.

4. Sadat seems here to show less interest than in his speech in a diplomatic effort. As in the past, he talks much more about the military route being the only way out. However, since he

carefully left the door open in his speech, he may have felt free here to be more negative for tactical purposes. He does say, however, that once the battle begins he would not hesitate to engage in direct negotiations with Israel. Diplomacy would continue.

5. Sadat's references to the resumption of fighting suggest that he may seriously be considering initiating a limited military engagement along the Suez Canal. He seems to realize that Egypt will not achieve its goal of recovering Sinai by military means, but that an end to the ceasefire might stimulate outside powers to press harder for a settlement. He appears to be saying, however, that even if fighting resumes, he does not want to end his contacts with Washington.

6. In his own words, Sadat has no new ideas for a settlement. He hopes that the US will revert to his interpretation of the "Rogers Plan", but instead sees a new US position emerging that substitutes the concept of sovereignty for withdrawal. This is a step backward from what he has hoped for, but might seem better than an indefinite continuation of the status quo. By taking a firm stand now, Sadat probably is hoping to move us toward a position closer to his idea of full sovereignty. He may well realize, however, that the range for further discussion lies somewhere between "full sovereignty" and "nominal sovereignty."

If this assessment of Sadat's position is accurate, he is probably willing to continue a dialogue with us, but his opening position will be quite tough. He is seeking to inject the prospect of imminent hostilities into the picture as a way of advancing the dialogue. At this point it would appear that if Sadat is to be engaged in a useful exchange of views he will have to be convinced that a formula balancing Egyptian sovereignty and Israeli security could include provisions that would progressively extend the scope of Egypt's sovereignty, but that this process would not be unconditional. It is this conditional link that he still refuses to acknowledge as a valid part of the peace making process.

Comment: It may be worth noting that our initial reports of Ismail's reactions to his visit here indicated that he was favorably impressed. One report indicated that he told the British Ambassador to the UN that he thought President Nixon was beginning to give attention to the question of a Middle East settlement. He expressed the view that President Nixon will take into consideration all points of view, not just the Israeli one. Ismail subsequently commented to David Rockefeller that he found you to be "a skillful and imaginative man."

These comments may suggest that Ismail was less disillusioned with his visit here than Sadat has suggested. This could represent a real difference of view between the two men; a re-evaluation of the US position after Mrs. Meir's trip and the news stories on aircraft; or a tactical position adopted by Sadat that may leave Ismail free to pursue the ideas he heard in Washington.

# NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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**SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION**

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ~~ROGERS~~ BRADEMAS X UNCLAS _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

KISSINGER X RICHARDSON _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____

SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____

ELIOT _____ S _____ CODEWORD _____

TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: Comments on (Cuban Factor) Relations of A. Brademas

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

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**ACTION REQUIRED**

MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( _____ )
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( _____ )
REPLY FOR _____ ( _____ )
APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( _____ )
MEMO _____ TO _____ ..... ( _____ )
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ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... ( _____ )
CONCURRENCE ..... ( _____ )
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COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

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**NSC/S DISP INSTR**

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OR RECORD COMMENT:) _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

JUN 27 1973

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SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: _____ Yellow

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★ GPO: 1973—489-668

1239

FILE

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

SECRET (GDS) March 7, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal

SUBJECT: Egyptian Position on Khartoum Murders

So that you may see the full picture of the Egyptian posture during the Black September operation in Khartoum last weekend, these are the main elements:

1. In the early stages of the crisis, the Egyptians agreed to have the terrorists and hostages come to Cairo but said they would refuse permission if we wished. Foreign Minister Zayyat said Egypt had agreed because it seemed that the terrorists might have more confidence negotiating in a Cairo setting, but he cautioned that he could not assure any outcome and that all nations with nationals involved would have to share responsibility. As you know, the situation changed before this became a serious option. Egypt also cleared our flights to and from Sudan.

2. After the murders, we asked that the terrorists not be given asylum. Foreign Office Under Secretary Fahmy responded equivocally. He told Greene of his personal deep regrets and that he deplored the murders. He went on to express the hope that the US "at last" appreciated the difference between governments like Egypt's and fanatics like the terrorists in Sudan, and tried to develop an analogy between the current situation and last week's shbotdown of a Libyan liner which Greene rejected. He gave little hope of any public expression of position, and no assurances were given on whether Egypt would refuse asylum. The issue, of course, did not ultimately arise for Egypt. Greene was told privately that Heykal and Mahmud Riad had also shared their shock and dismay with each other.

3. Greene reported that Hafiz Ismail, returning from abroad, made gestures of sorrow and regret in front of greeting dignitaries and cameras.

4. Themes in Egypt's media have included: (1) The US condemns this tragedy and practically acquits Israel's "bloody hands" from last week's shootdown. (2) The US is hypocritical in "what it calls terrorism" since Israel can commit any crime. (3) The US should face the issue that Palestinian despair is the root cause. (4) Hussein should not execute the "Palestinians" he has in jail (i. e. Black September members).

One new twist is evolving in the media. Cairo press Wednesday carried straightforward factual accounts of Nimeri's strong speech Tuesday denouncing the murders and publicly condemning Fatah. Though it is too early to judge, US Interests Section Cairo feels this may mark the beginning of a turning point in Egypt's media handling since it amounts to unfriendly handling of the Palestinian movement.

In short, Egyptians as individuals have shown sympathy and regret and have deplored the murders. As a government, Egypt has remained silent and never had to face the difficult decision of how it would handle the terrorists if they sought asylum or freedom in Egypt. Their equivocal responses showed at least that no decision had been made on this point.

# NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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**SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION**

TO: PRES ____ KISSINGER X SCOWCROFT ____

FROM: ROGERS ____ RICHARDSON ____ SCHLESINGER ____ ELIOT ____ Saunders

UNCLAS ____ LOU ____ C ____ S X TS ____

LOG IN/OUT ONLY ____ NO FORN ____ EYES ONLY ____ CODEWORD ____ SENSITIVE ____ NODIS ____ EXDIS ____

SUBJECT: Egyptian position on Khartoum murders of Cleo Noel & Curtis Moore

REFERENCE: S/S ____ OTHER ____ NOT XEROXED ____

**DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT**

| INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION | ACTION | INFO | REC CY FOR |
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| OCEANS POLICY | | | |

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( )
REPLY FOR ____ ( )
APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( )
MEMO ____ TO ____ ..... ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
JOINT MEMO ..... ( )
REFER TO ____ FOR: ____ ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... ( )
CONCURRENCE ..... ( )
DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

**SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS**

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**NSC/S DISP INSTR**

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SPECIAL DISPOSITION) ____
OR RECORD COMMENT:) ____
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: ____

CROSS REF W/ ____ JOINED BY LOG # ____

SEE # ____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ✓

JUN 14 1973

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D ADS BY ____

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★ GPO: 1973-489-668

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

~~INFORMATION~~

SECRET (XGDS)

March 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal

SUBJECT: Summary of Ismail Conversations

Attached as you requested is a memo for the President developed from my earlier summary of conversation.

Peter has the initial summary if you need it.

XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET (XGDS)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET (SGDS-3-HAK)

INFORMATION

March 6, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: My Talks with Hafiz Ismail - Summary

This memorandum describes (1) Ismail's position on each of the main issues as it evolved over two days of talks and (2) the process he envisages over the coming months. In short, he did not change Egypt's position on any basic issue, but he seemed quite open-minded in considering fresh approaches.

Ismail's Position

A. Urgency of An Overall Settlement

Ismail began on the first day emphasizing the importance of a settlement in 1973. However, on the second day he outlined procedures which if followed through to their logical conclusion could take well beyond the end of 1973 to complete, although he would want agreement on fundamental principles of an agreement by this September (see description of procedures below).

He absolutely rejected an "interim settlement" and insisted that the fundamental issues of an overall settlement be addressed. But he readily agreed that the ideas represented in the idea of a partial withdrawal from the canal could be used as the opening phase of a broader process.

B. Long-term Objective

He spoke from the outset in terms of wanting to see develop a Middle East of strong, healthy, cooperative, independent states. He implied Israel could be among them if Israel recognized itself as a Middle Eastern state. A peace settlement could be a basis for normalization of relations, but that would take a long time. Normalization of relations would depend on, among other things, a refugee settlement.

C. Recognition of Israel

He said an Egypt-Israel agreement would establish a state of peace. This would end the state of war but would not be "full peace."

-- This agreement would provide a situation different from the Egypt-Israel relationship before 1967 in that it would: allow Israel free passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal; end the boycott on third-party goods; commit Egypt to prevent guerrilla operations from Egyptian soil and elsewhere to the extent possible; end Egypt's practice of adding a reservation clause when it signs multilateral agreements, saying that they do not apply to Israel; commit each side to non-intervention in each other's internal affairs, e.g. by radio.

-- This agreement would not include exchanging ambassadors, trade agreement, borders open for routine travel. Those steps would be characteristics of later normalization.

By the second day he volunteered that in the transitional period between the ending of the state of war and the achievement of full peace there could begin some practical normal contacts between Egyptians and Israelis developing out of day-to-day situations.

He was uncertain about the timing of recognition, whether it should be tied to signing of the Syrian and Jordanian agreements. He rather thought so, but this is one of the aspects he is giving further thought to.

D. Main Aspects of a Settlement

He began by saying very generally that there were two main aspects of a settlement:

-- The question of restoring Egyptian sovereignty over Egyptian territory. This required Israeli withdrawal to pre-war borders.

-- The issue of Palestinian rights. This problem should be reduced to the size of Arab and Jewish communities within the area of mandated Palestine deciding how to divide that territory and live together.

In response to my questions on the first day, he developed these points the second day along the following lines:

-- He spoke of the sovereignty problem in terms of reconciling Egypt's sovereignty with legitimate Israeli security concerns.

-- Egypt was prepared to let Hussein negotiate his own agreement with Israel, including border changes (even a security corridor down the Jordan River) but probably not major concessions in Jerusalem. Egypt would consider whatever Hussein worked out with the West Bank Palestinians as an internal Jordanian matter, not an Arab-Israeli matter.

-- Gaza's self-determination should be worked out under UN auspices. An Egypt-Israel agreement should contain these principles: (1) Israel should agree to withdraw in principle so that (2) Gazans could freely exercise their right of self-determination (3) under UN auspices. This would also have to be related to a Jordan settlement. Gaza could become part of Jordan if the Gazans wished.

-- A refugee settlement would have to be in accordance with UN resolutions (unlimited opportunity to return to Israel). This agreement might be worked out by the UN.

-- The question of a Syria-Israel settlement was more serious to Egypt than a Jordan-Israel settlement because Syria was a member of the Egypt-Syria-Libya confederation. A Syrian settlement had to be based on the same principles as Egypt's.

E. Meeting Israel's Security Concerns

Ismail began talking about meeting Israel's "legitimate" security concerns in conventional ways, including international guarantees and Egyptian peace commitments (spelled out in C above):

-- Demilitarized zones could vary in size on the two sides of the border. The Israeli zone could be symbolic. International observers would inspect these zones.

-- An international force could be stationed in areas of special importance like Sharm al-Shaikh.

-- There could be big-power guarantees.

On the second day, he indicated that he had not really considered what might be done if the issue of sovereignty and borders were dealt with separately from security arrangements. He said he thought there might be interim security arrangements at some points during a transitional period, but he would have to give more thought to this. For instance, he would consider whether there might be transitional security arrangement during the period between the end of the state of war and the advent of full peace. As he began to understand this proposition he said: "If the issues of territory and sovereignty could be put aside, we could be open-minded." This, of course, could be quite significant.

F. Settlement by Stages and Sectors

He felt a settlement could be reached by stages and sectors, but they had to be linked so as to lead to an overall settlement. There had to be a full settlement; Egypt could not accept a partial withdrawal "left hanging." Asked whether a Jordanian settlement could come before an Egyptian one, his view was that agreement first on the principles of an Egypt-Israel settlement would help to "start the motors in other places." He saw the Syrian and Jordanian negotiations running one step behind the Egyptian negotiations. Egypt could sign a separate agreement with Israel provided Syrian and Jordanian negotiations were then in train.

The Procedures Ismail Suggests

Two possible approaches were posed on the first day:

1. The U. S. and Egypt could work out the principles of an agreement and then present them to Israel. This procedure failed in the past, Ismail felt, because understandings between the U. S. and Egypt came apart when Israel objected.

2. The U. S. could listen to both Egypt and Israel and try to develop a position that would meet the reasonable interests of both sides.

On the second day, Ismail opened by saying that the latter approach above seemed better to him. Once the U. S. has developed a sound position and reached an understanding with Egypt, the U. S. had to stand by it and influence Israel to accept it.

He elaborated this process with some precision on the second day:

1. (A) The objective in the first stage would be to develop what he called the "heads of an agreement," that is, the fundamental principles of an agreement, which would then be worked out in further U.S.-Egyptian talks. He left it to the U.S. to recommend when Israel would be brought into the process. He began talking about completing this stage by the end of May, but later he seemed to be discussing this plus a partial withdrawl (next paragraph) by September 1.

1. (B) In the course of this first stage, it might be possible concurrently in a separate channel to work out a first stage of an Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal along the lines of the State Department's idea for an interim agreement. Also, a prisoner exchange might be possible.

2. The second stage in the negotiating process would begin after Israel had accepted the "heads of agreement." The objective in this stage would be to develop the "final provisions" of an agreement. These would detail the obligations of both sides and the phasing of carrying out the provisions of the agreement. This stage would involve the Israelis "more actively, less indirectly." He did not set a limit to the amount of time it would take to work through this stage.

3. The third stage would be implementation, and this too could take place in phases.

As Egypt and Israel move through the above stages, Syria and Jordan would be roughly one stage behind.

What was new in Ismail's presentation?

In its essential points this was the familiar Egyptian position unchanged. However, there seemed to be several new points of emphasis which might lend thmselves to development.

-- One of the two most interesting points was the prospect of a process that might stretch over some period. He seemed to be acknowledging, perhaps without having thought it through, that if there were a serious process, Egypt would not feel the need to set deadlines.

-- If Egypt were "open-minded" on special security arrangements through a transitional period before full peace is

reached, that could be quite significant. He promised to consider this.

-- An interim agreement might be useful if it paralleled progress toward an overall agreement.

-- Normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel. Although Ismail said this would take a long time, he spoke of normalization as being at the end of the road. If this could be developed concretely and related to steps in the settlement process, it could be useful in persuading Israel that Egypt would be willing to have a normal relationship.

-- Egypt has not publicly endorsed Hussein's plan for a United Arab Kingdom. Ismail seemed to say Egypt would pose no objection to Hussein's getting the West Bank back and granting self-determination to the Palestinians, thereby making the Palestinian problem apart from a refugee settlement an internal Jordanian matter.

-- Egypt has indicated before that it does not want Gaza but that it must remain Arab. More was said than previously about the mechanics (UN auspices with Egypt handling its negotiation) of achieving self-determination.

This, it seems to me, opens the possibility of letting State develop an interim agreement under our guidance while an overall agreement is discussed in this channel.

2/21/73

Secretariat

This file can be closed. Action was taken. Later follow-on action is being dealt with in memo under log no. 838-X.

HHS

Hal should make a check of press in light of Hussein + written understanding. /RD

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION 353

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) January 24, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: Middle East Policy--Getting a Hold on Decision-Making

The attached cable brings to attention the practical question of how you want to proceed toward decisions on next steps on the Arab-Israeli issue. I am sending you separately a memo on the substance of the decisions ahead. The problem today is the procedural one of how to assure fundamental decisions on real alternatives in the weeks ahead.

The cable that State has just sent to Cairo without clearance here represents their view of how to proceed. Our minister in Cairo is instructed to explain to the Egyptians on an informal basis the following views:

--Washington is not satisfied with the present situation in the Middle East and believes we must continue efforts to make progress toward a peace settlement.

--There is a general consensus in the USG that an interim Canal settlement is the best way to proceed. This is the "only proposition in sight that offers prospects of real progress at the present time."

--While the terms of a final peace settlement cannot be predetermined now, we do not think that our concept of an interim agreement is in its essentials at variance with President Sadat's. The USG views an interim agreement as an integral part of a negotiating process for the full and complete implementation of Resolution 242.

While these instructions break no new ground, the mere reiteration now of the point that pursuit of an interim agreement is the only hope of movement will be read in Cairo as reflecting a decision that has not yet been made. Sadat is expecting a new US initiative and, since Greene has just been in

XGDS-3
DECLAS-Impossible to determine.
BYAUTH-Via attached.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

Washington, the Egyptians are quite likely to conclude that this is the beginning of it.

We do not yet have a formal recommendation from Secretary Rogers, but one can deduce from the things that have been said over recent weeks and from past style that his recommendation will contain the following elements:

--a new formula for getting proximity talks started and

--a formal approach to the Israelis, probably backed by a letter from the President putting this formula to the Prime Minister for discussion.

We do not know how or when the Secretary will present his proposal -- whether he will send a memo to the President or bring it to him personally.

State's probable proposal represents one option, but since our next step will set the tone and approach for some time it should be considered carefully against other alternatives before we move. For one thing, we must consider that Sadat himself seems now to have concluded that the interim idea, which he himself raised, is a non-starter. We increasingly hear that he feels he made a serious mistake in offering a partial Canal agreement in early 1971. For another, we must be very careful in approaching the Israelis now so that we can keep them with us over the four-year course ahead. Repeating the style of past State Department initiatives may not be the best way to do this.

There is an alternative to the probable State approach which deserves a serious hearing. This alternative approach would differ in two main respects from the State approach:

1. Style: State will probably propose going to the Israelis with a fully worked out formula and then ask to discuss it. The alternative would be to go to the Israelis with a proposal to work out a formula, stating in general terms the main elements we feel would have to be included. We would then work with them to reduce the general proposition to writing in ways that meet Israeli concerns as much as possible. We would begin with quiet private talks, either with the

Prime Minister or her representative, and would avoid publicizing a new US initiative. The objective of this style of approach to the Israelis would be to avoid confrontation by not presenting a finished formula while still engaging in substantive discussion at the outset. This is principally a difference in style, but how we deal with Israel will be of great importance in determining whether we can contribute anything to a negotiating process. The argument for State's approach is that Israel has responded in the past only when confronted by a hard US position backed by the President. The argument for the alternative is that the hard approach has tended to produce confrontation (as in December-January 1969-70 and August 1970) and that perhaps a lower key approach would enhance the spirit of consultation and lessen the appearance of our trying to force something of our making on Israel.

2. Substance: The State approach is to try to get talks going on an interim agreement while avoiding the hard issue of territory which will have to be addressed in a final agreement. They will probably propose some formula for beginning talks on an interim agreement by which both sides would agree that no outcome is precluded in advance of negotiations. There is a strong argument for simply getting the process of negotiation started, and in any course that is followed some such formula will probably have to be used publicly because neither side will be able to handle hard final decisions politically at the outset. However, it is also true that Sadat may not be willing to enter talks unless he knows generally where he might hope to come out, and the Israelis will be very suspicious that we will push the Rogers Plan. There is an argument for saying simply that we feel that many elements of the Rogers Plan will warrant consideration in negotiations but that we cannot and will not impose them. But that approach may not satisfy either side.

There is an alternative which should be seriously considered because it at least may suggest some elaboration of the State approach. This alternative approach would face the issue of territory at the outset in private talks with the Israelis, and eventually with the Egyptians. This could be done in the form of the same kinds of general principles

that we discussed before the Moscow summit last May. Essentially, we might strive for an Israeli agreement not to preclude the restoration of Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai, provided that concrete security arrangements could be worked out. These could include the agreed stationing of Israeli troops at key positions for extended periods, as we discussed last spring. The advantage of concentrating on "restoration of sovereignty" would be to shift the focus from "withdrawal", thus opening the way for return of Egyptian civil authority while preserving an Israeli security presence. The argument against this, of course, is that it would force the Israeli government to face up to a difficult decision on the eve of a national election. It should be possible, though, to handle this in a number of ways. For instance, the President and Mrs. Meir -- or their representatives -- might agree on a position to be taken publicly only after the Israeli election, which could permit us to take some measures now in the confidence that they would not be at odds with Israeli policy.

The problem today is not to choose between these possible courses but to assure that there is thoughtful discussion of them before a choice is made. Cables such as the attached do not set a course irrevocably, but they do tend to point a direction and set style. Once again, a strong case can be made for not taking any steps until decisions are made. We are sending you separately a more substantive and less procedural memo on these decisions, but we wanted you to be aware of the procedural problem quickly.

Recommendations:

1. That you speak with Secretary Rogers and/or the President in an effort to reach understanding on how best to discuss these decisions and an understanding that no further actions be taken until those decisions are made.

2. That you ask Dick Campbell to set aside a few minutes in the next week to discuss with me how you would like to move both in terms of procedures and in terms of substance.

Approve _____ Not now _____

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

HAK read this and asked Scowcroft to call State.
HHS

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NODIS

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

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NODIS FROM SECRETARY

1. FYI. AS YOU RETURN TO CAIRO YOU WILL OF COURSE BE SEEING VARIOUS SENIOR GOE OFFICIALS WHO WILL BE LISTENING CAREFULLY FOR ANY HINTS OF POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS BY THE USG. THIS WILL REQUIRE SOME DELICATE HANDLING SINCE, AS YOU KNOW FROM YOUR CONSULTATIONS BACK HERE, WE HAVE REACHED NO CONCLUSIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE FUTURE M.E. PEACE EFFORTS. WE HAVE TWIN OBJECTIVES DURING THIS PERIOD: TO PERSUADE GOE TO KEEP DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS OPEN; AT SAME TIME, TO KEEP GOE FROM BUILDING UP IN ITS OWN MIND UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS.

2. YOUR CONSULTATIONS HERE PROVIDE A PEG TO TRY TO DO SOME QUIET MISSIONARY WORK ON BEHALF OF INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH EGYPTIANS ALREADY SURMISE IS LIKELY TO REMAIN FOCUS OF OUR POLICY. DURING PAST YEAR SADAT AND HIS ADVISORS HAVE STEADILY RETREATED FROM THIS CONCEPT UNDER CLOUD OF ALMOST PARANOID SUSPICION THAT US HAS "DISTORTED" SADAT'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL INTO SOME KIND OF "TRAP" FOR EGYPT. WE WANT EGYPTIANS TO SEE THAT, WHILE THEY CANNOT EXPECT TO HAVE THEIR CONCEPT OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENT PRECISELY FULFILLED (ANY MORE THAN ISRAELIS CAN THEIRS), ACCOMMODATION WHICH WE BELIEVE POSSIBLE GOES LONG WAY TOWARD MEETING ESSENTIAL EGYPTIAN INTEREST THAT INTERIM AGREEMENT NOT BECOME END IN ITSELF.

They want more than that

3. TALKING POINTS BELOW ARE DESIGNED WITH THESE OBJECTIVES IN MIND AND ALSO INCLUDE SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS AND THE US ROLE. YOU MAY DRAW UPON THEM AS YOU FEEL APPROPRIATE. WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD NOT PRESS FOR EARLY APPOINTMENTS, LEST YOU AWAKEN UNDUE EXPECTATIONS, BUT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FIRST OPPORTUNITIES THAT COME NATURALLY TO HAND. YOUR REMARKS SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT MOOD IN WASHINGTON AND CURRENT VIEWS US POLICY-MAKERS, NOT AS FORMAL DEMARCHE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS. END FYI.

4. BEGIN TALKING POINTS. DURING YOUR LEAVE YOU HAD USEFUL WEEK OF CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON AT THE

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NODIS/SECRET

Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET



DEPARTMENT WITH THOSE OFFICIALS WHO ARE CONCERNED WITH MIDDLE EAST POLICY, INCLUDING MEETING WITH SECRETARY ROGERS. YOU FOUND VIEW THAT US INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST REQUIRE CONTINUING ACTIVE US DIPLOMATIC ROLE IN SEARCH FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SC RES. 242.D ALTHOUGH THERE IS GRATIFICATION THAT BOTH SIDES PERCEIVE IT IN THEIR INTEREST TO MAINTAIN CEASEFIRE, WASHINGTON IS NOT SATISFIED WITH PRESENT SITUATION AND BELIEVES WE MUST CONTINUE EFFORT TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE SETTLEMENT. YOU FOUND, HOWEVER, THAT SENIOR US OFFICIALS WERE ALSO HEAVILY PREOCCUPIED WITH SITUATION IN VIETNAM AS WELL AS DOMESTIC MATTERS AND PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES.

5. ALTHOUGH WASHINGTON HAS CAREFULLY KEPT OTHER APPROACHES UNDER REVIEW, YOU FOUND A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT IDEA ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT SADAT IN HIS FEBRUARY 4, 1971 SPEECH REMAINS MOST FEASIBLE AVENUE FOR PROGRESS. THERE IS NO HIDDEN MOTIVE FOR THIS; IT IS SIMPLY THAT USG IS INTERESTED IN SEEING SOME TANGIBLE PROGRESS MADE, EVEN IF IT IS MODEST IN THE FIRST STAGE, RATHER THAN CONTINUE THE STERILE PATTERN OF THE LAST 25 YEARS OF SEEING THE PARTIES TALK ABOUT ABSOLUTE POSITIONS WITHOUT ANY CONCRETE RESULTS. INTERIM AGREEMENT AS STAGE IN STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH, IS ONLY PROPOSITION IN SIGHT THAT OFFERS PROSPECT OF REAL PROGRESS AT PRESENT TIME. WE WISH IT COULD BE OTHERWISE, BUT WE CANNOT BE HOPEFUL ABOUT TOTAL APPROACH TO OVERALL SETTLEMENT AT THIS TIME. IN OUR JUDGMENT, PARTIES ARE NOT PRESENTLY PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF FINAL SETTLEMENT TERMS - RECOGNITION AND DETAILED PEACE COMMITMENTS, SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDERS, JUSTICE FOR PALESTINIANS - WITH DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY NECESSARY TO OFFER ANY CONCEIVABLE HOPE OF RESOLUTION. WE SEE NOTHING ON HORIZON THAT IS LIKELY TO CHANGE THIS SITUATION EXCEPT IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME FIRST STEP THAT CREATES MOMENTUM TOWARD PEACE AND CHANGED PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING PROSPECTS FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT. IT IS PRECISELY THIS DYNAMIC THAT MAKES

do we want Green to say this to Egyptians?

INTERIM AGREEMENT ATTRACTIVE. ONLY REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE WE SEE IS INDEFINITE CONTINUATION OF STATUS QUO, WHICH WE WOULD REGRET BUT, QUITE FRANKLY, BELIEVE WOULD BE EVEN LESS IN INTEREST OF PARTIES THEMSELVES.

6. YOU FOUND US OFFICIALS REGRETFUL THAT OVER PAST YEAR

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MISCONCEPTIONS HAVE GROWN UP WITHIN GOE ABOUT WHAT USG MEANS WHEN IT SPEAKS OF "INTERIM AGREEMENT". GOE SEEMS TO HAVE PERSUADED ITSELF THAT INTERIM AGREEMENT IS EUPHEMISM FOR ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH NEW STATUS QUO WHICH WOULD FREEZE EXISTING SITUATION INDEFINITELY. FROM YOUR DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY YOU CAN ASSURE EGYPTIANS THIS IS DEFINITELY NOT U.S. CONCEPT. AS WE HAVE TOLD EGYPTIANS IN PAST WE ENVISAGE INTERIM AGREEMENT AS BEING FOLLOWED BY ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RES 242. IN OUR JUDGMENT THERE WOULD BE IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM FOR SUCH ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS ONCE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT CONCLUDED. WE RECOGNIZE THAT PREFERRED EGYPTIAN CONCEPT OF INTERIM AGREEMENT IS THAT IT BE A FIRST PHASE IN PRE-AGREED TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT INCLUDING TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. NEITHER THIS CONCEPT NOR ORIGINAL ISRAELI CONCEPT -- THAT INTERIM AGREEMENT SHOULD STAND COMPLETELY ON ITS OWN AND INVOLVE COMMITMENTS TO PERMANENT CEASEFIRE -- CAN BE PRECISELY FULFILLED. WE HAVE WORKED HARD ON THIS POINT AND WITH SOME SUCCESS, AS EVIDENCED BY PRIME MINISTER MEIR'S PUBLIC STATEMENT LAST SUMMER THAT INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD BE "TEMPORARY", LINES TO WHICH ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW UNDER SUCH AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE FINAL BORDERS IN PEACE SETTLEMENT, AND THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW TO SUCH FURTHER LINE AS MAY BE SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED TO IN CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS ON AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. (YOU SHOULD REMIND ZAYYAT SISCO WAS AUTHORIZED BY PM MEIR TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT SADAT IN AUGUST 1971 THESE TWO LATTER POINTS AS THE OFFICIAL GOI POSITION. THERE HAS BEEN NO ISRAELI BACKOFF FROM THIS POSITION). WHILE TERMS OF FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT CANNOT BE PRE-DETERMINED AT THIS STAGE, WE DO NOT THINK OUR CONCEPT OF INTERIM AGREEMENT IS IN ITS ESSENTIALS ALL THAT MUCH AT VARIANCE WITH PRESIDENT SADAT'S. LIKE EGYPTIANS, USG ENVISAGES INTERIM AGREEMENT AS INTEGRAL PART OF NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WHICH NEED NOT BE DIRECT OR FACE-TO-FACE, FOR FULL AND COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RES 242. AS NEW OPPORTUNITIES ARISE FOR EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES FOR NEGOTIATIONS, WE HOPE GOE WILL LOOK BEHIND MISCONCEPTIONS THAT HAVE ACCUMULATED AROUND INTERIM AGREEMENT PROPOSAL AND ONCE AGAIN UNEMOTIONALLY WEIGH ADVANTAGES IT OFFERS AGAINST DISADVANTAGES OF ALTERNATIVE COURSE INCLUDING PERPETUATION OF STATUS QUO.

7. THIS MAY ALSO BE OCCASION TO MAKE SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. IT HAS



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BEEN WELL-KNOWN THAT ISRAEL OVER THE YEARS HAS INSISTED ON FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE NOT ADOPTED THIS POSITION, EVEN THOUGH WE BELIEVE IT IS THE BEST MEANS, LARGELY IN DEFERENCE TO THE EGYPTIAN VIEW THAT THIS WAS NOT POLITICALLY FEASIBLE AND THAT IN ANY SUCH NEGOTIATION EGYPT FEELS IT WOULD FIND ITSELF AT A DISADVANTAGE SINCE ISRAEL IS IN OCCUPATION OF ITS TERRITORY. WHILE WE DO NOT AGREE WITH THIS JUDGMENT, WE ARE NOT URGING EGYPT TO ENGAGE IN FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS TIME, BUT WE WANT TO SHARE A JUDGMENT WITH THEM. WE KNOW THAT EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI CONCEPTS OF NEGOTIATIONS DIFFER. EGYPT HAS TENDED TO VIEW NEGOTIATIONS AS AN ARENA OF CAPITULATION. WE BELIEVE THIS IS GROSS UNDERESTIMATION OF EGYPT'S CAPACITY TO NEGOTIATE EFFECTIVELY AND TO ACHIEVE FAIR SETTLEMENT BY THIS MEANS. WHAT EGYPT HAS FAILED TO UNDERSTAND IN PAST IS THAT FOR ISRAEL VERY WILLINGNESS ON PART OF EGYPT TO ENGAGE IN FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATION IS MATTER OF MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE DEEPLY EMBEDDED IN ISRAELI PSYCHE. WILLINGNESS OF EGYPT TO SIT DOWN ACROSS TABLE WITH ISRAEL WOULD BE TAKEN BY ISRAELIS AS MOST DECISIVE AND CONCRETE INDICATION THAT IN FACT EGYPT WOULD BE WILLING TO WORK OUT SETTLEMENT WHICH OFFERS REAL HOPE FOR REASONABLE, MUTUAL, CO-EXISTENCE OVER COMING DECADES. IN OUR JUDGMENT, CONCESSIONS ON PART OF ISRAEL ARE MUCH MORE LIKELY IN CONTEXT OF FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATION THAN THEY ARE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THIRD PARTY PRESENCE. THIS IS CRUCIAL POINT WHICH WE FEEL EGYPT SHOULD PONDER. BUT IN DOING SO, WE WANT TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THIS IS EXPRESSION OF JUDGMENT, THAT WE ARE NOT PRESSING EGYPT TO AGREE TO FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS BUT THAT IT IS SOMETHING WHICH THEY THEMSELVES SHOULD WEIGH VERY CAREFULLY ON BASIS OF OUR JUDGMENT THAT THIS IS ROUTE THAT WOULD MOST LIKELY LEAD TO SATISFACTORY RESULTS FOR EGYPT. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT UN ROUTE, FOUR POWER ROUTE, HAVE BEEN TRIED AND FAILED AND DO NOT OFFER FRUITFUL AVENUE OF APPROACH. THE UN CONTEXT OFFERS THE SEMBLANCE OF ACTIVITY BUT UNFORTUNATELY IT DOES NOT OFFER A MEANINGFUL PROCESS. EGYPT SHOULD WEIGH THE REAL AGAINST THE UNREAL. WE SAY THIS NOT AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, BUT AS JUDGMENT THAT AS LONG AS ATTEMPTS ARE MADE IN UN CONTEXT ISRAEL WILL NOT PLAY AND NO SET OF OUTSIDE FORCES CAN FORCE THEM TO PLAY IN THAT ARENA.

so has interim settlement

8. FINALLY, AS TO U.S. ROLE IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, WE RECOGNIZE THERE HAS BEEN SOME LOSS OF CONFIDENCE AS OUR



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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET



RELATIONSHIPS HAVE ERODED OVER PAST 18 MONTHS. WE ARE NOT GOING TO PRESS OUR ROLE IF IT IS NOT WANTED. WE ARE FRANKLY PERPLEXED BY INCONSISTENT LINE WHICH IS COMING FROM CAIRO, WHICH IN ONE BREATH STRESSES THAT U.S. IS KEY IN BRINGING ABOUT SETTLEMENT AND THAT SOME NEW U.S. MOVE WOULD BE WELCOME, WHILE IN THE SAME BREATH STRESSES THERE IS NO CONTACT WITH U.S., THAT U.S. IS COMPLETELY ONE-SIDED, ANTHAT EGYPT HAS GIVEN UP ON U.S. WE BELIEVE PARTIES THEMSELVES ARE THE KEY BUT THAT U.S. IS INDEED SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IN SITUATION. WE APPRECIATE THAT THIS IS REFLECTION OF A DILEMMA WHICH IS FELT IN EGYPT. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT IN OUR JUDGMENT FOR EGYPT TO SET ASIDE THE QUESTION OF CREDIBILITY AND TRUST. ANY OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST WILL LEAD TO INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION THAT IT IS IN U.S. INTERESTS TO DO WHATEVER IT CAN TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BASED ON 242 BECAUSE THE PRESENT NO-WAR-NO-PEACE SITUATION IS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF STABILITY AND PROGRESS. THIS IS BASIC U.S. APPROACH. END TALKING POINTS.

9. WITH RESPECT CAIRO 192, WE AGREE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO MAKE THESE POINTS IF EGYPTIANS RAISE SUBJECT OF SECRETARY"S SPEECH. SINCE EGYPTIAN REACTION THUS FAR HAS BEEN UNOFFICIAL IN FORM OF PRESS PLAY, WE BELIEVE IT BEST NOT TO RAISE MATTER OURSELVES WITH SENIOR GOE OFFICIALS. IN GENERAL WE WANT TO MAINTAIN POSTURE THAT WHILE WE ARE READY AND WILLING TO RESPOND TO ANYTHING GOE HAS TO SAY TO US THROUGH ITS OFFICIALS, WE WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO DEBATE WITH CAIRO MEDIA.

10. XGDS-CATEGORY 3. ROGERS

NEA/EGY:MSTERNER
1/17/73 EXT 22365
S:THE SECRETARY

NEA:JJSISCO
S/S:MR. ELIOT

NEA:ALATHERTON

SECRET

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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EXDIS

FOR S/S PASS TO MR. SISCO FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: ATTENDANCE AT GENEVA CONFERENCE

1. WHEN WITH FAHMY THIS AFTERNOON, HE ASKED IF I WERE GOING TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. WHEN I TOLD HIM THAT WAS NOT THE PRESENT PLAN, HE EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND NOTED VINOGRADOV HAD INFORMED HIM HE WILL BE ON SOVIET DELEGATION. VINOGRADOV LEAVING FOR GENEVA ON SATURDAY. FAHMY THOUGHT I SHOULD ALSO BE ON US DELEGATION.

2. IN LIGHT SECRETARY'S EARLIER APPROVAL THAT I MIGHT GO BACK ON CONSULTATIONS FEW DAYS AFTER HIS VISIT, I HAD TENTATIVELY BOOKED RESERVATIONS FOR WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 17. IF SECRETARY WISHES ME TO CANCEL THOSE PLANS AND ATTEND GENEVA, I AM, OF COURSE, READY TO DO SO. DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS, I COULD THEN PERHAPS RETURN WASHINGTON AFTER CONFERENCE.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR MENTIONING THIS TO THE SECRETARY ON FLIGHT ALGIERS TO CAIRO AND LET ME KNOW HIS WISHES ON ARRIVAL HERE.
EILTS



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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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S E C R E T CAIRO 3250

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS

DEBORCHGRAVE STATES THAT THIS MORNING HE WAS CALLED URGENTLY TO MEET WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SAYED MARI'I. MARI'I SAID SADAT WANTED TO GIVE DEBORCHGRAVE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

A. THE THIRD ARMY WAS SURROUNDED AFTER REPEAT AFTER THE CEASEFIRE.

B. EGYPT RESPECTED AND BELIEVED THE "GUARANTEES AND ASSURANCES" GIVEN BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US.

C. EGYPT WARNED THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US THAT ISRAEL WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CEASEFIRE TO TRY TO CUT OFF THE THIRD ARMY, BUT BOTH SUPERPOWERS TOLD CAIRO NOT TO WORRY AS THE US HAD RECEIVED AN APPROPRIATE PLEDGE FROM ISRAEL THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE THE CASE.

D. THE CREDIBILITY OF BOTH SUPERPOWERS IS NOW ON THE LINE AS THE THIRD ARMY'S SURVIVAL HAS BEEN JEOPARDIZED BY AN ISRAELI DOUBLECROSS OF THE US.

E. THE TWO SUPERPOWERS NOWKNOW EXACTLY WHAT

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 03250 271036Z

ISRAEL IS TRYING TO DO TO THE THIRD ARMY, DESPITE THE CEASEFIRE.

F. THE ISRAELIS HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW WATER OR BLOOD PLASMA TO GET THROUGH TO THE THIRD ARMY.

G. MORE ISRAELI TROOPS ARE NOW MOVING THROUGH MITLA PASS TO REINFORCE THE SIEGE OF EGYPT'S THIRD ARMY.

H. THE SERIOUSNESS OF NIXON AND BREZHNEV WILL NOW BE JUDGED BY WHAT HAPPENS TO THE THIRD ARMY.

SMITH

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

73 OCT 27 AM 9:54

SECRET 078

SITUATION ROOM

2

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03249 270840Z

11
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00

NSAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00 /031 W
---------- 094899

Z P 270830Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4123
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R ET CAIRO 3249

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR MOPS EG IS PINT
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN VIEW OF THIRD ARMY SITUATION

REF CARIO 3248

1. LAST NIGHT I SPENT THREE HOURS TALKING TO SAAD EL SARKI OF ARAB LEAGUE, CAIRO. EL SARKI, A FORMER POLICE GENERAL, IS WELL LOCKED IN TO OVERALL EGYPTIAN SITUATION AND PERSONALLY A VERY MODERATE, REASONABLE MAN. IN HIS LONG CONVERSATION HE SUBSTANTIATED ALMOST COMPLETELY OUR PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION REPORT GIVEN IN REFTEL. TOWARD THE END OF THE EVENING AND IN IMPASSIONED TONES, HE ASKED WHY THE ISRAELIS MUST STEAL VICTORY FROM THE ARABS AND AGAIN MAKE THEM FEEL THE STING OF DEFEAT? HE SAID IT COULD NOT HAPPEN, MUST NOT HAPPEN, AND WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN AND EGYPTIANS WOULD FIGHT WITH EVERYTHING AT THEIR DISPOSAL TO PREVENT IT.

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 03249 270840Z

2. WE BELIEVE THAT EL SARKI WAS VOICING A FEELING THAT HAS HIGH CURRENCY AMONGST THE TOP MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP. UNLESS THE PRESSURE ON THE THIRD ARMY IS STOPPED AND FOOD AND WATER SUPPLIES ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM QUICKLY, THEIR IS THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF A FULL RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING AND DESTRUCTION OF THE CONDITIONS WHICH NOW EXIST FOR A POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT.
SMITH

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 683

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03243 261529Z

51
ACTION SS-30

02

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

087364

73 OCT 26 PM 9:36
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

R 261025Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4116
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T CAIRO 3243

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEW ON CAUSES AND TIMING OF EGYPTIAN DECISION TO RESUME HOSTILITIES

1. DEPUTY TASS DIRECTOR LEO YEDRASHNIKOV, A SUSPECTED RIS OFFICER, HAS TOLD US THAT SADAT MADE DECISION TO OPEN HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL IN EARLY AUGUST. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID SOVIETS HAD VERY CAREFULLY CHECKED THEIR OWN RECORDS TO DETERMINE ACTUAL DATE OF DECISION. HE SAID THAT SOVIET EMBASSY IN CAIRO HAD RECEIVED SOME INDICATIONS IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER THAT SADAT WAS PREPARING FOR ANOTHER FIGHT, BUT WERE NOT ABLE TO DRAW THESE TOGETHER INTO COHERENT PICTURE UNTIL THE END OF SEPTEMBER. MOREOVER, SOVIET EMBASSY HAD NOT BELIEVED THAT RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING WAS AT ALL LIKELY.

2. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT, USING 20/20 HINDSIGHT, SOVIETS HAD PUT TOGETHER PICTURE OF WHO HAD BEEN INFORMED OF GOE DECISION TO RESUME WARFARE. HE STATED THAT FEISAL WAS

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INFORMED OF PLAN RELATIVELY EARLY IN THE GAME. SADAT HAD DISCUSSED PLAN WITH HIM DURING HIS VISIT TO JIDDA ON AUGUST 23, AND HAD IN FACT BEEN ENCOURAGED BY SAUDI MONARCH. HUSSEIN WAS GENERALLY AWARE THAT EGYPT WAS PREPARING FOR WAR, BUT WAS NOT INFORMED OF WHEN IT WOULD OCCUR. HE DISCUSSED DECISION WITH SADAT DURING TRIPARTITE MEETINGS IN CAIRO ON SEPTEMBER 10-12 AND WAS ENJOINED TO SILENCE. HVEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT HUSSEIN WAS TAKEN BY SURPRISE ON DAY WAR BROKE OUT, SINCE HE BELIEVED IT WOULD TAKE PLACE LATER.

3. WITHIN THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, SECRET WAS HELD VERY TIGHTLY AMONG SMALL GROUP OF ADVISORS SURROUNDING SADAT. THESE WERE WAR MINISTER AHMED ISMAIL, INTERIOR MINISTER SALEM AND ASU FIRST SECRETARY HAFEZ GHANEM. HEYKAL WAS BROUGHT INTO IT AFTER HE RETURNED TO SADAT'S GRACES AT THE END OF AUGUST. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT HAFEZ ISMAIL WAS OPPOSED TO WAR FROM START; HE WAS STRONGLY PRO-AMERICAN AND BELIEVED THAT POLICY OF RAPPROCHEMENT WITH WEST WAS WORKING IN EGYPT'S FAVOR.

4. ON OCTOBER 5, SADAT HELD FULL CABINET MEETING TO REVEAL THAT ON FOLLOWING DAY EGYPT WOULD GO TO WAR. DURING DISCUSSION WHICH TOOK PLACE, MOST OF THOSE PRESENT APPROVED. VICE-PRESIDENT SHAFEI AND HAFEZ ISMAIL WERE OPPOSED. VICE-PRESIDENT FAWZI CONTRIBUTED LITTLE TO THE DISCUSSION.

5. YEDRASHNIKOV CONCLUDED THAT SOVIETS THEMSELVES WERE NOT AWARE OF DANGER OF SITUATION UNTIL END OF SEPTEMBER, AND DID NOT KNOW DEFINITELY THAT SADAT WAS ABOUT TO RESUME WAR UNTIL OCTOBER 3, WHEN VINOGRADOV SAW SADAT.

6. REGARDING CAUSES OF WAR, YEDRASHNIKOV SAID SOVIETS BELIEVED IT TO HAVE BEEN FORCED ON SADAT BY INTERNAL PRESSURES. AMONG THESE WERE WIDESPREAD RESENTMENT AT SHORTAGES AND PRICE INCREASES OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS, FEARS IN GOE OF CONTINUED STUDENT DISTURBANCES WHEN UNIVERSITIES, AND GENERAL MALAISE ABOUT POLITICAL SITUATION. YEDRASHNIKOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THESE REASONS SEEMED INSUBSTANTIAL ALMOST TO THE POINT OF WHIMSY, BUT ADDED THERE SEEMED NO OTHER PROXIMATE CAUSE.
SMITH


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WH

SECRET 882

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03245 261221Z

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53
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 W
---------- 085616

O 261120Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4118
INFO ACTOBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2727
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T CAIRO 3245

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY

REF: DAO TEL AVIV 1965 OCT 73M

1. REFTEL DESCIRBES ISOLATION OF EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY. AT SAME TIME IT RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS WHICH HAVE DIRECT BEARING ON US POLICY IN AREA.

2. PRIMARY QUESTION IS WHETHER ISRAEL INTENDS TO DESTROY THIRD ARMY AND THEREBY REGAIN CONTROL OF AREA IT OCCUPIES TO EAST OF CANAL. IT MAY NOT. NEVERTHELESS, ZEIRA'S STATEMENT ABOUT SHOOTING DOWN ANY AIRCRAFT OR HELICOPTERS LANDING OR TAKING OFF FROM THIRD ARMY AREA, AND HIS INFO THAT IDF HAS CUT WATER PIPELINES SAME AREA, SUGGESTS THAT ISRAELIS ARE TRYING TO FORCE THIRD ARMY TO SURRENDER OR TO ATTEMPT ANOTHER BREAKOUT WHICH IDF WOULD THEN USE TO CRUSH IT.

3. ASIDE FROM IMPLICATIONS OF PRESENT SITUATION FOR CEASE-FIRE, DESTRUCTION OR SURRENDER OF THIRD ARMY COULD WELL IMPOSE ON EGYPT A MENTALITY OF DEFEAT SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 03245 261221Z

HAS HELD IT FROM NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL FOR THE PAST SIX AND A HALF YEARS. IT WILL, MOREOVER, PLACE MORE PRESSURE ON SADAT'S PERSONAL POSITION.
SMITH

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

73 OCT 24 PM 5 22

SECRET 669

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03223 241151Z

2/3

51
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W
---------- 063173

O 240850Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4103

S E C R E T CAIRO 3223

STADIS//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG UR
SUBJECT: REPORT OF KOSYGIN'S RETURN TO CAIRO

WE HAVE RECEIVED REPORT FROM USINT SOURCE THIS MORNING THAT KOSYGIN ARRIVED FROM DAMASCUS OCTOBER 23. SOURCE STATES KOSYGIN'S PURPOSE IN DAMASCUS WAS TO PERSUADE SYRIANS TO ACCEPT CEASEFIRE.SMITH

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 114

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03209 230726Z

11
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 USSS-00

DODE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
---------- 051596

O R 230710Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4095
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USCINCEUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHLFT

S E C R E T CAIRO 3209

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR EG GR
SUBJECT: ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEPARTURE OF AMERICANS IN EGYPT

1. OUR ESTIMATE OF CURRENT SITUATION HERE PROMPTS US TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS NO LONGER NECESSARY FOR M.S. KNOSSOS TO REMAIN ON STANDBY FOR POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF AMERICAN RESIDENTS IN EGYPT. THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE KNOSSOS WOULD BE READY IF NEEDED WAS OF CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE IN MAINTAINING OUR STANDFAST POSITION.

2. WE DEEPLY APPRECIATE EVERYONE'S EFFORT AND COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY AMEMBASSY ATHENS, IN ASSISTING US WITH AMERICAN TOURISTS EVACUATION AND PREPARING FOR POSSIBLE AMERICAN RESIDENT EVACUATION.
SMITH


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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 318

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03200 211400Z

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45
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

NSAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00 /031 W
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O P 211320Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4089
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AME BASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR PRIORITY
CINCUSNAVEUR PRIORITY
COMSIXTHFLEET PRIORITY

S E C R E T CAIRO 3200

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR EG GR
SUBJECT: ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEPARTURE OF AMERICANS
IN EGYPT

MOSCOW FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

1. SPANISH AMBASSADOR ALABART HAS JUST SEEN ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER FAHMY REGARDING SECURITY OF AMCITS IN EGYPT, WHICH SUBJECT HE RAISED YESTERDAY. FAHMY TOLD ALABART: (A) NO HARM WOULD COME TO AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN EGYPT. GOE WOULD GUARANTEE THIS. (B) MILITARY SITUATION WAS GOOD. ISRAELIS HAD MADE SOME PENETRATION WEST OF CANAL, BUT THIS WAS NOT A PROBLEM. (C) DECISION OF VARIOUS NATIONAL COMMUNITIES IN EGYPT TO DEPART WAS MATTER FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS, AND GOE HAD NO PARTICULAR COMMENT ON IT.

2. ALABART STATED FAHMY APPEARED TOTALLY CONFIDENT OF

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 03200 211400Z

MILITARY SITUATION. ALABART COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW, IF EGYPTIAN MILITARY POSITION WAS DISINTERGRATING, FAHMY (AND GHORBAL AND SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR WITH WHOMHE HAS SPOKEN IN PAST 24 HOURS) COULD RADIATE SUCH OPTIMISM.

3. IT COMES DOWN TO QUESTION OF WHOM TO BELIEVE: ISRAELIS OR EGYPTIANS? WHATEVER THE TRUTH MAY BE, WE MUST TAKE THE MOST PRUDENT POSITION AND ACCEPT WHAT ISRAELIS SAY UNTIL THERE IS POSITIVE EVIDENCE TO CONTRARY.

4. THEREFORE BELIEVE BEST COURSE IS TO RECHARTER KNOSSOS IMMEDIATELY AND ORDER IT TO SAIL FOR VICINITY OF CRETE FOR POSSIBLE ONWARD TRIP ALEXANDRIA FOR BOARDING OF AMCITS.

5. WE ARE NOT NOW RECOMMENDING EVACUATION. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW TEL AVIV AND OTHER REPORTS CLOSELY IN ORDER TO DECIDE WHETHER PARTIAL EVACUATION IS CALLED FOR OR WHETHER WE CAN CONTINUE TO RECOMMEND THAT AMERICAN COMMUNITY STANDFAST.

6. AT PRESENT, THERE HAS BEEN VIRUTALLY NO CHANGE IN SECURITY SITUATION IN CAIRO.

7. MOST IMPORTANT JOB NOW IS TO TIE DOWN KNOSSOS FIRMLY.
SMITH

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 548

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03192 201706Z

51 15
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
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O 201055Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4082
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T CAIRO 3192

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS PINT EG
SUBJECT: ABSENCE OF ALARM WITHIN GOE

1. EVERY INDICATION WE HAVE HAD THUS FAR IS THAT GOE POLITICIANS ARE COMMUNICATING NO SENSE OF UNEASE AT DEVELOPING MILITARY SITUATION. WE HAVE SPOKEN WITH CORRESPONDENTS AND DIPLOMATS WHO SAW GHORBAL, HEYKAL AND ISMAIL FAHMY LATE YESTERDAY. DE BORCHGRAVE SAW HEYKAL THIS MORNING. IN ALL CASES, THESE EGYPTIANS HAVE GIVEN NO SIGN THAT THEY BELIEVE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION IS DETERIORATING.

2. THIS MAY MEAN THAT EHY KNOW WHAT SITUATION IS AND ARE SIMPLY KEEPING A STIFF UPPER LIP; OR THAT THEY REMAIN OPTIMISTIC AS TO OUTCOME; OR THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING TOLD THE TRUTH BY THEIR OWN MILITARY.

3. IT SEEMS IMPROBABLE THAT BOTH HEYKAL AND THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER ARE NOT AWARE OF SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS, LATTER POSSIBILITY IS REINFORCED SOMEWHAT BY REPORT FROM USINT SOURCE THAT EGYPTIAN MILITARY COMMAND HAS INFORMED

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

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MINISTRY OF INTERIOR THAT YESTERDAY'S ACTION INVOLVED NO MORE THAN 50 ISRAELI TANKS WHICH HAD BEEN SURROUNDED AND CONTAINED BY NIGHTFALL.
SMITH

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET 995

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03188 201112Z 02

13
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W
---------- 036119

O 200855Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 4079

S E C R E T CAIRO 3188

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR EG
SUBJECT: E AND E PLANNING

REF: ATHENS 7331

PLEASE INFORM TOTAL CAPACITY OF KNOSSOS.
SMITH

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

SECRET 993

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W
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O 200835Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4077
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
73 OCT 21 AM 11:45

S E C R E T CAIRO 3187

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJECT: E AND E PLANNING

REF: STATE 207763 (NOTAL); CAIRO 3046 (NOTAL)

1. CAIRO REFTEL (OF OCTOBER 11) STATES THAT EARLIER SUCCESS OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY CAMPAIGN HAD OBVIATED NEED FOR US TO SCAPEGOAT FOR EGYPTIAN FAILURE. REFTEL CONTINUED THAT SECURITY SITUATION REGARDING RESIDENT AMERICANS IN EGYPT WOULD CHANGE IF ISRAELIS USED DEEP PENETRATION TECHNIQUES AGAINST CAIRO AREA OF CIVILIAN TARGETS IN EGYPT, OR SPECIFIC ACTIONS BY USG GAVE CAUSE FOR EGYPTIANS TO REACT MORE STRONGLY TO AMERICAN PRESENCE.

2. WE HAVE NO REASON TO ALTER THIS ESTIMATE OF WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN. WE WOULD ONLY ADD THAT AT MOMENT, IT IS NOT WIDELY KNOWN IN EGYPT JUST HOW SERIOUS ISRAELI PENETRATION TO WEST OF CANAL IS. PRESS ONLY CARRIES STORIES OF CONTINUING BATTLES AND SOME ISRAELI INFILTRATION. ANTI-US

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SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 05187 201111Z

TONE IN PRESS HAS PICKED UP BUT NOT ALARMINGLY SO YET, ONLY A LITTLE. OBVIOUSLY THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH COULD CHANGE VERY RAPIDLY IF MILITARY SITUATION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE. DEPARTMENT MUST REALIZE THAT WE ARE UNABLE TO JUDGE PROGRESS OF WAR FROM CAIRO, HOWEVER, AND WE THEREFORE REQUEST THAT DEPARTMENT PROVIDE US WITH BRIEF ESTIMATE BY NIACT IMMEDIATE CABLE AT PERIODIC INTERVALS ON (A) DEPTH OF ISRAELI PENETRATION AND - IF POSSIBLE - (B) ISRAELI INTENTIONS; SPECIFICALLY, IS CAIRO THEIR OBJECTIVE?

3. WE ARE THIS MORNING INFORMING SPANISH AMBASSADOR ALABART (WHO HAS JUST RETURNED) IN GENERAL TERMS OF EXTENT OF ISRAELI PENETRATION AND SHALL ASK HIM TO CONTACT FOREIGN MINISTRY ABOUT ITS VIEWS ON SITUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS IN EGYPT.

4. APPRECIATE ASSISTANCE WITH KNOSSOS.
SMITH

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SECRET 808

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W
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O P 200830Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4076
USCINCEUR PRIORITY
CINCUSNAVEUR PRIORITY
COMSIXTHFLEET PRIORITY

S E C R E T CAIRO 3186

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR EG
SUBJECT: E & E PLANNING

1. IF EVACUATION BY AIR DIRECTLY FROM CAIRO REMAINS UN-
FEASBILE, AND MILITARY OPERATIONS CREATE A SITUATION UNDER
WHICH OUR PRIME EVACUATION ALTERNATIVE (BOAT FROM ALEXANDRIA)
WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE, WE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO CONSIDER THE
OVERLAND BUS TO BENGHAZI ALTERNATIVE TO EVACUATE APPROXI-
MATELY 1000 AMERICAN RESIDENTS FROM EGYPT.

2. SO THAT WE CAN MAKE BEST POSSIBLE DECISION, WE WOULD
APPRECIATE INFORMATION ON LAST WEEK'S AMERICAN TOURIST
EXIT FROM EGYPT VIA BUS TO BENGHAZI. WHAT PROBLEMS, IF
ANY, DID THEY ENCOUNTER? DID THEY ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES
WITH PASSPORTS/VISAS OR LIBYAN BORDER, CUSTOMS OR OTHER
AUTHORITIES? WHAT GOL TAXAS OR DUTIES, EZC., DID TOURISTS
HAVE TO PAY WHEN LEAVING LIBYA? WAS THERE AN ACCUMULATION
OF TOURIESTS IN BENGHAZI WAITING FOR AIR TRANSPORT OUT?
WERE HOTEL ACCOMMODATION IN SHORT SUPPLY?

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PAGE 02 CAIRO 03186 200950Z

3. IF BUS TO BENGHAZI ALTERNATIVE BECOMES NECESSARY, WHAT SUPPORT, IF ANY, COULD AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PROVIDE? UNDER SITUATION WHERE YOU TOO MIGHT BE EVACUATING, WOULD EMBASSY LOCAL EMPLOYEES BE AVAILABLE IN BENGHAZI TO ASSIST AMERICANS EVACUATING FROM EGYPT? DOES USG OWN PROPERTY IN BENGHAZI SUITABLE FOR HOUSING AMERICANS FOR SHORT PERIOD OF TIME?

4. ASSUMING A DETERIORATING MILITARY SITATION FOR EGYPTIANS AND ARABS IN GENERAL (WITH PERHAPS EVEN DIRECT LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT), WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL MOOD OF GOL AND LIBYANS IN GENERAL IN RELATION TO ALLOWING AMERICANS TO EVACUATE THROUGH BEN-GHAZI.

5. FOR ROME AND TRIPOLI: WE UNDERSTAND FROM ALITALIA REP HERE THAT ALITALIA (WHICH HAS REGUALR SERVICES TO LIBYA) COULD CHARTER AIRCRAFT ON 48 HOURS NOTICE. COULD A US AIRLINE OBTAIN LANDING RIGHTS AT BENGHAZI FRO CHARTERS? WE ESTIMATE THAT IT WOULD TAKE 48 -72 HOURS FROM EVACUATION DECISION BEFORE FIRST BUSES WOULD ARRIVE AT BENGHAZI.
SMITH

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 600

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03172 182000Z 2

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 W
---------- 014417
O 181905Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4059
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
USCINCEUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLEET

S E C R E T CAIRO 3172

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR EG
SUBJECT: E & E PLANNING

REF: (A) CAIRO 3140; (B) STATE 204191

1. WE MUST RELY UPON THE DEPARTMENT FOR AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL/MILITARY SITUATION AS IT AFFECTS OUR POSITION HERE. FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT THINGS COULD BE TAKING A TURN FOR EITHER THE BETTER OR THE WORSE. IF FOR THE WORSE, WE MUST ANTICIPATE EVACUATION OF AMERICAN RESIDENTS FROM CAIRO EITHER AT GOE'S REQUEST OR ON OUR RECOMMENDATION TO THE DEPARTMENT. WE SEE OUR DECISION TO EVACUATE COMING PRIMARILY FROM MOUNTING ANXIETY WITHIN AMERICAN RESIDENT COMMUNITY CAUSED BY:

(A) INCREASED PHYSICAL DANGER DUE TO WAR ESCALATION (I.E., ISRAELI AIR OR MISSILE ATTACKS IN CAIRO AREA AND/OR ISRAELI GROUND ADVANCES ACROSS SUEZ CANAL);

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PAGE 02 CAIRO 03172 182000Z

(B) PERCEIVED PERSONAL DANGER CAUSED BY INCREASED ANTI-AMERICAN TONE IN EGYPTIAN NEWS MEDIA AND/OR POSSIBLY ISOLATED ANTI-AMERICAN ACTS BY PALESTINIANS OR LESS SOPHISTICATED ELEMENTS OF EGYPTIAN SOCIETY; OR
(C) EVACUATION OF MAJORITY OF OTHER NON-ARAB RESIDENTS.

2. AT PRESENT, FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT ITEM (C) APPEARS TO OFFER A POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING TO POINT WHERE WE WILL BE OBLIGED TO RECOMMEND EVACUATION. ITEM (A) CAN ONLY BE ACCURATELY ASSESSED BY THE DEPARTMENT IN LIGHT OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS AND PLANNED ACTIONS.

3. CONCERNING ITEM (C), A FEW AMERICAN RESIDENTS--PEOPLE RECENTLY ARRIVED IN EGYPT OR WITH EXTENUATING REASONS FOR GOING--WILL DEPART EGYPT TOMORROW WITH AMERICAN TOURISTS BOUND FOR PIRAEUS. AMERICAN RESIDENTS HAVE NOTED WITH GOOD HUMOR THAT CERTAIN EAST EUROPEAN NATIONALS HAVE DEPARTED. SOME BECAME SLIGHTLY CONCERNED WHEN THE SWEDES AND GERMANS WERE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO EVACUATE. TODAY, MORE AMERICANS BECAME CONCERNED WHEN THEY HEARD CANADIANS "HAD DECIDED TO EVACUATE." WHILE CANADIAN EMBASSY IS SAYING THEY HAVE ONLY ADVISED WOMEN WITH SMALL CHILDREN TO DEPART EGYPT, CANADIAN STUDENTS AT CAC ARE TELLING AMERICAN CO-STUDENTS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN ORDERED OUT. PARTIAL CANADIAN DEPARTURE IS PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE BECAUSE AMERICANS ARE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THEM IN BUSINESS, SCHOOL AND SOCIALLY. IF OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ELECT THIS ROUTE, AND PRESSURE WITHIN AMERICAN COMMUNITY BEGINS TO MOUNT RAPIDLY, OR FACTORS (A) AND (B) COME INTO PLAY, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO EVACUATE SWIFTLY.

4. IN MY VIEW, THE FIRST PRECEPT WE SHOULD ACCEPT IN SUCH A SITUATION IS THAT WE MUST RELY AS MUCH AS POSSIBLY ON OURSELVES AND USG AGENCIES IN EXECUTING AN EVACUATION. (WE KNOW NOW IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO RELY ON GOE MINISTRY OF TOURISM, EGYPTIAN TRAVEL AGENTS, LONDON INSURANCE COMPANIES ON SUNDAY, GOG, GREEK SAILORS, ETC.)

5. THE SECOND PRECEPT IS, ONCE THE DECISION IS MADE, TO EVACUATE AS SIMPLY, QUICKLY AND COMPACTLY AS POSSIBLE. MIND-



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


*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 03172 182000Z

FUL OF THE TWO PRECEPTS, I PROPOSE THAT WE CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS ON A DEPARTURE BY SEA FROM ALEXANDRIA.

6. IF GOE WOULD ALLOW, BEST METHOD OF TRANSPORTATION WOULD BE AN MSTS SHIP IF ONE IS AVAILABLE. AN MSTS SHIP IS PREFERABLE TO ANY SIXTH FLEET TRANSPORT SHIP BECAUSE IT HAS NO MILITARY FUNCTIONS AND IS EQUIPPED TO HANDLE LARGE NUMBERS OF PASSENGERS. I DO NOT KNOW IF GOE WOULD PERMIT AN MSTS SHIP OR ANY OTHER US NAVY VESSEL TO LAND IN ALEXANDRIA. NEVERTHELESS, WE RECALL THAT INJUNE OF 1970, EVACUATION AIRCRAFT ARRIVED IN AMMAN UNDER AUSPICES OF THE ICRC (WITH APPROPRIATE RED CROSS PAINTED ON THEIR TAILS) AND BELIEVE THAT SIMILAR ARRANGEMENT WITH MSTS VESSEL MAY BE WORTH CONSIDERING.

7. ALTERNATIVELY, AMERICAN FLAG PASSENGER LINERS MAY BE AVAILABLE, OR ANOTHER GREEK SHIP--PERHAPS EVEN THE KNOSSOS ITSELF--MIGHT BE USED. THE IDEA OF A SPANISH SHIP MAY ALSO BE WORTH CONSIDERING SINCE SPANISH GOVERNMENT HAS A SPECIAL JOB IN PROTECTING US INTERESTS HERE. THE GREAT PROBLEM WITH THIS IS THAT IF THE WAR GETS WORSE AND/OR ALEXANDRIA HARBOR IS BOMBED, GOG AND GREEK SHIP OWNERS WHO WERE STINTINGLY COOPERATIVE IN GETTING TOURISTS OUT OF EGYPT MAY BE UNWILLING TO PUT SHIPS INTO ALEXANDRIA, WHATEVER THE INDUCEMENTS. IF WE ARE OBLIGED TO USE OTHER THAN AN AMERICAN FLAG SHIP, WE MUST BE CERTAIN THAT THE CREW IS ADEQUATELY COMPENSATED, FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE MISSION AND IS COMMITTED TO IT.

8. WE THEREFORE REQUEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT TAKE FOLLOWING ACTION:

(A) INVESTIGATE AVAILABILITY OF MSTS VESSEL FOR SOONEST DEPARTURE TO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, AND OF SECURING RED CROSS OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL COVER FOR ITS USE; AND

(B) IF THIS SHOWS NO PROMISE BY COB FRIDAY, OF CHARTERING VESSEL CAPACITY FOR AT LEAST 800 PERSONS AND HAVING IT AVAILABLE TO ACCOMMODATE EVACUATION FROM ALEXANDRIA ON 18-24 HOURS' NOTICE AT ANY TIME DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. VESSEL COULD AWAIT WORD FROM VICINITY OF CRETE OR CYPRUS OR EVEN REMAIN BERTHED AT LIMASSOL AS LONG AS IT COULD

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SECRET

PAGE 04 CAIRO 03172 182000Z

DEPART ON VERY SHORT NOTICE.

9. IF DEPARTMENT ACCEPTS ABOVE PLAN, WE BELIEVE SAFEHAVEN SHOULD LOGICALLY BE ATHENS, INSTEAD OF ROME AS SHOWN IN REF B.
SMITH

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 864

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03167 181337Z

19

45
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 ISO-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 /031 W
010871

O 181250Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4054
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T CAIRO 3167

STADIS//////////////////////////

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN MILITARY SITUATION

1. TO ALL INDICATIONS, BATTLE WHICH OCCURRED THROUGHOUT OCTOBER 17 AND INTO TODAY IN CENTRAL SECTOR OF CANAL'S EAST BANK IS OF MAJOR PROPORTIONS AND OF CONSIDERABLE COST TO BOTH SIDES. IT MAY ALSO BE BEGINNING OF TRUE TEST OF LAND POWER IN SINAI.

2. CAIRO PRESS REPORTS OF VIOLENT CLASHES BETWEEN ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN ARMOR ARE REINFORCED BY REPORT FROM USINT SOURCE THAT DURING COURSE OF OCTOBER 17 EGYPTIAN ARMY SUFFERED LOSS OF 86 TANKS (WE NOTE IDF TOTALS EGYPTIAN LOSSES ON OCTOBER 17 AS 90-100 TANKS). SOURCE HAS INFORMED US THAT EGYPTIANS SUFFERED 630 MILITARY KILLED AND 780 WOUNDED AND, ALTHOUGH SOURCE DID NOT SAY WHETHER THESE WERE TOTAL EGYPTIAN MILITARY CASUALTIES OR REPRESENTED ONLY THOSE FROM FRONT, CERTAINLY LARGEST LOSS WAS REGISTERED IN ISMAILIA SECTOR.

3. SOURCE HAS ALSO STATED THAT IN CENTRAL SECTOR, EGYPTIAN ARMY SUFFERED A LOSS OF SOME KILOMETERS. IN THIS REGARD, EGYPTIAN MILITARY SPOKESMAN WAS REPORTED THIS MORNING BY AKHBAR AS HAVING STATED THAT EGYPTIAN FORCES HAD PENETRATED

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

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TO DISTANCE OF 16 KILOMETERS INSIDE SINAI. REFERRING TO SOURCE'S EARLIER INFORMATION THAT EGYPTIANS OCCUPIED POSITIONS 20 KM DEEP OPPOSITE ISMAILIYYA THIS SUGGESTS A MINIMUM LOSS OF FOUR KILOMETERS IN THIS SECTOR AS OF YESTERDAY EVENING.

4. THERE ARE OTHER INDICATIONS THAT THINGS DID NOT GO WELL FOR EGYPTIANS ON OCTOBER 17. THROUGHOUT THE DAY ONLY ONE COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED, AND THAT LATE IN EVENING. TODAY, OCTOBER 18, THERE HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN NO OTHER MILITARY ANNOUNCEMENTS. FINALLY, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY NBC TV CORRESPONDENT, WHO WAS SCHEDULED TO GO TO SUEZ FRONT TODAY, THAT GOE INFORMATION DEPARTMENT LAST NIGHT TOLD HIM ALL REQUESTS FOR VISITS TO FRONT WERE BEING POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

5. PICTURE WE ARE GETTING IS THAT EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELI FORCES HAVE BEEN LOCKED IN MAJOR ARMORED BATTLE SINCE YESTERDAY MORNING, AND THAT OFFENSIVE HAS BEGUN TO MOVE INTO ISRAELI HANDS EVEN IF ONLY TEMPORARILY. IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL NOW, BUT WE MAY BE SEEING THE BEGINNING OF THE TRUE TEST OF POWER BETWEEN EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI LAND FORCES. IN VIEW OF EVENTS SINCE OCTOBER 6, IT IS QUESTIONALBLE WHETHER ISRAELI AIRCRAFT CAN PLAY MORE THAN A MINIMAL ROLE IN THIS EVENT.

6. SOURCE ALSO REPORTS THAT ISRAELIS LOST 16 AIRCRAFT, 12 OF THEM IN SUEZ CANAL/FRONT AREA, ON OCTOBER 17.
SMITH


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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

73 OCT 22 PM 12:22
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 564

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03096 132201Z

62
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

NSAE-00 USSS-00 INRE-00 /031 W
---------- 098473

Z 0 132135Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4003
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T CAIRO 3096

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJECT: ALLEGED OVERFLIGHT BY US AIRCRAFT

REF: CAIRO 3095 (NOTAL)

1. SPANISH CHARGE VILLACIEROS AND I WENT TO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS REQUESTED AND WERE IMMEDIATELY RECEIVED BY ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER ISMAIL FAHMY. HE READ TO ME THE FOLLOWING ORAL PROTEST:

QUOTE: I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INFORM YOU ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT THAT TWO AMERICAN PLANES, TYPE CR-71, (SIC) VIOLATED OUR AIRSPACE TODAY AND WERE REGISTERED BY OUR RADAR AT PORT SAID MOVING ALONG THE RED SEA ON THE WEST SIDE TO NEGA HAMADI; THEN CROSSED THE DESERT TO CAIRO; THEN TO THE WESTERN DESERT; THEN BACK TO SINAI TO ISRAEL AND FROM ISRAELI AIRSPACE TO SYRIA WHERE THE SYRIAN RADAR AGAIN REGISTERED THE TWO PLANES. THE PLANES PROCEEDED FROM SYRIA TO LEBANON AND THEN OUT INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA. THEIR SPEED WAS MACH 3 AND AS A RESULT OF THIS GRAVE VIOLATION, ON BEHALF OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, I STRONGLY


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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

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PROTEST THIS GRAVE AND SERIOUS VIOLATION OF OUR AIRSPACE BY TWO AMERICAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT, AND WE CONSIDER THAT THIS CONSTITUTES A DIRECT VIOLATION, THE RESULT OF WHICH WILL HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. END QUOTE.

MR. FAHMY THEN REQUESTED ME TO TRANSMIT THE ABOVE TO MY GOVERNMENT AND OBTAIN IMMEDIATE CLARIFICATION.

2. COMMENT: DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT PROTEST WILL PROBABLY BE MADE PUBLIC IN MORNING CAIRO PRESS.

3. BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE DELAY DUE TO OTHER HIGH PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC, REQUEST REPLY BY FLASH.
SMITH

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SECRET

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

'73 OCT 17 AM 8:06

SECRET 404

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03140 1618002Z 2

54
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 USSS-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
---------- 119637

O 161735Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4038
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLEET

S E C R E T CAIRO 3140

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJECT: E AND E PLANNING

REF: STATE 204191

1. WE ARE NOT ABLE TO ASSESS THREAT TO US RESIDENTS EXCEPT OVER VERY SHORT TERM. AT MOMENT, GOE IS DOING QUITE WELL IN CONTROLLING ANTI-US MEDIA PLAY AND LEVEL OF PUBLIC EMOTION. SADAT HAS NOT ATTACKED US AND, THANKFULLY, US RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL IS NOT CENTER OF ATTENTION NOW. THIS IS HIGHLY UNSTABLE SITUATION, HOWEVER, AND IS AFFECTED BY NEW FACTORS VIRTUALLY EVERY DAY. AMERICAN COMMUNITY RESIDENTS HAVE THUS FAR REMAINED CALM; NEVERTHELESS, WORD THAT OTHER COMMUNITIES HAVE LEFT OR ARE CONSIDERING LEAVING HAS IN TURN INCREASED PRESSURE ON RESIDENT AMERICANS TO CONSIDER THEIR OWN DEPARTURE, AT LEAST OVER SHORT RUN. THIS HAS NOT BECOME A

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 CAIRO 03140 161800Z

PROBLEM YET, BUT IT IS NOTICEABLE. OUR BEST JUDGMENT IS THAT SITUATION DOES NOT REQUIRE EVACUATION NOW OR FOR NEXT TWO TO THREE DAYS.

2. WHILE WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY TO INITIATE AN EVACUATION AT THIS TIME, WE ASSUME THAT THE ONLY FEASIBLE MEANS OF EVACUATING OUR AMERICANS IN A HURRY WILL BE BY TRAIN OR BUS TO ALEXANDRIA AND FROM ALEXANDRIA BY SHIP. THIS SHIP WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE TO BE CHARTERED. IN VIEW OF THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE HAD IN OBTAINING A SHIP FOR USG TOURISTS, WE BELIEVE URGENT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MEANS OF OBTAINING SECOND SHIP IN SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME. THIS WOULD MEAN (A) CONTACTING SHIPPING AGENTS FOR INFORMATION ON DAY-TO-DAY AVAILABILITY OF VESSELS; (B) ENSURE THAT SOME SHIPPING UNDERWRITER WILL, WITHOUT DELAY, BE PREPARED TO INSURE ANY VESSEL THAT MAY BE CHARTERED FOR EVACUATION PURPOSES. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTACT INSURER ON WEEKENDS; AND (C) IN CASE (B) FAILS, PREPAREDNESS OF USG TO GUARENTEE SHIP IMMEDIATELY.

3. LATEST ESTIMATE OF PRIVATE AMERICANS WHO WOULD REQUEST EVACUATION IS 800. IF WE ARE ALL FORCED TO LEAVE THE NUMBER WOULD BE 1100. THERE ARE STILL APPROXIMATELY 350 TOURISTS IN EGYPT, BUT WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL DEPART ON OCTOBER 18.
SMITH

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

73 OCT 16 AM 8:34

SECRET 574

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03119 151540Z

3

40
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 /031 W
106993

P 1512457 OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4022

S E C R E T CAIRO 3119

STADIS

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJECT: DEATH OF SADAT'S HALF-BROTHER

REF: CAIRO 2111

SAUDI EMBOFF THIS MORNING CONFIRMED THAT ISAM SADAT, YOUNGER HALF-BROTHER OF PRESIDENT SADAT HAD BEEN KILLED IN ACTION DURING PRESENT HOSTILITIES. EMBOFF STATED, HOWEVER, THAT DEATH HAD OCCURRED IN EARLY DAYS OF WAR AND NOT RECENTLY. SAUDI STATED HE HAD RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION ABOUT OCTOBER 10.
SMITH

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 OCT 16 AM 8:34

SECRET 366

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
3

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03117 151330Z

44
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 DODE-00

CIAE-00 USSS-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
---------- 105646

P R 1512452 OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4020
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T CAIRO 3117

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJECT: ALLEGED OVERFLIGHT BY US AIRCRAFT

REF: CAIRO 3107

ATTEMPTED TO ARRANGE MEETING WITH FAHMY, WHO WAS TOO BUSY TO SEE US. WE WERE ASKED TO SEE SAAD KHALIL OF THE NORTH AMERICAN DESK INSTEAD. CHARGE VILLA-CIEROS AND I SAW HIM AT 12:00 P.M. TODAY AND I DELIVERED THE RESPONSE AS INSTRUCTED.
SMITH

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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73 OCT 15 AM 9:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2/3

SECRET 833

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03107 142015Z

67
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00

CIAE-00 USSS-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
---------- 101444

O 142005Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4014
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T CAIRO 3107

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, EG, IS
SUBJECT: ALLEGED OVERFLIGHT BY US AIRCRAFT

REF: STATE 203669

SHALL SEEK MEETING WITH FAHMY AT EARLIEST MOMENT, BUT DO NOT BELIEVE THIS CAN BE ARRANGED BEFORE MORNING.
SMITH

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DE RUESOR #2844 2680730
O 250725Z SEP 73
FM USINT CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3820

INFO USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE 2170
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2644
AMEMBASSY BEIRT 3479
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 303
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1589
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1124
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1436
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1525
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3261
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1449
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 865

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 2844

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG US
SUBJ:5: PRESS REACTS NEGATIVELY TO KISSINGER'S UN
ADDRESS

1. IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE ORCHESTRATED LEAD ARTICLES, SEPTEMBER 25 CAIRO PRESS HAS REACTED NEGATIVELY TO SECRETARY'S ADDRESS AT UN SEPTEMBER 24. HEADLINES ARE AS FOLLOWS: (A) AHRAM: "KISSINGER SPEECH IN UN DEALS WITH ME BY INCIDENTAL ALLUSIONS;" (B) AKHBAR: "NO NEW AMERICAN INITIATIVES;" (C) GUMHURIYYA: "AMERICA DOES NOT HURRY TO SOLVE ME CRISIS."

2. AHRAM'S ARTICLE REPORTS THAT IN MEETING WITH DELEGATIONS IN UN, SECRETARY GAVE HIS "PRIVATE VIEW" CONCERNING ME TO EFFECT THAT IN AREA SUCH AS ME, US WILL ASSIST IN SEARCH FOR JUST SOLUTIONS, BUT THAT US EFFORTS ARE NO ALTERNATIVE TO THOSE OF PARTIES TO DISPUTE; MOREOVER, US IS PREPARED TO USE ITS INFLUENCE IN CREATING A SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION AND ENCOURAGING PARTIES (TO REGIONAL DISPUTES) TO ACHIEVE ACTUAL PROGRESS. ARTICLE CONTINUES THAT KISSINGER WELCOMED CONTINUANCE OF CEASEFIRE AS ONE SIGN OF PROGRESS IN THE WORLD, ALONG WITH OTHERS SUCH AS BERLIN AGREEMENT, CONCLUSION OF VIETNAM

WAR, AND REDUCTION OF INTENSITY OF INTERNATIONAL CONFRONTATION. AHRAM ADDS THAT "KISSINGER HAS INFORMED CONCERNED DELEGATIONS THAT HE WILL NOT UNDERTAKE ANY INITIATIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNTIL AFTER THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS ON OCTOBER 29. HE MENTIONED THAT HE WILL BE SATISFIED WITH LISTENING UNTIL THAT TIME AND WILL UNDERTAKE NO INITIATIVE."

3. AKHBAR AND GUMHURIYYA CARRY ESSENTIALLY SIMILAR REPORTS. TO EFFECT THAT US IS PREPARED TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO ASSIST IN SOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, BUT THAT THIS IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR EFFORTS OF PARTIES THEMSELVES. AKHBAR IS ONLY PAPER WITH EDITORIAL COMMENT, THRUST OF WHICH IS THAT KISSINGER SPEECH DOES NOT INDICATE US WILL GIVE ANY PRIORITY TO ME CRISIS, THAT US STAND REMAINS ONE OF FULL SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, AND THAT ONLY INITIATIVE US WILL UNDERTAKE WILL BE FOR PURPOSE OF KEEPING SITUATION FROZEN.

4. COMMENT: DISTINCT IMPRESSION IS THAT, DESPITE APPOINTMENT OF NEW SECRETARY OF STATE, US DOES NOT BELIEVE ME TO BE OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE TO MERIT MORE THAN PASSING ATTENTION.
SMITH
BT

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

'73 AUG 32

SECRET 263

2

PAGE 01 CAIRO 02625 311115Z

KENNEDY
L.L.

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 106386

R 310955Z AUG 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3699
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T CAIRO 2625

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN PRECEPTIVES OF U.S. MOTIVES IN
MIDDLE EAST

1. MY CONTACTS WITH EGYPTIANS AT VARIOUS LEVELS SINCE USG VETO OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON MID-EAST ON JULY 26 HAVE LED ME TO CONCLUDE THAT GOE THINKING HAS NOW CRYSTALLIZED ON FOLLOWING THEORY TO EXPLAIN USG INTENTIONS AND ACTIONS IN MIDDLE EAST:
2. EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT USG HAS CONCLUDED THAT ITS INTERESTS IN AREA CAN BE BEST SERVED BY ARMING ISRAEL AND IRAN AS MILITARY SURROGATES AND KEEPING ARABS, PARTICULARLY EGYPT, WEAK AND DIVIDED. IRANIAN MILITARY POWER CAN BE USED, IF NECESSARY, TO PRESERVE US OIL INTERESTS IN PERSIAN GULF. ISRAELIS ARE BEING STRENGTHENED SO THAT THEY CAN CONTINUE TO OCCUPY EGYPTIAN TERRITORY, DISSIPATE EGYPTIAN ENERGIES, FORCE EGYPT TO DIRECT SCARCE ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO DEFENSE BUDGET, AND


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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**



DISTRACT GOE FROM POSSIBLE ANTI-US ROLE IN THE AREA BY KEEPING IT PREOCCUPIED WITH ISRAELI AGGRESSION. USG STRATEGY IS THUS VIEWED BY EGYPTIANS AS EFFORT TO BLOCK PEACE EFFORTS AND KEEP ISRAELI BOOTS ON EGYPTIAN NECKS IN ORDER TO DISTRACT EGYPT FROM POSSIBLE FUTURE MOVES AGAINST US INTERESTS. TO FURTHER THIS OBJECTIVE, USG IS ALSO ATTEMPTING TO PROMOTE INTERNAL DIVISION WITHIN EGYPT AND IS TAKING STEPS TO WEAKEN EGYPT ECONOMI-CALLY. LATEST EXAMPLE CITED TO US BY SEVERAL OFFICIAL EGYPTIANS IS CANCELLATION OF USG PARTICIPATION IN FAO PROGRAM FOR SCHOOL LUNCHES IN RURAL AREA OF EGYPT (STATE 156142).

3. EVEN THE MORE SOPHISTICATED EGYPTIANS HAVE DECIDED THIS THEORY IS ONLY REASONABLE EXPLANATION OF USG VETO AND CONTINUED HEAVY US ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. IF USG MEANS WHAT IT SAYS ABOUT ACHIEVING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY, THEY REASON, FOR USG TO APPLY ENOUGH PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, THROUGH US CONTROL OF ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC AND MILITARY LIFELINES, TO BRING ABOUT MORE FLEXIBILITY IN ISRAEL'S NEGOTIATING POSTURE. FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT DONE SO CAN ONLY MEAN THAT USG IS NOT INTERESTED IN A SETTLEMENT, BUT IS INTERESTED IN CURBING EGYPTIAN POWER THROUGH USE OF ISRAEL AS CHOSEN INSTRUMENT.

4. USG CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL ON UNSC AIRLINER DIVER-SION RESOLUTION IS CONSIDERED WINDOW DRESSING, BECASUSE USG REFUSED TO CONSIDER SANCTIONS THAT WOULD HAVE PUT TEETH INTO SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNATION AND MADE IT SOMETHING MORE THAN A VERBAL EXERCISE.

5. IN ABSENCE OF ANY INDICATION OF USG PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, GOE WILL PROBABLY REACT TO THIS PERCEPTION OF USG INTENTIONS BY INTENSIFYING ITS EFFORTS TO LASH OUT AGAINST US INTERESTS. EFFORT IS NOW APPARENTLY UNDER WAY TO SOLICIT COOPERATION OF SAUDI ARABIA AND GULF STATES IN APPLYING PRESSURE ON US OIL INTERESTS AND UTILIZING ARAB FINANCIAL RESERVES IN WAYS THAT WOULD UNDERCUT US INTERNATIONAL MONETARY OBJECTIVES. FORTUNATELY FOR US, EGYPTIAN NEED FOR SAUDI ECONOMIC SUPPORT HAS



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PAGE 03 CAIRO 02625 311115Z

GIVEN SAUDIS THE UPPER HAND IN NEGOTIATING WITH SADAT AND HAS APPARENTLY ENABLED FAISAL TO MODERATE SADAT'S INCLINATION TO STRIKE OUT AT UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS. IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH FAISAL, SADAT HAS HAD TO AGREE TO GO ALONG WITH FAISAL'S MORE MODERATE APPROACH TO THE USE OF OIL AS A POLITICAL WEAPON. THE SAUDIS HAVE APPARENTLY INTERVENED WITH SADAT ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL ON SUMED AND WE HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS THAT SADAT HAS AGREED TO SUPPORT FAISAL'S OIL DIPLOMACY AT THE UPCOMING ARAB MEETINGS AT ALGIERS.

6. ON MORE PAROCHIAL ISSUES, SUCH AS AMERICAN CULTURAL INTERESTS IN EGYPT AND USINT'S FREEDOM OF ACTION, THE SAUDIS WILL HAVE LITTLE INTEREST, AND WE MAY BE IN FOR SOME DIFFICULT DAYS AHEAD.
WILEY

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

AUG 14 PM 6:17
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

2

SECRET 713

PAGE 01 CAIRO 02453 141634Z

51
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
--------------------- 084452

O R 141520Z AUG 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3597
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T CAIRO 2453

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: UN EG US
SUBJECT UNSC DEBATE

1. CAIRO PRESS ON AUGUST 14 GAVE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO AN ALLEGED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI THAT HE WOULD VETO A RESOLUTION CONTAINING SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. AKHBAR CARRIED EDITORIAL ATTACKING STATEMENT AS AMOUNTING TO "AMERICAN PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL BANDITRY."

2. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE WE HAVE MADE SOME LIMITED PROGRESS IN PERSUADING MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE AND SOPHISTICATED EGYPTIANS THAT OUR LAST VETO WAS CAST IN INTEREST OF PRESERVING RESOLUTION 242 AS BASIS FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATING EFFORTS, BUT WE WOULD FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO MAKE CREDIBLE DEFENSE OF ANOTHER VETO (OR, FOR THAT MATTER, ABSTENTION) IN CURRENT SESSION EVEN IF DRAFT RESOLUTION CALLED FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN HAS DEPLORED ISRAELI ACTION AS VIOLATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS FOR SUCH ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR WOULD SEEM EMINENTLY APPROPRIATE EVEN TO MOST REASONABLE AND SOPHISTICATED EGYPTIANS.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 02453 1416347

3. BELIEVE WE SHOULD ALSO KEEP IN MIND THAT A MAJOR UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL PROPOSAL, THE $360 MILLION SUMED CONTRACT, WILL BE COMING TO EGYPTIAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN NEXT FEW DAYS OR WEEKS. ANOTHER VETO COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE OUR CHANCES OF RECEIVING THIS CONTRACT, AND WE COULD ALSO LOSE THE SUBSTANTIAL FUTURE COMMERCIAL SPIN-OFF IN FORM OF SUMED RELATED COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES IN EGYPT AND ELSEWHERE IN ARAB WORLD.
WILEY

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

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SECRET 685

PAGE 01 CAIRO 02293 011222Z

53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 108273

R 011130Z AUG 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3512
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T CAIRO 2293

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GHORBAL REACTS TO US
VETO IN UNSC

1. I TELEPHONED ASHRAF GHORBAL TODAY TO TELL HIM THAT I WAS SENDING TO HIS OFFICE THE FULL TEXT OF ASST. SECRETARY SISCO'S ON-THE-RECORD STATEMENT TO ISRAELI JOURNALISTS, AND I SUGGESTED THAT HE READ IT CAREFULLY. GHORBAL THEN SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DELIVER ANGRY HARANGUE AGAINST UNITED STATES FOR VETOING SC DRAFT RESOLUTION. THIS IS ONLY OFFICIAL REACTION TO US VETO THAT I HAVE SO FAR RECEIVED. (CAIRO PRESS REACTION DURING LAST TWO DAYS IS REPORTED IN CAIRO 2286.)

2. GHORBAL EXPRESSED ANGER AND CONCERN THAT USG HAD REPUDIATED ITS OWN PREVIOUS POSITIONS. HE SAID GOE WAS GREATLY DISAPPOINTED SINCE VETO HAD MOVED US COMPLETELY INTO ISRAELI CAMP AND DESTROYED ALL HOPE OF FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT.

3. I RESPONDED THAT PROPOSED RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE

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COMPLETELY ALTERED RESOLUTION 242 AND IF WE HAD NOT CAST VETO, RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE BEEN DESTROYED AS EFFECTIVE BASIS FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. USG BELIEVED PARTIES SHOULD LOOK FORWARD AND NOT DWELL ON UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS IN THE PAST. WE WERE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN PRESERVING RESOLUTION 242 AS A BASIS FOR FUTURE EFFORTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, I AGAIN SUGGESTED THAT GOE TAKE A CAREFUL LOOK AT SISCO'S STATEMENT AND NOTED THAT ITS IMPORTANCE WAS UNDERLINED BY FACT THAT SISCO HAD DELIVERED IT AS AN ON-THE-RECORD STATEMENT RATHER THAN AS A BACKGROUND BRIEFING WHICH WOULD NORMALLY BE GIVEN TO VISITING JOURNALISTS.

4. DESPITE THIS STRONG REACTION, OUR WORKING RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE CHANGED. AT THE END OF HIS EMOTIONAL PRESENTATION,
GHORBAL TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK
FOR MY HELP ON A PENDING VISA CASE CONCERNING THE
RELATIVE OF A FRIEND.
WILEY

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 416

PAGE 01 CAIRO 02268 301328Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 089607

O R 301250Z JUL 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3496
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO CAIRO 2268

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO WALDHEIM'S VISIT
TO ME

1. IN PREPARING FOR OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH ISRAELIS PRIOR TO WALDHEIM'S VISIT TO AREA, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD REEXAMINE OUR PREMISE THAT EGYPTIANS ARE BLOCKING PROGRESS BY REFUSING TO ENTER INTO DIRECT OR INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT USG CAN BE HELPFUL ONLY AFTER EGYPTIANS AGREE TO ENTER INTO A NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IN FACT, EGYPTIANS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN INDIRECT NEGOTIATING PROCESS THROUGH JARRING, THROUGH US, THROUGH VARIOUS VISITING VIP'S, AND THROUGH VARIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THEY HAVE SPELLED OUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THEIR BARGAINING POSITION IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AND CONVEYED IT TO THE ISRAELIS

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THROUGH MANY CHANNELS.

2. IN SPELLING OUT THEIR POSITION EGYPTIANS HAVE ACCEPTED RESOLUTION 242 AND ALL IT CONTAINS (WHICH HAS GIVEN THEM PROBLEMS WITH MANY OF THEIR FELLOW ARABS); THEY HAVE ACCEPTED THE JARRING MEMORANDUM; THEY HAVE ACCEPTED ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST; THEY HAVE AGREED TO ENTER INTO A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL; THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY ARE READY TO CONSIDER A RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES TO PROVIDE GREATER SECURITY FOR ISRAEL, INCLUDING DEMILITARIZED ZONES AND THE STATIONING OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCES; AND THEY HAVE CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED THAT THE PRICE FOR THESE CONCESSIONS IS RETENTION OF EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL OCCUPIED EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. MOST OF THESE POSITIONS HAVE BEEN EMBODIED IN FORMAL NEGOTIATING DOCUMENTS.

3. THERE IS NO LACK OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES BY WHICH PARTIES CAN CONVEY THEIR POSITIONS BACK AND FORTH--PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY--WHEN AND IF THEY HAVE ANYTHING MORE TO CONVEY. EXPRESSION OF EXISTING POSITIONS THROUGH SPOKESMEN SITTING IN CLOSER PHYSICAL PROXIMITY OR UNDER MORE DEFINITE PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES WOULD NOT IN ITSELF MOVE PROBLEM TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. REAL HANG UP AT THIS STAGE IS NOT A QUESTION OF PROCEDURE, BUT OF SUBSTANCE, I.E., WHETHER OR NOT ISRAEL WILL FORMALLY ANNEX EGYPTIAN TERRITORY AND THEREBY CHANGE STATUS OF THIS TERRITORY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM MILITARY OCCUPATION TO FULL ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY.

4. USG HAS APPARENTLY ASSUMED THAT BY BRINGING PARTIES TOGETHER IN MORE FORMAL DIRECT OR INDIRECT NEGOTIATING PROCESS LIKELIHOOD OF A CHANGE IN SUBSTANTIVE POSITION BY ONE SIDE OR OTHER WOULD BE INCREASED. I, FOR ONE HAVE MY DOUBTS OF THE VALIDITY OF THIS ASSUMPTION, SINCE THE PROCESS WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD BECOME PUBLIC AND, EVEN IF IT DID NOT, BOTH SIDES WOULD FEAR THAT IT WOULD BE LEAKED TO PRESS. BOTH SIDES WOULD THEN FEEL COMPELLED TO ADHERE TO THEIR LONG-STATED PUBLIC POSITIONS. THE



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MORE FORMAL THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, THE MORE LIKELY THE PUBLICITY, EVEN IF AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO MAINTAIN SECRECY ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TALKS. NEITHER THE ISRAELIS NOR THE ARABS HAVE A VERY GOOD TRACT RECORD ON PRESERVING CONFIDENTIALITY OF DISCUSSIONS OF THIS NATURE. GIVEN THE ARAB CONVICTION OF ISRAEL'S EXPANSIONIST DESIGNS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF LEAKS, SADAT WOULD PROBABLY CONCLUDE THAT HE WOULD BE A DEAD MAN IF HE TOOK ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE MOST RIGID POSITION IN FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS.

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SECRET 442

PAGE 01 CAIRO 02268 301346Z

44
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
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O R 301250Z JUL 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3497
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO CAIRO 2268

EXDIS

5. IF WE FEEL THAT IT IS TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK (AND I FEEL STRONGLY THAT IT IS), THEN WE SHOULD CONSIDER HOW WE CAN ADDRESS THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE THAT IS NOW HOLDING UP PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. WE OR SOME OTHER PARTY COULD BEGIN BY DISCUSSING THE SUB-STANTIVE ISSUES WITH BOTH SIDES, PROBING FOR ANY POSSIBLE GIVE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS ARE CURRENTLY UNBRIDGEABLE, WE AND OTHER CONCERNED ONLOOKERS SHOULD THEN CONSIDER WHAT WE CAN DO TO ALTER THE INCENTIVES OR SANCTIONS OPERATING ON BOTH PARTIES IN SUCH A WAY THAT A COMPROMISE ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE BY ONE OR THE OTHER OF THEM WOULD SEEM TO THEM TO BE TO THEIR OWN NET ADVANTAGE.

6. THE EGYPTIAN REGIME HAS BEEN PLACED UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE BY THE ISRAELIS AND OTHERS SINCE 1967 TO SETTLE ON ISRAEL'S TERMS, IE., FORMALLY CEDE LAND TO ISRAEL.

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FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT DONE SO DEMONSTRATES THAT EGYPTIAN LEADERS WOULD RATHER RESIST THESE PRESSURES THAN RISK POSSIBILITIES OF OVERTHROW AND ASSASSINATION. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE ARE IN A POSITION TO BRING ANY ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON SADAT OF THE KIND THAT COULD CAUSE SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO CHANGE THEIR JUDGMENT OF EGYPTIAN POLITICAL REALITIES.

7. IN FACT, SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES DIVIDING TWO SIDES MAY NOT BE AS SERIOUS AS THE TWO PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE HAVE INDICATED. BY UTILIZING SUCH DEVICES AS DEMILITARIZED ZONES, INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCES AND PREHAPS LONG-TERM LEASES, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE FACE-SAVING ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD ENABLE SADAT TO CLAIM "SOVEREIGNTY" OVER ALL EGYPTIAN LAND AND AT SAME TIME PROVIDE FOR ALL REASONABLE (AND PERCEIVED) ISRAELI SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER PARTS OF SINAI.

8. MAIN PROBLEM HAS BEEN THAT ISRAELIS HAVE NOT BEEN INTERESTED IN PROVIDING FACE-SAVING DEVICES FOR SADAT. FROM CAIRO, IT SEEMS THAT THEY ARE MORE INTERESTED IN PUNISHING HIM FOR WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE EGYPTIAN SINS IN THE PAST. NOW THAT WE HAVE AGAIN DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATED OUR SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL BY CASTING SC VETO, I BELIEVE TIME IS APPROPRIATE TO CONVEY FORCEFULLY TO ISRAELIS OUR BELIEF THAT THEY SHOULD RESPOND TO OUR SUPPORT BY OFFERING SADAT SOME SUCH FACE-SAVING DEVICES IN THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT.

9. WALDHEIM'S VISIT WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN THIS PROCESS. EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO CONDUCT INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL THROUGH WALDHEIM OR ANYONE ELSE WILL BE IN DIRECT PROPORTION TO THEIR PERCEPTION OF EXTENT TO WHICH ISRAELIS WILLING TO GO TO GIVE THEM THE NEEDED FACE-SAVING DEVICES. BY NOW, I BELIEVE, SADAT IS A REALIST ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS, BUT HE IS ALSO A REALIST ON THE QUESTION OF HOW FAR HE CAN GO WITHOUT BEING OVERTHROWN. THE KEY TO THE PROBLEM IS A WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS TO HELP SADAT WORK OUT THE NEEDED

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FACADE. IF WALDHEIM, WHEN HE VISITS EGYPT, CAN BRING WITH HIM ANY INDICATION OF ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO HELP SADAT ERECT THIS FACADE, I BELIEVE THAT THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES WOULD BE SECONDARY AND COULD BE QUICKLY WORKED OUT.
WILEY

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 JUL 14 PM 2:28

SECRET 265 WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 02122 140756Z

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 085334

R 140700Z JUL 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3414

S E C R E T CAIRO 2122

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE ANTI-SOVIET MOVE BY GOE.

1. IN CAIRO 1970, WE REPORTED THAT SADAT NOW APPEARS TO BE UNDER PRESSURE FROM SOME FACTIONS WITHIN EGYPT TO DEMONSTRATE HIS DISPLEASURE WITH THE SOVIET UNION BY MAKING AN OVERT AND DRAMATIC ANTI-SOVIET MOVE. GIVEN HIS CURRENT SENSE OF DISAPPOINTMENT AND FRUSTRATION OVER THE FAILURE OF EGYPT'S DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY, SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE IN CHARACTER. IT WOULD ALSO BE IN CHARACTER FOR MANY OF HIS ADVISORS WHO HAVE NEVER BEEN PERSONALLY COMFORTABLE WITH EGYPT'S CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND WHO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET FAILURE TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO EGYPT'S PROBLEMS REQUIRES SOME KIND OF RIPOSTE. EVEN THOUGH EGYPT REMAINS HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT, WE BELIEVE THAT CONSIDERATION OF PRESTIGE AND PRIDE COULD LEAD SADAT TO TAKE SUCH A STEP. THE MOST FREQUENTLY MENTIONED POSSIBILITIES ARE A DENIAL OF PORT FACILITIES FOR SOVIET SHIPS OR A RENUNCTIATION (OR REVISION) OF THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY. SADAT'S JULY 23 SPEECH ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTION COULD PROVIDE THE VEHICLE FOR SOME SUCH DRAMATIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

2. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE THREE SRS REPORTS FROM SAUDI ARABIA (TDFIRDB-315/06282-73, NWJ-4269, AND NWJ-

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4276) PROVIDE INTERESTING READING. FROM THESE REPORTS IT APPEARS THAT SADAT IS ACTIVELY SEEKING SAUDI SUPPORT AS PART OF A GENERAL REORIENTATION AWAY FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND TOWARDS THE WEST

3. SINCE SADAT AND HIS ADVISORS ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO MAKE SUCH A MOVE, I BELIEVE IT IS AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR THE USG TO CONSIDER WHAT IT COULD DO TO HELP SADAT MAKE UP HIS MIND.

4. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR EGYPT ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUES WITH ISRAEL WOULD CERTAINLY PRODUCE THE QUICKEST PAYOFF. SHORT OF THIS, THERE ARE OTHER POSSIBLE MOVES WHICH WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON SADAT'S THINKING.

5. FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE QUESTION OF MILITARY SUPPORT, WE COULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOW CONSIDERING SALES OF ARMS TO EGYPT THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO A REALIGNMENT OF EGYPT'S MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONS AWAY FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE AS LONG AS THE BASIC BALANCE OF POWER IN THE AREA IS NOT DISTURBED. WE COULD ALSO EASE UP SOMEWHAT ON OUR OWN ARMS EMBARGO ON EGYPT AND ALLOW EGYPT TO PURCHASE NON-LETHAL MILITARY ITEMS IN THE UNITED STATES.

6. PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO SADAT WOULD BE AN INDICATION THAT THE USG WILL TAKE A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE TOWARD EGYPT IN HELPING THE COUNTRY DEAL WITH ITS SERIOUS AND GROWING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. WHILE I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE EGYPTIANS TO RELY ON THEIR ARAB BRETHREN FOR THE BULK OF THEIR FUTURE EXTERNAL CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, THERE ARE OTHER STEPS WE COULD NOW TAKE TO GIVE SADAT MORE CONFIDENCE IN DEFYING THE RUSSIANS.

7. ONE OF EGYPT'S MOST CRITICAL AND PRESSING PROBLEMS IS THE IMPORTATION OF ADEQUATE WHEAT TO FEED ITS BURGEONING POPULATION. AN OFFER TO SELL EGYPT A MILLION TONS OF WHEAT ON CCC CREDIT TERMS WOULD STRIKE A VERY RESPONSIVE CHORD WITH THE EGYPTIAN REGIME. THE GOVERN-

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 02122 140756Z

MENT OF EGYPT IS NOW PREPARING TO SEND TEAMS TO AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND POSSIBLY OTHER COUNTRIES TO NEGOTIATE TERMS FOR WHEAT IMPORTS FOR THE COMING YEAR. EGYPT WILL NEED A TOTAL OF TWO AND ONE-QUARTER MILLION TONS OF WHEAT AND ABOUT 600,000 TONS OF WHEAT FLOUR, AND THEY WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY IN FINDING ADEQUATE CREDIT. IF WE WISH TO HAVE AN IMPACT DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS WHILE SADAT IS CONTEMPLATING HIS NEXT MOVE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION, WE COULD EXTEND AN INVITATION FOR ONE OF THESE TEAMS TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES TO DISCUSS CREDIT TERMS FOR A MILLION TON SALE. I SUSPECT THE GOE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO BUY US WHEAT ON STANDARD CCC 3-YEAR CREDIT TERMS

8. WE COULD ALSO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT BY INDICATING A READINESS ON THE PART OF THE EXIM BANK TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FINANCING OF INDUSTRAIL PROJECTS IN EGYPT SUCH AS THE PETRO-CHEMICAL PLANT WHICH EGYPT HOPES TO BUILD IN THE DELTA AREA USING GAS FROM THE ABU MAADI FIELD. EXIM HAS BROKEN THE ICE BY MAKING A PRELIMINARY COMMITMENT TO MARRIOTT HOTELS FOR A PROJECT IN CAIRO, BUT IT WOULD BE MORE USEFUL IF THE EGYPTIAN COULD BE ASSURED THAT EXIM IS NOW PREPARED TO SUPPORT PROJECTS IN OTHER INDUSTRIAL AREAS.

9. WHETHER OR NOT DEPARTMENT DECIDES TO PURSUE ANY OF THESE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS, I BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT WE KEEP IN MIND THAT THE EGYPTIAN REGIME IS NOW FINALLY FACING UP TO THE FAILURE OF ITS PREVIOUS POLICIES WHICH WERE BASED ON INVOLVEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION. WE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY IN COMING FEW DAYS OR WEEKS TO INFLUENCE OUTCOME OF GENERAL POLICY REVIEWS THAT ARE NOW UNDERWAY WITHIN GOE.
WILEY

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 601

PAGE 01 CAIRO 02106 1214517Z

53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
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R 120820Z JUL 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3402
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

'73 JUL 12 PM 7:33
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
064742

S E C R E T CAIRO 2106

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG, SA, BEXP
SUBJECT: CALL ON SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR FUAD NAZIR

1. SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR NAZIR TOLD ME ON JULY 11 THAT EGYPTIAN MINISTER OF PETROLEUM WOULD VISIT SAUDI ARABIA DURING THE COMING WEEK TO DISCUSS MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE SUMED PIPELINE. HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT MIGHT JOIN WITH THE KUWAITIS IN FINANCING THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS (CAIRO 2092), PRESUMABLY FOR A SHARE OF THE EQUITY.

2. AMBASSADOR NAZIR ALSO SAID THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD RECENTLY GUARANTEED REPAYMENT OF $25 MILLION IN CREDITS FOR FOOD IMPORTS TO EGYPT IN ADDITION TO A GIFT OF 750,000 TONS OF CRUDE OIL. HE ALSO MENTIONED FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR HELICOPTERS FOR THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE, BUT DID NOT SPECIFY THE AMOUNTS. HE SAID THAT SOME OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS WERE BASED ON AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SAUDI SUPPORT WOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AN ADVANCE AGAINST FUTURE KHARTOUM SUBSIDY PAYMENTS. HE ADDED THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS DOUBTFUL THAT THE ADVANCES WOULD IN FACT EVER BE DEDUCTED FROM FUTURE PAYMENTS.

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3. NAZIR EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT HAFEZ ISMAIL DURING HIS CURRENT TRIP TO MOSCOW EOULD DEMAND AN ACCOUNTING FROM THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE RUSSIAN FAILURE TO PROVIDE MORE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT. IF ISMAIL RECEIVED NO SATISFACTION FROM THE RUSSIANS, NAZIR THOUGHT THAT SADAT MIGHT DECIDE TO RENOUNCE THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY, PERHAPS IN HIS JULY 23 SPEECH ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTION.

4. ON THE PROPOSED UNITY WITH LIBYA, NAZIR WAS OF THE OPINION THAT THERE MAY BE NO UNITY ANNOUNCEMENT AT ALL BY SEPTEMBER 1, SINCE SADAT AND QADHAAFI HAD FAILED TO REACH A MEETING OF THE MINDS DURING QADHAAFI'S TRIP TO EGYPT. ACCORDING TO NAZIR, QADHAAFI REMAINED ADAMANT TO THE END AND REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE EGYPTIAN ARGUMENTS THAT A SOUND UNION COULD ONLY BE BROUGHT ABOUT ON A STEP BY STEP BASIS WITH PROPER ADVANCE PLANNING.
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S E C R E T CAIRO 1881

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG, JO
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN POLICY TOWARDS PALESTINIAN STATE

REF: CAIRO 1849

1. DURING MY CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER UNDER SECRETARY SHOUKRI ON JUNE 23, I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE THE SUBJECT OF EGYPTIAN POLICY TOWARDS A PALESTINIAN STATE. SHOUKRI DENIED THAT THE STATEMENTS BY FOREIGN MINISTER ZAYYAT AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND AT COPENHAGEN INDICATED ANY NEW DEPARTURE IN EGYPTIAN POLICY. HE SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT AND THAT EGYPT'S POLICY HAD ALWAYS BEEN THAT THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION. IT WAS UP TO THE PALESTINIANS TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN FUTURE.

2. I ASKED HIM WHY FOREIGN MINISTER ZAYYAT HAD MADE NO MENTION OF THE FACT THAT THE WEST BANK WAS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE PART OF JORDAN AND HE REPLIED THAT ZAYYAT HAD FELT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE A SOMEWHAT MORE HISTORIC APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM. SINCE EGYPT HAD

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RECOGNIZED THE RIGHT FOR A NATIONAL HOME FOR THE JEWISH RESIDENTS OF PALESTINE. IT WAS NOW TIME TO THINK ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF THE NON-JEWISH RESIDENTS TO A HOME OF THEIR OWN. IN FACT, ZAYYAT'S STATEMENTS DID NOT DIFFER ALL THAT MUCH FROM KING HUSSEIN'S OWN POSITION SINCE THE KING HAD PROMISED THE PALESTINIANS THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE AN AUTONOMOUS PALESTINIAN STATE IF THIS WAS WHAT THE PALESTINIANS DESIRED. SHOUKRI ALSO EXPRESSED ANNOYANCE OVER TAKOAH'S TACTIC OF MAKING TROUBLE BETWEEN JORDAN AND EGYPT AND SAID HE THOUGHT IT VERY INAPPROPRIATE FOR A COUNTRY THAT IS IN MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK TO ARGUE THAT SOME OTHER COUNTRY IS TRYING TO DISMEMBER JORDAN.

3. COMMENT: DESPITE SHOUKRI'S NOT UNEXPECTED DENIAL OF A NEW EGYPTIAN POLICY, IT SEEMS TO US THAT EGYPT IS NOW PAYING MORE PUBLIC ATTENTION TO THIS QUESTION THAN IT HAS IN THE PAST AND IS BEING MORE SPECIFIC IN ITS SUPPORT FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE. IT ALSO APPEARS TO US THAT THESE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ARE COUCHED IN A MANNER TO EXERT PRESSURE ON KING HUSSEIN AND TO INCREASE EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE WITH THE PALESTINIANS AS REPORTED IN CAIRO 1849.
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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S E C R E T CAIRO 1849

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR JO EG
SUBJECT: JORDAN'S FEARS ABOUT EGYPT

REF: STATE 119011

1. LAST WEEK WE WOULD HAVE AGREED WITH DEPARTMENT'S ASSESSMENT AS EXPRESSED REFTEL. NOW, HOWEVER, WE ARE IMPRESSED BY FACT THAT ZAYYAT IS CONTINUING TO PURSUE THEME OF PALESTINIAN STATE. MOST RECENT EXAMPLE IS DANISH TELEVISION INTERVIEW ON JUNE 19. ACCORDING TO REPORTS OF THIS INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN CAIRO PRESS, ZAYYAT POINTEDLY IGNORED ANY GOJ CLAIMS TO WEST BANK WHEN DISCUSSING FUTURE OF PALESTINIAN STATE. THIS LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT EGYPTIANS MAY HAVE DECIDED CONDUCT PRESSURE CAMPAIGN ON JORDAN FOR PURPOSE OF INFLUENCING KING'S POLICIES TOWARDS EASTERN FRONT AND PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS.

2. ZAYYAT'S BLUNT TACTICS COULD ALSO HAVE OTHER MOTIVATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT EGYPT IS CONCERNED BY



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THE DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITIES OF MORE EXTREMIST PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS TO DISRUPT PROGRESS TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. STRONG REACTION OF WESTERN COUNTRIES TO PALESTINIAN TERRORIST TACTICS HAS PROBABLY CONVINCED EGYPTIANS THAT BSO AND THEIR ILK DO IN FACT POSSESS THIS CAPABILITY. EGYPTIANS MAY FEEL THAT EXTREMIST ELEMENTS AMONG PALESTINIANS CAN BE UNDERCUT IF MORE MODERATE PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS ARE GIVEN INCREASED STATURE. WHILE PALESTINIANS ARE STILL HIGHLY DIVIDED AND LACKING IN BROADLY BASED LEADERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS, EGYPTIANS MAY HAVE HOPES THAT PLO WITH PROPER EGYPTIAN NOURISHING COULD BECOME A MORE MODERATE AND RESPONSIBLE GROUP REPRESENTING BROADER SECTOR OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

3. WE BELIEVE SADAT ALSO POSSESSES TRADITIONAL EGYPTIAN AMBITION OF PLAYING LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ARAB WORLD. EGYPT'S ESPOUSING OF PLO COULD INCREASE EGYPT'S PRESTIGE WITH PALESTINIANS AS WELL AS WITH BROAD SECTOR OF ARAB PUBLIC OPINION. SINCE JORDANIANS NOW OBVIOUSLY UNWILLING TO TAKE ORDERS FROM EGYPT, GOE MAY FEEL IT HAS LITTLE TO LOSE BY ANTAGONIZING HUSSEIN AND, WITHIN ARAB CONTEXT, MAY HAVE MUCH TO GAIN BY INCREASING ITS SUPPORT FOR PLO.

4. WHILE KING HUSSEIN WILL CERTAINLY BE UNHAPPY WITH THIS EVOLUTION IN EGYPTIAN POLICY, WE BELIEVE THAT EGYPT HAS ONLY A LIMITED CAPABILITY FOR HARMING THE JORDANIAN REGIME, AT LEAST ON ITS EAST BANK HOME GROUND. THE JORDANIAN REGIME THAT SURVIVED THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 1970 SHOULD NOT BE SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY THIS NEW THRUST IN EGYPTIAN POLICY TOWARDS PALESTINIANS. EGYPTIANS DO, HOWEVER, HAVE SOME DIPLOMATIC CAPABILITY FOR INFLUENCING ULTIMATE DISPOSTION OF WEST BANK. THEY NOW SEEM PREPARED TO USE THIS CAPABILITY TO WORK AGAINST HUSSEIN'S WEST BANK ASPIRATIONS.
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S E C R E T CAIRO 1495

EXDIS

EO 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, XF, EG, SA
SUBJECT: SADAT AND FEISAL ON WAR AND PEACE

REF: CAIRO 1456 AND 1317

SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO, KING FEISAL HAS URGED SADAT NOT RPT NOT TO INITIATE HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL UNTIL EGYPT IS COMPLETELY READY AND INDICATED WHEN THAT DAY CAME, WHICH FEISAL DOES NOT SEE COMING VERY SOON, SAUDI ARABIA WOULD NOT STAND IN EGYPT'S WAY. OIL SUPPLY WAS NOT RPT NOT MENTIONED IN THIS CONTEXT. END SUMMARY.

1. DURING HOUR'S CONVERSATION MAY 21, SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR NAZIR GAVE ME SOME MORE BACKGROUND AND DETAILS OF FEISAL'S VISIT TO CAIRO MAY 12-13. NAZIR RECALLED HE HAD MENTIONED THAT HE WAS AMONG KING'S ADVISORS WHO HAD URGED HIM TO MEET WITH SADAT, EITHER IN JIDDA OR CAIRO, TO COUNSEL MILITARY RESTRAINT. FEISAL HAD CRISPLY RESISTED THIS ADVICE: HOW, HE ASKED HIS PEOPLE, COULD THE KING WHO HAD CALLED FOR A JIHAD TO LIBERATE JERUSALEM, COUNSEL AN ARAB PRESIDENT NOT TO START THE FIGHTING?

2. WHAT TURNED THE KING AROUND WAS HIS AND HIS GOVERNMENT'S DISCUSSIONS WITH EGYPTIAN DEFENSE MINISTER

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AHMED ISMAIL IN SAUDI ARABIA IN EARLY MAY. IT HAD BECOME PLAIN THAT DESPITE BRAVADO AND SABRE RATTLING, FORCES AT ISMAIL'S DISPOSAL WERE IN NO WAY READY FOR A SUCCESSFUL BATTLE. FEISAL TOLD ISMAIL THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD HAVE TO BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE THE WHOLE ARAB NATION IF HE ADVISED SADAT TO GO INTO A FIGHT UNTIL HE COULD COME OUT A WINNER. AFTER THESE DISCUSSIONS, FEISAL PERCEIVED THAT HE HAD BETTER TALK TO SADAT HIMSELF, SO HE AGREED TO STOP ON HIS WAY TO PARIS.

3. DURING THIS VISIT, FEISAL NEVER LEFT KUBBEH PALACE; HE HAD A COUPLE OF PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH SADAT, AND SEVERAL MEETINGS AT WHICH THEIR ADVISORS WERE PRESENT, INCLUDING AMBASSADOR NAZIR. NAZIR IS CONFIDENT THAT, THE WAY FEISAL RUNS HIS GOVERNMENT (ASSURING THAT HIS IN-GROUP KNOWS WHAT IS GOING ON), HE AND SAQQAF AND KAMEL ADHAM WOULD KNOW ABOUT ALL THAT HAPPENED EVEN IN THE PRIVATE SESSIONS. THE IDEA OF SAUDI ARABIA USING ITS OIL SUPPLY IN CONNECTION WITH A WAR, WHICH I TOLD NAZIR THE EGYPTIANS HAD MENTIONED TO DE BORCHGRAVE, HE SAID FLATLY HAD NEVER COME UP. MOREOVER, NAZIR ADDED, THAT IS NOT THE WAY FEISAL WANTS TO RUN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING OIL.

4. WHAT DID COME UP WAS THAT SADAT TOLD FEISAL HE HAD TO UNDERTAKE A MILITARY ACTION IN ORDER TO BREAK THE IMPASSE AND FORCE THE GREAT POWERS TO "DO SOMETHING." FEISAL HAD RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT STAND IN SADAT'S WAY IF AND WHEN HE WERE READY TO WIN WHATEVER HE STARTED, BUT IT IS PLAIN TO EVERYONE THAT EGYPT IS NOT READY NOW. BEFORE THE ASSEMBLED GROUP, FEISAL TURNED TO DEFENSE MINISTER ISMAIL AND REMINDED HIM OF WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT ISMAIL'S RESPONSIBILITY; FEISAL THEN TOLD SADAT THAT IT WAS SADAT'S RESPONSIBILITY NOT TO BRING HUMILIATION ON THE WHOLE ARAB NATION BY FORCING AHMED ISMAIL TO START A WAR THAT WOULD BRING ONLY REPETITION OF THE DISASTER OF 1967.

5. THE SAUDI SIDE WAS CONSIDERABLY SURPRISED AND CONCERNED THAT DURING THESE DISCUSSIONS, SADAT AMONG OTHER

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THINGS REFERRED AT EMOTIONAL LENGTH TO SOMETHING HE SAID HAD APPEARED IN MAAREV PURPORTING TO DESCRIBE A MEETING OF ISRAELI GENERALS; SADAT WORKED HIMSELF UP INTO CITING THEIR REPORTED ATTITUDES AS ANOTHER REASON WHY HE HAD TO RESUME HOSTILITIES. NAZIR TELLS ME THE SAUDI SIDE WERE CONCERNED THAT SADAT IS SO EMOTIONALLY UNSTABLE AS TO FALL FOR ISRAELI PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

6. AFTER ALL THIS, THE SAUDIS ARE NO RPT NO MORE CERTAIN THAN ANYONE ABOUT WHAT SADAT WILL DO. (NAZIR CONTRASTED WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT HOW FEISAL RUNS THINGS WITH THE OBVIOUS CIRCUMSTANCE THAT MOST OF THE PEOPLE AROUND SADAT DURING THEIR DISCUSSIONS, INCLUDING BOTH VICE PRESIDENTS AND MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE, WERE HEARING THEIR LEADER'S VIEWS FOR THE FIRST TIME.)

7. I RELATED MY OWN EFFORTS TO GET ACROSS TO ZAYYAT THE US VIEW OF THE ROAD TO PEACE, AND ZAYYAT'S RESPONSE (CAIRO 1317).

8. OTHER MATTERS DEALT WITH DURING FEISAL'S VISIT WERE SADAT'S NEEDS FOR MONEY AND OIL. ACCORDING TO NAZIR, FEISAL SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING TO LEND EGYPT SOME MORE MONEY IF AND WHEN THEY PRESENT A DEPENDABLE REPAYMENT SCHEDULE; THIS HAS NOT YET APPEARED. IN RESPONSE TO A SADAT REQUEST, FEISAL DID AGREE TO LET HIM HAVE 750,000 TONS OF OIL. EVEN AFTER THIS WAS ARRANGED, NAZIR SAYS HE HAD TO PERSUADE THE EGYPTIANS THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS NOT GOING TO PROVIDE THE TANKERS, AND THAT IF EGYPT WANTS THE OIL THEY HAVE TO SEND THEIR OWN TO PICK IT UP.

9. AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION, NAZIR SAID THAT FEISAL IS CONSIDERING GOING FROM SWITZERLAND (WHERE HE IS CURRENTLY) TO MEET KING HASSAN IN RABAT. SADAT AND BOUMOUDIENNE WOULD GO TOO, BUT NOT QADAFFI. WHEN I REMARKED THAT THIS MIGHT MAKE QADAFFI SORE, NAZIR SAID THAT SADAT HAD TOLD FEISAL HE THINKS QADAFFI MUST BE "NUTS." FEISAL DISPLAYED SURPRISE THAT SADAT HAD NOT BEEN AWARE OF THIS EARLIER AND SADAT REPLIED TO THE GENERAL EFFECT

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THAT FEISAL SHOULD NOT PUT WORDS IN HIS MOUTH ABOUT
WHAT HE MAY HAVE SAID BEFORE; HIS CONCLUSION
ABOUT QADAFFI IS THE CURRENT ONE.
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 1421

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR MOPS EG
SUBJECT: USINT CURRENT ESTIMATE OF LIKELIHOOD AND
IMPLICATIONS OF MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES

REF: NIE 30-73

1. THE RECOVERY OF OCCUPIED EGYPTIAN TERRITORY IS A MAJOR AND, PSYCHOLOGICALLY SPEAKING, OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE OF EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY. SADAT'S FAILURE TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE IS A CONTINUING EMBARRASSMENT AND A SOURCE OF CONSIDERABLE NATIONAL FRUSTRATION. WE BELIEVE THAT SADAT HAS A REALISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF HIS COUNTRY'S MILITARY LIMITATIONS VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL, BUT HE IS ALSO CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE AN EXPANSIONIST POWER AND WILL TAKE MORE AND MORE OF THE LAND OF EGYPT AND OTHER ARAB STATES UNLESS THEY ARE STOPPED. HE THEREFORE BELIEVES THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL WOULD BE USELESS AND THAT EGYPT'S ONLY HOPE OF STOPPING ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM AND RECOVERING OCCUPIED LAND LIES IN ENGAGING THE SUPPORT OF POWERS STRONGER THAN ISRAEL. HIS EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJOR POWERS HAS SO FAR MET WITH LIMITED SUCCESS; AND HE HAS CONCLUDED THAT AS LONG AS ISRAEL IS STRONGLY BACKED BY THE UNITED STATES, THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO INFLUENCE FROM ANY OTHER QUARTER. HE THEREFORE BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED STATES IS THE KEY TO THE SOLUTION OF HIS PROBLEM, AND HE HOPES HE CAN CONVINCE THE USG THAT IT IS IN UNITED STATES' INTERESTS

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TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL'S EXPANSIONISM AND RETURN THE OCCUPIED ARAB LAND. HIS PRESENT SABRE-RATTLING IS DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO RAISE APPREHENSIONS WITHIN THE USG THAT WAR IS IMMINENT AND WILL BE HARMFUL TO US INTERESTS. HE HOPES TO CONVINCE USG TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO BECOME MORE FLEXIBLE ON SETTLEMENT TERMS WITH EGYPT. SO FAR THIS POLICY HAS ACHIEVED FEW RESULTS AND SADAT'S FRUSTRATION HAS INCREASED AS, PRESUMABLY, HAS HIS CONCERN FOR HIS CREDIBILITY. WHILE WE STILL BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY THAT SADAT WILL INITIATE HOSTILITIES, HE IS PLAYING A DANGEROUS GAME AND MIGHT WELL FIND HIMSELF TRAPPED INTO A SITUATION THAT LEADS TO WAR.

2. APART FROM THE PRESSURES GENERATED BY EGYPT'S OFT-PROCLAIMED GOAL OF "RECOVERING EVERY INCH OF THE OCCUPIED LAND," SADAT IS SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE PRESSURES FROM THE PALESTINIANS AND THE MORE RADICAL ARAB STATES, LED BY THE LIBYANS, FOR INCREASED MILITANCY VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL. THESE PRESSURES ARE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE EGYPTIAN REGIME THROUGH EGYPT'S DESPERATE NEED FOR THE LIBYAN ECONOMIC SUBSIDIES AND BY THE CAPABILITY OF THE PALESTINIANS AND THE MORE RADICAL ARABS FOR STIRRING UP STRONG ARAB NATIONALISTIC EMOTIONS WITHIN EGYPT AND ELSEWHERE IN THE ARAB WORLD. NO ARAB LEADER WHO WISHES TO STAY IN POWER CAN AFFORD TO IGNORE THESE EMOTIONS. IT IS THEREFORE POSSIBLE THAT A SUDDEN FLARE-UP OF ARAB/ISRAELI HOSTILITIES IN LEBANON OR SYRIA OR AN ESCALATION OF TERRORISM AND COMMANDO RAIDS INVOLVING ISRAEL AND LIBYA COULD DRAG EGYPT INTO WAR.

3. ON OTHER HAND, SADAT ALSO HAS DISINCENTIVES FOR A WAR WITH ISRAEL. FIRST AND FOREMOST IS FACT THAT EGYPT WOULD PROBABLY SUFFER FURTHER DEMORALIZING MILITARY DEFEAT WHICH COULD RESULT IN REPLACEMENT OF SADAT. MORE CONSERVATIVE ARAB STATES, LED BY SAUDI ARABIA, ARE APPARENTLY ADVISING SADAT TO AVOID WAR, AS, WE BELIEVE, ARE RUSSIANS WHO ARE STILL PRINCIPAL MILITARY SUPPLIERS FOR EGYPTIAN REGIME. WITHIN EGYPT WE SEE NO INCREASE IN ENTHUSIASM FOR A MILITARY ADVENTURE, AND THERE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY A NUMBER OF COOLER HEADS WHO ARE QUIETLY ADVISING SADAT TO AVOID HOSTILITIES ON GROUNDS THAT RENEWED FIGHTING WOULD NOT ONLY RESULT IN CONSIDERABLE



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DAMAGE TO EGYPTIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, BUT WOULD ALSO INTERFERE WITH EGYPT'S PLANS FOR OBTAINING FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND PROMOTING TOURISM.

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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 CAIRO 1421

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4. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN MIND OF SADAT IS EVIDENCE THAT UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION HAVE MADE PROGRESS TOWARDS THEIR OBJECTIVE OF ASSURING THAT MIDDLE EAST WILL NOT BECOME CAUSE OF MAJOR POWER CONFRONTATION. WHILE THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS NO DOUBT MADE SADAT UNHAPPY, HE PROBABLY REALIZES THAT HIS CAPABILITY OF INVOLVING VITAL US AND SOVIET INTERESTS THROUGH THE TRIGGERING OF HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL HAS BEEN REDUCED. HE MAY, IN FACT, SUSPECT THAT MAJOR POWERS WOULD NOW TURN THEIR BACKS WHILE ISRAELIS DESTROYED SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, PARTICULARLY IF HOSTILITIES WERE INITIATED INTENTIONALLY BY GOE.

5. BEST WAY FOR USG TO REDUCE LIKELIHOOD OF HOSTILITIES WOULD BE TO HELP SADAT FIND SOME FACE-SAVING WAY OUT OF PRESENT IMBROGLIO. A SETTLEMENT RECONCILING THE REQUIREMENTS OF EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY WITH THE SECURITY NEEDS OF BOTH ISRAELIS AND ARABS WOULD NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE IF BOTH SIDES WISHED TO ACHIEVE IT. IT PROBABLY CANNOT BE ACHIEVED, HOWEVER, IF ISRAELIS INSIST THAT ANNEXATION OF MAJOR PORTIONS OF ARAB TERRITORY IS THE ONLY WAY TO ASSURE ISRAEL'S FUTURE SECURITY. LEVEL OF FRUSTRATION WITHIN EGYPT WOULD ALSO BE REDUCED IF THERE WERE CREDIBLE INDICATIONS THAT USG MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL HAS AN UPPER CEILING AND THAT USG DOES NOT SUPPORT ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM. AS LONG AS USG APPEARS TO SUPPORT ISRAELI POLICY REGARDLESS OF ISRAEL'S OBJECTIVES, SADAT WILL SEE LITTLE CHANCE FOR A

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SETTLEMENT WITH HONOR.

6. IF HOSTILITIES BREAK OUT AND EGYPT SUFFERS ANOTHER MAJOR MILITARY DEBACLE, WE BELIEVE SADAT WOULD PROBABLY BE REPLACED BY A MILITARY REGIME OF OFFICERS WHO WERE LUCKY ENOUGH TO SURVIVE THE DEFEAT WITH REPUTATIONS STILL RELATIVELY INTACT. FRUSTRATION WITHIN EGYPT WOULD BE AS GREAT OR GREATER THAN IT NOW IS. WE DOUBT THAT EGYPTIANS WOULD BE ANY MORE WILLING TO CEDE LAND FORMALLY TO ISRAEL THAN THEY ARE AT PRESENT TIME. PRINCIPAL RESULTS WOULD BE REINFORCEMENT OF EXISTING NO-WAR, NO-PEACE SITUATION AND INCREASED ANTI-US SENTIMENT IN THE ARAB WORLD. EXISTING US INTERESTS IN EGYPT HAVE ALREADY BEEN REDUCED TO A HARD CORE, MOST OF WHICH WOULD SURVIVE ANOTHER ROUND OF HOSTILITIES, BUT LIFE WOULD BE DISAGREEABLE AND EVEN DANGEROUS FOR THOSE AMERICANS RESIDENT IN EGYPT DURING THE ACTUAL FIGHTING. WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO PREDICT HOW US OIL INTERESTS IN OTHER ARAB STATES WOULD BE AFFECTED, BUT EGYPT WOULD CERTAINLY DO ALL IT COULD TO INFLUENCE OTHER ARABS TO ACT AGAINST US OIL INTERESTS.

7. IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT THE EFFECT OF ANOTHER WAR ON SOVIET INTERESTS IN EGYPT. IT WOULD PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE RUSSIANS TO EXPLOIT IF THEY MOVED IN QUICKLY WITH REPLACEMENT MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND ECONOMIC AID. AT SAME TIME, EGYPTIANS WOULD BLAME RUSSIANS FOR THEIR MILITARY INADEQUACIES AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES WOULD CONTINUE TO BE UNPOPULAR IN CAIRO. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHICH GROUP OF MILITARY OFFICERS AROSE FROM THE ASHES OF DEFEAT TO ASSUME CONTROL OF EGYPTIAN REGIME. A RIGHTIST GROUP, PERHAPS CENTERING AROUND ZAKARIA MOHIEDDIN OR AHMED SADEK, COULD EMERGE AND ADOPT A POLICY OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE WEST; OR ALTERNATIVELY, A GROUP COULD FORM AROUND A FIGURE SUCH AS ALI SABRI, WHO WOULD PROBABLY UNDERTAKE A POLICY OF RAPPROCHEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION AS THE ONLY VIABLE MEANS OF PROCURING EGYPT'S BASIC ECONOMIC AND MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.

8. FOR FURTHER USINT COMMENTARY ON THESE ISSUES, SEE CAIRO 460, CAIRO 491, CAIRO 998, CAIRO 1014 AND CAIRO 1360.

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 1316

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG, XF
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND WAR IN MIDDLE EAST

REF: STATE 082526 (NOTAL), CAIRO 1291

SUMMARY: OUR SOUNDINGS WITH GOE AND DIPLOMATIC COL-
LEAGUES OVER PAST WEEK BEAR OUT SOMBER PICTURE OF
PROSPECTS AND EGYPTIAN ATTITUDES WHICH REDIES FOUND
A MONTH AGO. SADAT AND GOE AFFECT TO DESPAIR OF
US TAKING POSITION OR ROLE IN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
ACCEPTABLE TO EGYPT, YET, IN CURIOUS WAY, SEEM
EQUALLY DESPERATELY TO HOPE US WILL COME AROUND BEFORE
IT IS TOO LATE--MEANING PRODUCE SOME CHANGE IN ISRAELI
POSITION. GOE OFFICIALS SPEAK OF GRAVE SITUATION AND
ONLY REMAINING OPTION BEING MILITARY ACTION; DIPLO-
MATIC COLLEAGUES CLOSER TO GOE THAN WE ARE INCREASINGLY
TEND TO VIEW THAT THIS MAY EVENTUATE, EITHER BY AD-
MITTEDLY SELF-DESTRUCTIVE EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE, OR BY
ISRAELI PREEMPTIVE ACTION PROVOKED BY EGYPTIAN HRETORIC.
SOME ALSO SEE POSSIBILITY EGYPTIANS CONTRIVING TO
PROVOKE ISRAELIS INTO MOVING FIRST. END SUMMARY.

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1. ASHRAF GHORBAL, IN INFORMAL CONVERSATION, SOUGHT TO IMPRESS ME TWITH VERY SERIOUS NATURE OF PRESENT SITUATION AND HOW LITTLE ROOM SADAT HAS LEFT FOR POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH NEW MININFO GHALEB, HE GAVE WITHOUT ANY ENCOURAGEMENT FROM ME WHAT WITH HINDSIGHT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN FORETASTE OF SADAT'S MAY DAY SPEECH; HE RECAPITULATED EGYPTIAN VIEW OF POLITICAL EVENTS OF 1971 AND 72 CULMINATING IN DISILLUSIONMENT WITH US; NOW, ACCORDING TO GHALEB, SADAT IS GRADUALLY EXPENDING HIS POLITICAL OPTIONS; BUT HE STILL HOPES THE SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION WILL PRODUCE SOME CHANGE IN THE SITUATION (MEANING THE ISRAELI POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL). GHALEB ALSO WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE ANYTHING LEFT IN THE IDEA OF A PEACE CONFERENCE SUCH AS WALDHEIM HAS MENTIONED. MEANWHILE, HAFEZ ISMAIL IS GOING TO PARIS AND MADRID AND, GHALEB ASSERTED, EXPECTS TO MEET HENRY KISSINGER. (SOVIET AMBASSADOR VINOGRADOV, IN COURSE OF REMARKS DESCRIBED BELOW, ALSO ASSERTED AS FACT THAT HAFEZ ISMAIL AND KISSINGER WILL BE MEETING.)

2. MEANWHILE, ACCORDING TO GHALEB (AND ANY MODERATELY PERCEPTIVE OBSERVER), THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN EGYPT AND ESPECIALLY IN CAIRO IS DETERIORATING, SO THAT "SADAT HAS TO DO SOMETHING." UNLESS THE POLITICAL TRACK PRODUCES SOME CHANGE IN THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE, ONLY REMAINING CHOICE WILL BE BETWEEN SLOW DEATH AND FIGHTING, EVEN IF FIGHTING MEANS DEFEAT. I OBSERVED TO GHALEB THAT NO GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING USG, CAN BE PUT IN POSITION OF HAVING TO ACT IN RESPONSE TO PUBLIC THREATS, AND THAT USG WANTS TO DO WHAT IT CAN FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, BUT ITS CAPACITY TO BE HELPFUL WOULD BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING. THEREFORE, I SUGGESTED, IT IS TIME TO COOL SOME OF THE RHETORIC AND EASE THE PATH OF NEGOTIATION, ESPECIALLY SECRET NEGOTIATION. THE TROUBLE WITH PEACE CONFERENCE SUGGESTIONS IS THAT THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT ALL THE PARTIES WOULD TURN UP, MUCH LESS DO SERIOUS BUSINESS IN SUCH A PUBLIC SETTING. GHALEB RESPONDED

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THAT SADAT AND GOE COULD ONLY COOL THINGS NOW IF THEY SAW THE PROSPECT OF AN OUTCOME THEY CAN LIVE WITH.

3. (COMMENT: GHORBAL AND GHALEB ARE, OF COURSE, IN THE BUSINESS OF PURVEYING INFORMATION FOR SADAT AND GOE; EVEN ALLOWING FOR THIS, HOWEVER, ONE IS IMPRESSED BY THEIR GLOOM.)

4. JUST HOW GOE PLANS TO HANDLE FORTHCOMING SC GO-ROUND IS NOT YET CLEAR. IT MAY BE RELEVANT THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR VINOGRADOV TOLD ME AT POLISH RECEP-TION FOR GA PRESIDENT TREPCZYNSKI THAT HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION NOT TAKE MATTERS BACKWARDS. HE THOUGHT JARRING WILLING TO STICK WITH IT DESPITE HIS DISAPPOINTMENTS; HE MENTIONED RE-STARTING 4-POWER TALKS (I DISCOURAGED THIS) AND RE-HEARSED WELL-KNOWN SOVIET AND EGYPTIAN VIEWS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UN SETTING FOR SEEKING A SETTLEMENT. YET VINOGRADOV, LIKE EVERYBODY ELSE, WOUND UP ASKING WHAT US IS GOING TO DO THAT'S NEW.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 2 CAIRO 1316

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5. SAUDI AMBASSADOR NAZIR AND ETHIOPIAN AMBASSADOR ANDOM SAY THAT SADAT IS GOING TO MEET KING FEISAL AND ATTEND OAU 10TH ANNIVERSARY MEETING IN ADDIS FOR AT LEAST A DAY. NAZIR IS TRYING TO WORK OUT WHETHER FEISAL STOPS IN CAIRO ON HIS WAY TO PARIS, WHERE HE IS EXPECTED MAY 14, OR WHETHER SADAT GOES TO SAUDI ARABIA BEFORE THAT DATE, OR ON HIS WAY TO ADDIS. NAZIR THINKS BOTH SADAT AND FEISAL REGARD IT IMPORTANT THAT THEY MEET (ALTHOUGH AS INDICATED BELOW, FOR PERHAPS OPPOSITE REASONS). ANDOM SAID THAT WHEN HE TOOK HIM'S MESSAGE TO SADAT INVITING HIM TO ADDIS, SADAT SAID HE STILL HAS A BAD HEART AND WONDERS WHETHER HE SHOULD UNDERTAKE THE TRIP TO THAT ALTITUDE, BUT IN THE END SAID HE WOULD.

6. FRENCH, BRITISH AND SAUDI AMBASSADORS ALL FEEL THAT UNLESS THERE IS SOME BREAK ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, THERE WILL BE AN OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING, STARTED EITHER BY EGYPT (IN THIS SET, AFTER SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IF IT IS STERILE, BUT POSSIBLE JUST BEFORE OR DURING IT TO GET EVERYBODY'S ATTENTION) OR, MORE OMINOUSLY, BY ISRAEL. NAZIR ESPECIALLY PROFESSES


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TO READ MRS. MEIR'S STATEMENTS, AND THE PLAY THEY ARE GETTING IN EUROPE, AS HERALDING PROSPECT OF AN ISRAELI PREEMPTIVE STRIKE STIMULATED BY EGYPTIAN RHETORIC AND MILITARY MOVEMENTS, ON THE MODEL OF 1967. CANADIAN AMBASSADOR STANSFIELD SAYS EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS IN CAIRO THINK ISRAELIS WILL START THE SHOOTING; THESE DIPLOMATS FORESEE IT HAPPENING IN JUNE.

7. NAZIR, ALWAYS WELL-CONNECTED WITH THE PRESIDENCY HERE AND NORMALLY CHEERFUL, SAYS THAT SADAT IS FEELING INCREASINGLY DESPERATE AND HAS TO DO SOMETHING. NAZIR THINKS SADAT HOPES A MILITARY ACTION COULD BE KEPT ON A SMALL SCALE. HE ALSO MAKES MUCH OF STORIES HE SAID ARE CIRCULATING IN BEIRUT THAT NOT ONLY THE ISRAELIS BUT EVEN THE AMERICANS ARE WILLING TO HAVE A FIGHT BREAK OUT, TO TAKE EGYPT DOWN A FEW MORE PEGS AND, IN THIS THEORY, MAKE THEM MORE LIKELY TO KNUCKLE UNDER. I DISCLAIMED ANY SUCH AMERICAN VIEW AND EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF CEASEFIRE HOLDING IF DIPLOMATIC TRACK IS TO HAVE ANY PROSPECT OF SUCCESS.

8. NAZIR SAID FEISAL THINKS THE RHETORIC AND THE SITUATION HAVE TO BE COOLED AND WANTS TO DO WHAT HE CAN TO INFLUENCE SADAT IN THAT DIRECTION; ONE ADVANTAGE FEISAL SEES TO TALKING TO SADAT BEFORE HE TALKS TO POMPIDOU IS TO PUT POMPIDOU IN A POSITION TO TAKE HIS VIEWS TO PRESIDENT NIXON. (AGAIN, ALL ROADS LEAD TO WASHINGTON.) BUT NAZIR SAYS THAT, FROM VIEWPOINT OF PERSUASIVENESS WITH SADAT, COUNSELS OF RESTRAINT SO FAR HAVE NOT SHOWN HIM A POLITICALLY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO HOSTILITIES, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE LATTER; WHAT HE IS LOOKING FOR IS HELP, NOT RESTRAINT. I REPEATED TO NAZIR AT SOME LENGTH RATIONALE FOR KEEPING THE PEACE.

9. INCIDENTALLY, NAZIR THINKS SADAT IS GRADUALLY DISTANCING HIMSELF FROM THE SOVIETS; HIS INTEREST IN WESTERN-EUROPEAN-ASSISTED DEFENSE PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN EGYPT IS ONE EVIDENCE OF THIS. NAZIR SAID HE THOUGHT SADAT MIGHT EVEN ABROGATE SECURITY TREATY WITH SOVIETS, BUT DID NOT PRESS THIS POINT WHEN I EXPRESSED



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DOUBT.

10. POSTSCRIPT: BRITISH AMBASSADOR ADAMS SAYS THAT WHEN HE SAW ZAYYAT LAST WEEK HE FOUND HIM GLOOMY AND SEEING NO PROSPECT FOR ANYTHING BUT RENEWED FIGHTING. THIS CONVERSATION WAS OCCASIONED BY ZAYYAT CALLING ADAMS IN TO BRACE HIM ABOUT AFP REPORT OF MAARIV STORY THAT RAF HAD SPOTTED MIRAGES AND HUNTERS ON EGYPTIAN AIRFIELDS. ZAYYAT'S QUESTIONS TO ADAMS WERE: WHAT IS RAF DOING FLYING OVER EGYPT AND WHY DID HMG TELL ISRAEL? (ZAYYAT DID NOT ADDRESS HIMSELF TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE QUESTION OF WHEREABOUTS OF THE AIRCRAFT.) ADAMS PREEMPTIVELY DENIED AFP STORY. IN TELLING ME OF THIS, ADAMS ADDED THAT HMG DOES NOT IN ANY EVENT NEED RAF TO HELP THEM KNOW THAT THE MIRAGES AND HUNTERS--FROM IRAQ--HAVE BEEN AT TANTA.

11. ADAMS ALSO SAYS THAT AS PART OF FCO POST MORTEM ON LAST SECURITY COUNCIL EXPERIENCE, SPECIALLY ITS STRESSES IN US/UK RELATIONS, PARSONS HAS CALLED FOR NEW IDEAS FROM BRITISH AMBASSADORS IN MIDDLE EAST, AS PRELIMINARY TO CONSULTING AMERICAN AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS BEFORE NEXT SC MEETING.

12. ACCOUNT OF MY MAY 3 CONVERSATION WITH ZAYYAT IN SEPTEL.
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S E C R E T CAIRO 1180

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR EG LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN MIRAGES IN EGYPT

REF: USDAO TEL AVIV 568 DTG 131455Z APR 73

1. WHILE IDF INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS AND OTHER SOURCES AVAILABLE TO USG ALL INDICATE THAT SIZEABLE NUMBER OF LIBYAN MIRAGES HAVE BEEN FLOWN TO EGYPT, OUR FRENCH DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES ARE STILL EXPRESSING SKEPTICISM OF PRESS REPORTS CONCERNING MIRAGE TRANSFERS. ONE POSSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS WOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ADVANCE OPERATIONAL BASES FOR MIRAGES IN EGYPT. BULK OF MIRAGES COULD STILL BE KEPT IN LIBYA WITH SMALLER NUMBERS TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED TO EGYPTIAN BASES ON ROTATIONAL BASIS FOR TESTING GROUND ENVIRONMENT AND FOR TRAINING IN EGYPTIAN OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES. MARCH AIRLIFT BETWEEN LIBYA AND EGYPT COULD THEN BE EXPLAINED, AT LEAST PARTIALLY, AS TRANSFER OF MIRAGES GROUND ENVIRONMENT AND OTHER MIRAGE LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS. WITH MOST LIBYAN MIRAGES STILL IN LIBYA, GOL WOULD HOPE TO BE IN A POSITION TO CONCEAL OPERATION OR AT LEAST TO DENY PLAUSIBLY THAT THEY HAD TRANSFERRED MIRAGES TO EGYPT. THEY MIGHT ALSO HOPE THAT THIS STRATEGEM WOULD AVOID MAJOR CONFRONTATION WITH GOF WHICH COULD LEAD TO CANCELLATION OF FUTURE MIRAGE DELIVERIES ON GROUNDS THAT PLANES WERE TRANSFERRED OUT OF LIBYA

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WITHOUT GOF PERMISSION.

2. IN CASE OF OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, BULK OF MIRAGES COULD BE QUICKLY MOVED TO EGYPT IF TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS SO WARRANT. OVERFLIGHT OF MIRAGES BASED IN EGYPT OVER EGYPTIAN CITIES COULD ALSO BE USED BY SADAT AS PROPAGANDA PLOY AT SOME FUTURE DATE AS PART OF A STRATEGY OF MOBILIZING EGYPTIAN PUBLIC AND HEATING UP SITUATION IN AREA.

3. ASSUMING ALL THIS IS TRUE, WE HAVE NO WAY OF JUDGING WHETHER GOF AGREEMENT WAS OBTAINED IN ADVANCE OR IF IT WAS OBTAINED AT ALL. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT GOF COULD REMAIN UNAWARE OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT FOR LONG, ALTHOUGH GOF MIGHT STILL ATTEMPT TO DENY TO GOVT OF ISRAEL AND USG THAT TRANSFERS HAD ACTUALLY TAKEN PLACE.

4. WE ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.

WILEY

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S E C R E T CAIRO 1116

EXDIS//NOFORN

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPU
SUBJECT: LIBYAN MIRAGE TRANSFER TO EGYPT

REF: USDAO TEL AVIV 0553 121429Z APR 73

1. REFTEL REPORTS THAT EIGHT MIRAGE-5 AIRCRAFT FLEW FROM WHEELUS TO EGYPTIAN AIR BASE AT BIRMA ON APRIL 10, AND IAF NOW CONVINCED THAT AIRLIFT BETWEEN LIBYA AND EGYPT WAS IN SUPPORT OF LIBYAN MIRAGE-5 DELIVERIES TO EGYPT. IT OCCURS TO US THAT TRANSFER OF LIBYAN MIRAGES TO EGYPT ALONG WITH RUMORED TRANSFER OF LIGHTNINGS TO EGYPT FROM KUWAIT OR SAUDI ARABIA COULD BECOME JUSTIFICATION FOR GOI DECISION TO LAUNCH PREEMPTIVE STRIKE ON EGYPTIAN AIRFIELDS WITH OBJECT OF KNOCKING OUT THE MIRAGES.

2. WHILE ISRAELIS MIGHT VIEW SUCH A MOVE AS MEANS OF "SOFTENING UP" SADAT TO MAKE HIM MORE AMENABLE TO ISRAELI TERMS ON NEGOTIATIONS, IT SEEMS MORE LIKELY TO US THAT AN AIRSTRIKE ON EGYPT AT THIS TIME WOULD FURTHER ENFLAME EGYPTIAN PASSIONS, MAKE MODERATE COURSE IN UN AND OTHER FORA MORE DIFFICULT FOR EGYPT, AND FURTHER POSTPONE DAY WHEN EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP COULD NEGOTIATE REASONABLE SETTLEMENT TO OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE FURTHER FUEL TO ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT NOW RUNNING HIGH AS RESULT OF ISRAELI BEIRUT RAID.

3. EMBASSY TEL AVIV MAY WISH TO COMMENT.

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S E C R E T CAIRO 1029

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR MCAP MOPS YE YS
SUBJECT: YARG REQUEST FOR URGENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE

REF: STATE 60629

1. WHILE WE HAVE NOT HAD OCCASION TO DISCUSS YAR-PDRY SITUATION WITH SENIOR EGYPTIANS, WE BELIEVE THAT CAIRO WOULD BE GUIDED BY THREE PRINCIPAL CONSIDERATIONS IF SUBJECT WERE BROUGHT TO THEIR ATTENTION EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH ARAB LEAGUE:

A. DESIRE TO DAMP DOWN ALL INTRA-ARAB CONFLICTS THAT TEND TO DIVERT ARAB ENERGIES FROM WHAT THEY CONSIDER CENTRAL PROBLEM OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES.

B. DESIRE TO AVOID MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH THEIR FINANCIAL BACKERS, LIBYA AND SAUDI ARABIA.

C. DESIRE TO PLAY LEADERSHIP ROLE WITHIN ARAB WORLD.

2. THESE CONSIDERATIONS WOULD PROBABLY LEAD EGYPT TO SUPPORT YAR INITIALLY IN CASE OF UNPROVOKED ATTACK BY PDRY. WE BELIEVE EGYPT WOULD THEN ATTEMPT TO PLAY MEDIATING ROLE IN HOPE OF RESTORING PEACE AND ENHANCING EGYPTIAN AUTHORITY AMONG ARAB COUNTRIES. GREENE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 0951

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG, US, IS
SUBJECT: DEBORCHGRAVE/SADAT INTERVIEW

REF: CAIRO 0950

1. IN REFTEL WE REPORT DEBORCHGRAVE INTERVIEW WITH SADAT. ITS MINATORY TONE CANNOT IN PRUDENCE BE IGNORED. IT MAY BE THAT SADAT IS TRYING TO FORCE US HAND WITH COMBINATION OF INNUENDO AND BRAVADO; WHETHER OR NOT HE ACTUALLY INTENDS TO START A FIGHT, IT IS PRETTY CLEAR HE WANTS USG TO THINK HE DOES.

2. SADAT'S VERSION OF ANTECEDENTS OF HAFEZ ISMAIL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IS ENTIRELY NEW TO ME. IF THERE IS ANY FOUNDATION IN FACT FOR SADAT'S VERSION, OR IF FACTS ARE OTHERWISE, I FEEL I MUST HAVE THE FULL STORY IF I AM TO BE IN A POSITION EFFECTIVELY TO REPRESENT US VIEWPOINT WITH GOE. KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS BEFORE DEBORCHGRAVE'S STORY APPEARS IN PRINT WILL BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT.
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 0934

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PFOR, YE, EG
SUBJECT: ARAB GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION

REF: CAIRO 869, TEL AVIV 2294, BEIRUT 2701

1. HEREWITH SOME FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON WHERE WE ARE HEADING ON THE ISSUES OF TERROR AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AS SEEN FROM CAIRO.

2. THERE IS NOTHING VERY NOVEL ABOUT THE CURRENT CONFIGURATION OF THE ME PROBLEM OR EVEN THE LOCAL RHETORIC IN WHICH IT IS EXPRESSED, EXCEPT PERHAPS ITS INTENSITY. THE CENTRAL ISSUES AS THEY AFFECT EGYPTIAN POLICY ARE AS WE SPELLED OUT IN CAIRO 491 (NOTAL), TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN 1967 WITH WHAT EGYPTIANS DESCRIBE AS US SUPPORT, AND THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS. WE SUGGEST THAT WHAT IS NEEDED TO ARREST A DRIFT TO GREATER VIOLENCE, TO

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MORE CONFRONTATION AND LESS NEGOTIATION, IS A FORTH-RIGHT EXPRESSION OF A POSITIVE US VIEW ON THESE ISSUES.

3. THE IDEAS SET OUT BELOW ON AN EXPRESSION THAT WOULD HAVE THIS EFFECT PROCEED FROM THE HYPOTHESES THAT A PEACE IN ME ACCEPTABLE TO THE CONTESTANTS HAS TO BE DEVISED BY THEM IF IT IS TO BE DURABLE, AND THAT SUCH A PEACE IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE US BROADLY CONCEIVED. FACT THAT THE WORD "PEACE" MEANS DIFFERENT THINGS TO DIFFERING ARABS AND ISRAELIS COM-PLICATES ACHIEVING ACCEPTABILITY, BUT DOES NOT IN-VALIDATE THE HYPOTHESES.

4. AN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FOR US POLICY IS THAT EVENTS SINCE MID-FEBRUARY HAVE RESULTED IN THE US AND THE CONTESTANTS BEING PUSHED INTO CONFRONTATION ON NARROW, NEGATIVE ISSUES, WHEN WHAT WE WANT IS TO PUSH THE CONTESTANTS INTO NEGOTIATION ON BROAD, AFFIRMATIVE PRINCIPLES. TO CONTAIN, RATHER THAN CONFRONT, THOSE IN ISRAEL AND IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS THEIR CONSTITUENTS IN OUR OWN AND OTHER BODIES POLITIC, WHO BLOCK THE PATH OF NEGOTIATION, WE NEED TO ESTABLISH FOR ALL CONCERNED THAT THERE IS A BETTER FUTURE THAN STRIFE AND CONFLICT: OBVIOUS AS THIS MAY BE TO AMERICANS, IT IS NOT OBVIOUS TO MANY ON BOTH SIDES WHO HAVE A STAKE IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CON-FLICT.

5. I ACKNOWLEDGE THE COMPLEXITIES FOR US POLICY, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN DEALING WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND THE ISSUES, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE ENORMOUS DISPARITY IN THE CONSTITUENCIES FOR THE OPPOSING POINTS OF VIEW IN THE BODY POLITIC OF THE US. MOREOVER, THE VIABILITY AND PRIORITIES OF OUR NATIONAL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES FOR OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD (INCLUDING THE US ITSELF), IN TERMS OF OUR EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES, ARE OFTEN AFFECTED BY THESE CONSTITUENCIES' PERCEPTIONS OF OUR PROGRAMS AND POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. NEVERTHELESS, IT SEEMS FROM CAIRO THAT THE BEST PROSPECT OF OVERRIDING THE CURRENTLY CONFLICTING PRES-SURES, AND ARRESTING AN INEXORABLE EVOLUTION OF RHETORIC

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TO MORE PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, OVERT AND TERRORIST, IS AN AUTHORITATIVE, POSITIVE ASSERTION OF US NATIONAL IN-TEREST AND POLICY ON THE ISSUES BEFORE US. PARADOXICALLY, PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE MAY ALSO BRING MORE TERROR, BUT THE ARABS WHO HAVE TO DEAL WITH THEIR VICIOUS BRETHREN MAY BE BETTER DISPOSED TO DO SO IF THE US POSTURE AND IMAGE IS AN ASSET RATHER THAN A BURDEN TO THE EFFORT.

6. AS WE HAVE SEEN (CAIRO 859, 869, ROME 23051), EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN GOVERNMENTS CONTINUE PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITIONS ON OPPOSITION TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THEIR TERRITORY AND US SUPPORT THEREOF. THIS ENABLES THEM TO FINESSE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE--BOTH OUR CONCERN FOR CONTAINING PALESTINIAN TERROR AND THE SHARED CONCERN FOR "THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS." TO GET THEM TO FACE UP TO BOTH THE TERRITORIAL AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUES, WE HAVE SOMEHOW TO CONVEY THAT US MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IS NOT UNLIMITED; TO MAKE THIS TOLERABLE IN ISRAEL, WE HAVE TO CONVEY CONTINUING CONCERN FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY. SECURITY AGAINST WHOM OR WHAT? IN THE END, BOTH SIDES--ARAB (INCLUDING PALESTINIAN) AND ISRAELI--HAVE TO FIND INTEGRITY AND SECURITY IN THE ARRANGEMENT IF THERE IS TO BE ONE.

7. EVEN THE NOTION OF BALANCE MIGHT NOT BE PERSUASIVE IN EGYPT WITHOUT EVIDENT, CONCRETE CONCERN FOR THE PALESTINIANS. WHAT ARE THEIR LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS? WHO IS TO DETERMINE THIS ANYWAY? IF NOT THE FATAH/BSO TYPES, THE "GOOD" PALESTINIANS AND OTHER ARABS NEED SOMETHING MORE PALPABLE THAN THEY HAVE NOW TO LOOK FORWARD TO, AND THEIR "OBLIGATION" TO STAND BY THE "BAD" PALESTINIANS HAS TO BE RELIEVED.

8. THE ELEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN FUTURE THAT IS MOST CONSPICUOUSLY LACKING TODAY IS A PLACE TO LIVE--A HOMELAND. THE US MUST FOR ITS PART ADDRESS THIS ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY AND INTEGRITY OF ISRAEL

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EXDIS

AND JORDAN. BUT CAN WE NOT EXPRESS OUR SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPTS OF KING HUSSEIN'S PLAN FOR THE WEST BANK, EITHER DIRECTLY OR BY INFERENCE? WE WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO HEDGE THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM, BUT THAT COULD BE LEFT WHERE IT IS FOR THE TIME BEING. THE MAJOR GAIN WOULD BE THAT THE GOOD PALESTINIANS WOULD HAVE SOMETHING GOING FOR THEM IN TAKING ON THE BAD ONES, AND SO WOULD THE OTHER CONFRONTATION STATES--EGYPT AND SYRIA.

9. THIS KIND OF STATEMENT COULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY OTHER MOVES CALCULATED TO DEPRIVE THE FATAH/BSO OF THEIR POLITICAL BASE. WE COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ARABS' OWN WEAKNESSES, FOREMOST AMONG THEM THEIR PROPENSITY FOR INTERNECINE CONFLICT AND THEIR DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING HOMOGENEOUS LOYALTY PATTERNS TOWARDS ANY ORGANIZATION. GRAFT IS WIDESPREAD IN THE ARAB WORLD AND SECRETS ARE USUALLY NOT KEPT FOR LONG. THESE WEAKNESSES CAN BE EXPLOITED BY INTENSIFIED EFFORTS TO PENETRATE THE TERRORISTS GROUPS, PROMOTE DIVISIONS WITHIN

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THEM, AND COLLECT INTELLIGENCE FOR SUBSEQUENT POLICE ACTIONS. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY A JOB FOR PROFESSIONAL POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE MEN IN COOPERATION WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES IN OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHO HAVE A PARALLEL INTEREST IN CONTROLLING ARAB TERRORISM. IT IS ALSO A JOB THAT SHOULD BE DONE COVERTLY.

10. MEANWHILE, WE SHOULD AVOID OVERT HEAD-ON ATTACKS ON THE EXTREMISTS OR ON THOSE WHO SUPPORT THEM, BECAUSE THESE GENERALLY FORCE THE GOOD AND THE BAD TO CLOSE RANKS.

11. EVEN AFTER WE HAVE SIGNALED BOTH A LIMIT ON SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL AND SYMPATHY FOR THE PALESTINIANS, THE TERRITORIAL CRUNCH WITH EGYPT (AND SYRIA) WOULD HAVE TO BE MET. BUT IT WOULD BE IN MORE LIMITED FORM AND THERE MIGHT JUST BE ROOM TO DEAL WITH IT, AS WE SUGGESTED IN CAIRO 491.

12. WHAT, SPECIFICALLY, TO DO? ONE COURSE FOR THE USG WOULD BE TO DO AND SAY LITERALLY NOTHING. JUST STOP TALKING ABOUT "MIDDLE EAST PEACE," ABOUT THE PROCESS OF ACHIEVING IT, ABOUT THE BALANCE OF POWER, ABOUT WHAT PEACE MEANS, ABOUT HOW THE CONTESTANTS CAN OR SHOULD COPE WITH THE OPPOSITION IN THEIR OWN RANKS. THIS WOULD GET THE ATTENTION OF THOSE IN THE ARAB WORLD WHO TAKE OUR EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN WITH PEACE TO MEAN IT IS WORTH MORE TO US THAN TO THEM, SO THEY DON'T HAVE TO PAY, WE WILL. IT WOULD ALSO GET THE ATTENTION OF BOTH ISRAELIS AND ARABS WHO ACT AS IF THEY TAKE UNLIMITED US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL FOR GRANTED. IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT, HOWEVER, EXCEPT OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, GET THEM TO LOOK TO EACH OTHER FOR "PEACE."

13. ANOTHER WAY WOULD BE TO RISE--RHETORICALLY AND IN FACT--ABOVE THE STRUGGLE AND TUMULT, TO A BROAD STAND ON PRINCIPLES THAT ARE GOALS RATHER THAN LIMITS FOR POLICY AND ACTION, AND THAT ARE ASSETS TO THOSE WHO SEEK AN HONORABLE AND SECURE WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT BIND. THIS COULD BE STARTED PERHAPS BEST BY A CONGRESSIONAL JOINT RESOLUTION, OR BY A STATEMENT AT THE HIGHEST EXECUTIVE LEVEL, ALONG THE LINES THAT UNITED

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STATES MIDDLE EAST POLICY IS DIRECTED TO PROMOTING THE CONDITIONS OF A PEACE AMONG ALL THE PEOPLES LIVING IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH ASSURES THEIR SECURITY, TRANQUILITY, AND PROGRESS, IN MUTUAL RESPECT FOR THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF ALL; THAT EFFORTS BY ANY NATION OR GROUP TO PURSUE DIFFERENT ENDS BY MEANS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE ARE INHERENTLY SELF DEFEATING AND WILL NOT HAVE US SUPPORT; BUT THAT SUCCESS IN THE PATH OF PEACE WILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIPS--ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL, AS WELL AS POLITICAL AND SECURITY--BETWEEN THE US AND ALL THE PEOPLES AND STATES OF THE M.E. A FAVORABLE REFERENCE TO THE HUSSEIN PLAN COULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS CONTEXT.

14. IN SHORT, RESTATE THE AFFIRMATIVE CONCEPTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S FEBRUARY 1972 FOREIGN POLICY REPORT RE THE M.E. THERE MIGHT BE SOME SKEPTICISM, EVEN CYNICISM, ABOUT WHAT SUCH A STATEMENT IMPLIED FOR US ACTION AND PROGRAMS, ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO ISRAEL. WE WOULD OVER THE TIME HAVE TO PROVE THE PUDDING BY THE EATING. IN THE MEANTIME, IT WOULD HOPEFULLY CAUSE LEADERS ON ALL SIDES OF THE ARGUMENT TO PAUSE LONG ENOUGH TO THINK WHETHER THEY ARE ADEQUATELY IN TUNE WITH THE US TO SERVE THEIR OWN INTERESTS, AND WHETHER THEY SHOULD NOT STOP TRYING TO PUSH US AROUND IN BEHALF OF THOSE INTERESTS.

15. IF THE HYPOTHESES IN PARA 3 ABOVE ARE INVALID, THEN OF COURSE THESE CONCLUSIONS ARE ALSO INVALID.

16. RE TEL AVIV 2294, WE SAY "HEAR, HEAR."

17. SINCE FOREGOING DRAFTED, WE HAVE SEEN IN MARCH 28 WIRELESS FILE EXCERPTS FROM SECRETARY RICHARDSON'S STATEMENT TO SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. THIS HAS MUCH OF THE CONTENT WE INTEND TO SUGGEST. AS WE KNOW, HOWEVER, GOE REACTS AGAINST EXPLICIT INTENT TO DISCOURAGE RESUMPTION OF OPEN CONFLICT, BECAUSE THIS SHOWS US AS DEPRIVING THEM OF THE CREDIBLE MILITARY OPTION THEY THINK IS IMPORTANT TO THEIR POSITION IN A DIALOGUE ABOUT PEACE: TO THIS EXTENT, OUR MAKING THIS POINT TENDS TO GET IN THE WAY OF BROADER EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

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S E C R E T CAIRO 0869

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, XF, EG
SUBJECT: ARAB GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION

REF: CAIRO 859

1. HEREWITH OUR REFLECTIONS ON THE MOTIVES AND IMPLICATIONS OF HAFEZ ISMAIL'S RESPONSE TO MY REPRESENTATION ON PEACE AND TERROR.

2. GOE IS VERY ANGRY INDEED OVER REPORTS OF FURTHER US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL AND THE MOTIVES FOR IT DESCRIBED BY FBAN. COMING SO SOON AFTER HAFEZ ISMAIL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, THESE REPORTS (WITH THE EMBELLISHMENTS PROVIDED BY THE ISRAELI PRESS--TEL AVIV 2177) HAVE PUT SADAT ON THE DEFENSIVE AGAINST THOSE ARABS IN EGYPT AND ELSEWHERE WHO SAID ISMAIL SHOULD NOT HAVE GONE. IT WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH WHAT WE KNOW OF SADAT AND HIS CRITICS FOR THEM TO PARLAY THEIR RESENT-

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MENT INTO A THEORY THAT THE VISIT WAS HANDLED TO SET EGYPT (OR SADAT PERSONALLY) UP FOR REPORTS OF ANOTHER ROUND OF AIRCRAFT DELIVERIES, CALCULATED TO EMBARRASS SADAT. SADAT IS ALL TOO QUICK TO SEE MALICIOUS INTENT IN MANY THINGS. IN ANY EVENT, THE REPORTED EGYPTIAN NOTE TO OTHER ARABS (CAIRO 853) IS CONSISTENT WITH ISMAIL'S STATEMENTS TO ME AND FURTHER DOCUMENTS INTENSITY OF EGYPTIAN FEELING: THE DIALOGUE AT THE PRESIDENCY EXCEEDED MY EXPECTATIONS (CAIRO 799) ONLY IN ITS INTENSITY.

3. IT IS INTERESTING, HOWEVER, THAT HAFEZ ISMAIL, FOR ALL THE OUTRAGE AND REJECTION OF A CONNECTION BETWEEN GOE RELATIONS WITH TERRORISTS AND US RELATIONS WITH EGYPT, DID NOT SAY WHAT GOE WILL OR WILL NOT DO ON THE ISSUES I RAISED. HE FINESSED MY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGITIMATE PALESTINIANS AND TERRORISTS, AND COUNTERED WHAT HE CALLED AL ULTIMATUM WITH AN ATTACK ON THE US-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP. NEEDLESS TO SAY, HE LEFT UNSPOKEN ANY INFERENCE THAT IF THE US REDUCED ITS SUPPORT OF ISRAEL, EGYPT WOULD REDUCE ITS SUPPORT OF PALESTINIANS, GOOD OR BAD. HE ALSO LEFT UNTOUCHED QUESTIONS OF THE CAPACITY AND WILL OF GOE TO IMPOSE RESTRAINTS ON TERRORISTS. INDEED, THE WHOLE PERFORMANCE, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, MAY BE PART OF A TACTICAL EFFORT TO IDENTIFY AND COPE WITH TERRORISTS WITHOUT ADMITTING IT TO THE USG OR EXPOSING THEMSELVES TO CONFRONTATION WITH OTHER ARABS. INTERESTINGLY, THE MARCH 23 CAIRO PRESS MAKES NO REFERENCE TO MY DISCUSSION WITH ISMAIL. IF AS WE HOPE BRITISH (LONDON 3346) AND PERHAPS GERMANS WEIGH IN, REACTION THEY GET WILL BE INSTRUCTIVE FOR ALL OF US.

4. A SIDE EFFECT, INCIDENTALLY, OF ISMAIL'S STRONG MEDICINE IS THAT IT TENDS TO HAMPER THE EFFORT FONMIN ZAYYAT HAS RECENTLY BEEN MAKING IN DISCOURSE TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN EGYPT'S PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF THE OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY BY ISRAEL IN 1967 AND JORDAN'S PROBLEM ARISING OUT OF THE CREATION OF ISRAEL IN 1948-49.

5. ON THE LONGER TERM ISSUE OF PEACE, ISMAIL'S COUNTER



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ATTACK (AND THE CURRENT PRESS CAMPAIGN) REAFFIRM IN EMOTIONAL TERMS THE CONNECTION EGYPT MAKES BETWEEN PROSPECTS OF DIALOGUE AND US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. ISMAIL DID NOT DENY THAT EGYPT SEEKS PEACE--HE ONLY SAID THE US AND ISRAEL ARE BLOCKING THE WAY. THE PUBLIC REFERENCE TO "A NEW, SERIOUS PHASE," THE CALL FOR ARAB COUNTRIES TO "SHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES" IN THE NEXT MEETING OF THE ARAB CHIEFS OF STAFF, IS MILITANT RHETORIC OF CONFRONTATION WITH US AND ISRAEL, REINFORCED BY THE PROMINENCE GIVEN TO REPORTS OF THE C-130 AS A "SPY PLANE." NEVERTHELESS, SO FAR THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EGYPTIAN MILITARY FORAY SEEMS NEITHER GREATER NOR LESS THAN LAST MONTH.

6. WHAT TO DO? IN GENERAL, BATTEN DOWN THE HATCHES AND RIDE OUT ANOTHER ROUGH PERIOD IN EGYPTIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS. THE TURBULENCE SO FAR IS POLITICAL AND RHETORICAL, AND THEY KNOW HOW SERIOUSLY WE WOULD REGARD RESORT TO VIOLENCE. CARRY ON OUR NORMAL ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS IN CAIRO, INCLUDING CULTURAL AND LOCAL-CURRENCY PROGRAMS, UNLESS WE ARE TOLD TO STOP. WATCH FOR, BUT DO NOT PRESS FOR, SIGNS OF GOE POLICY ON TERRORISM AND TERRORISTS. WE ALSO SUGGEST THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY KEEP ALL ITS EYES AND EARS WELL TUNED TO ORDER OF BATTLE ON SUEZ FRONT, MILITARY MOVEMENTS BETWEEN LIBYA AND EGYPT, AND RELATED ATR BASES, AND SHARE THE TAKE WITH US.
GREENE



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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 0859

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, XF, EG
SUBJECT: ARAB GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION

REF: STATE 51645, CAIRO 853, 841, 840

SUMMARY: IN MEETING WITH HAFEZ ISMAIL MARCH 22, I STATED USG CONTINUES TO SEARCH FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE BASED ON SC RES 242 AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF PALESTINIANS, AND TAKES SERIOUS VIEW OF BSO/FATAH TERROR ACTIVITIES AND ARAB GOVERNMENT SUPPORT THEREOF. HAFEZ ISMAIL STERNLY REJECTED "ULTIMATUM", SAID THAT GOE WILL NOT TURN AWAY FROM PALESTINIANS, CONSIDERS USG REJECTS 242, IS ACCUSTOMED TO UPS AND DOWN IN RELATIONS WITH USG AND IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A DOWN NOW. HAFEZ ISMAIL MADE FREQUENT REFERENCE TO BRIEFING PAPER HE HAD, SO HIS COMMENTS MUST BE TAKEN AS DELIBERATE. THEY ARE ALSO CONSISTENT WITH CONFRONTATION BUILDING UP IN CAIRO PRESS OVER US MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL; ANY PUBLICITY OF MY TALK WITH ISMAIL WILL BE ONE GAUGE OF HOW FAR GOE INTENDS TO GO WITH THIS. END SUMMARY.

1. AS USUAL, WABHA WAS PRESENT WHEN I CALLED ON HAFEZ ISMAIL AND TOOK NOTES. I OPENED BY SAYING THAT WE HAD THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TAKE STOCK OF SITUATION IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE ISMAIL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. SECRETARY ROGERS AND OTHERS OF

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USG HAD BEEN GRATIFIED BY THE FRIENDLY TONE THAT HAD CHARACTERIZED HIS CONVERSATIONS AND THAT HE HIMSELF HAD MENTIONED PUBLICLY. WE RECOGNIZE THAT WELL-KNOWN DIFFERENCES IN VIEWS ABOUT HOW TO ACHIEVE PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBORS HAD BEEN RESTATED, BUT THERE SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN NO DIFFERENCE ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF A PEACE BASED ON SC RESOLUTION 242 THAT WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS. SINCE THEN, THE TRAGEDY AT KHARTOUM HAD GIVEN RISE TO OTHER ISSUES, BETWEEN THOSE WHO WANT PEACE AND THOSE WHO DO NOT, AND BETWEEN THOSE WHO PRACTICE AND SUPPORT TERROR AND THOSE WHO OPPOSE IT.

2. I SAID THAT AS HE PERHARS KNEW, I HAD EXPLAINED TO GOE THAT USG UNDERSTANDS THE ARAB AND PALESTINIAN VIEW, AND HAS MADE CLEAR ITS CONCERN THAT PEACE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT PALESTINIANS' LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS. ELIMINATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL IS NOT A LEGITIMATE ASPIRATION, AND THE FATAH/BSO FOLLOWERS WHO RESORT TO TERROR IN SUPPORT OF THEIR VIEW ARE RESORTING TO MEANS THAT ARE NOT LEGITIMATE IN PURSUIT OF A GOAL THAT WE ALSO REGARD AS NOT LEGITIMATE. AS US REPRESENTATIVES HAVE EXPLAINED TO OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS, USG, RESPONSIVE TO THE STRONG PUBLIC FEELING IN US, TAKES A SERIOUS VIEW OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND OF THE FACILITIES AND SUPPORT, INCLUDING MONEY AND COMMUNICATIONS, THAT SOME ARAB GOVERNMENTS PROVIDE; INDEED, USG VIEW OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THOSE GOVERNMENTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE WAYS THEY DEAL WITH THE BSO/FATAH AND THEIR KIND. AS HE WOULD HAVE LEARNED FROM KHALIL'S REPORTS, USG HAD NOTICED THAT GOE HAD NOT ITSELF CONVEYED CONDOLENCES OR REGRETS OVER KHARTOUM. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE MANY EXPRESSIONS OF SORROW AND REGRET THAT HAD BEEN MADE TO ME.

3. I REITERATED THAT WE ASSUME GOE CONTINUES TO SHARE OUR CONCERN FOR PURSUING THE PATH OF PEACE.

4. HAFEZ ISMAIL SAID THAT IF THIS PURPORTED TO BE A TAKING OF STOCK OF EVENTS SINCE HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON, IT OMITTED VERY IMPORTANT ONE: MRS. MEIR'S VISIT. GOE HAS ONLY PRESS REPORTS TO GO ON REGARDING NATURE

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AND EXTENT OF US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. HE ASKED WHAT I COULD TELL HIM IN THIS REGARD.

5. I SAID THAT AS HAD BEEN NOTED IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY ROGERS, AND AS HAD BEEN SAID TO KHALIL, US POLICY OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IS A WELL KNOWN CONSTANT. WE DO NOT DISCUSS DETAILS; THE 515 MILLION DOLLAR FIGURE THAT HAD BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS IS AN ISRAELI FIGURE WHICH WOULD OF COURSE BE SUBJECT TO NORMAL US EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATION. WE DO NOT REGARD OUR SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL AS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURSUIT OF AN EFFORT TO MOVE TOWARD PEACE IN THE CONTEXT OF 242, AND THUS MAKE NO APOLOGY FOR IT. WE BELIEVE THAT SOME DIALOGUE OR PROCESS, EVEN INDIRECT, ENGAGING ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBORS IS ESSENTIAL TO MOVING TOWARD PEACE, AND THE US CONTINUES TO BE AVAILABLE IN THAT CONTEXT.



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6. HAFEZ ISMAIL READ FROM A REPORT OF EBAN'S MARCH 17 PRESS CONFERENCE, ATTRIBUTING TO HIM EXPRESSIONS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE CONTINUITY OF AMERICAN SUPPORT AND THE VIEW THAT THIS SUPPORT PROVIDES A DETERRENT TO OTHERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HOW, HE ASKED, WOULD I EXPLAIN THAT STATEMENT?

7. I SAID THAT ONE OF THE THINGS THE SECRETARY HAD SAID TO HIM IN WASHINGTON HAD SERVED TO GIVE EXPRESSION TO A FEELING THAT I HAD DEVELOPED IN THE YEAR AND MORE I HAD BEEN IN CAIRO, AND THAT IS THAT EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS SOMETIMES ADDRESS ME AS IF I WERE A MEMBER OF OR SPOKESMAN FOR THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT COMMENT ON EBAN'S REPORTED STATEMENT, BUT I COULD ASSURE HIM THAT THE USG VIEW IS AS I HAD STATED IT.

8. HAFEZ ISMAIL SAID HE WONDERED WHAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WOULD SAY IF THE GOE MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ABOUT USG POLICY; HE ASSUMED MR. BRAY WOULD QUICKLY COMMENT, BUT HE WAS UNAWARE OF ANY COMMENT ON EBAN'S STATEMENT.

9. THERE ENSUED A PAUSE WHILE HE CONSULTED HIS BRIEFING PAPER AND READ THE NOTES OF MY COMMENTS AT THE BEGINNING OF OUR TALK. HE THEN SAID THAT I HAD MADE A VERY SERIOUS STATEMENT. I NODDED. HE SAID, "I REJECT THIS ULTIMATUM;" THE GOE WILL NOT TURN AWAY FROM THE PALESTINIANS NOR ACCEPT REGULATION OF ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHERS IN TERMS OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS. I HAD MENTIONED COMMUNICATIONS; AS WE KNEW, THEY USE THE RADIO HERE.

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THE GOE IS ACCUSTOMED TO UPS AND DOWNS IN ITS RELATIONS WITH USG AND IS ABLE TO LIVE THROUGH A "DOWN" NOW. "THIS IS ALL I HAVE TO SAY."

10. AFTER ANOTHER PAUSE, I SAID THAT HIS STATEMENT ALSO WAS A SERIOUS ONE: HE NODDED. I SAID IT HAD NOT SEEMED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF AN IMPORTANT POINT IN MY COMMENTS, NAMELY THE DISTINCTION WE MAKE BETWEEN THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS, AND PURSUIT THEREOF BY LEGITIMATE MEANS, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE ILLEGITIMATE PURSUIT OF OTHER ASPIRATIONS, ON THE OTHER HAND.

11. WITH CONSIDERABLE VIGOR, NOT TO SAY ANGER, HAFEZ ISMAIL SAID, "DO YOU NOT SUPPORT ISRAEL IN ITS AGGRESSION AGAINST US?" HE CONCLUDED A BRIEF ELABORATION OF THIS POINT WITH THE FURTHER STATEMENT, THAT "YOU REJECT RESOLUTION 242," "YOU LET US DOWN IN 1969, 1971, 1972," AND REPEATED, "DO YOU OR DO YOU NOT SUPPORT ISRAELI AGGRESSION?" I SAID THAT I HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE USG SUPPORTS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACE BASED ON RESOLUTION 242 AND THAT I COULD ONLY RECALL WHAT HE HAD SAID A FEW MINUTES BEFORE, AND SAY IT MYSELF, "I HAVE NOTHING MORE TO SAY."

12. AS HE SAW ME TO THE DOOR, HAFEZ ISMAIL SAID WITH APPROPRIATE STERNNESS, "PLEASE CONDUCT YOUR TALKS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY FROM NOW ON."

13. COMMENT: WE WANT TO REFLECT FURTHER BEFORE ATTEMPTING COMMENT ON THIS CONVERSATION. HAFEZ ISMAIL WAS OBVIOUSLY CAREFULLY BRIEFED FOR IT, SO IT WAS NO FLASH IN THE PAN. NOR, OF COURSE, ARE THE CONTINUING REPORTS IN THE PRESS (CAIRO 840, 853) OF EGYPTIAN AND ARAB LEAGUE EFFORTS TO MUSTER ARAB OPINION AGAINST THE US RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL.

14. I LEAVE TO THE DEPARTMENT WHETHER TO REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO OTHER INTERESTED POSTS. PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHETHER YOU DO.
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S-1652

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

'73 MAR 16 PM 1:09

SECRET 193

PAGE 01 CAIRO 00799 161352Z

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
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P R 161210Z MAR 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2746
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E EC R E T CAIRO 0799

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, XF, EG
SUBJECT: ARAB GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION

REF: CAIRO 766, STATE 46941

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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SUMMARY: HEREWITH RECAPITULATION OF WHERE WE HAVE GOT AND WHERE WE MAY HAVE PROSPECT OF GETTING WITH OUR REPRESENTATIONS IN CAIRO ON BSO. PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS SO FAR ARE THAT GOE PROBABLY HAS THE MESSAGE; HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE HIGHLY SENSITIVE TO PUBLIC INDICATIONS OF "PRESSURE" FROM US; AND REACTS SUBJECTIVELY TO REPORTS OF US SUPPORT TO ISRAEL, THUS REDUCING PROSPECT OF ANY, AND CERTAINLY ANY VISIBLE, STEPS AGAINST TERRORISTS IN EGYPT. END SUMMARY.

1. USINT OFFICER HAS SEEN ACTING FONMIN HATEM'S MEMORANDUM OF MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM MARCH 13; COPIES SENT TO THE PRESIDENCY AND THE FONOFF. MEMO RECORDED I HAD CALLED WITH MESSAGE FROM USG RE BSO KHARTOUM OPERATION TO EFFECT THAT BSO IS A WING OF FATAH AND THAT SUPPORT FOR BSO OPERATIONS BY ANY ARAB GOVERNMENT WOULD COMPLICATE ANY US EFFORTS TO FIND A SETTLEMENT TO ME CRISIS. NOT A WORD ABOUT THE EFFORT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS AND ILLEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES OF BSO, NOR ABOUT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS, AND JUST THE HIGHLY COMPRESSED VIEW OF CONNECTION BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR BSO AND USG PEACE POLICY THAT WE HAD SOUGHT TO AVOID. ALTHOUGH CAIRO PRESS REPORTED SEVERAL OTHER DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENTS FOR HATEM THAT DAY, THERE WAS NO REPORT OF MY MEETING WITH HIM. THIS IS SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE SIGN, IN THAT INFERENCE OF PRESSURE IS AVOIDED.

2. WE HAVE SENT OUR USUAL INTERLOCUTORS IN THE PRESIDENCY, FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND ARAB LEAGUE COPIES OF CONGRESSMAN HAMILTON'S VERY USEFUL SIX-POINT STATEMENT OF MARCH 13 (WIRELESS FILE NESA 24).

3. AS REPORTED SEPTELS, ARAB LEAGUE SECGEN MAHMOUD RIAD, AT LEAST IN PUBLIC, IS CONTINUING EFFORTS TO PATCH THINGS UP BETWEEN SUDAN AND PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS, AND PERHAPS TO LIMIT TERROR TO NON-ARAB TARGETS AND SETTINGS. WE INFER, BUT CANNOT DOCUMENT, THAT IN THESE EFFORTS MAHMOUD RIAD IS TAKING SOME OR ALL OF HIS CUES FROM GOE. IT WOULD NOT HELP EITHER HIM OR GOE FOR US TO BE SEEN PUBLICLY TO BE ADDRESSING HIM ON THE SUBJECT, BUT PRIVATE, INFORMAL PRESENTATION OF STRENGTH

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OF OUR VIEWS COULD HELP.

4. MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THIS, HOWEVER, AS WITH APPROACHING PRESIDENCY TO MAKE SURE IT GETS FULLER FLAVOR USG VIEWS, IS INTERVENTION OF REPORT OF FURTHER US ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL IN AIRCRAFT AND AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION (CAIRO 785 NOTAL). WE HAVE IT INFORMALLY BUT AUTHORITATIVELY (GHORBAL) THAT PRESIDENCY WAS DISMAYED BY THIS REPORT, ESPECIALLY IN CONTEXT THEY THOUGHT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY HAFEZ ISMAIL TALKS IN WASHINGTON. THEIR CONCERN WAS INCREASED BY THE THOUGHT THAT PRINCIPAL TARGET OF F-4'S AND A-4'S IS EGYPT. IN MY JUDGMENT , WE CANNOT USEFULLY GO TO THE PRESIDENCY TO TALK ABOUT EGYPTIAN SUPPORT OF FATAH/PSO TERROR IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS REPORT. THE EFFORT WOULD LEAD STRAIGHT TO FRUITLESS ARGUMENT ABOUT WHO IS SUPPORTING WHOM AND WHY. WHILE IT CANNOT, OF COURSE, BE PROVEN THAT LIMITATION OF US SUPPORT TO ISRAEL WOULD LEAD TO LIMITATION OF EGYPTIAN SUPPORT FOR MILITANT PALESTINIANS, ALLEGEDLY CONTINUING US SUPPORT TO ISRAEL REDUCES SADAT'S RECEPTIVITY TO OUR ARGUMENTS FOR LIMITING EGYPTIAN AID TO TERRORISTS. THIS MAY NOT SEEM LOGICAL, BUT IT IS SADAT'S KIND OF POLITICS, ANTIDOTE WOULD BE FACTUAL REFUTATION OF THE NY TIMES STORY ABOUT AIRCRAFT.

5. IN ANY EVENT, WE MAY NEVER KNOW WHETHER AND IF SO TO WHAT EXTENT GOE ACTS TO DENY THE HOSPITALITY OF CAIRO TO RESIDENT AND TRANSIENT PALESTINIAN MILITANTS OR TO DENY THEM MATERIAL WHEREWITHAL. THERE ARE DOUBTLESS STRONG VOICES IN GOE ARGUING THAT WHATEVER GOE MAY DECIDE TO DO IN ITS OWN INTERESTS IN THESE REGARDS, IT SHOULD NEVER ACKNOWLEDGE THEM TO USG, MUCH LESS LET THEM BECOME PUBLIC. NOW THAT SUBJECT IS ACTIVE IN NAC AND EC FORA, WITH ATTENDANT POSSIBILITY OF LEAKS AND PROBABILITY OF PUBLICITY IF ANY OR ALL EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ACTUALLY DO ANYTHING, PROBLEM OF PRESERVING THE SILENCE ESSENTIAL TO EFFECTIVE GOE ACTION IS COMPOUNDED. THIS IS NOT OF COURSE A REASON FOR NOT ENGAGING THE EUROPEANS IN THE EFFORT, BUT SIMPLY A REMINDER OF THE HAZARDS INVOLVED.

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6. WE HAVE TRIED TO THINK OF STEPS USG MIGHT TAKE ON ITS OWN TO HARASS OR OTHERWISE INHIBIT FATAH/BSO. ONE PROBLEM IS THAT SUCH STEPS MIGHT FORCE EGYPT AND OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO SHOW THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIANS. ONLY IDEA WE COME UP WITH SO FAR (AND IT IS NOT FREE OF AFOREMENTIONED PROBLEMS) IS JAMMING VOICE OF PALESTINE (WHICH BUYS AIR TIME FROM RADIO CIAOR), ESPECIALLY AT RECEIVERS IN LEBANON, LIBYA AND SYRIA. WITH ALL THE ASSETS USG HAS ASHORE, AFLOAT AND ALOFT IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, ASSUME THE TECHNOLOGY OF SUCH JAMMING WOULD BE MANAGEABLE.
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SECRET 212

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46 2
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
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P R 131240Z MAR 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2729
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
USINT ALGIERS
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AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
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'73 MAR 13 AM 8 07

S E C R E T CAIRO 0766

EXDIS

Z.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, XF, EG
SUBJ: ARAB GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION

REF: STATE 42486, 42539, 44811, 44852

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

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SUMMARY: I CALLED ON ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER (DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF INFORMATION) HATEM ON MARCH 13 TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS PRESCRIBED REF-TELS. THERE WAS NO ONE ELSE PRESENT. HATEM SAID HE WOULD INFORM GOE AND WE CAN BE SURE LATTER WISHES TO CONTINUE COOPERATE IN ASSURING SECURITY OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL AND PREMISES IN EGYPT. END SUMMARY.

1. I SAID I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EXPLAIN THE SERIOUS VIEW USG TAKES OF BSO AND ITS ASSOCIATES, AND OF SUPPORT THEY MIGHT RECEIVE FROM ARAB GOVERNMENTS. THIS EXPLANATION IS BEING MADE BY AMERICAN CHIEFS OF MISSION TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ARAB NATION.

2. THE US GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS THE ARAB VIEW GENERALLY AND THE FORCE OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE IN THE ARAB WORLD, IN ITS CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL. THE US HAS MADE CLEAR ITS SYMPATHY FOR THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS AND ITS POLICY THAT ANY SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT MUST TAKE THESE AS-PIRATIONS INTO ACCOUNT. BSO ACTIVITIES, MOST LATELY IN KHARTOUM, HAVE ALREADY HARMED THE ARAB CAUSE AND THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. FURTHER INCIDENTS WILL ONLY CAUSE MORE HARM; WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PURSUIT OF LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS BY MEANS THAT ARE NOT LEGITIMATE CAN OR WILL BE TOLERATED.

3. I SAID US PUBLIC OPINION AND EMOTION HAVE BEEN SHOCKED BY THE KHARTOUM AFFAIR. GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY, USG POLICY IS RESPONSIVE TO THESE OPINIONS AND EMOTIONS AND INDEED WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS SUPPORT OR GIVE HOSPITALITY OR FACILITIES TO THE BSO, FATAH, AND THEIR ILK. WE INCLUDE PROVISION OF FUNDS, PASSPORTS, COM-MUNICATIONS FACILITIES, INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND RADIO, AMONG THE KINDS OF SUPPORT WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE DENIED TO THEM. WHAT ARAB GOVERNMENTS DO OR DO NOT DO IN THESE RESPECTS WILL HAVE AN EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THOSE GOVERNMENTS.

4. IN THIS CONNECTION, I SAID US GOVERNMENT KNOWS THAT BSO IS LINKED TO FATAH; LATTER IS THEREFORE

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EMBRACED IN OUR VIEW OF THESE MATTERS.

5. BOTH FATAH AND BSO SEEM TO BE OUT TO DIVERT ALL OF US FROM THE PATH TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS PRECISELY TO DENY THEM SUCCESS IN THIS EFFORT THAT USG REGARDS IT AS IMPORTANT THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHICH ALSO PURSUE THAT GOAL NOT BE DIVERTED EITHER. I SAID WE CONSIDER EGYPT HAS A SPECIAL ROLE IN THE ARAB NATION, BY ITS SIZE AND LEADERSHIP, AND THEREFORE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY. USG UNDERSTANDS THAT GOE HAS DIFFICULTIES AND WE DO NOT WANT TO COMPOUND THEM. WE HAVE WELCOMED INDICATIONS THAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF US-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS CAN IMPROVE; WHAT GOE DOES OR DOES NOT DO REGARDING TERROR AND ITS PERPETRATORS WILL INEVITABLY HAVE A BEARING ON THIS FOR THE USG. THE US, I REPEATED, WANTS TO MOVE ALONG THE PATH OF PEACE.

6. CONCLUDING, I REFERRED TO MY OWN AND MY ASSOCIATES' CONVERSATIONS WITH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ASSURING SECURITY OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL AND PREMISES IN EGYPT. I SAID WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE COOPERATION WE HAVE HAD AND LOOK FORWARD TO ITS CONTINUANCE.

7. HATEM SAID ONLY THAT HE WOULD REPORT WHAT I HAD SAID TO HIS GOVERNMENT. AS REGARDS SECURITY, WE COULD BE SURE THAT GOE IS CONCERNED AND WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE IN NECESSARY MEASURES. I SAID I WOULD OF COURSE BE AVAILABLE TO DISCUSS FURTHER ANY OF THESE MATTERS IF GOE SO DESIRED.

8. COMMENT: ON HIS RECENT PUBLIC RECORD, I WOULD HAVE EXPECTED HATEM TO TAKE ISSUE WITH SEVERAL CARDINAL POINTS OF THE PRESENTATION: HE IS ONE OF THE SHARPEST DENOUNCERS OF THE US IN THE GOE. FOR THIS REASON, POLITICS AS WELL AS THE PROPRIETIES ARE SERVED BY HAVING MADE THE PITCH TO HIM IN FIRST INSTANCE. WE SHALL WATCH FOR INDICATIONS, PUBLIC OR PRIVATE, THAT HE REPORTS ACCURATELY TO THE GOE AND, IF NECESSARY TO ASSURE CLARITY AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, WILL REPEAT THE MESSAGE CLOSER TO THEM. IT WOULD BE REALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT SUCH MEASURES AS GOE TAKES AGAINST BSO/FATAH

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WILL NOT BE PUBLICIZED, UNLESS, PERHAPS, BSO FEELS SO PINCHED
THAT IT COMPLAINS PUBLICLY.
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 00731 121035Z

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
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FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2720

S E C R E T CAIRO 0731

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, XF, EG
SUBJ: ARAB GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION

REF: STATE 44852 AND 44811

1. MANY THANKS FOR HELPFUL FURTHER GUIDANCE IN REFTELS. ACTING FONMIN HATEM HAS SET MY CALL ON HIM FOR 1:00 P.M. CAIRO TIME MARCH 13.

2. WE ARE REPORTING BY SEPTEL GOE STATEMENT MARCH 11 DENYING THEY ARE ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS. THIS LOOKS LIKE EFFORT FEND OFF FATAH AND BSO.
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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
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P R 101045Z MAR 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2717
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
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'73 MAR 9 AM 9:29

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 0724

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, XF, EG
SUBJ: ARAB GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION

REF: STATE 42486, 49539; CAIRO 683

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1. PURSUANT STATE 42486, I AM SEEKING APPOINTMENT WITH ACTING FONMIN HATEM TO KEEP OUR VIEW OF THE ISSUES IN THE AFTERMATH OF KHARTOUM CLEARLY BEFORE GOE. FOR REASONS DISCUSSED IN CAIRO 683 (NOTAL) AND ELABORATED BELOW: 1) I PLAN UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE TO AVOID MAKING EXPLICIT THREATS OR STATEMENTS ABOUT WHAT USG MAY OR MAY NOT DO IF BSO/FATAH ARE NOT RESTRAINED; 2) I SUGGEST DEPT SEEK TO ENLIST SUPPORT OF EC COUNTRIES IN THESE REPRESENTATIONS, VIA THEIR MARCH 12-16 MEETINGS IN ROME, AND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED ALSO TO CONVEY OUR CONCERNS DIRECTLY TO SECGEN OF ARAB LEAGUE.

2. AS SUGGESTED IN CAIRO 683, I ASSUME IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE AS SURE AS WE CAN THAT WHAT WE SAY AND DO WITH GOE, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, SERVES THE LONG TERM PURPOSES OF ACHIEVING A NEGOTIATED ME PEACE, AS WELL AS THE INTERMEDIATE PURPOSE OF DENYING TO BSO FACILITIES IN EGYPT. THESE ARE ANTITHETICAL PURPOSES, AND THE ANTITHESIS IS COMPOUNDED BY THE OBVIOUSLY CONFLICTING PRESSURES THE BESET, BELEAGUERED AND EMBARRASSED GOE IS UNDER FROM US, ON ONE HAND, AND FROM THE PALESTINIANS AND THEIR FRIENDS ON THE OTHER.

3. INCIDENTALLY, IT DOES NOT IN EGYPT SERVE OUR LONG TERM INTERESTS NOR INDEED THE PURPOSES TO WHICH STATE 42486 IS DIRECTED, WHEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAYS, AS QUOTED IN THE MARCH 8 WIRELESS FILE, THAT "OUR BASIC PURPOSE IS TO RAISE THE PRICE WHICH ASSASSINS CAN EXPECT TO PAY." I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THAT TO BE OUR PURPOSE; IF IN FACT IT IS, THEN WE NEED A DIFFERENT KIND OF APPROACH TO AT LEAST GOE AND PERHAPS OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS. ESPECIALLY WHEN MADE IN PUBLIC, THAT STATEMENT TENDS TO EVOKE AN ESCALATION OF VENGEANCE AND VIOLENCE FROM WHICH ON THE RECORD OF THE LAST SIX MONTHS, THE BSO FANATICS DO NOT QUAIL.

4. NOR DOES IT SERVE US PURPOSES AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM IN CAIRO TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN AT VIOLENCE SOLELY IN TERMS OF BLACKMAIL, IN WHICH "THEY WILL LOSE." FROM BSO POINT OF VIEW, AS WE ESTIMATE IT, THEY THINK

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THEY WIN IF INDISCRIMINATE ASSASSINATION AND TERROR INTERRUPT THE PROCESSES OF PEACE AND FORCE THE LEADERS OF GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED IN THOSE PROCESSES TO TURN AWAY FROM EACH OTHER AND FROM US.

5. I HYPOTHESIZE THAT LONG TERM US PURPOSE IN RELATIONSHIP TO GOE IS TO ENTICE SADAT AND COMPANY INTO A DIALOGUE ABOUT THE TERRITORIAL ISSUES BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE PURPOSES OF BSO AND FATAH ARE DEMONSTRABLY THE ANTITHESIS OF OURS. IF WE WANT GOE TO BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR PURPOSES RATHER THAN TO THOSE OF BSO-FATAH, EVEN PRIVATELY AND SECRETLY, WE HAVE TO FIND WAYS TO SHOW THEM THAT GOING WITH US IS, IN TERMS OF THE RESULTS, WORTH THE RISKS ENTAILED. LATTER ARE THE PROSPECT OF TERROR BEING DIRECTED AGAINST THEM (AND DIPLOMATS IN CAIRO) AND THE LOSS OF FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT OF OTHER ARAB STATES. NUMEIRY'S MARCH 6 SPEECH HAS DOCUMENTED FOR ALL ARABS AND THE WORLD WHAT BSO WILL DO BY WAY OF RETRIBUTION TO A REGIME THEY THINK HAS SOLD THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE OUT, ESPECIALLY TO THE US. THE LESSON AND THE DILEMMA ARE COMPOUNDED FOR EGYPT BY THE IDENTIFICATION OR AT LEAST ASSOCIATION OF LIBYA WITH THE OPERATION: IT IS WITH LIBYA THAT SADAT IS COMMITTED TO MERGING EGYPT, IT IS ON LIBYA THAT HE DEPENDS FOR A LOT OF HIS CASH, AND IT IS QADDAFI WHO, WITH ARAFAT, IS PUBLICLY CALLING ON SADAT TO STAND WITH THE MILITANTS AGAINST A US CAMPAIGN AGAINST THEM.

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14
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
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P R 101045Z MAR 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2718
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 CAIRO 0724

EXDIS

6. HOW THIS HAS OPERATED OVER THE LAST WEEK IN CAIRO IS ILLUSTRATED BY TWO VIGNETTES RELIABLY SHARED WITH US BY COLLEAGUES: AS LATE AS SUNDAY MORNING, MARCH 4, FOLLOWING MY DISCUSSION WITH FAHMAY AT FOREIGN OFFICE ON MARCH 3 (CAIRO 656), THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE PRESIDENCY BOTH THOUGHT THAT TEXTS OF MESSAGES OF CONDOLENCE FROM PRESIDENT SADAT TO PRESIDENT NIXON,

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AND FROM MINISTER ZAYYAT TO SECRETARY ROGERS, HAD BEEN CLEARED FOR TRANSMISSION. WE ARE NOT SURE WHAT THEN HAPPENED, BUT THERE IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL INFERENCE THAT SIDKY AND THE PEOPLE CLOSEST TO HIM IN THE CABINET GOT THEM STOPPED.

7. THE OTHER VIGNETTER IS THAT ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL MAHMOUD RIAD'S SUGGESTION THAT ARAFAT GO TO KHARTOUM HIMSELF ON FRIDAY WAS CONTAINED IN A STRONGLY WORDED MESSAGE FROM RIAD DIRECTLY TO ARAFAT, IN WHICH RAID DEVELOPED THE THESIS THAT THE KHARTOUM OPERATION WAS DOING MORE FOR SUPPORT OF ISRAEL THAN ANYTHING ANYONE ELSE COULD DO.

8. AGAIN I SUGGEST THAT UNLESS WE ARE VERY CAREFUL IN WHAT WE SAY, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, WE RUN CONSIDERABLE RISKS OF UNDERMINING PEOPLE HERE WHO WANT TO GO WITH US AND OF LETTING THE IMPRESSION GROW THAT BSO-FATAH WILL WIND UP COMPELLING EVERYONE'S CONDUCT, INSTEAD OF THE OTHER WAY AROUND.

9. IN THE SPECIFIC CASE OF EGYPT, WHAT WE BELIEVE GOE WANTS FROM USG IS A POLICY THAT COMPELS THE CONDUCT OR AT LEAST THE ATTITUDE OF ISRAEL ON THE TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF PEACE. THEIR DESIRE FOR THIS GIVES US SOME LEVERAGE IN PRESSING FOR AT LEAST SECRET MEASURES AGAINSTTHE FEDAYEEN IN EGYPT; BUT QADDAFI'S AND ARAFAT'S MESSAGES TO SADAT ILLUSTRATE THE COUNTER PRESSURES. UNLESS OR UNTIL WE ARE READY TO ADOPT THE KIND OF POLICY THE GOE HOPES FOR, THE BEST HOPE OF PERSUADING SADAT, ET AL, TO KEEP THE PEACE OPTION OPEN (OR AT LEAST OF AVERTING FURTHER ESTRANGEMENT) LIES IN JUDICIOUS MIXTURE OF MAKING CLEAR OUR OWN DETERMINATION NOT TO LET BSO CALL THE TUNE, OUR UNDERSTANDING OF EGYPTIAN DELEMMA EVEN THOUGH WE CANNOT ACCEPT ITS RESOLUTION IN FAVOR OF TERROR, AND CARE NOT TO MISLEAD GOE ABOUT WHAT OUR PEACE POLICY IS OR MAY BECOME. TO DO SO NOW WOULD BUT POSTPONE TO LATER DATE A SHARPER CONFRONTATION ON ISSUES OF BOTH PEACE AND TERRORISM.

10. THEREFORE IN CONVEYING THE MESSAGE IN STATE 42486, I PROPOSE TO LIMIT IT TO PARAGRAPHS ONE AND TWO,

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AND THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES OF PARAGRAPH 3. THE THIRD SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH THREE IS IMPLICIT IN OUR WHOLE APPROACH, BUT IF MADE EXPLICIT CARRIES A STRONG "OR ELSE" IMPLICATION THAT UNLESS GOE HANDLES THE PROBLEM WITH BSO-FATAH IN WAYS TO OUR LIKING, WE WILL TURN AWAY. I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS WILL SERVE IN THE LONG RUN TO HELP ENTICE GOE EITHER INTO A NEGOTIATING SITUATION OR TO TAKING ON THE BSO.

11. FOR ANALOGOUS REASONS, IT IS DESIRABLE NOT TO PUT TOO FINE A POINT ON THE THOUGHT IN PARA 4 RE THE EFFECT OF BSO ON "USG'S TASK IN SEEKING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT." AGAIN, THIS IS IMPLICIT IN THE GENERAL APPROACH, AND UNLESS THERE IS IN FACT SOMETHING NEW I CAN SAY ABOUT WHAT THE US PLANS TO DO, IT WOULD AVOID THE POTENTIALLY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF MISLEADING THE GOE ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS TO OMIT PARAGRAPH 4 FROM PRESENTIATION HERE AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE.

12. REMAINING POINTS CAN OF COURSE BE BUTTESSED BY DESCUSSION OF EVIDENCE THAT FATAH IS LINKED WITH BSO, AS DISCUSSED IN STATE 42539. WE HAVE IN FACT BEEN GETTING EVICENCE OF THESE LINKS TO THE EGYPTIANS THROUGH ESTABLISHED CHANNELS FOR SOME DAYS.

13. REGARDING THE OVERALL SCENARIO, ROME 1751 (REPEATED CAIRO AS STATE 41849) PROMPTS THE SUGGESTION THAT, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF ALL THE EFFORTS GOE HAS BEEN MAKING TO CULTIVATE EUROPEANS AND ESPECIALLY MEMBERS OF EC, LATTER COULD PERFORM A USEFUL SERVICE AT THIS STAGE BY AGREEING DURING THEIR MEETINGS MARCH 12-16 TO MAKE TO THE EGYPTIANS AND OTHERS THE SUB-STANTIVE POINTS THAT US IS MAKING. THIS NEED NOT, AND PROBABLY SHOULD NOT, BE DONE IN EXPLICIT CONCERT WITH OUR REPRESENTATIONS, BUT THE IDEA WOULD BE TO HAVE THE EGYPTIANS GET THE MESSAGE FROM OTHERS WHOSE VIEWS AND SUPPORT THEY VALUE. HOW MUCH THEY VALUE MEDICI, FOR EXAMPLE, IS SUGGESTED BY THE FACT THAT ZAYYAT STARTED HIS PRESENT TOUR IN ASIA WITH A SIDE TRIP FOR LUNCH WITH MEDICI IN ROME (ROME 1840).

14. IT COULD ALSO BE USEFUL, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE NOT WITHOUT SOME PROBLEMS AND EVEN RISKS, FOR ME TO MAKE

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THE SAME PITCH THAT I MAKE TO GOE TO MAHMOUD RIAD. HIS WILLINGNESS, IN PRIVATE, TO TAKE ON FATAH, AND THE PUBLISHED FACT THAT SEVERAL ARAB GOVERNMENTS ARE ADDRESSING THEMSELVES TO HIM IN THE CURRENT PHASE, SUGGEST THAT HE COULD USEFULLY USE IN HIS DIALOGUES AN AUTHORITATIVE EXPRESSION OF THE USG POINT OF VIEW. THIS COULD BE DONE INFORMALLY, IN THE CONTEXT OF MY INFORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH RIAD, RATHER THAN AS A COMMUNICATION FROM USG TO THE ARAB LEAGUE, IF THE DEPARTMENT AGREES.
GREENE

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SECRET 894

Scowcroft
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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
--- 102399

P R 171015Z FEB 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2598
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

'73 FEB 17 AM 10:42

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 0491

EXDIS

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST PEACE: EGYPT'S POLICY

REF: CAIRO 460

1. IT MAY BE USEFUL AT THIS TIME TO RECAPITULATE WHAT WE KNOW OR CAN INFER ABOUT THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT'S VIEW OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE ARE SEVERAL RECENT SIGNS BOTH OF SADAT'S CONCERN THAT CURRENT IMPASSE IS HURTING AND OF FLEXIBILITY, OR AT LEAST MANEUVERABILITY, IN HIS SEARCH FOR AN HONORABLE, PEACEFUL WAY OUT. ONE CAN HARDLY EXPECT HIM TO DISCLOSE ALL HIS HAND RIGHT NOW; WE SUBMIT FOLLOWING MUCH-DISTILLED REFLECTIONS AS A SORT OF BASE LINE FROM WHICH TO GAUGE NEXT PHASES OF US AND EGYPTIAN POLICY AND ACTION.

2. AS THEY HAVE EVOLVED OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, THE GOE'S STRATEGY AND TACTICS TODAY ARE A FUNCTION OF TWO SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS: EGYPTIAN TERRITORY, AND EGYPT'S PERCEPTION OF HOW PALESTINIANS AND OTHER ARABS WHOSE SOLIDARITY EGYPT VALUES VIEW THE FUTURE OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE. ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL VIA A PEACE AGREEMENT IS ONE ASPECT OF THIS. IT IS PRUDENT TO ASSUME THAT WHAT SADAT AND CO. SAY ARE THEIR POLICY AND STRATEGY, REALLY ARE; IT IS INSTRUCTIVE AND POSSIBLY REWARDING TO TRY TO LOOK BEHIND THE RHETORIC FOR THE REALITY.

3. ON THE CENTRAL ISSUES, SADAT CONSIDERS THAT EGYPT

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HAS ACCEPTED ISRAEL AS A NATION STATE: THEREFORE, WHILE THIS MAY LEAVE AN ISSUE BETWEEN HIM AND LEADERS OF THE PALESTINIANS AND OF SOME ARAB STATES, AS IT IS BETWEEN THE LATTER AND ISRAEL, IT IS NOT AN ISSUE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL NOR BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY OF NATIONS.

4. SADAT WANTS AND NEEDS PEACE, BUT HE DOES NOT NEED IT AT THE PRICE OF AN EXPANSIVE ISRAEL. HE ACCEPTS AND RECOGNIZES THE INTEGRITY OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE AREA ENCOMPASSED WITHIN ISRAEL'S BORDERS AS OF JUNE 1967: ANY DOUBT ON THIS SCORE WAS, HE CONSIDERS, DISPELLED BY EGYPT'S ACCEPTANCE OF SC RES. 242 AND THEIR REPLY TO THE JARRING MEMORANDUM IN FEBRUARY 1971. THAT SOME OTHER ARABS--AND SOME EGYPTIANS TOO--CONSIDER THAT REPLY TO HAVE GIVEN AWAY AN IMPORTANT NEGOTIATING ASSET IN THE EFFORT TO OBTAIN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE 1967 BORDERS, IS A MAJOR REASON WHY THE GOE CURRENTLY STANDS FAST IN INSISTING ON "COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL" AS A SINE QUA NON OF THE PEACE THEY ARE READY TO CONCLUDE. AS ONE OF THEM HAS SAID, THEY CANNOT DISCUSS RECOGNITION OF ISRAELI'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI RECOGNITION OF EGYPT'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

5. THE EGYPTIAN VIEW OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ITSELF AND OF "INTERIM" OR "INITIAL" ARRANGEMENTS IS A MATTER OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS, NOT OF FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES. TO THE EXTENT THAT NEGOTIATION, ESPECIALLY DIRECT NEGOTIATION, IS REGARDED AS A SUBSTANTIVE QUES-TION INVOLVING ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL, THE EGYPTIANS ARGUE (AS NOTED) THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY CONCEDED THAT (ALTHOUGH, AS NOTED BELOW, THEY ENDOW THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ISSUE WITH SUBSTANTIVE MERIT AS A DEFENSIVE MEASURE). THEIR PROBLEM LIES BOTH IN THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING SIDES AND IN THE PLACE OF THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY THINK, INDEED THEY FEAR, THAT IF THEY (AND THE OTHER ARAB STATES WHOSE TERRITORY ISRAEL OCCUPIES) ARE LEFT ALONE TO DEAL WITH THE ISRAELIS, THEIR WEAKNESS WOULD LEAD TO AN IMPOSED "PEACE" WITH AN EXPANDED ISRAEL THAT WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH ARAB CONCEPTS OF NATIONAL HONOR



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AND NATIONAL INTEREST, WOULD REWARD FORCE, AND WOULD THUS BE INHERENTLY UNSTABLE. SO GREAT IS THEIR CONCERN ON THIS ACCOUNT THAT THEY HAVE BEEN UNWILLING TO RISK EVEN STARTING THE PROCESS, AS SADAT HIMSELF SUGGESTED IN FEBRUARY 1971, UNLESS OR UNTIL THEY ARE REASSURED THAT ISRAEL WILL WITHDRAW "COMPLETELY." THE ISRAELI REPLY TO JARRING IS THE MAJOR, AND PERHAPS IN THE GOE SCHEME OF THINGS, THE ONLY OUTSTANDING IMPEDIMENT TO GETTING UNDER WAY. THE POSSIBILITY OF FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR VIEW OF HOW THE PROBLEM IS STATED IS SUGGESTED BY THEIR PUBLIC (AND PRIVATE) EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ISRAEL FORSWEARING THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE (AS IN SC RES 242 AND THE SENGHOR FORMULA).

5. THERE MAY, JUST MAY, ALSO BE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN TERMS OF MINOR BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS/RECTIFICATIONS, IF THE CONTEXT OF IDENTIFYING THEM IS THE PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BOTH SIDES, ARAB AND ISRAELI.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 CAIRO 0491

EXDIS

6. AS FOREGOING INDICATES, SADAT AND CO. ARE REALISTIC ENOUGH TO KNOW THAT THE PRESENT IMPASSE CAN ONLY BE PEACEFULLY RESOLVED THROUGH SOME KIND OF PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION OR DISCUSSION. BUT AS PART OF THEIR DEFENSE AGAINST AN INTOLERABLE SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME, THEY RATTLE THEIR SABRES AND THEY ENDOW THE PROCEDURAL ASPECT WITH SUBSTANTIVE MERIT. THE PUBLIC VERSION OF THIS IS "NO PARTIAL SOLUTION AND NO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS." THIS DISTORTION OF THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT VIA PROXIMITY TALKS PROVIDES SOME LEEWAY FOR THE GOE TO MOVE VIA OTHER MEANS TOWARD A FIRST STEP, AS LONG AS THEY CAN ALSO CLAIM THAT STEP IS ONLY THE FIRST.

7. SADAT ALSO CONSIDERS THAT THE US, BECAUSE OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL, HOLDS THE KEY TO THE GOI POSITION. HE AND HIS SENIOR ADVISORS HAVE MANIFESTED LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE USG'S WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE GOI IN THE DIRECTION OF THEIR POSITION, CITING THE EVENTS OF 1971 AND EARLY 1972: THEY SAY THEY CONSIDER THAT THE US IS COMMITTED TO ISRAEL, AND THAT US ARMS UNDERPIN ISRAELI OCCUPATION. SO THEY CALL ON THEIR FRIENDS, THE UN AND THE WORLD AT LARGE TO SUPPORT THEM AND ON THE "BIG FIVE" TO LIVE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES--A EUPHEMISM FOR PRESSURE ON THE US AND ON ISRAEL.

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8. THE UN CONTEXT, SC RES. 242, AND JARRING ALL CONTINUE TO HAVE CONTINGENT VALUE TO SADAT. SC RES. 242 IS STILL PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY ACCEPTABLE, BOTH SUBSTANTIVELY AND PROCEDURALLY, AS A WAY OF MOVING, IF ONLY ISRAEL WILL MOVE IN THE SAME TRACK. SADAT RECOGNIZES THIS IS PRESENTLY UNACCEPTED BY ISRAEL, BUT HE DARE NOT DISCARD IT. BUT IF THERE IS ANOTHER TRACK THAT WILL PRODUCE THE RESULT HE NEEDS, HE WILL NOT STICK ON THE PROCEDURES. HE WILL NEED INTERMEDIARY RATHER THAN DIRECT COLLOQUY, PREFERABLY SECRET, TO HELP DEVISE AND DISCERN THE RESULT, AND THEN PERHAPS SOME HELP IN THE COSMETICS OF ITS PUBLIC PRESENTATION. HE WILL PROBABLY ALSO NEED ECONOMIC HELP TO SURVIVE THE WRATH OF HIS BENEFACTORS LIKE LIBYA AND KUWAIT WHOSE ANTI-ZIONIST MILITANCY MAY LEAD THEM TO CUT OFF THEIR HARD CURRENCY SUBSIDIES TO EGYPT.

9. ONE MAY LEGITIMATELY QUESTION WHETHER SADAT AND CO. WOULD OR COULD DELIVER ON ANY AGREEMENT THEY COULD BE PERSUADED TO ENTER INTO. A COMBINATION OF ECONOMIC INDUCEMENT AND SELF-ENFORCING DETAILS WOULD BE PRUDENT; IT IS ALSO ARGUABLE THAT AN "HONORABLE" DEAL WOULD STRENGTHEN BOTH THE WILL AND THE CAPACITY OF THE LEADERSHIP TO HONOR IT, NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT WOULD ENABLE THEM TO REDIRECT AND REALLOCATE EGYPTIAN RESOURCES TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND TO BROADEN THE BASE OF THEIR PRODUCTIVE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS.

10. WHETHER SADAT FEELS HE CAN MAKE A SEPARATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL, OR THAT HE MUST PHASE EGYPT'S MOVES WITH SYRIA'S AND JORDAN'S IS NOT CLEAR. OUR HUNCH IS THAT IF HE GOT WHAT HE NEEDS FOR EGYPT, RECOGNITION OF EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND "COMPLETE" WITHDRAWAL, HE WOULD FIND A WAY TO DEAL WITH HIS ARAB BRETHREN, ESPECIALLY IF THE PACKAGE CONTAINED ECONOMIC SUSTENANCE FROM ELSEWHERE. MOREOVER, HIS FOREIGN MINISTER HAS RECENTLY SUGGESTED EGYPT IS READY TO SEPARATE THEIR PROBLEM FROM THE PALESTINIANS', BY RELATING THE LATTER TO THE 1948 ARMISTICE AND EGYPT'S PROBLEMS TO THE 1967 AFTERMATH. LEAVING THE PALESTINIANS TO MAKE THEIR OWN WAY WITH JORDAN AND ISRAEL,



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PERHAPS UNDER A "SELF-DETERMINATION" RUBRIC. WOULD STILL LEAVE SADAT WITH THE PROBLEM OF SYRIA; AGAIN, IN THE CRUNCH, IT WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH THE ARAB CHARACTER TO PUT SELF INTEREST ABOVE EPHEMERAL "ARAB UNITY" IF THE DEAL WERE OTHERWISE "HONORABLE."

11. THERE ARE OF COURSE NUMEROUS OTHER DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX ISSUES THAT HAVE TO BE COVERED; GUARANTEES OF NAVIGATION, TERRITORIAL SECURITY AND INTEGRITY-- IN SHORT, THOSE IDENTIFIED IN RES. 242. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT SOME IN THE GOE HAVE READ THE VIETNAM PEACE PACKAGE WITH AN EYE TO THEIR OWN PROBLEM. THEY MAY COME UP WITH IDEAS OF AGREEMENT TO FREEZE OF LIMIT THE MILITARY STATUS QUO, TO PROVIDE FOR SUPERVISION, RECONSTRUCTION, ETC. WE BELIEVE SADAT WOULD FIND ALL THESE QUESTIONS MANAGEABLE, IF TIME CONSUMING, IN A CONTEXT THAT ASSURED EGYPT'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.
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GREENE

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SECRET 706

PAGE 01 CAIRO 00488 170814Z

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ACTION SS-25

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R 170755Z FEB 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2595
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

S E C R E T CAIRO 0488

EXDIS

SUBJECT: FEDREP-EGYPT RELATIONS

REF: CAIRO 365, 486

GERMAN AMBASSADOR STELTZER HAS GIVEN US RUNDOWN ON VON WELL'S POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ZAYYAT, FAHMY AND KHALIL AT FOREIGN OFFICE. THESE GENERALLY FOLLOWED THE SAME PATTERN AS THE EGYPTIAN PRESENTATION TO ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER (CAIRO 0363). ZAYYAT STRESSED EGYPT'S NEED TO FIND A WAY TO PEACE AND ALL THREE REFLECTED HOPE THAT GFR WOULD TALK TO USG ABOUT IT.
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GREENE

'73 FEB 17 AM 10:42

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'73 FEB 8 AM 9.30

SECRET 414

PAGE 01 CAIRO 00368 071341Z

46 2
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
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R 071250Z FEB 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2538
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T CAIRO 0368

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MEDICI VISITS
EGYPT: MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSIONS

REF: CAIRO 0335

SUMMARY: ITALIAN AMBASSADOR PLAJA SAYS GOE RECEIVED ITALIAN FONMIN WARMLY. HE CAME SEEKING INFORMATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT AND EGYPTIANS, ESPECIALLY ZAYYAT, EXPLAINED GOE VIEW OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE SOLUTION IN GENERALLY FAMILIAR TERMS. ZAYYAT EXPOUNDED IN SOME DETAIL HOW GOE CURRENTLY DIFFERENTIATES BETWEEN TWO PARTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM: THAT INVOLVING THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER PALESTINE MANDATE, AND THAT INVOLVING TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN 1967. AS ZAYYAT EXPLAINED IT, FORMER IS MATTER FOR PALESTINIANS TO WORK OUT, LATTER IS WHAT EGYPT IS INTERESTED IN. CONVERSATIONS ON BILATERAL MATTERS (REPORTED SEPTEL) WERE ROUTINE. END SUMMARY.

1. IN CONVERSATION FEBRUARY 7, PLAJA SAID MEDICI HAD COME WITHOUT A "DELEGATION" BUT RATHER WITH THREE ACCOMPANYING OFFICIALS. HE WANTED TO LISTEN AND LEARN, WITH A VIEW EVENTUALLY TO JUDGING WHAT IF ANYTHING HE OR GOI CAN DO TO BE HELPFUL IN ADVANCING MIDDLE EAST PEACE. GOE RECEIVED HIM WARMLY; IN addition TO FORMAL HOSPITALITY FOR WHICH MINISTERS TURNED OUT IN

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PAGE 02 CAIRO 00363 071341Z

FORCE, ZAYYAT HAD MEDICI, PLAJA AND A FEW OTHERS TO PRIVATE DINNER AT HOME.

2. MAIN THRUST OF EGYPTIAN PRESENTATION ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE WAS THE FAMILIAR ONE THAT THEY CANNOT AGREE TO CEDE A SINGLE INCH OF TERRITORY TO ISRAEL. IF THAT COULD BE THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, ALL OTHER ASPECTS WOULD BE MANAGEABLE. ZAYYAT EXPLAINED THE PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST AS BEING IN TWO PARTS: FIRST, THE LEGACY OF 1948 AND THE CREATION OF A JEWISH STATE AND AN ARAB STATE IN THE FORMER BRITISH MANDATED PALESTINE. TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE ARE PROBLEMS LEFT OVER TODAY, THEY ARE PRIMARILY THE CONCERN OF THE PALESTINIANS, WHO, IN THIS VIEW, WILL HAVE TO MAKE THE BEST ARRANGEMENT THEY CAN WITH GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, MEANING PRIMARILY JORDAN AND ISRAEL. DURING MEDICI CALL ON ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL MAHMOUD RIAD, LATTER SAID THAT THIS CONCEPT HAD ALSO BEEN ACCEPTED BY MOST OF THE STATES AT THE RECENT ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING.

3. SECOND PART OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, ZAYYAT TOLD MEDICI, AND ONE WHICH MOST CONCERNS EGYPT, IS LEGACY OF 1967 WAR AND CONTINUING ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF TERRITORIES OF EGYPT AND SYRIA. GOE IS ANXIOUS TO LIQUIDATE THIS PROBLEM BUT WILL NOT YIELD "A SINGLE INCH" OF TERRITORY. ZAYYAT TOLD MEDICI THAT IN HIS VIEW, A PEACE AGREEMENT THAT DID NOT DENY TO ISRAEL ARAB TERRITORY TAKEN BY FORCE WOULD ONLY PLANT THE SEEDS OF FUTURE WAR: ISRAEL WOULD THINK THEY COULD AGAIN EXPAND, AND THE ARABS WOULD STILL WANT TO GET BACK WHAT THEY HAD LOST. (COMMENT: MUCH OF FOREGOING SEEMS TO BE FURTHER REFINEMENT OF VIEWS ZAYYAT EXPRESSED TO SECRETARY IN NEW YORK OCTOBER 5--USUN 3723.)

4. ALTHOUGH ZAYYAT ALSO TOLD MEDICI THAT EGYPT IS MOUNTING ANOTHER "DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN" WITH EUROPEANS, WEST AND EAST, AND PERHAPS OTHERS, TO EXPOUND ITS POSITION, PLAJA SAID THERE WAS VERY LITTLE SAID ABOUT HOW GOE SEES SITUATION MOVING. WHILE ITALIANS SAW SOME WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT AN "INTERIM AGREEMENT"

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PAGE 03 CAIRO 00363 071341Z

FIRMLY LINKED TO FINAL AGREEMENT, EGYPTIANS SHOWED NO FLEXIBILITY ON PROXIMITY TALKS OR NEGOTIATIONS. THE "DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN" THUS LOOKED TO THE ITALIANS LIKE A DEVICE FOR FILLING TIME.

5. ZAYYAT AT ONE POINT SAID THAT THE "ROGERS PLAN" OF DECEMBER 1969 WOULD STILL BE ALL RIGHT BY EGYPT AND ASKED MEDICI WHY WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS COULD NOT USE THEIR INFLUENCE AND STRENGTH WITH WASHINGTON TO MOVE US POLICY "BACK TO THE ROGERS PLAN." MEDICI APPARENTLY GAVE HIM NO COMFORT ON THIS PROSPECT.

6. MEDICI BRIEFED THE AMBASSADORS OF THE EEC COUNTRIES IN CAIRO ON THESE CONVERSATIONS. HE HAS AN INVITATION TO VISIT ISRAEL AND, ACCORDING TO PLAJA, HOPES TO DO SO DURING FIRST HALF OF MARCH.
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET 511

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

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FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2489
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

'73 JAN 31 PM 4:12

S E C R E T CAIRO 0276

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JAGUARS FOR SAUDI ARABIA

REF: LONDON 0964

PARA TWO REFTEL MENTIONED LIGHTNING AIRCRAFT SOLD TO SAUDIS AND "SINCE TRANSFERRED TO EGYPT." THIS IS FIRST INDICATION WE HAVE HAD OF ANY SUCH TRANSFER. WOULD APPRECIATE FURTHER DETAILS, IF AVAILABLE.
XGDS-1.
GREENE

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 03063 1215572

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 CCO-00

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T CAIRO 3063

EXDIS

EO 11652: PFOR EG IS
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE CEASEFIRE

IN CONVERSATION WITH USINTOFF THIS MORNING, BRITISH COUNSELOR FABER SAID BRITISH HAD LIGHTLY TRIED TO SOUND OUT EGYPTIANS ON ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE CEASE-FIRE. AMBASSADOR ADAMS, IN DISCUSSION WITH MININFO HATEM EVENING OCTOBER 11, RAISED SUBJECT BRIEFLY. HATEM GAVE TOTALLY NEUTRAL RESPONSE. FABER HIMSELF ALSO TALKED WITH HFEZ ISMAIL'S CHEF DE CABINET, AND HAD NO REACTION. BRITISH HAVE CONCLUDED THAT EGYPTIANS ARE NOT YET PREPARED FOR CONSIDERATION OF CEASEFIRE.
SMITH

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 388

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W

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S E C R E T CAIRO 3061

STADIS//////////////////////////////////////////////////

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG SA US
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN ATTEMPT TO FORCE SAUDI CUTOFF OF
OIL

REF: CAIRO 3060

IF DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT QUALITY OF INFORMATION
PROVIDED BY SOURCE IS HIGH, SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD
BE PAID TO INFORMATION CONTAINED PARA 8 REFTEL
REGARDING PURPOSE OF MAR'I MISSION TO JIDDA.
SMITH

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3968
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T CAIRO 3054

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG UR
SUBJECT: EVACUATION OF SOVIET DEPENDENTS FROM EGYPT
BEFORE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

1. TASS AGENCY REP IN CAIRO WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH SOVIET EMBASSY HAS TOLD US THAT SOVIETS FIRST LEARNED OF EGYPTIANS' PLANS FOR ATTACK ACROSS CANAL AT END OF SEPTEMBER. ON OCTOBER 3, SOVIET AMBASSADOR VINOGRADOV SAW SADAT. VINOGRADOV UNDERSTOOD FROM SADAT'S REMARKS THAT ATTACK WAS IMMINENT. TASS REP STATES SADAT DID NOT INFORM VINOGRADOV DIRECTLY, BUT HINTED AT RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. VINOGRADOV RECOMMENDED IMMEDIATE EVACUATION OF DEPENDENTS OF SOVIET TECHNICIANS IN EGYPT AT THAT TIME, AND SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT WERE CALLED IN FROM ALL COUNTRIES IN NEAR VICINITY TO ASSIST IN EVACUATION.

2. TASS REP STATES THAT ON OCTOBER 10, WIVES OF SOVIET EMBASSY PERSONNEL WITH SMALL CHILDREN DEPARTED CAIRO. SOME FAMILIES STILL REMAIN.

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 03054 111708Z

3. TASS REP ADDED THAT SOVIET TECHNICIANS HAD DE-
PARTED EGYPT, BUT DID NOT SAY WHEN.
SMITH

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 147

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03046 121620Z

43/51
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
USSS-00 INRE-00 /031 W

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088214

'73 OCT 12 PM 5:33
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

O R 110930Z OCT 73 ZDK
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3960
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T CAIRO 3046

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJECT: SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

REF: STATE 201367

1. OUR VARIOUS SITREPS HAVE REPORTED THAT, AS OF OCTOBER 10, US HAS NOT BEEN FOCUS OF CRITICAL ATTENTION IN EGYPTIAN MEDIA. OCTOBER 11 PRESS REGISTERS SLIGHT CHANGE UPWARD, WITH SEVERAL EDITORIALS CRITICIZING AMERICAN POLICY AND AHRAM FRONT-PAGING REPORT OF US RESUPPLY OF ROCKETS AND BOMBS TO ISRAEL. NEVERTHELESS, SUCCESS OF EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN HAS OBVIATED NEED FOR SCAPEGOAT.

2. PLANS TO REMOVE STRANDED TOURISTS FROM EGYPT APPEAR TO BE MOVING MORE SLOWLY THAN WE WOULD WANT. THE SLOW AND AMBIGUOUS BUREAUCRATIC PROCESS OF ARRANGING FOR TOURISTS' DEPARTURE HAS HEIGHTENED THEIR SENSE OF BEING "TRAPPED" IN EGYPT. NONETHELESS, WE HOPE THAT ALL WHO WISH TO DEPART

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SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 03046 121626Z

WILL BE GONE IN THE NEXT FOUR OR FIVE DAYS.

3. ASIDE FROM DISADVANTAGES OF BEING IN WAR ZONE, RESIDENT AND OTHER AMERICANS ARE AT THIS TIME SUBJECT TO FEW ADDITIONAL HAZARDS IMPOSED BY SITUATION. THIS WILL CHANGE IF ISRAELIS USE DEEP PENETRATION TECHNIQUES AGAINST CAIRO AREA OR CIVILIAN TARGETS IN EGYPT OR IF SPECIFIC ACTIONS BY US GOVERNMENT GIVE CAUSE FOR EGYPTIANS TO REACT MORE STRONGLY TO AMERICAN PRESENCE HERE.
SMITH

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FORM DS-1652

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 8 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 421

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03035 101328Z

40
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 /026 W
---------- 062296

O 101315Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3951

S E C R E T CAIRO 3035

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG IS
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN MILITARY SITUATION

REF: CAIRO 3026

1. SOURCE HAS AGAIN REPORTED. INFORMATION IS CURRENT AS OF 1400 LOCAL, OCTOBER 10.

2. ISRAELIS HAVE STRUCK WITH PLANES IN NORTHERN SECTOR OF EGYPTIAN LINES. NO FIGURES NOW AVAILABLE, BUT MAJOR EGYPTIAN CASUALITIES EXPECTED. LAST NIGHT ISRAELIS ATTACKED EGYPTIAN POSITIONS FROM 7 P.M. TO 12 MIDNIGHT LOCAL TIME AND RESUMED ATTACKS AT SIX O'CLOCK THIS MORNING. THESE ARE CONTINUING.

3. ISRAELI AIRCRAFT ARE ALSO IN HEAVY ACTION AGAINST SYRIAN POSITIONS. SYRIANS HAVE GAINED SOME GROUND AND LOST SOME GROUND.

4. ISRAELI PRISONERS TAKEN BY EGYPTIANS ARE PRESENTLY LOCATED IN CITADEL.

5. THIS MORNING QADHAAFI HAS OFFERED EGYPT ONE MILLION STERLING; GULF STATES HAVE OFFERED 500 MILLION STERLING. SINCE WEEK BEFORE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES FEISAL HAS GIVEN, REPEAT GIVEN, 500 MILLION STERLING TO EGYPT.

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FORM DS-1652

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 03035 101328Z

6. REGARDING INTERNATIONAL OFFERS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE, EGYPTIANS HAVE NOT ASKED FOR RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT YET. EGYPT IS PREPARED TO BUY IN EUROPE. SOURCE REPORTS THAT CHINESE AMBASSADOR SAW SADAT AND OFFERED PILOTS, AMMUNITION AND EQUIPMENT FOR EGYPTIAN USE. REPORTEDLY, NORTH KOREANS HAVE MADE SIMILAR OFFER.
SMITH

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SECRET

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

OCT 10 PM 3:36
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 412

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03026 101341Z

43/15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 /026 W
---------- 062471

O 100900Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3945

S E C R E T CAIRO 3026

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (REF ADDED)

REFERENCE:CAIRO 3007

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJECT: REPORT ON CURRENT EGYPTIAN MILITARY POSITION

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION COMES FROM USINT SOURCE, DRAWN FROM SAME SUB-SOURCE MENTIONED REFTEL. INFORMATION IS VALID AS OF LATE EVENING OCTOBER 9.

2. BY NIGHTFALL OCTOBER 9, EGYPTIAN POSITION HAD CHANGED VERY LITTLE FROM OCTOBER 8. THERE HAD BEEN A WITHDRAWAL OF 10 KILOMETERS IN NORTHERN SECTOR. EGYPTIAN LINE REPORTEDLY RUNS 20 KILOMETERS EAST OF CANAL IN NORTHERN SECTOR, TO 10 KILOMETERS EAST OF CANAL IN CENTRAL SECTOR, TO 20 KILOMETERS EAST OF PORT TAWFIK IN SOURTHERN SECTOR. NUMBER OF EGYPTIAN TANKS TO EAST OF CANAL IS APPROXIMATELY 550. ON OCTOBER 9, ISRAELIS MANAGED TO DESTROY SIX BRIDGES. ONLY SEVEN REMAIN OPERABLE.

2. ISRAELI AIR RAIDS. SOURCE REPORTS THAT CAIRO WEST AND QUWEISNA AIRPORTS WERE RAIDED BY ISRAELI AIRCRAFT YESTERDAY. SOURCE HAD NO IDEA OF DAMAGE OR



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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 03026 101341Z

CASUALTIES, BUT BELIEVED IT WAS MINOR IN BOTH CASES. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, CIVILIAN CASUALTIES SUFFERED IN ISRAELI RAID ON PORT SAID OCTOBER 8 WERE 78 KILLED AND 108 WOUNDED.

3. EGYPTIAN CASUALTY FIGURES. BY NIGHTFALL OCTOBER 9, EGYPTIANS HAD SUFFERED APPROXIMATELY 5,000 KILLED IN ACTION. SOORCE HAD NO FIGURE FOR WOUNDED. SOURCE REPORTS THAT MAADI MILITARY HOSPITAL, IMBABA HUMMIYYAT HOSPITAL AND KUBR AL-UBBA MILITARY HUSPITAL ARE FULL. (COMMENT: SEPARATE SOURCES HAVE INFORMED US, AND WE HAVE CONFIRMED DEFINITELY, THAT OMAR KHAYYAM HOTEL HAS BEEN CONVERTED TO MILITARY HOSPITAL.

4. PRISONERS. DURING OCTOBER 9, EGYPTIANS CAPTURED 132 ISRAELI PRISONERS. FOUR OF THESE WERE PILOTS. EGYPTIAN MILITARY COMMAND HAS INTERCEPTED ISRAELI INSTRUCTIONS TO ITS FRONT LINE TROOPS TO SURRENDER IF THEY ARE SURROUNDED AND NOT KILL THEMSELVES TRYING TO BE HEROES.

5. INTERNAL SITUATION. SOURCE REPORTS THAT WITHIN PAST FEW DAYS, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR HAS INITIATED ARREST OF POTENTIALLY DISSIDENT INTERNAL ELEMENTS, INCLUDING KNOWN COMMUNISTS AND IKHWANISTS. THROUGHOUT EGYPT TOTAL ARRESTS AS OF OCTOBER 9 REACHED 4800. 1500 OF THESE WERE IN CAIRO, AND 890 IN ALEXANDRIA. ARRESTS WILL REPORTEDLY CONTINUE.

6. PLANS. SOURCE REPORTS THAT ATTEMPTED EGYPTIAN TROOP LANDING NEAR SHARM ES-SHEIKH EVENING OCTOBER 8 WAS THWARTED. OF 50 EGYPTIAN COMMANDOS SENT BY BOAT, FIVE WERE KILLED AND THE REST WERE CAPTURED. SOURCE HAD NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON PLANNED BOMBER RAIDS ON TARGETS WITHIN ISRAEL. EGYPTIANS NOW VIEW FUTURE BATTLE AS ONE THAT WILL TAKE UP TO TWO OR THREE MONTHS TO ACCOMPLISH. OBJECTIVE REMAINS RETURN OF ALL OF SINAI. GHQ BELIEVES ISRAELIS CANNOT LAST THAT LONG. THEY EXPECT, AND ARE PREPARED FOR, ISRAELIS DESPERATION TACTICS SUCH AS AIR RAIDS DEEP WITHIN EGYPT, AND POSSIBLY ON CIVILIAN TARGETS. EGYPTIAN COMMAND CONTINUES TO HOLD MAJOR PART OF COMBAT

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 03026 101341Z

READY MILITARY FORCES ON WEST SIDE OF CANAL, IN ORDER TO INTERDICT ANY ISRAELI ATTEMPT TO LAND COMMANDOS OR PARATROOP FORCES WITHIN EGYPT.

7. ABOVE SOURCE MUST BE ABSOLUTELY PROTECTED.

8. ONLY OTHER RELEVANT CURRENT INFORMATION ON EGYPTIAN MILITARY SITUATION COMES TO US FROM FRENCH. FRENCH EMBOFF REPORTED LATE LAST NIGHT THAT MILITARY CORRESPONDENT OF AHRAM TOLD HIM EGYPTIANS HAD HELD THEIR TWO BEST TANK DIVISIONS TOTALLING 500 TANKS UNTIL EVENING OCTOBER 8. AFTER NIGHTFALL THESE WERE SENT ACROSS THE CANAL.
SMITH

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FORM DS-1652

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 OCT 10 PM 1:

SECRET 975

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03026 100917Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 /026 W
---------- 060109

O 100900Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3945

S E C R E T CAIRO 3026

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJECT: REPORT ON CURRENT EGYPTIAN MILITARY POSITION

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 03026 100917Z

3. EGYPTIAN CASUALTY FIGURES. BY NIGHTFALL OCTOBER 9, EGYPTIANS HAD SUFFERED APPROXIMATELY 5,000 KILLED IN ACTION. SOORCE HAD NO FIGURE FOR WOUNDED. SOURCE REPORTS THAT MAADI MILITARY HOSPITAL, IMBABA HUMMIYYAT HOSPITAL AND KUBR AL-UBBA MILITARY HOSPITAL ARE FULL. (COMMENT: SEPARATE SOURCES HAVE INFORMED US, AND WE HAVE CONFIRMED DEFINITELY, THAT OMAR KHAYYAM HOTEL HAS BEEN CONVERTED TO MILITARY HOSPITAL.

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 03026 100917Z

7. ABOVE SOURCE MUST BE ABSOLUTELY PROTECTED.

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SMITH

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 978

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03013 091254Z

51
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 CCO-00

USSS-00 /026 W
---------- 051435
O 091220Z OCT 73 ZFF-6
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3933
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISION USUN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T CAIRO 3013

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG IS
SUBJECT: EGYPT'S TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVE

USINTOFF SAW MOHAMED RIAD OF ARAB LEAGUE MORNING OCTOBER 9. USINTOFF ASKED WHERE EGYPT'S POLITICAL GOAL IN CURRENT HOSTILITIES LAY. MOHAMED SAID THAT ULTIMATE EGYPTIAN PURPOSE WAS TO MOVE EGYPT'S FORCES TO THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES IN SINAI. HE DID NOT STATE WHETHER THIS OBJECTIVE WAS TO BE CARRIED OUT MILITARILY OR BY POLITICAL ACTION. HE SAID THAT IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT RECOVERY OF EGYPTIAN LANDS IN SINAI WAS EXTENT OF EGYPT'S TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVES. IN REPLY TO QUESTION AS TO WHETHER INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES MEANT BOUNDARIES OF PALESTINE MANDATE OR THE LINES PRIOR TO JUNE 5, 1967, RIAD SAID SIMPLY THAT WELL-KNOWN EGYPTIAN POSITION ON GAZA WAS THAT ITS FUTURE SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY ITS INHABITANTS.

2. MOHAMED SAID THAT PRESENT HOSTILITIES HAD BEEN CAUSED BY SEPTEMBER 13 ISRAELI ATTACK ON SYRIA. EGYPT HAD BEEN

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SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 03013 091254Z

PREPARING SINCE THAT POINT FOR FURTHER ISRAELI PROVOCATION.
HE SAID THAT IT WAS A PITY UN OBSERVERS HAD NOT BEEN
STATIONED ALONG RED SEA COAST. THEY WOULD CONFIRM THAT
FIRST ATTACKS OF OCTOBER 6 HAD BEEN MADE BY ISRAELI
FORCES AGAINST ZA'FARANA AND SUKHNA.
SMITH

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SECRET 904

PAGE 01 CAIRO 02987 071545Z

41
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

USSS-00 /026 W
---------- 042136

Z O 071535Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3910
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T CAIRO 2987

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, PFOR, EG
SUBJECT: SADAT STATES INTENTIONS TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR ADAMS SAW SADAT AT 1:00 P.M. TODAY. MEETING TOOK PLACE IN TAHA PALACE. SADAT WAS IN UNIFORM, AND APPEARED RELAXED THROUGHOUT.

2. SADAT TOLD ADAMS THAT EGYPTIANS HAD CROSSED CANAL AS DEFENSIVE ACT AGAINST ISRAELI ACTION WHICH BEGAN YESTERDAY. HE SAID THAT EGYPTIAN FORCES WOULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT UNTIL THEY REACHED THE JUNE 1967 BOUNDARIES. IT MIGHT TAKE ONE DAY, OR A WEEK, OR TEN YEARS, BUT THEY WOULD ACHIEVE THEIR GOAL.

3. SADAT SAID THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT SEEK TO CONVENE UNSC. EGYPT WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, OPPOSE MEETING OF SC. IF SC RESOLVED TO CALL FOR CEASEFIRE, EGYPT WOULD COMPLY.

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 02987 071545Z

4. SADAT REPEATED MESSAGE TO ADAMS, AND CLEARLY WANTED IT TO BE PASSED ON.

5. FRENCH AMBASSADOR DELEUSSE WAS SCHEDULED TO SEE SADAT AT 1:30 P.M. HE PROBABLY RECEIVED THE SAME MESSAGE.
SMITH

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 950

PAGE 01 071849Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 USSS-00 DODE-00 CCO-00

/026 W
---------- 042592

Z071830Z OCT 5

NFM USINT CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3911
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T CAIRO 2989

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJECT: REPORT ON SADAT'S MEETING WITH FRENCH AMBASSADOR

REF: CAIRO 2987

1. FRENCH EMBASSY OFFICER HAS BRIEFED US ON SADAT'S MEETING WITH DE LEUSSE. FRENCH EMBOFF STATED HE WAS PROVIDING US WITH THIS INFORMATION WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF HIS AMBASSADOR. HE THEREFORE MUST BE FULLY PROTECTED.

2. DE LEUSSE SAW SADAT AT 1:30 P.M. LOCAL TIME. SADAT, AS HE WAS WITH BRITISH AMBASSADOR ADAMS, WAS RELAXED. HE TALKED WITH EASE AND, AT TIMES, AMUSEMENT. HE SAID THAT MANY PEOPLE HAVE MISJUDGED EGYPT'S CAPACITY AND THAT OF ITS ARMY. THESE PEOPLE HAD THOUGHT THAT ARMY COULD NOT MAKE WAR, AND THAT HE, SADAT, WAS NOT A CAPABLE PRESIDENT. SADAT SAID HE HAD PROVED THE CONTRARY. AT NO TIME DID

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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SADAT INDICATE THAT EGYPT HAD LAUNCHED THE ATTACK.

3. SADAT TOLD DE LEUSSE THAT HE DID NOT WANT A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED FRENCH NOT TO RAISE ISSUE OF SUCH A MEETING. HE STATED THAT EGYPT MIGHT ACCEPT CONVENING OF SC WHEN EGYPTIAN FORCES HAD REACHED "THEIR OWN BOUNDARIES." HE DID NOT MENTION WHAT THESE BOUNDARIES WERE. HE REPEATED THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION UNTIL EGYPTIAN FORCES HAD REACHED THEIR BOUNDARIES.

4. ACCORDING TO FRENCH EMBOFF, SADAT RAISED POSSIBILITY THAT PEACE CONFERENCE MIGHT BE CONVENED TO SETTLE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. HE TOSSED THIS IDEA OUT WITHOUT GIVING IT GREAT WEIGHT.

5. DE LEUSSE NOTED THAT THERE WERE VIRTUALLY NO GUARDS OR SOLDIERS AT TAHIR (NOT TAHA) PALACE. ATMOSPHERE WAS TOTALLY CALM AND IMPRESSION HE GAINED WAS THAT SADAT FELT NO FEAR OF INTERNAL OPPOSITION.

6. COMMENT: WE ARE NOT ABLE TO RECONCILE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WHAT SADAT REPORTEDLY TOLD FRENCH AMBASSADOR AND BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN SEPARATE MEETINGS HELD WITHIN 20 MINUTES OF EACH OTHER.
SMITH

EOT

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 949

PAGE 01 CAIRO 02987 071851Z

45/41
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

USSS-00 /026 W
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Z O 071535Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3910
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T CAIRO 2987

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (.MOSCOW ADDED AS INFO ADDEE)

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, PFOR, EG
SUBJECT: SADAT STATES INTENTIONS TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR ADAMS SAW SADAT AT 1:00 P.M. TODAY. MEETING TOOK PLACE IN TAHA PALACE. SADAT WAS IN UNIFORM, AND APPEARED RELAXED THROUGHOUT.

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 02987 071851Z

IF SC RESOLVED TO CALL FOR CEASEFIRE, EGYPT WOULD COMPLY.

4. SADAT REPEATED MESSAGE TO ADAMS, AND CLEARLY WANTED IT TO BE PASSED ON.

5. FRENCH AMBASSADOR DELEUSSE WAS SCHEDULED TO SEE SADAT AT 1:30 P.M. HE PROBABLY RECEIVED THE SAME MESSAGE.
SMITH

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 830

PAGE 01 CAIRO 02967 061635Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

/026 W
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Z O 061615Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3894
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATER
).5373/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 3512
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T CAIRO 2967

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJECT: "REGION OF WAR" DEFINED BY GOE IN POSITION GIVEN TO
BRITISH

1. BRITISH EMBASSY COUNSELOR FABER, ACTING IN PLACE OF AMBASSADOR ADAMS WHO IS IN ALEXANDRIA, HAS BRIEFED US ON DETAILS OF MEETING TO WHICH HE HAD BEEN SUMMONED BY FOREIGN UNDERSECRETARY KHALIL. MEETING OCCURRED AT 1600 HOURS LOCAL. FABER SAID KHALIL REPEATED ALLEGATIONS BROADCAST IN MILITARY COMMUNIQUES OF ISRAELI ATTACKS ON EGYPTIAN POSITIONS THIS AFTERNOON. KHALIL SAID THAT EGYPTIANS HAD DETERRED ATTACKS AND ARE IN STATE OF SELF DEFENSE. HE ADDED THAT ISRAELIS HAD CLEARLY BEEN PREPARING TO ATTACK EGYPT SINCE THEIR "AGGRESSION" ON SYRIA SEPTEMBER 13.

2. KHALIL THEN SAID THAT HMG SHOULD NOTE THAT "REGION OF WAR" EXISTED WITHIN FOLLOWING BOUNDARIES: (A) SOUTH OF LATITUDE 33 DEGREES NORTH; (B) EAST OF LATITUDE 29 DEGREES 20 MINUTES EAST; (C) NORTH OF LATITUDE 23 DEGREES


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FORM DS-1652
1-66

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 02967 061635Z

TEN MINUTES NORTH. EASTERN BOUNDARY WAS NOT DEFINED.

3. FABER ASKED KHALIL WHETHER PRESENT SITUATION WAS IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH MILITARY EXERCISES WHICH EGYPTIAN FORCES HAD BEEN CONDUCTING IN PAST WEEK. KHALIL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH EXERCISES HAD TAKEN PLACE, BUT DISMISSED THEM AS NORMAL TRAINING. HE REITERATED THAT EGYPT HAD BEEN PREPARING FOR FURTHER ISRAELI AGGRESSION FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 13 AIR ATTACKS BY IAF ON SYRIA.

4. FABER WAS TOLD THAT OTHER REPS OF BIG 5 UNSC MEMBERS WERE BEING SUMMONED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY TO BE SIMILARLY INFORMED OF GOE POSITION. AS OF 1800 LOCAL, FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS NOT CONTACTED US.
SMITH

SECRET

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

'73 DEC 13 PM 9:27

SECRET 645

PAGE 01 STATE 243578

46
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 /031 R

66650
DRAFTED BY: S/S-O:G TWOHIE
APPROVED BY: S/S:S GAMMON
---------- 120991

O 131356Z DEC 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE

S E C R E T STATE 243578

EXDIS TOSEC 121

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS TO SAM 86970

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION USINT ALGIERS SECSTATE FROM CAIRO
DECEMBER 13 REPEATED YOU

QUOTE

S E C R E T CAIRO 3980

EXDIS

FOR S/S PASS TO MR. SISCO FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: ATTENDANCE AT GENEVA CONFERENCE

1. WHEN WITH FAHMY THIS AFTERNOON, HE ASKED IF I WERE GOING TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. WHEN I TOLD HIM THAT WAS NOT THE PRESENT PLAN, HE EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND NOTED VINOGRADOV HAD INFORMED HIM HE WILL BE ON SOVIET DELEGATION. VINOGRADOV LEAVING FOR GENEVA ON SATURDAY. FAHMY THOUGHT I SHOULD ALSO BE ON US DELEGATION.

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SECRET

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 243578

2. IN LIGHT SECRETARY'S EARLIER APPROVAL THAT I MIGHT GO BACK ON CONSULTATIONS FEW DAYS AFTER HIS VISIT, I HAD TENTATIVELY BOOKED RESERVATIONS FOR WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 17. IF SECRETARY WISHES ME TO CANCEL THOSE PLANS AND ATTEND GENEVA, I AM, OF COURSE, READY TO DO SO. DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS, I COULD THEN PERHAPS RETURN WASHINGTON AFTER CONFERENCE.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR MENTIONING THIS TO THE SECRETARY ON FLIGHT ALGIERS TO CAIRO AND LET ME KNOW HIS WISHES ON ARRIVAL HERE. EILTS UNQUOTE RUSH

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SECRET



FORM

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 OCT 24 PM 5 6324

SECRET 012

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 2 3

PAGE 01 STATE 209626

51
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00

CIAE-00 NSAE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY AF/N:JJBLAKE:RJP
APPROVED BY AF/N:JJBLAKE
S/S- MR. GAMMON

========== 064532

P 241419Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

S E C R E T STATE 209626

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, XI
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST

REFERENCE: DEPTEL 208680

FOLLOWING PORTION REFTEL OMMITTED DURING TRANSMISSION:

PARAGRAPH 3, LINES 13 AND 14:

"SUCH RESTRAINTS WOULD PREVAIL. ONE PROBLEM WAS TEMPERAMENT OF THE OPPOSING SIDES WITH THE ARABS BEING THE "ROMANTICS" AND THE ISRAELIS "DOGMATIC". KISSINGER

SECRET

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FORM

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Department of State

WH

TELEGRAM

SECRET 253

PAGE 01 STATE 208680

2

16
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00

CIAE-00 NSAE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY AF/N:JJBLAKE:RJP
APPROVED BY S/S: MR. MILLER
AF:DDNEWSOM
NEA:JJSISCO
S - MR. EAGLEBURGER
S - MR. GOMPERT

040793

R 202145Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

S E C R E T STATE 208680

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, XI
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST

SUMMARY: SECRETARY RECEIVED SUDANESE FOREIGN MINISTER KHALID OCTOBER 16 ALONG WITH AMBASSADOR HAMZA IN RESPONSE FOREIGN MINISTER'S REQUEST FOR MEETING. ASSISTANT SECRETARY NEWSOM ALSO PRESENT. DURING EXCHANGE, WHICH LASTED ABOUT HALF HOUR, SECRETARY INFORMED KHALID THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT "OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS" FOR ESTABLISHMENT ACCEPTABLE PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST NOW EXISTED. PRIORITY TASK WAS TO GET CEASE FIRE FIRST AFTER WHICH NEGOTIATIONS FOR "A DECENT PEACE FOR ALL PEOPLE IN AREA" COULD BE WORKED OUT. KHALID EXPRESSED GENERAL AGREEMENT, NOTING, HOWEVER, THAT NOTHING HAD FOLLOWED AFTER 1967 CEASE FIRE AND THAT ARABS WOULD BE PREPARED, IN HIS JUDGMENT, RETURN TO PRE-1967 LINES WITH MINOR TERRITORIAL RECTIFICATIONS. SECRETARY

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SECRET

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 208680

STATED SITUATION TODAY VASTLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF 1967 AND REITERATED BELIEF OPPORTUNITY NOW EXISTED FOR ALL PARTIES TO REACH JUST AND LASTING PEACE. END SUMMARY.

1. FOREIGN MINISTER WARMLY CONGRATULATED SECRETARY ON AWARD TO LATTER OF NOBEL PEACE PRIZE. EXPRESSED HOPE SECRETARY'S ACHIEVEMENT WOULD NOW BE CARRIED OVER TO MIDDLE EAST. SECRETARY STATED AWARD WAS COMPLETE SURPRISE TO HIM AND DEEPLY GRATIFYING. HE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF IT BY NOTE PASSED TO HIM AT WHITE HOUSE MEETING CONCERNED WITH MIDDLE EAST. SECRETARY ASSURED FOREIGN MINISTER HE WOULD PURSUE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST AS VIGOROUSLY AS HE HAD IN VIET NAM. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO MIDDLE EAST.

2. SECRETARY SAID HE SAW PRESENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AS DEVELOPING IN TWO STAGES: FIRST, A CEASE FIRE, THEN NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A JUST AND LASTING PEACE, "A DECENT PEACE FOR ALL PEOPLE IN AREA". FOREIGN MINISTER INTERJECTED THAT AFTER FIGHTING STOPPED IN 1967 ARABS FOUND "NOTHING FOLLOWED". SECRETARY REPLIED PRESENT SITUATION DIFFERENT. ARABS HAVE ALREADY ACHIEVED 90 OF THEIR OBJECTIVES BY RESTORING THEIR DIGNITY AND PROVING THAT NO COUNTRY CAN BE MILITARILY SUPREME IN THE MIDDLE EAST. MOREOVER, THE US IS MUCH MORE ACTIVE NOW IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE THAN WAS THE CASE IN THE PAST. ISRAELIS MUST ALSO HAVE LEARNED SOME LESSONS FROM FIGHTING IN THE LAST ELEVEN DAYS. SECRETARY STRESSED THAT THE LONGER THE WAR LASTS THE GREATER THE RISK THAT THE US WOULD BE DRAWN IN FURTHER "FOR REASONS NOT RELATED TO THE MIDDLE EAST ITSELF". RESULT WOULD BE NO RESOLUTION OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. SECRETARY THEN REFERRED TO SADAT'S PEACE PROPOSALS MADE KNOWN OCTOBER 16. DESCRIBED THEM AS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL WHICH WOULD RATHER PURSUE THE WAR THAN ACCEPT THEM. HENCE, CEASE FIRE MUST BE QUICKLY ARRANGED. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 MUST BE REAFFIRMED, INCLUDING ITS WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS, AND US MUST PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN BRINGING THE PARTIES TOGETHER.

3. KHALID AGREED THAT THE WAR SHOULD BE ENDED SOON. SUGGESTED BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT COULD BE WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-1967 LINES ACCOMPANIED BY MINOR TERRITORIAL RECTIFICATIONS



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AND AFFIRMATION THAT TERRITORY ACQUIRED BY FORCE WAS ILLEGAL. SECRETARY CAUTIONED THAT IF CEASE FIRE WERE ARRANGED AND NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN, SOME MONTHS WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR PROGRESS TO BE MADE DURING WHICH TIME ALL PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO SHOW PATIENCE. FOREIGN MINISTER OBSERVED THAT EGYPTIANS WERE DISPLAYING REMARKABLE PATIENCE, FOR EXAMPLE, IN NOT BOMBING ISRAELI CITIES. SECRETARY AGREED. BUT STATED THE LONGER THE WAR LASTS ONE COULD NOT BE CERTAIN THAT SUCH RESTRAINTS WOULD "DOGMATIC". ONE THING ISRAELIS NOW KNOW IS THAT ARABS CANNOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT. SECRETARY STATED THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT "OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS" NOW EXIST FOR SPEEDY CEASE FIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS.

4. FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OCTOBER 15 REGARDING US VIEW OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AND PRESIDENT'S REFERENCES TO 1956. SECRETARY TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT MUST BE SEEN IN CONTEXT OF VERY ACTIVE US DIPLOMACY. US OBJECTIVE COULD BE SUMMARIZED AS SEEKING TO BRING END TO PRESENT HOSTILITIES AND IN SUCH A WAY THAT ARABS WILL FEEL AFTER THE WAR US CAN BE TRUSTED AND HAS NO DESIRE TO HUMILIATE THEM. ARABS THEMSELVES MUST SHOW SOME RESTRAINT AND AVOID INTEMPERATE ACTIONS IN ORDER TO PERMIT USG TO ESTABLISH BASIS ON WHICH PERMANENT PEACE MAY BE FOUNDED. US HAS NO INTEREST IN MILITARY BASES AND NO DESIRE FOR CONFRONTATION WITH ARABS.

5. FOREIGN MINISTER SAID PERHAPS ARABS ARE READING TOO MUCH INTO PUBLIC US STATEMENTS. SECRETARY SAID HE HOPES ARABS WOULD UNDERSTAND PRESSURES ON USG AND ON HIM PERSONALLY FROM ALL QUARTERS AT THIS TIME. FOREIGN MINISTER REPLIED "WE MUST NOT MISS THIS CHANCE". SECRETARY AGREED AND SUGGESTED THERE WERE THREE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF PRESENT FIGHTING: ONE SIDE COULD WIN OVERWHELMINGLY, IN WHICH CASE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE; A US-SOVIET CONFRONTATION COULD RESULT IN WHICH PROBLEMS OF MIDDLE EAST WOULD BECOME SECONDARY, OR, BOTH PARTIES TO CONFLICT COULD FIGHT TO EXHAUSTION AND BATTLE LINES WOULD BE FINAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THEM. SECRETARY REPEATED THAT ARABS HAD ALREADY ACHIEVED 90 OF THEIR OBJECTIVES AND

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 208680

SHOULD SEIZE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY FOR LASTING PEACE WHICH NEW SITUATION OFFERED. FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SOVIETS ARE PLAYING WITH MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM BUT "WITHIN LIMITS OF PROPRIETY". SECRETARY RESPONDED HE THOUGHT SOVIET ACTIONS WERE AT "OUTER LIMITS OF PROPRIETY".

6. SECRETARY URGED FOREIGN MINISTER TO CONVEY TO HIS EGYPTIAN COLLEAGUES WHAT HE HAD TOLD HIM. "ONE SHOULD KNOW WHEN TO CLINCH ONE'S GAIN IN A WAR IN TERMS OF WHAT CAN BE CONSOLIDATED POLITICALLY." FOREIGN MINISTER AGREED, NOTING THAT SYRIA AND EGYPT WANT ONLY THE RECOVERY OF THEIR LOST TERRITORIES AND THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF DRIVING ISRAEL INTO THE SEA.

7. IN CONCLUDING MEETING, SECRETARY REITERATED THAT FIRST OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO ESTABLISH CEASE FIRE SO THAT BASIS FOR LASTING PEACE MAY BE ESTABLISHED. USG WOULD NOT WANT TO TIE ITSELF IN ADVANCE INTO ANY SPECIFIC OUTCOME OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS. ESSENTIAL THING TO RECOGNIZE WAS THAT OPPORTUNITY NOW EXISTED WHICH HAD NOT EXISTED BEFORE FOR RESOLUTION OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM TO BENEFIT OF ALL PARTIES. RUSH

SECRET

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 826

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51
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 INRE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA TASK FORCE:INR/RNA:RMERRICK
APPROVED BY NEA TASK FORCE:MSTERNER
ARN - MR. KORN
IAI - MR. WALKER

S/S-O -GTWOHIE

13 OCT 73 PM 11:44
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

---------- 039977

O P 202007Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 208660

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJECT: E AND E PLANNING
REF: CAIRO 4077; STATE 207763

1. FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT PREPARED FOR YOUR OWN USE. IS NOT TO BE SHARED WITH ANYONE INCLUDING NATO COLLEAGUES IN CAIRO.

2. MOST RECENT INFORMATION FROM ISRAELIS INDICATES THEIR FORCES, NOW IN AT LEAST DIVISION STRENGTH AND EQUIPPED WITH ABOUT 300 TANKS, HAVE LAUNCHED THREE-PRONGED THRUST WEST OF CANAL FROM CROSSING POINT AT DEVERSOIR: ONE AT


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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

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ABU SUWEIR, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO MOVE WESTWARD, ANOTHER SOUTH ALONG LAKES TOWARD SUEZ CITY, AND THIRD SOUTH-WEST TOWARD GABAL EL-GAFRA TO INTERDICT ROAD AND RAILWAY BETWEEN CAIRO AND SUEZ. ISRAELIS HAVE PENETRATED AT LEAST AS FAR AS ABU SUWEIR, OR ABOUT 20 KMS. WEST OF CANAL. ALSO ARE OPERATING IN VICINITY OF GABAL EL-GAFRA ABOUT 30 KMS. WEST OF ISRAELI BRIDGEHEAD. DRIVE TOWARD SUEZ SEEMS TO HAVE STALLED-ISRAELI BRIEFER LATE ON OCTOBER 19 SEEMED MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT SUCCESS OF OPERATIONS BECAUSE OF MOUNTING EGYPTIAN RESISTANCE.

2. INTENTIONS OBVIOUSLY DIFFICULT TO ASSESS. ISRAELIS DO NOT SHARZ THEIR MILITARY OBJECTIVES WITH US. IDF BRIEFINGS OF TEL AVIV DATT, WHICH ALSO BEING REPEATED TO YOU, ARE MAIN SOURCE OF OUR INFORMATION ABOUT PROGRESS ON BATTLE-FIELD. ISRAELIS WOULD NO DOUBT LIKE TO ANNIHILATE EGYPTIAN ARMY BY ENVELOPMENT BUT WILLINGNESS TO PURSUE THIS OBJECTIVE MAY DEPEND TO SOME EXTENT ON CASUALTIES THEY ARE TAKING (ABOUT WHICH OR HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION) AND ON WHETHER ANY CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL LEAVES THEM IN SUFFICIENTLY ATTRACTIVE POSITION ON GROUND. IF MILITARY OPERATIONS CONTINUE, WE DOUBT CAIRO CONSIDERED BY ISRAELIS AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE IN ITSELF, BUT WOULD NOT RULE OUT AIRSTRIKES AND OTHER ACTIONS DESIGNED TO DESTROY VERY SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY CAPABILITY WHEREVER IT IS LOCATED. POSSIBILITY OF DEEP PENETRATION RAIDS AND ATTEMPT TO DAMAGE EGYPTIAN INFASTRUCTURE WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON ISRAELI ASSESSMENT OF SUCCESS OF CUR-RENT OPERATIONS.

3. WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO GIVE YOU UP-TO-DATE REPORTS ON BATTLEFIELD SITUATION AS WE UNDERSTAND IT. RUSH

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 170

PAGE 01 STATE 207763

55
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

NSAE-00 USSS-00 CCO-00 /031 R

73 OCT 21 AM 11:45
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

2

DRAFTED BY TASK FORCE:TWDAVIS:DP
APPROVED BY TASK FORCE:JJSISCO
TASK FORCE:MSTERNER
TASK FORCE:HHSTACKHOUSE
TASK FORCE:LRHUNT
OPR/WLG:JMCDONNELL
S/S:TPICKERING

---------- 029055

O 192057Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMCONSUL STUTTGART

S E C R E T STATE 207763

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJECT: E AND E PLANNING

REF: CAIRO 3172

1. M.S. KNOSSOS WILL OFF LOAD PASSENGERS AT PIRAEUS SATURDAY EVENING OCTOBER 20 REBUNKER (ABOUT SIX HOURS) AND THEN STAND BY ON IMMEDIATE NOTICE FOR RETURN TO ALEXANDRIA IF NECESSARY FOR EVACUATION AMERICAN CITIZENS FROM EGYPT. AS SAILING TIME PIRAEUS-ALEXANDRIA APPROXIMATELY 30 HOURS THIS MEANS VESSEL COULD BE AT ALEXANDRIA AS EARLY AS MONDAY MORNING, IF REQUIRED.

2. WE RELY UPON YOUR CONTINUING ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 207763

SITUATION RELATIVE SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN EGYPT.
WE HAVE NOTED SOME NATIONALS HAVE LEFT OR ARE LEAVING.
WE SUGGEST YOU BE IN TOUCH WITH GOE CONCERNING REPORTED
EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS MENTIONED REFTEL. DOES
GOE BELIEVE EVACUATION FOREIGN NATIONALS CALLED FOR AT
THIS TIME AND SHOULD USG BE CONSIDERING SAME ACTION? KISSINGER

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 OCT 16 AM 8:35

SECRET 819

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 3

PAGE 01 STATE 204144

71
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/EGY:GNANDERSON:DD
APPROVED BY NEA/EGY:MSTERNER
NEA TASK FORCE:
S/S: MR. GAMMON

---------- 111298

R 152108Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T STATE 204144

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PINR, EG,
SUBJECT: BIO: ISAM SADAT

WE HAVE NO RPT NO INFORMATION ON ISAM SADAT. WE UNDERSTAND SADAT HAS FULL BROTHER NAMED ISMAT, WHO WAS REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS SMUGGLING IN EARLY 1960'S AND IS THEREFORE PROBABLY OVER 26. SADAT'S FATHER WAS MARRIED AT LEAST TWICE AFTER MARRIAGE TO SADAT'S MOTHER, BUT WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON ISSUE OF THESE OTHER MARRIAGES. KISSINGER

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

73 OCT 15 AM 9:17

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 813

PAGE 01 STATE 203669

53
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00

CIAE-00 USSS-00 NSAE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:RPDAVIES:EMP
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
S/PRS:RMCCLOSKEY
S/S-O:RELTZ
S-LSEAGLEBURGER

---------- 101271

Z 141816Z OCT 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO FLASH
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK FLASH

S E C R E T STATE 203669

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, EG, IS
SUBJ: ALLEGED OVERFLIGHT BY US AIRCRAFT
REF : CAIRO 3096

1. YOU SHOULD REPLY TO FAHMY THAT YOU HAVE REPORTED HIS DEMARCHE AND HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO RESPOND WITH THE FOLLOWING. QUOTE AS YOU KNOW, OUR GOVERNMENT REGULARLY CONDUCTS RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS ON A WORLDWIDE BASIS AS PART OF ITS SECURITY PROGRAM. I AM INFORMED THAT MY GOVERNMENT IS INVESTIGATING THE MATTER RAISED BY THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT.

2. FYI: WE WILL NOT COMMENT PUBLICLY ON THE CHARGE BROADCAST BY THE EGYPTIANS. KISSINGER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 536

PAGE 01 STATE 097056

20
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF:DDNEWSOM:BJR
05/21/73 EXT22530
APPROVED BY AF:DDNEWSOM
S/S - MR. BARNES

'73 MAY 22 AM 9:00
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
24944

R 212049Z MAY 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

S E C R E T STATE 097056

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LY
SUBJ: LIBYAN ATTITUDE TOWARD US

1. PROFESSOR GEORGE LENCZOWSKI OF UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA WHO WAS INVITED TO LIBYA TO ATTEND RECENT CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN AND ARABIC YOUTH MET WITH PRIME MINISTER JALLUD MAY 16. LENCZOWSKI (PROTECT SOURCE) HAS REPORTED FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS TO DEPARTMENT.

2. IN ANSWER TO FOLLOWING QUESTION "HOW DO YOU VISUALIZE THE STATE AND FUTURE OF LIBYAN RELATIONS WITH THE U.S." JALLUD REPLIED "RELATIONS BETWEEN LIBYA AND THE ARAB WORLD ON THE ONE HAND AND THE U.S. ON THE OTHER ARE IN A STATE OF TENSION AND DETERIORATION BECAUSE THE U.S. CONTINUES TO TAKE HOSTILE ACTION TOWARD THE ARABS." ASKED TO ELABORATE ON WHAT HE MEANT BY HOSTILE ACTIONS JALLUD MENTIONED THE SUBSTANTIAL DELIVERY OF WEAPONS TO ISRAEL AND THE PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SIXTH FLEET OFF LIBYA'S COAST.

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SECRET

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3. WHEN ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF OFFICIAL LIBYAN-US RELATIONS COULD BE MAINTAINED, JALLUD REFERRED TO "AGGRESSIVE AND UNFRIENDLY" ACTS BY THE US AND SAID "IF THIS ATTITUDE AND POLICY CONTINUE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND LIBYA ARE HEADED FOR DISASTER."

4. PROFESSOR LENCZOWSKI ASKED JALLUD WHETHER LIBYA WAS PREPARED TO TREAT AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES ON A PURELY COMMERCIAL BASIS. JALLUD REPLIED "HOW CAN WE, CONSIDERING THE HOSTILE POLICIES OF THE US? ALL OF THESE MATTERS ARE INTERCONNECTED."

5. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE UNION WITH EGYPT, JALLUD SAID THAT DIFFERENCES EXIST BETWEEN LIBYA AND EGYPT BECAUSE THEY ARE NOW TWO SOVEREIGN STATES. UNION WILL TAKE PLACE AS SCHEDULED ON SEPTEMBER 1 AND DIFFERENCES WILL DISAPPEAR.

6. COMMENT: LENCZOWSKI COMMENTED THAT IN HEARING QADHAFI BOTH AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE AND IN TALKING WITH CONFERENCE DELEGATES, IN LISTENING TO JALLUD, AND IN CONTACTS WITH LIBYANS HE GAINED STRONG IMPRESSION THAT LIBYAN HOSTILITY TOWARD US DUE FAR MORE TO US POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL AND US SUPPORT FOR TRADITIONAL ARABS THAN AS RESULT ANY CLEAR BILATERAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. RUSH

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/EGY:MSTERNER
3/20/73 EXT 22365
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
NEA:ALATHERTON,JR.
NEA:AHMEYER
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---------- 107509

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, XF, EG
SUBJECT: ARAB GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION

REF: CAIRO 799

1. IN VIEW OMISSIONS AND DISTORTIONS WHICH YOU CITE IN HATEM'S RECORD OF YOUR PRESENTATION TO HIM ON TERRORISM (PARA 1 REFTEL), WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD USE ANY EARLY OPPORTUNITY GO OVER SAME GROUND AGAIN WITH BOTH PRESIDENCY AND FONMIN OFFICIALS.

2. WE RECOGNIZE DIFFICULTY OF TASK OF TRYING ENGAGE EGYPTIANS IN SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE TOWARD OUR REPRESENTATIONS ON TERRORISM IN LIGHT PRESS STORIES PURPORTING TO GIVE DETAILS OF NEW ARMS CONTRACTS WITH ISRAEL. WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE EITHER USEFUL OR APPROPRIATE TO GO ANY FURTHER WITH EGYPTIANS ON THESE REPORTS THAN ATHERTON DID WITH KHALIL (STATE 44656) AND AS YOU WERE AUTHORIZED TO IN STATE 50748.

3. IF EGYPTIANS ATTEMPT TO LINK SUBJECTS OF TERRORISM AND ARMS FOR ISRAEL, WE THINK MOST USEFUL TACK TO TAKE IS AS FOLLOWS. AS EGYPTIANS HAVE LONG KNOWN, US IS COMMITTED TO

ISRAEL'S SURVIVAL AND DEFENSE. TOWARD THIS WE HAVE ONGOING MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL. THIS FACT DOES NOT ALTER OUR CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO HELP ACHIEVE PEACE SETTLEMENT, NOR OUR VIEW THAT LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN INTERESTS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT. THESE HAVE BEEN CONSTANT FACETS OF OUR MIDDLE EAST POLICY FOR SOME TIME. WE RECOGNIZE THAT DIFFERENCES EXIST BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON MANY OF THESE FACETS AND IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE VALUE LINES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN US FOR PURPOSES OF UNDERSTANDING REASONS FOR OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS AND IN CONSTANT EFFORT TO NARROW DIFFERENCES. REASONS FOR US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IS LEGITIMATELY PART OF THIS DIALOGUE, BUT WE CANNOT ALLOW THIS FEATURE OF US POLICY, WHICH HAS BEEN WELL KNOWN TO GOE FOR

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SOME TIME, TO BE ADDUCED NOW AS REASON FOR MITIGATING SEVERITY WITH WHICH ALL CIVILIZED NATIONS MUST CONDEMN CRIMES OF SORT COMMITTED BY BSO IN KHARTOUM.

4. WHILE IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE THUS FAR TO TRANSLATE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS, AND MUTUALITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE PARTIES, WHICH SC RES 242 REPRESENTS, INTO ON-THE-GROUND PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE SETTLEMENT, BOTH PARTIES AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEVERTHELESS RECOGNIZE VALUE OF THAT CONSENSUS AND NEED TO PRESERVE IT AS FOUNDATION FOR EVENTUAL PEACE SETTLEMENT. IT IS BECAUSE BSO/FATAH TERRORISM THREATENS TO STRIKE AT HEART OF THIS CONSENSUS THAT EGYPT, NO LESS THAN US, SHOULD TAKE FIRM STAND AGAINST IT. IF BSO/FATAH OPERATIONS ARE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE, AND IF ARAB GOVERNMENTS ADOPT ACQUIESCENT ATTITUDE TOWARD THEM, IT WILL DRIVE WEDGE BETWEEN ARAB STATES AND, NOT ONLY US, BUT ENTIRE CIVILIZED COMMUNITY WHICH CONSIDERS SUCH METHODS ANATHEMA.

5. WE THEREFORE THINK EGYPT HAS VERY STRONG INTEREST IN MAKING CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONTINUED EGYPTIAN SUPPORT FOR LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN INTERESTS (I.E., WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF RES. 242) THROUGH LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ACTION AND CONDEMNATION OF METHODS WHICH ARE MORALLY ABHORENT AND OUTSIDE BOUNDS OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR AS RECOGNIZED IN UN CHARTER. THIS IS EQUALLY OUR APPROACH: WE DO NOT INTEND TO ALLOW ACTIONS BY HANDFUL OF CRIMINALS TO ALTER OUR VIEW THAT PALESTINIANS HAVE LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES AND ASPIRATIONS THAT MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT. ROGERS

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3/13/73 EXT 22660
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
NEA/EGY:MSTERNER
NEA:ALATHERTON,JR.
S/S - MR. BARNES
---------- 095051

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S E C R E T STATE 050249

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, XF, EG
SUBJECT: ARAB GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION

REF: STATE 44852, CAIRO 724

YOU MAY MAKE INFORMAL APPROACH TO MAHMOUD RIAD ALONG SAME LINES AS YOUR APPROACH TO GOF. ROGERS

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TAGS: PINS, XF, EG
SUBJECT: ARAB GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION

REF.: CAIRO 724

1. WE FULLY AGREE THAT WE SHOULD HANDLE OUR ACTIONS VS. TERRORISM, INCLUDING OUR APPROACHES TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS RE BSO, IN WAYS WHICH WILL MINIMIZE RISKS TO OUR LONG-TERM PEACE EFFORTS AND AVOID UNDERMINING ELEMENTS IN EGYPT AND ELSEWHERE WHO WANT TO STAY WITH US ON THIS QUESTION.

2. LANGUAGE IN PARAS 3 AND 4 OF STATE 42486 WHICH YOU PROPOSE ELIMINATING (AND ANALOGOUS LANGUAGE IN STATE 44811 WHICH YOU SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED BY NOW), HOWEVER, GOES TO HEART OF PROBLEM. IT IS NOT A THREAT, EITHER GENERAL OR EXPLICIT, BUT A STATEMENT OF FACT, AND IN CONVEYING IT YOU CAN MAKE THIS POINT. IN DOING SO, YOU MAY IF YOU DEEM USEFUL NOTE THAT USG IS BY NATURE OF OUR SOCIETY RESPONSIVE TO PUBLIC OPINION IN CONDUCT OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY, AND PUBLIC OPINION HERE IS AROUSED BY COLD-BLOODED MURDER OF TWO U.S. DIPLOMATS. IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE WE DO NOT WANT TO BE DIVERTED FROM GOAL OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WHICH WE AGREE IS WHAT TERRORISTS WANT, THAT WE CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT FOR GOVERNMENTS IN AREA WHO SHARE OUR GOAL TO MAKE CLEAR--BY THEIR ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS TERRORISM--THAT THEY DO NOT INTEND TO HELP BSO SUCCEED IN ITS AIMS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF EGYPT, GIVEN ITS LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ARAB WORLD. WE ARE FULLY SENSITIVE TO CONFLICTING PRESSURES ON SADAT AND WILL DO WHAT WE CAN TO AVOID COMPOUNDING HIS DIFFICULTIES, BUT IT IS AS A PRACTICAL MATTER UNAVOIDABLE THAT OUR JUDGMENT OF EGYPT'S POSITION AND ATMOSPHERE OS U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS--WHOSE RECENT IMPROVEMENT WE HAVE WELCOMED--WILL BE INFLUENCED BY WHAT EGYPT DOES AND FAILS TO DO VIS-A-VIS BSO AND SIMILAR GROUPS.

3. WE, THEREFORE, CANNOT AGREE TO MODIFICATION YOU SUGGEST IN YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. FOR ONE THING, POINTS YOU SUGGEST DROPPING WILL BE MADE IN OTHER ARAB CAPITALS, AND WE CAN ASSUME WILL BE FED BACK TO EGYPTIANS, WHO WOULD CERTAINLY NOTE DISCREPANCY. MORE SUBSTANTIVELY, WE THINK IN INTEREST OF FRANK DIALOGUE WE AND ISMAIL AGREED

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IS DESIRABLE THAT WE OWE IT TO EGYPTIANS NOT TO MISLEAD THEM ABOUT REALITIES ON U.S. SIDE JUST AS WE WANT TO UNDERSTAND REALITIES ON EGYPTIAN SIDE.

4. IN CONVEYING POINTS IN STATE 42486 AND 44811 YOU MAY, TO DEGREE YOU DEEM USEFUL, DRAW ON PARA 2 AND FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA 3 ABOVE.

5. WE ARE REFLECTING ON YOUR IDEA OF AN INFORMAL APPROACH TO MAHMOUD RIAD AND WILL BE IN FURTHER TOUCH WITH YOU ON THIS.

6. WE APPRECIATE YOUR SUGGESTION RE APPROACH TO EC AND ARE LOOKING AT IT ON PRIORITY BASIS. ROGERS

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SECRET 494

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/EGY:GNANDERSON:DD
3/9/73 EXT 22660
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON,JR.
NEA/EGY:MSTERNER
S/S-O: R.WRIGHT

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'73 MAR 9 AM 9:08

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TO USINT CAIRO
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY RABAT

S E C R E T STATE 044656

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS 3
TAGS: PFOR, EG
SUBJECT: CALL BY EGYPTIAN MINISTER

1. EGYPTIAN MIN KHALIL CALLED AT HIS REQUEST ON DEP ASST SECY ATHERTON ON MAR 9, PRIMARILY TO SEEK INFORMATION ON PRIMIN MEIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. COUNTRY DIRECTOR STERNER ALSO PRESENT. WHEN ATHERTON REFERRED TO KHARTOUM TRAGEDY, KHALIL SAID HE HAD BEEN PERSONALLY MOVED AT NOEL-

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MOORE FUNERAL, WHICH HE HAD ATTENDED ON OWN INITIATIVE ALTHOUGH CAIRO AWARE HE HAD DONE SO. ATHERTON SAID HE BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT THAT GOE KNOW THAT IT HAD BEEN NOTED ON HIGH LEVELS OF USG THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN A SINGLE PUBLIC STATEMENT FROM CAIRO EVEN OF CONDOLENCE, LET ALONE REGRET OR CONDEMNATION OF KHARTOUM MURDERS. THIS WAS SEEN HERE AGAINST BACKGROUND OF IMMEDIATE MESSAGES OF CONDOLENCE FROM PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY REGARDING LOSS OF EGYPTIAN LIVES IN SHOOTING DOWN OF LIBYAN AIRLINER. ATHERTON ADDED THAT HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING ANYTHING, MERELY CONVEYING AN OBSERVATION. ATHERTON ALSO NOTED ATTEMPTS IN ARAB WORLD TO AVOID SEEING KHARTOUM TRAGEDY AS IT REALLY WAS BY PORTRAYING IT AS ACT OF FEW UNBALANCED TERRORISTS. THERE WAS NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER IN USG MIND, ATHERTON STRESSED, THAT BLACK SEPTEMBER IS IN FACT CLANDESTINE INSTRUMENT OF FATAH AND THAT SUPPOSEDLY "RESPECTABLE" HEADS OF FATAH ACTUALLY DIRECT OPERATIONS OF THIS NATURE. GOVERNMENTS OF AREA,

ATHERTON CONTINUED, MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THIS SORT OF TERRORISM TO OCCUR BY PROVIDING TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WITH PASSPORTS, POUCH FACILITIES, MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES IF NOT DIRECTLY, RADIO FACILITIES, ETC. IN SPECIFIC CASE OF KHARTOUM TERRORISM, CONNECTION BETWEEN BSO AND FATAH WAS INDISPUTABLE: PRESIDENT NUMEIRI HAD HIMSELF INDICATED IN RECENT SPEECH THAT NUMBER TWO MAN IN KHARTOUM OFFICE OF FATAH HAD BEEN IN CHARGE OF OPERATION. ATHERTON EMPHASIZED THAT USG HAD ITSELF CONCLUSIVELY VERIFIED EXISTENCE OF LINKS BETWEEN BSO AND FATAH.

2. ATHERTON AT SAME TIME STRESSED THAT USG WELL AWARE OF AND SYMPATHETIC TO LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS. USG DID NOT LUMP ALL OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT TOGETHER. WE BELIEVED OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS PROBABLY AS SHOCKED AND HORRIFIED AS WE REGARDING KHARTOUM MURDERS, WHICH WE VIEWED AS CRIMINAL ABERRATION OF LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL MOVEMENT. KHALIL SAID HE APPRECIATED SERIOUSNESS OF ATHERTON'S PRESENTATION AND PROMISED TO REPORT IT IMMEDIATELY TO CAIRO. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION THAT USG NOT LUMPING TOGETHER ALL PALESTINIANS. ATHERTON ADDED THAT SOME PEOPLE SAYING THAT KHARTOUM WAS RESULT OF FAILURE OF EFFORTS TO MOVE TOWARD PEACEFUL ME SETTLEMENT. GOAL OF TERRORISTS WAS, IN FACT, TO SABO-

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

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TAGE PEACE. IF THERE WERE MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE, IT PROBABLE THAT PALESTINIAN EXTREMISTS WOULD ATTEMPT INITIALLY TO INCREASE TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

3. KHALIL EXPRESSED OPINION THAT IDENTIFICATION OF BSO WITH FATAH WAS IMPORTANT SHIFT ON PART USG. HE HOPED THIS WOULD NOT BE EXPLOITED BY ISRAEL AS PRETEXT FOR ALL-OUT WAR AGAINST ALL PALESTINIANS. STERNER STRESSED THERE HAD BEEN NO SHIFT IN USG POSITION. WE HAD NEVER THOUGHT THERE WAS SEPARATION BETWEEN BSO AND FATAH AND HAD NEVER SO STATED. THERE HAD PERHAPS PREVIOUSLY BEEN REASONABLE ROOM FOR DOUBT BECAUSE OF LACK OF EVIDENCE, BUT EVIDENCE NOW IN HAND HAD LED TO INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION OF FIRM LINKAGE.

4. ATHERTON STRESSED THAT USG FELT IT IMPORTANT TO BE FRANK WITH GOE AT THIS TIME, INASMUCH AS WE HAD BEEN HEARTENED BY POSITIVE NATURE OF HAFEZ ISMAIL VISIT WHICH ISMAIL HAD HIMSELF DESCRIBED AS POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR IMPROVED US-EGYPTIAN DIALOGUE. USG DID NOT WANT TO ALTER THIS TREND. KHALIL SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN ISMAIL VISIT AND TERRORISM IN KHARTOUM. ATHERTON REPLIED IT WAS USG DESIRE TO FORESTALL SUCH CONNECTION BEING MADE. KHALIL, NOTING ASST SECY SISCO HAD EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CAIRO'S OFFER TO RECEIVE

TERRORISTS AND HOSTAGES, FELT THAT CURRENT SILENCE IN CAIRO STEMMED FROM EXTREMELY DIFFICULT SITUATION AND DESIRE NOT TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM ROOT CAUSE OF MIDDLE EAST INSTABILITY: LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. ATHERTON SAID IT INEVITABLE THAT USG ATTITUDE WILL BE INFLUENCED BY WHAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS DO OR DO NOT DO RE TERRORISM. GOVERNMENTS' REACTIONS WILL ALSO BE SEEN AS INDICATION OF WHETHER THEY DESIRED TO MAINTAIN NORMAL INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT DEALINGS, AS RELATIONS COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED ON RATIONAL BASIS IN PRESENCE OF TERRORISM AGAINST DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES.

5. KHALIL SAID HE WOULD NOT EQUATE KHARTOUM TERRORISM WITH SHOOTING DOWN OF LIBYAN AIRCRAFT. GOE HAD APPRECIATED US CONDOLENCES IN LATTER CASE, IN WHICH A GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN SHOOTING DOWN OF PASSENGER

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PLANE. ATHERTON SAID US POSITION ON LIBYAN AIRCRAFT WAS CLEAR. US HAD VOTED IN FAVOR OF ICAO RESOLUTION. WE BELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN NO PREMEDITATION IN SHOOTING DOWN OF AIRCRAFT AS THERE WAS AT KHARTOUM, THAT ERRORS HAD BEEN MADE AND FULL INVESTIGATION NEEDED.

6. KHALIL, TURNING TO MEIR VISIT, ASKED WHAT ATHERTON COULD TELL HIM ABOUT IT. ATHERTON STATED USG SAW RECENT SERIES OF VISITS BY HUSSEIN, ISMAIL AND MEIR AS OPPORTUNITY TO LISTEN AND INSURE WE FULLY UNDERSTOOD HOW PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED IN ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT ASSESSED SITUATION, AS WELL AS TO EXPLAIN HOW USG SAW MATTERS. THESE VISITS WERE ESSENTIAL BEGINNING OF ANY MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE TOWARD SETTLEMENT. MEIR VISIT SHOULD BE SEEN IN THIS CONTEXT. ZIEGLER STATEMENT HAD CONTAINED AS MUCH AS COULD BE SAID OFFICIALLY. ATHERTON STRESSED THAT RECENT VISITS HAD NOT BEEN VIEWED BY USG AS OCCASION FOR INITIATIVES OR PROPOSALS AND THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR MEANS OF MAKING PROGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, WHICH SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DRIFT. AS PRESIDENT HAD STATED, OUR DESIRE WAS TO SEE SITUATION MOVE OFF DEAD CENTER.

7. KHALIL ASKED WHAT WAS MEANT BY "ONGOING MILITARY COMMITMENT" TO ISRAEL. REFERRING TO FIGURE CITED IN PRESS OF FIVE HUNDRED FIFTEEN MILLION DOLLARS OF EXPECTED US AID TO ISRAEL, KHALIL SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THERE WERE ITEMS STILL IN PIPELINE THROUGH 1974 AND WONDERED WHETHER THERE HAD NOW BEEN NEW COMMITMENTS. ATHERTON SAID PRESIDENT HAD MADE CLEAR BY REAFFIRMING THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING US-

ISRAELI RELATIONS THAT USG HAD A POLICY OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL AND THAT THERE NO REASON TO BELIEVE SUPPORT HAD CHANGED OR WOULD CHANGE IN FUTURE. AS FOR SPECIFICS, HOWEVER, THIS WAS MATTER OF PRIVILEGED BILATERAL RELATIONS. USG STILL IN PROCESS OF FORMULATING ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR COMING FISCAL YEAR FOR ALL COUNTRIES, INCLUDING ISRAEL. FIGURE OF FIVE HUNDRED FIFTEEN MILLION DOLLARS WAS THAT WHICH ISRAEL BELIEVED IT NEEDED FOR COMING YEAR. KHALIL ASKED ABOUT MEIR MEETING WITH DEF SECY RICHARDSON. ATHERTON CONFIRMED TWO HAD MET, WHICH WE SAW AS NORMAL IN LIGHT OF ONGOING

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PROGRAMS OF MILITARY NATURE. KHALIL COMMENTED THAT CAIRO DETECTED NOTHING NEW IN MEIR STATEMENTS ON PEACE BUT THOUGHT ISRAEL BECOMING MORE FRANK ON TERRITORIAL DEMANDS. ATHERTON SAID THAT THE LONGER STALEMATE LASTED, THE MORE DIFFICULT THE TERRITORIAL PROBLEM WOULD BECOME. HE HOPED SECRETARY'S CAREFUL EXPOSITION TO ISMAIL ON NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD. KHALIL SAID IT HAD BEEN, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY LIKED. ATHERTON ALSO RECALLED SECRETARY'S STATEMENT TO ISMAIL THAT USG COULD USE ITS INFLUENCE MOST EFFECTIVELY IF NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDER WAY AND SPECIFIC PROBLEMS UNDER DISCUSSION, BUT USG COULD NOT BE VERY HELPFUL IN VACUUM OF LACK OF DIALOGUE. SUMMING UP, ATHERTON ASSURED KHALIL OF USG DESIRE TO CONTINUE TO LOOK AT BASIC PROBLEM OF ME SETTLEMENT AND SEE WHAT DIPLOMACY COULD DO TO HELP. KHALIL SAID HE HAD FEELING, FROM CAIRO RADIO REPORTS, THAT GOE BELIEVED IT SHOULD NOT BE DIVERTED FROM MAIN ISSUE OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT DESPITE CURRENT DIFFICULT SITUATION. ATHERTON STATED THAT WE SHOULD NOT DECEIVE OURSELVES THAT PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT COULD BE EASY. FIRM RESOLVE ON PART OF ALL THOSE WORKING TOWARD SETTLEMENT WOULD BE NECESSARY. ROGERS

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SECTO 100

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, PA, US
SUBJECT: PANAMA NEGOTIATIONS: MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER TACK

REF: STATE 244031

FOR BUNKER FROM THE SECRETARY

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE. THE DRAFT LETTER IS APPROVED, EXCEPT THAT I WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR ANY TRAVEL UNTIL SOMETIME AFTER THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY. THUS, THE LETTER SHOULD BE CHANGED ACCORDINGLY.

2. FURTHER, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO LEAVE GENEVA FOR A SHORT PERIOD AROUND DECEMBER 26. THUS, SHOULD YOU WISH IT, YOU COULD MAKE ONE MORE TRIP TO PANAMA. IF YOU WANT TO PLAN ON THAT, THEY YOU WILL WANT TO MODIFY THE LETTER TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THAT FACT AS WELL.

3. I HAVE ASKED BRENT SCOWCROFT TO SEE THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF YOUR APPOINTMENT IS MADE FROM THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY SO YOU AND JACK KUBISCH SHOULD COORDINATE WITH HIM. THE LETTER TO TACK SHOULD BE DELIVERED IMMEDIATELY SO THE PANAMANIANS KNOW BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE.

KISSINGER

BT
#4001

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

Z 140130Z DEC 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4696
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONTROL: 3 4 4 7Q
RECD: 13 DEC'73 8:59PM

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SECTO 98

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION BILL

REF: STATE 244140

SECRETARY AGREES CHANGE PROPOSED IN FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION BILL IS DESIRABLE AND HE SUPPORTS IT.
KISSINGER

'73 DEC 14 AM 8:26
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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WHITE HOUSE

# Department of State TELEGRAM

'73 DEC 14 AM 8:26

R 132110Z DEC 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4691
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 3994

CONTROL: 3 4 0 2Q
RECD: 13 DEC'73 5:36PM

NODIS

SECTO 93

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DER STOEL.

1. US PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER, MR. HELMUT SONNENFELDT, COUNSELOR DESIGNATE, MR. WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, MR GEORGE VEST, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR PRESS AFFAIRS.

2. DUTCH PARTICIPANTS: FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DER STOEL; AMBASSADOR VAN LYNDEN; J. VAN DER VALK, DIRECTOR, NATO WEU AFFAIRS, FOREIGN OFFICE; DR W. F. VAN EEKELEN, COUNSELOR.

3. PLACE: THE HILTON HOTEL, DECEMBER 9, 1973.

4. THE MID-EAST

THE SECRETARY THOUGHT WE WERE MAKING PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PARTICULARLY WITH THE MAIN PROBLEM WHICH IS TO GET THE COMBATANTS TOGETHER IN A CONFERENCE. THE ENERGY CRISIS HAD BEEN DUE ANYWAY EVEN WITHOUT AN ARAB-ISRAELI WAR. INSOFAR AS THE CRISIS WAS RELATED TO THE WAR, WESTERN DISUNITY IN THE WEST HAD AGGRAVATED IT. THE DECLARATION OF THE NINE ONLY PRODUCED A NEGATIVE INFLUENCE. BY BEING CALM ABOUT THE EUROPEAN PROPOSAL, WE ARE, IN FACT, HELPING THEM BECAUSE THE ARABS HAVE CONSIDERABLE BLACKMAIL POTENTIAL TO THE EUROPEANS SO THE LESS SAID TO SPOTLIGHT EUROPEAN WEAKNESS THE BETTER. HE PARTICULARLY WELCOMED THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER TO SAY HOW MUCH HE APPRECIATED AND ADMIRED THE DUTCH POSITION.

5. FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DER STOEL AGREED THAT HE TOO WAS CONVINCED THAT THE EUROPEAN POLICY WAS INVITING A FURTHER BLACKMAIL. HOWEVER, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF

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THE NINE, THE DUTCH WERE DEALING WITH A PROBLEM, THE FRENCH AND BRITISH.

6. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD SURPRISED YAMANI IN THEIR CONVERSATION EARLIER THIS WEEK IN WASHINGTON. YAMANI HAD ASKED ABOUT MODALITIES FOR HELPING THE US OUT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. H, THE SECRETARY, HAD REPLIED THAT THE FIRST THING TO DO WAS TO LIFT THE EMBARGO AGAINST THE NETHERLANDS AND THEN TO THINK ABOUT THE US.

7. VAN DER STOEL ASKED WHAT THE DUTCH SHOULD DO IN THE MEANTIME. THE SECRETARY ADVISED THE DUTCH TO STAY COOL AND TO MAKE NO FURTHER GESTURE TOWARD THE ARABS SINCE THIS WOULD INVITE THEM TO THINK THE DUTCH WERE WEAKENING. VAN DER STOEL AGREED.

8. VAN DER STOEL MENTIONED THAT JOBERT IN THE WEU ASSEMBLY HAD TALKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ARAB-EUROPEAN GATHERING. HIS OWN REACTION WAS THAT IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY DISADVANTAGEOUS AT THE PRESENT. SUCH A GATHERING WOULD BE ONE THING IN THE CONTEXT OF A SETTLEMENT, BUT OTHERWISE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER JOBERT WOULD PURSUE THE IDEA BUT THE ARABS JUST MIGHT POSSIBLY TURN UP ON THE MARGINS AT COPENHAGEN DURING THE NINE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE A NEAR DISASTER, HEIGHTENING THE SEPARATION BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE US; HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT IT MIGHT "JUST HAPPEN". SOVIET CONTAINMENT IS OF ESSENTIAL VALUE TO BOTH THE US AND EUROPE AND WE SHOULD NOT BE COMPETING IN THIS SITUATION. THE US WAS PREPARED TO KEEP THE EUROPEANS INFORMED ABOUT OUR ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HOWEVER, AN OBSTACLE WAS OUR CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION WE SHARED HAS BEEN USED AGAINST US. IF WE INFORMED OUR ALLIES, WE ASKED THOSE WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO KEEP US INFORMED. IN FACT WE WERE BETTER INFORMED BY THE ARABS THAN BY SOME OF OUR ALLIES. HE EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE FULLEST CONSULTATION.

9. THE MIDDLE EAST DECLARAGION OF THE NINE WAS NOT A FRIENDLY GESTURE, COMING OUT JUST THE DAY HE ARRIVED IN CAIRO AND EMBARRASSED BOTH HIM AND PRESIDENT SADAT BECAUSE IT ASKED FOR MORE THAN SADAT WAS ASKING.



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A MODICUM OF CONSULTATION WOULD HAVE HELPED. HE ASKED IF THE DUTCH KNEW WHAT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH WERE DOING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. VAN DER STOEL SAID HE REALLY HESITATED TO ANSWER BECAUSE HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT HE WAS NOT SATISFACTORILY INFORMED.

10. THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT ONCE WAR BROKE OUT THE KEY ISSUE FOR US ALL WAS TO SECURE THE AREA FROM SOVIET INFLUENCE. HE THOUGHT THE US POLICY WAS SHOWING PRACTICAL RESULTS. ACCORDING TO REPORTS OF THE ALGIERS' CONFERENCE, EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, AND SYRIA WERE NOT HAPPPY WITH THE SOVIETS. THE ARAB COUNTRIES WERE COMPETING TO PERSUADE HIM TO VISIT IN THEIR CAPITALS BECAUSE THE US HAD THE INFLUENCE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS IN THE AREA. TOGETHER, WE AND THE EUROPEANS COULD DO SO MUCH MORE.

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R 132110Z DEC 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4692
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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 CAIRO 3994/2

CONTROL: 3 3 9 5Q
RECD: 13 DEC'73 5:21PM

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SECTO 93

11. VAN DER STOEL SAID HE HOPED THE SECRETARY WOULD MAKE THESE POINTS DURING THE NATO MINISTERIAL BECUASE HIS VIEWS WOULD FALL ON OTHER RECEPTIVE EARS AS WELL AS THE DUTCH

12. THE US AND THE NINE

VAN DER STOEL SAID THAT THE DUTCH ARE FULLY INVOLVED WITH THE COMMUNITY WITH DEEPLY INTERDEPENDENT ECONOMIES. HE AND THOSE WHO FELT LIKE HIM WANTED TO TRY TO HELP WITH THE CRISIS BUT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE FRENCH AND UK WOULD CHANGE THEIR POLICIES. THE BENELUX COUNTRIES, THE GERMANS AND ITALIANS ARE IN A EIFFICULT POSITION WHEN THE FRENCH AND UK DIG IN THE HEELS.

13. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE US STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY BUT WE RESIST THE IDEA THAT IT SHOULD DEVELOP ON AN ANTI-AMERICAN BASIS. IF A EUROPEAN UNITY EMERGES BASED REALLY ON OPPOSITION TOWARD THE US, IT WILL UNDERMINE THE ESSENTIAL ATLANTIC UNITY. WE HAVE HAD AN UNSATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT WHERE WE RECEIVED DECISIONS FROM A COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE WHO HAS NO AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE, AND WITH NO OPPORTUNITY TO INJECT US THINKING IN THE PROCESS. IF WE WENT ON LIKE THIS WE MIGHT END UP LIKE THE GREEK CITY-STATES. VAN DER STOEL SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE MAJOR PROBLEM WITHIN THE COMMUNITY WAS THE COMMUNITY MACHINERY ITSELF.

14. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT AS HE DEALT WITH THE RECENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, HE THOUGHT BACK TO THE US-UK RELATIONSHIP DURING THE JORDAN CRISIS. THEN, ALMOST EVERY NIGHT THE PRESIDENT SPOKE TO THE PRIME MINISTER AS HE DID WITH DENNIS GREENHILL. HE WONDERED WHY EUROPE COULD NOT COME UP TO THE STANDARD OF THAT BRITISH RELATIONSHIP RATHER THAN BRITISH DO THE REVERSE.

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MINOR TENDENCIES COULD BECOME A MASSIVE PROBLEM IN THE YEARS AHEAD. HE REITERATED THAT HE FULLY APPRECIATED THE DUTCH ATTITUDE AND SUPPORTED ITS EFFORT TO REMAIN IN EUROPE.

15. OIL

UNDER SECRETARY DONALDSON WOULD TALK TO THE DUTCH AFTER THE NATO MINISTERIAL TO SEE THAT WE COULD DO TO HELP. IT WAS A MORAL DISGRACE THAT THE DUTCH SHOULD SUFFER IN THIS SITUATION. VAN DER STOEL WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE AND ADDED THAT THE DUTCH CONCERN WAS THAT THE BIG US COMPANIES SHOULD REFINE IN ROTTERDAM AND OIL SHIPMENTS STILL GO THROUGH ROTTERDAM. KISSINGER

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

R 131935Z DEC 73 73 DEC 14 AM 8:26
FM USINT CAIRO
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 925
INFO RUEHCR/USMISSION UN 2336
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4687
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 3990

CONTROL: 3 3 5 4Q
RECD: 13 DEC'73 4:56PM

NODIS

SECTO 90

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE- MESSAGE FROM
SECRETARY TO JOBERT

PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER
JOBERT FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER:

QUOTE DEAR FRIEND:

LET ME TELL YOU, FIRST, THAT I WAS AWESTRUCK BY THE
DEPTH OF YOUR INSIGHT INTO MY CHARACTER -- THOUGH OF COURSE
IT DOES NOT APPROACH MY OWN ESTIMATE OF MYSELF. I ONLY
WISH I COULD PERSUADE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS TO CARRY YOUR
INTERVIEW VERBATIM. BUT SERIOUSLY, YOUR GENEROUS COMMENTS
DID MUCH TO BUOY MY FLAGGING HUMOR AS I BEGIN THE MIDDLE
EAST TRIP, AND I AM GRATEFUL.

MENTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST LEADS ME TO A SECOND
POINT -- ABRIEF STATUS REPORT ON THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.
WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS TOWARD AGREEMENT ON THE DETAILS
YET REMAINING IN THE WAY OF THE CONFERENCE. IF THINGS
PROCEED AS I HOPE THEY WILL WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO PROPOSE
THAT IT WILL CONVENE UNDER UN AUSPICES ON DECEMBER 18.
THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT US-USSR LETTER TO THEY SYG MAKES
CLEAR THAT THE SYG WILL BE PRESENT AT THE OPENING, WILL
PRESIDE DURING THIS PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE, AND WILL BE
THE CONVENOR OF THE CONFERENCE. HE WILL BE INVITED TO LEAVE
A REPRESENTATIVE AT THE CONFERENCE THROUGHOUT SO THAT HE
CAN BE FULLY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, AS WELL AS THE US AND THE
USSR, HAVE AGREED THAT AT SUCH TIME AS THE LETTER GOES
FORWARD TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE PRESIDENT OF THE

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SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD CONSULT INFORMALLY WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WITH A VIEW TO DEVELOPING A CONSENSUS OF THE COUNCIL WHICH WOULD GIVT THE CONFERENCE A UN BLESSING.

THUS, EVENTS SEEM TO BE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. PERHAPS WE SHALL HAVE SOME GOOD NEWS TO ANNOUNCE IN A FEW DAYS.

I DEEPLY HOPE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO AVOID IN THE VIELD OF ENERGY COOPERATION, THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WE FOUND OURSELVES ENMESHED IN WITH REGARD TO OUR APPROACH TO EUROPE. YOU WILL SEE FROM THE FULL TEXT OF MY LONDON SPEECH THAT I LEFT PARTICIPATION IN THE ENERGY ACTION GROUP OPEN TO PRODUCER NATIONS, AS YOU SUGGESTED. AS I RECALL, THAT WAS THE ONLY REQUIREMENT YOU SET FOR FRENCH PARTICIPATION. YOU WILL ALSO NOTE THAT I ADDED A SENTENCE WHICH WOULD LEAVE IT UP TO THE NINE WHETHER THEY WOULD PREFER TO PARTICIPATE AS THE COMMUNITY.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU ON DECEMBER 19. I WILL GET WORD TO YOU AGAIN FROM MY TRIP.

ONCE AGAIN, MANY THANKS FOR YOUR VERY KIND REMARKS. WARM REGARDS,
HENRY A. KISSINGER. UNQUOTE.
KISSINGER

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SECRET

CONTROL: 3225Q
RECD: DEC 13, 1973
1332Z

P 131255Z DEC 73
FM USINT CAIRO
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INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3509
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 3983

NODIS

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR EG IS
SUBJECT: BAB AL-MANDAB PASSAGE

REF: STATE 243506

LOUTFI NOTIFIED NOON TODAY RE PASSAGE DATA ON IRIN.

EILTS

BT
#3983

'73 DEC 13 PM 12:33
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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WH
Scowcroft
McFarlane
Saunders

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

CONTROL: 3 2 2 4 Q
DECEMBER 13, 1973
8:27 AM

0 131250Z DEC 73 ZFF4
FM USINT CAIRO
TO RUFNRS/USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 716
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4680
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 3981

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR EG
SUBJECT: FAHMY'S INTEREST IN DAYAN VISIT

REF: USNATO 6028 (SECTO 11), 6032 (SECTO 14)

TODAY WAS FIRST OPPORTUNITY I HAD TELL FAHMY CONTENTS OF REFTELS ON DAYAN VISIT. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO HEARING MORE ABOUT DAYAN VISIT DURING UPCOMING MEETINGS WITH YOU.

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

O 111445Z DEC 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4643
RUEHCR/USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE 31
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 3926

2 5 1 9 Q
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Secretary
McFarlane
Saunders
Rodman

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR EG
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

FAHMY HAS JUST TOLD VINOGRADOV AND ME, ON INSTRUCTIONS OF SADAT AND ASSAD, THAT EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN GOVERNMENTS GIVE US-USSR GREEN LIGHT TO SEND LETTER TO SYG ON BASIS OF A SERIES OF JOINTLY AGREED GOE-GOS "PRINCIPLES," PROVIDED US AND USSR FIND THESE ACCEPTABEEL. THESE PRINCIPLES ARE IN EFFECT HOSE CONTAINED IN OUR THIRD DRAFT, ALTHOUGH FAHMY SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT I HAD WITHDRAWN THAT DRAFT EARLIER TODAY AND WAS THEREFORE COMMENTING ON SUBSTANCE TEXT SHOULD CONTAIN RATHER THAN ANY SPECIFIC VERSION. FULL REPORT FOLLOWS.

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4631
INFO RUEHCR/USMISSION NATO NIACT IMMEDIATE 0028
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3496
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 3911

Scowcroft
McFARLANE
SAUNDERS
RODMAN

NODIS

NATO FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR IS EG
SUBJECT: BAB EL-MANDAB PASSAGE

REF: STATE 240954

1. USINTOFF SMITH WAS CALLED TO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO MEET WITH UNDER SECRETARY LOUTFI AT 12 NOON, DECEMBER 11. THERE WERE VISITORS IN LOUTFI'S OFFICE AND IN A HURRIED CONVERSATION IN HIS OUTER OFFICE LOUTFI TOLD SMITH THAT OF THE THREE SHIPS WE HAD NOTIFIED HIM OF ON DECEMBER 11, TWO WERE ACCEPTABLE, BUT THE "ADMIRAL OF THE ZONE REGRETTED THAT THE ISRAELI FLAG FREIGHTER TEVERYA WAS NOT". HE SAID HE HAD "RECEIVED WORD FROM THE ADMIRAL LAST NIGHT AT 11:00 PM BUT IT WAS TOO LATE TO CALL US THEN". SMITH ASKED HIM IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY REASON GIVEN OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE SHIPS AND LOUTFI REPLIED "NO THAT WAS ALL I WAS TOLD". SMITH ASKED AGAIN WHO HAD REGRETTED THAT THE TEVERYA WAS UNACCEPTABLE AND WHETHER ANY REASONS HAD BEEN GIVEN. LOUTFI REPLIED THAT THE INFORMATION CAME FROM GENERAL ISMAIL'S OFFICE, THE MINISTER OF WAR, AND THAT "THEY" HAD NOT USED THE WORD "REGRETTED". "THEY" HAD SIMPLY SAID IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE AND HE HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN ANY FURTHER INFORMATION.

2. COMMENT: WE HAVE NO INFORMATION WHETHER TEVERYA WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TRANSIT BAB EL-MANDAB NIGHT OF DECEMBER 9-10, HAS ACTUALLY BEEN STOPPED BY EGYPTIAN NAVAL FORCES.
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RODMAN

O 111110Z DEC 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4630
RUEHCR/USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE 0027
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 3910

CN: 2468Q
REC'D: DECEMBER 11, 1973
6:51 A.M.

Scowcroft
McFARLANE
SAUNDERS
RODMAN

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR EG
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

REF: USNATO 6048 (SECTO 17)

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

1. IN VIEW OF UNCERTAINTY MY BEING ABLE SEE FAHMY IN PERSON TODAY, I CONVEYED YOUR MESSAGE USNATO 6048 DURING MY TALK WITH HIM ON THE TELEPHONE EARLIER TODAY. HE LAUGHED, ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS THANKS TO YOU AND HIS HOPE THAT AN AGREED UPON DRAFT LETTER WILL EXPEDITIOUSLY BE AVAILABLE.

2. RE COMMENTS TO FAHMY ON YOUR TALK WITH DAYAN (USNATO 6028, SECTO 11), I CONSIDER IT BEST TO WAIT UNTIL I SEE FAHMY PERSONALLY TO CONVEY INFO. USNATO 6032 (SECTO 14) APPARENTLY DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION AND JUST RECEIVED. SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENTS GIVEN THEREIN WILL BE INCLUDED IN MY PRESENTATION.
EILTS
BT
#3910

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SECRET

O 111100Z DEC 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4629
RUEHCR/USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE 0026
BT

CN: 24670
REC'D: DECEMBER 11, 1973
6:50 A.M.

S E C R E T CAIRO 3909

NODIS/CHEROKEE

Scowcroft
McFARLANE
S'FELDT
SAUNDERS
RODMAN

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652 XGDS-1
TAGS/ PFOR EG
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

REF: USNATO 6047 (SECTO 16) USNATO 6050

1. CONTACTED VINOGRADOV FIRST THING THIS MORNING TO ADVISE HIM THAT I WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO WITHDRAW DRAFT LETTER TO SYG. HE HAD NOT YET HAD THIS INFORMATION BUT EXPRESSED APPRECIATION. HE ASKED IF WE ARE NOW SUPPORTING SECOND DRAFT. I TOLD HIM I UNDERSTOOD MATTER UNDER DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON.

2. I THEN ASKED FOR URGENT MEETING WITH FAHMY, BUT WAS TOLD HE HAD AN EXTREMELY BUSY SCHEDULE TODAY AND WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR A MEETING. HIS SECRETARY WAS UNCERTAIN WHEN HE COULD SEE ME. (ASSAD ARRIVED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND EGYPTIANS ARE BUSY WITH HIM) ACCORDINLY I GOT IN TOUCH WITH HIS AIDE, SAYYED OMAR SIRRI, TO ADVISE HIM OF WITHDRAWAL

3. AS A RESULT, FEW MINUTES LATER (1015) FAHMY TELEPHONED ME AND I REPEATED MESSAGE TO HIM. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUERY WHY LETTER BEING WITH DRAWN, I EXPLAINED THERE HAD BEEN A MIX-UP ON THE DRAFT THAT I HAD GIVEN HIM, DETAILS OF WHICH I DID NOT KNOW, AND THAT I WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO WITHDRAW THAT TEXT WHILE MATTER BEING STRAIGHTENED OUT AT HOME. HE ASKED IF THIS MEANT WE ARE COORDINATING FURTHER WITH SOVIETS IN WASHINGTON. I TOLD HIM I HAVE NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. HE NOTED SOVIETS HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR OBJECTION TO "UN AUSPICES" AND SYG'S ROLE LANGUAGE AND SAID HE ASSUMED THIS WAS SOURCE OF PROBLEM. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT UNLESS DRAFT LETTER IS EX-

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PEDITIOUSLY AND SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED, GENEVA CONFERENCE MAY NOT OPEN AS SCHEDULED.

4. DURING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH VINOGRADOV AT 12:30 NOON LOCAL, I CONFIRMED TO HIM I HAD TOLD FAHMY LETTER WITHDRAWN WHILE MATTER BEING STRAIGHTENED OUT BACK HOME. VINOGRADOV AGAIN ASKED IF WE ARE NOW SUPPORTING SECOND DRAFT WHICH, HE NOTED, WAS ALSO JOINT DRAFT. I SAID I WAS UNABLE TO SPEAK TO THIS POINT. HE STATED HE IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO SEEK OUT FAHMY AND URGE GOE APPROVAL OF THAT SECOND DRAFT TEXT.

5. FEW MINUTES AGO VINOGRADOV AGAIN CALLED TO SAY HE HAD BEEN IN TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH FAHMY TO URGE GOE ACCEPT SECOND DRAFT, CLAIMING THIS REPRESENTS JOINT DRAFT. FAHMY HAD NOTED I HAD ONLY ASKED FOR WITHDRAWAL THIRD DRAFT AND NOT THAT GOE NOW APPROVE SECOND DRAFT. FAHMY HAD ATTACHED SIGNIFICANCE TO THIS. VINOGRADOV CLAIMS HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW STATED I WAS TO BE INSTRUCTED WITHDRAW THIRD DRAFT AND SUPPORT SECOND. I SAID THERE MUST BE MISUNDERSTANDING SINCE I DID NOT HAVE SUCH SPECIFIC SUPPORTIVE INSTRUCTIONS. AS I HAD TOLD HIM EARLIER, I HAD LIMITED MY COMMENT TO FAHMY THAT THIRD DRAFT BEING WITHDRAWN WHILE PROBLEM BEING STRAIGHTENED OUT BACK HOME. HE ASKED HOW I WOULD RESPOND IF EGYPTIANS ASK IF WE NOW SUPPORT SECOND DRAFT? I TOLD HIM THAT, SHOULD THIS HAPPEN, I WOULD AS OF NOW HAVE TO TELL EGYPTIANS I WOULD NEED INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON BEFORE GIVING REPLY.
EILTS



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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SCOWCROFT

MCFARLANE

SECRET

O 101238Z DEC 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4614
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 3880

2 1 2 0 Q
10 DEC 73 13 04

73 DEC 10 PM 1:35

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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EYES ONLY FOR ASST SECY SISCO FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652 XGDS
TAGS: PFOR EG US
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

IN DEALING WITH FAHMY AND VINOGRADOV HERE, I FIND MYSELF A BIT IN LEFT FIELD IN NOT KNOWING ABOUT SUCH DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR AND SOVIET POSITIONS AS MAY HAVE ARISEN. INCIDENT REPORTED CAIRO 3874 IS CASE IN POINT. IT WOULD FACILITATE MY MISSION IF I COULD SOMEHOW BE KEPT UP TO DATE ON ANY SUCH DIFFERENCES WHICH MAY BE REFLECTED IN OUR RESPECTIVE DEALINGS WITH EGYPTIANS. FOR EXAMPLE SPECIFIC INDICATION CONTAINED STATE 239824 THAT SOVIETS COULD NOT INSIST UPON LAST SENTENCEOF PARA 21 IN EARLIER DRAFT WAS MOST HELPFUL. ALSO, IF WE HAVE SHOWN THEM DRAFT LETTERS AS APPARENTLY WAS THE CASE WITH FIRST AND SECOND DRAFTS.
EILTS

SECRET

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

WH

COPY 8 OF 10 COPIES

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET

Department of State

'73 DEC 5 PM 11:12

SCOWCROFT
MCFARLANE
RODMAN
SAUNDERS

# TELEGRAM

O 052000Z DEC 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4560
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 3810

CONTROL: 1 1 0 3Q
RECD: 05 DEC'73 4:51PM

NODIS//CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR EG
SUBJECT: FAHMY'S MESSAGE OF DEC. 5

1. FAHMY ASKED ME TO CALL AT 2000 TODAY. AFTER I HAD CONVEYED YOUR THANKS FOR YESTERDAY'S LETTER, HE HANDED ME A STATEMENT OF SIX PRINCIPLES WHICH HE EXPLAINED SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR PROCEEDING TO CONVENING CONFERENCE. TEXT FOLLOWS:

"1. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL INFORM THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL AND OTHERS ABOUT THE FOLLOWING MODALITIES FOR THE CONFERENCE.

"2. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL ARRANGE FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE WILL DECLARE THAT ACCORDING TO THEIR UNDERSTANDING EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN AND SYRIA HAVE AGREED TO ATTEND THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

"3. THE CONFERENCE WILL BE CONVENED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE.

"4. THE CONFERENCE WILL BE UNDER THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

"5. THE CONFERENCE WILL BE CONVENED ON DECEMBER 18, 1973, IN GENEVA. THE OPENING SESSIONS WILL

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**



BE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S LEVEL.

"6. THE TIMING OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PALESTINIANS AND LEBANON WILL BE DISCUSSED DURING THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE."

2. FAHMY ASKED ME TO PASS ON TO YOU THAT EGYPT IS UNWILLING TO ALTER ANY OF THESE PRINCIPLES. IT BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT THEY SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR EXTENDING INVITATIONS. HE ALSO POINTEDLY NOTED THAT HE, NOT THE SOVIETS, HAD OBTAINED SYRIAN APPROVAL TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE. SYRIANS HAD AGREED TO DO SO ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES.

3. FAHMY CONTINUED THAT HE HAD SEEN VINOGRADOV SHORTLY BEFORE RECEIVING ME AND (A) INFORMED HIM THAT GOE AGREES TO ATTEND CONFERENCE, (B) GIVEN HIM THE ABOVE SIX POINTS, AND (C) ADVISED HIM EGYPT INSISTS THEY SHOULD BE THE BASIS ON WHICH THE CONFERENCE IS CONVENED. HE OBSERVED THAT WHEREAS USG HAD EARLIER BEEN TOLD EGYPT WILL ATTEND, THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SO NOTIFIED.

4. NOTING GOE-PROPOSED SIX PRINCIPLES ARE DIFFERENT FROM EARLIER JOINT US/USSR LETTER GIVEN TO FAWZI, VINOGRADOV HAD SAID USG WOULD PROBABLY OBJECT TO THESE CHANGES. HE HAD ALSO SOUGHT TO PROBE WHETHER EGYPTIANS HAD EARLIER DISCUSSED THESE PRINCIPLES WITH ME. ACCORDING FAHMY, HE HAD TOLD VINOGRADOV SOVIETS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO USG THESE ARE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH EGYPT INSISTS. FAHMY HAD ALSO DENIED ANY EARLIER DISCUSSIONS WITH ME ON THE SUBJECT.

5. FAHMY CONCLUDED THAT HE HOPED USG WILL NOW BE ABLE TO PROCEED QUICKLY TO ARRANGE THAT NECESSARY INVITATIONS BE EXTENDED. I ASSURED HIM THAT I WOULD AT ONCE CONVEY THE ABOVE TO YOU.

6. AS I WAS LEAVING, FAHMY SAID HE ALSO WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT SADAT'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S RECENT LETTER WILL PROBABLY BE SENT IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

Scowcroft
McFarlane
Rodman

SECRET

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

0 051240Z DEC 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4553
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 3802

CONTROL: 9 7 9 Q
DECEMBER 5, 1973
8:48 AM

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652 XGDS
TAGS/ PFOR EG US UR
SUBJECT: VINOGRADOV'S COMMENTS

1. SUMMARY: VINOGRADOV CONTINUED DEBUNK SIX-POINT AGREEMENT. CLAIMS EGYPT HAS GAINED LITTLE FROM IT, ISRAEL EVERTHING IT WANTS. USG HAS RESPONSIBILITY AS ORIGINATOR OF SIX-POINT AGREEMENT, PRESS ISRAEL FULFILL ALL OF ITS PROVISIONS. ARGUMENT THAT ISRAEL UNABLE MOVE ON DISENGATEMENT UNTIL AFTER ELECTION COULD EITHER ABORT PEACE CONFERENCE OR BE PROVEN INVALID THERE. AFFIRMED HE HAD SUGGESTED TO HAFEZ ISMAIL THAT GOE ACCEPT DRAFT TEXT OF LETTER OF INVITATION WITHOUT ANY CHANGE. I STRESSED USG PUT FORWARD SIX-POINT AGREEMENT TO SOLIDIFY CEASEFIRE AND HOPEFULLY TO ENABLE SOME PROGRESS TO BE MADE IN MILITARY TALKS. HOWEVER, USG NOT A PARTICPANT IN MILITARY TALKS AND BELIEVES PEACE CONFERENCE IS MOST EFFECTIVE FORUM WHERE USG CAN PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. APART FROM OCCASIONAL REMINED THAT WE HOPED FOR AN EARLY GOE APPROVAL TO PROCEED. I HAD NOT DISCUSSED DRAFT LETTER FURTHER. END SUMMARY.

2. I HAD PERIODIC REVIEW OF SITUATION WITH VINOGRADOV TODAY. EHE WENT THROUGH WHAT HAS BECOME HIS CUSTOMARY LINE. SIX-POINT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL. PARA 2 DEALING WITH OCTOBER 22 LINES AND DISENGAGEMENT REMAINS UNFULFILLED. AGREEMENT MADE AT USG INITIATIVE AND EGYPTIANS HOLD US RESPONSIBLE. HE PROFESSED NOT TO BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND HOW USG COULD HAVE PROPOSED SIX-POINT AGREEMENT WITHOUT PRIOR ISRAELI CONSENT TO WITHDRAW. YAARIV HAD MADE SOME DISENGAGEMENT PROPOSALS AT KM 101 TALKS, BUT HAD THEN WITHDRAWN THEM. WHY

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HAD NOT USG PRESSED ISRAEL TO HONOR ITS COMMITEMENT? EGYPT HAS GAINED LITTLE FROM IX-POINT AGREMENT: ISRAEL HAS HAD ALL THE BENEFITS. IT HAS GOTTEN ITS POW'S BACK. HE CLAIMED THAT SENIOR EGYPTIANS ARE TELLING HIM THIS. HE HAD NOT VOLUNTEERED ANY SUCH COMMENT.

3. DOBRYNIN HAD REPORTED, HE CONTINUED, THAT YOU HAD TOLD HIM DISENGAGEMENT WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT FIRST PHASE OF PEACE CONFERENCE. IF ISRAELI AGRUMENT THAT NOTHING CAN HAPPEN ON DISENGAGEMENT BEFORE ELECTION IS VALID, HE ARGUED, THEY MUST BE EXPECTED TAKE SOME POSITION AT CONFERENCE. THIS COULD ABORT THE CONFERENCE. CONVERSELY, IF ISRAELI ABLE ACCEPT DISENGAGEMENT AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE, I.E. BEFORE THEIR ELECTIONS, IT VITIATES KONTENTION THEY CNNOT MOVE BEFORE ELECTION. HE SCOFFED AT IDEA THAT ISRAELI ELECTION SHOULD BE THAT IMPORTANT. ISRAEL IS BUT ONE COUNTRY. EGYPT MUST CON SIDER NOT ONLY DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION PROBLEM, BUT ALSO BROADER ARAB AND AFRICAN REACTIONS. ON ITS PART USSR WANTS A PEACE CONFERENCE TO DEVELP A "JUST" PEACE BASED ON UN RESOLUTION 242: USG, IN CONTRAST SEEMS TO BE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH GIVING ISRAEL WHAT IT WANTS. USSR BELIEVES POINTS SET FORTH THEREIN SHOULD BE SCRUPULOUSLY IMPLEMENTED, NOT SIMPLY USED AS AN AGENDA FOR DISCUSSIONS.

4. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT I HAVE HEARD SOME CRITICISM OF NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF PARA 2. I EMPHASIZED USG HAD PUT FORTH SIX-POINT AGREEMENT IN GOOD FAITH TO SOLIDFY CEASEFIRE AND IN THE HOPE THAT THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO SIDES MIGHT MAKDE PROGRESS. BUT, AS HE KNEW, USG IS NOT A PARTICIPANT IN THOSE TALKS. LIKE SOVIET UNION, IT WILL BE A PARTICIPANT IN PEACE CONFERENCE WHERE WE BELIEVE OUR INFLUENCE CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY BE USED TO PROGRESS. I REMINDED HIM USG HAS LONG WANTED A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE AND HAS CONSISTENTLY EXERTED ITS EFFORTS TO THIS END.

5. REFERRING TO MY TALK WITH SADAT, VINOGRADOV ASKED IF I HAD RAISED THE MATTER OF GOE APPROVAL OF DRAFT



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NODIS NODIS

3-CAIRO 3802, DECEMBER 5, 1973 (NODIS/CHEROKEE)

LETTER WHICH HE AND I HAD A WEEK AGO, SEPARATELY, PRESENTED TO FAWZI. I SAID I HAD NOT DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE PRESIDENT. NOR HAD I DISCUSSED IT WITH ANYONE ELSE EXCEPT FOR OCCASIONAL GENERAL REMINDER THAT WE HOPED FOR EARLY APPROVAL TO PROCEED. VINOGRADOV EXPLAINED HE HAD ALSO GIVEN SADAT A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL LETTER AND HAD TALKED WITH HAFEZ ISMAIL ABOUT IT AT GREATER LENGTH. WHILE RESPECTING PERSONAL VIEWS FAWZI HAD ADVANCED, HE HAD POINTED OUT TO HAFEZ THAT LETTER WAS "CAREFULLY" BALANCED" JOINT US-USSR PRODUCTION. IN DRAFTING SAME, USSR HAD SOUGHT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT EGYPTIAN VIEWS, AND US HAD DONE SO WITH ISRAELI VIEWS! ANY SUGGESTED CHANGES NOW WOULD REQUIRED THE WHOLE PROCESS TO BE BEGUN AGAIN. HE HAD SUGGESTED, THEREFORE, THAT GOE ACCEPT ORIGINAL DRAFT WITHOUT ANY CHANGE. MATTERS LIKE PALES-TINIAN REPRESENTATION NEED NOT BE SPECIFIED AT THIS TIME. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR PARTICIPANTS INVITE PALESTINIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN SECOND DAY OF CONFERENCE IF THEY WISHED. HE HAD BEEN TOLD A REPLY MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING TODAY OR TOMORROW. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH WHEN SUCH A REPLY IS RECEIVED.

6 COMMENT: I MADE NO MENTION OF PERTINENT COMMENTS WHICH FAHMY MADE TO ME LAST NIGHT (PAR 4, CAIRO 3786) SINCE WIRITING ABOVE, FAHMY HAS ASKED TO SEE ME AT 2000 TONIGHT LOCAL.
EILTS



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WH (9)

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WHITE HOUSE '73 DEC 4 AM 8:20

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROL: 328Q
RECD: DEC 3, 1973
1607Z

R 031255Z DEC 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4527
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 3759

HAK
SCOWCROFT
McFARLANE
RODMAN

NODIS

FOR ASST SECY SISCO FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: EG
SUBJECT: ASHRAF GHORBAL

REF: CAIRO 3680, 3754

1. ASHRAF GHORBAL LEFT CAIRO THIS MORNING. HE WILL SPEND TWO DAYS IN GENEVA THEN TO LONDON WHENCE HE WILL PROCEED TO WASHINGTON, VIA NEW YORK, DECEMBER 6. ETA WASHINGTON 1900. CAIRO 3754 PROVIDES DETAILS.

2. AT LUNCH YESTERDAY GHORBAL EXPRESSED REGRET THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO ARRIVE EARLIER AS SECRETARY HAD HOPED. PRESIDENT SADAT WAS UNABLE TO SEE HIM UNTIL YESTERDAY, AND BRIEF STOP IN GENEVA APPARENTLY NECESSARY. HE SAID HE HAD AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM SADAT TO DELIVER TO THE SECRETARY. WHILE AWARE OF THE SECRETARY'S BUSY SCHEDULE, GHORBAL HOPED THAT IT MIGHT SOMEHOW BE POSSIBLE TO FIT HIM IN. I SAID I KNEW THE SECRETARY WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING HIM, BUT COULD NOT SAY WHAT HIS BUSY SCHEDULE MIGHT MAKE POSSIBLE.

3. ASSUME APPROPRIATE PROTOCOL ARRANGMENTS BEING MADE TO GREET GHORBAL SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH I RECEIVED ON ARRIVAL.

EILTS

BT
#3759

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WH (9)

Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SCOWCROFT
HOLDE
MCFARLANE

8184Q

27 OCTOBER 8 46 AM

Z 271240Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4127
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 3253

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR MOPS EG IS
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY: USG ACTION

1. IT APPEARS TO US THAT FATE OF EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO US POLICY, BUT THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE TIME REMAINING BEFORE ISRAELIS PREEMPT ANY ACTION WE MAY BE ABLE TO TAKE.

2. PRESENT STATED US POSITION IS THAT WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO CONSIDER INJUECTION OF US PERSONNEL TO OBSERVE CEASE-FIRE. BELIEVE THAT MOST URGENT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO PLACING FIRST CONTINGENT OF US OBSERVERS ON EDGES OF THIRD ARMY AREA, AND POSSIBLY WITHIN THIRD ARMY AREA ITSELF.

3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT GOE WILL OBJECT. IF ANYTHING, ALL INDICATORS SUGGEST THE OPPOSITE.

4. AT SAME TIME, US MAY WISH TO INFORM GOI THAT IT IS NOT PREPARED TC SEE THE SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION OF THIRD ARMY.

SMITH

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W17 (6)

NODIS NODIS NODIS

# Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 3930Q
RECD: OCT 15, 1973
1524Z

HAK
Scowcroft
LL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
OCT 15 PM 4:23

O 151445Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4023
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 3120

NODIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR US UR EG IS
SUBJECT: SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR US INTERVENTION TO ACHIEVE CEASEFIRE AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

REF: CAIRO 3052

1. DEPUTY TASS DIRECTOR YEDRASHNIKOV TELEPHONED USINTOFF (HOUGHTON) OCTOBER 15 TO SAY IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THEY MEET BRIEFLY. APPOINTMENT WAS ARRANGED. USINTOFF APOLOGIZED FOR NOT HAVING BEEN ABLE TO SEE YEDRASHNIKOV ON OCTOBER 12, BUT NOTED THAT PRESS OF WORK AND ABSENCE OF ANY USEFUL IDEAS ON SUBJECT OF ME SETTLEMENT SEEMED TO OBVIATE MEETING AT THAT TIME.

2. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD. HE DID WANT TO MAKE A FEW SUGGESTIONS, HOWEVER, ON A PERSONAL BASIS AND EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS REASON FOR PRESENT MEETING. HE NOTED PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION. SYRIA SEEMED TO BE IN MUCH BETTER CONDITION THAN IT WAS FOUR DAYS AGO. EGYPT WAS HOLDING, AND THERE WAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SHE WAS IN IMMINENT DANGER. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT IMPROVEMENT IN SYRIAN SITUATION HAD CONTRIBUTED TO EGYPTIAN ABILITY TO WITHSTAND EXPECTED ISRAELI ONSLAUGHT.

3. OUTCOME OF SITUATION WAS STILL INDETERMINATE. THE WAY HE SAW IT, EGYPTIANS WERE PLANNING ON MAINTAINING ESSENTIALLY STATIC POSTURE WHILE ISRAELIS FLUNG THEMSELVES USELESSLY AGAINST EGYPTIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES. EGYPTIANS EXPECTED THAT WHEN ISRAEL WAS SUITABLY WEAKENED, SHE WOULD PLEAD FOR A CEASEFIRE, WHICH EGYPTIANS WOULD ACCEPT ONLY ON THE BASIS OF ISRAELI RETURN TO PRE-1967 BOUNDARIES. EGYPTIANS WOULD ACCEPT NOTHING LESS. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT IF ISRAELIS WOULD NOT ACCEPT CEASEFIRE ON THESE TERMS, EGYPTIAN FORCES WOULD CONTINUE TO MOVE ACROSS SINAI UNTIL THEY ATTAINED THIS END FOR THEMSELVES.

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4. YEDRASHNIKOV SAW THIS AS A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION. ISRAELIS NEEDED TO BE ASSURED THAT ARAB FORCES WOULD NOT ENTER ISRAEL PROPER. HE SAID THAT SOME GREAT POWER INPUT WAS NEEDED-A PROPOSAL, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR A CEASEFIRE COUPLED WITH SOME FACE-SAVING FORMULA WHICH WOULD PERMIT SITUATION TO STABILIZE. SOVIET UNION COULD DO LITTLE: IT HAD VIRTUALLY NO INFLUENCE AMONG ARABS. US ON THE OTHER HAND HAD POWERFUL INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL.

5. YEDRASHNIKOV THEN SUGGESTED THAT US SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE. BEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE FOR US PROPOSAL FOR A CEASEFIRE WITH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-JUNE-1967 BOONDARIES. CEASEFIRE, ACCOMPANIES BY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, COULD BE ENFORCED BY GREAT POWER PEACE-KEEPING FORCES OR SOME OTHER MECHANISM. IMPORTANT POINT WAS A CEASEFIRE TOWARD WHICH THE US WAS IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO ASSIST.

6. WITHOUT REPLYING SUBSTANTIVELY, USINTOFF THANKED YEDRASHNIKOV FOR HIS VIEW, AND MEETING ENDED.

SMITH

BT
#3120



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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

CONTROL: 2350Q
RECD: 10 OCT 73 4:30AM

O 100730Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3942
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 3023

NODIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJECT: CURRENT EGYPTIAN MILITARY SITUATION

REF: CAIRO 3007

'73 OCT 10 AM 11:33
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. LAST NIGHT AP CARRIED FOLLOWING REPORT, BY-LINED TO FRED HOFFMAN IN WASHINGTON AND ATTRIBUTED TO US INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS:

QUOTE: WASHINGTON - MEADEAT-INTELLIGENCE

"ONE REPORT, APPARENTLY BASED ON INFORMATION FROM EGYPTIAN SOURCES, SAID THAT THE EGYPTIAN ARMY'S FIRST OBJECTIVE WAS TO GRAB TERRITORY AS FAR AS ABOUT 20 MILES DEEP IN THE SINAI, POSSIBLY INCLUDING THE VITAL MOONTAIR PASSES, AND TO HOLD THIS GROUND UNTIL THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OR PRESSURE FROM THE BIG POWERS COULD BRING A CEASEFIRE.

"BUT THE SAME SOURCES SAID THE EGYPTIAN GOAL NOW HAS BEEN BROADENED BECAUSE OF WHAT IS DESCRIBED AS EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT'S VIEW THAT HIS ARMIES ARE CAPABLE OF TAKING ALL THE SINAI. END QUOTE.

2. SEE PARA 9 REFTEL.

3. IF THIS CONTINUES, SOURCE CANNOT CONTINUE TO PRODUCE.
SMITH

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White House

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 SEP 26 AM 9:56

SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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R 261120Z SEP 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3830
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 2861

6431Q
1973 SEP 26 1150Z

NODIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: APER EG
SUBJECT: DEPARTURE OF USINT ACTING PRINCIPAL OFFICER

REF: STATE 191211

APPROACH OUTLINED PARA. 2 REFTEL WAS MADE TO GHORBAL'S ASSISTANT SAAD ABUL KHEIR IN TEMPORARY ABSENCE OF GHORBAL FROM CAIRO. ABUL KHEIR SAID GOE WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO DAMPEN CAIRO RUMORS AND PRESS SPECULATION. HE SAID GOE HAD NO INTEREST IN CREATING ISSUE OUT OF WILEY DEPARTURE FROM USINT.

SMITH

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

SEP 25 PM 3 58

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

0 0 6 Q

25 SEPTEMBER 8 53 AM

0 251225Z SEP 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3825
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 2849

NODIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: APER, EG
SUBJECT: DEPARTURE OF USINT ACTING PRINCIPAL OFFICER

1. STORY HAS NOW ENTERED DIPLOMATIC CIRCUIT FROM EGYPTIAN SOURCES THAT MARSHALL WILEY'S DEPARTURE WAS REQUESTED BY GOE. ACCORDING TO FRENCH EMBOFF, EGYPTIANS ARE SAYING THAT ABSENCE OF REPLACEMENT FOR GREENE, FOLLOWED BY AUGUST AP STORY FROM WASHINGTON TO EFFECT THAT NO REPLACEMENT WOULD BE NAMED IN NEAR FUTURE, WAS SPECIFIC CAUSE OF GOE DESIRE TO RETALIATE BY TAKING ACTION AGAINST MARSHALL WILEY.

2. WE HAVE MANAGED TO DEFLECT QUESTIONS, BUT INTEREST IN MARSHALL WILEY'S TRANSFER AND SPECULATION ABOUT APPOINTMENT OF NEW PRINCIPAL OFFICER IS INCREASING. THIS MORNING'S GUMHURIYYA CONTAINS ONE-LINE ARTICLE STATING THAT US WILL NOMINATE NEW USINT CHIEF. AP BUREAU CHIEF WHO VERY ACTIVE IN DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY ALSO ASKING TO TALK TO US AGAIN, PRESUMABLY ABOUT SAME SUBJECT.

3. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH PROVIDE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE REGARDING WILEY'S DEPARTURE BEFORE WE TALK TO AP CHIEF.

4. DEPARTMENT MAY ALSO WISH TO CONSIDER OUR SUGGESTING TO GOE THAT THEIR CONTROLLING SPECULATIVE STORIES ON SUBJECT IN CAIRO PRESS WOULD SERVE TO SMOOTH EFFECTS OF WILEY'S DEPARTURE.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

O 130810Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3985
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 3074

CN: 3546Q
REC'D: OCTOBER 13, 1973
4:24 A.M.

NODIS

E 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR US UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEW OF CAUSE OF HOSTILITIES

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
73 OCT 13 AM 9:14

REF: CAIRO 3052

1. LOCAL AP BUREAU CHIEF HAS INFORMED US THAT ON OCTOBER 11, CHIEF OF TASS BUREAU IN CAIRO YURI TRUSHIN GAVE HIM ALMOST EXACTLY SAME VERSION OF KISSINGER/SADAT CONSPIRACY THEORY THAT HIS DEPUTY GAVE USINTOFF (PARA 5 REFTEL). TRUSHIN WAS ALSO QUITE EMPHATIC ABOUT IT MAKING NO DIFFERENCE WHETHER OR NOT SYRIA WAS CLOBBERED IN PRESENT HOSTILITIES.

2. TRUSHIN GAVE AP CORRESPONDENT HIS VIEWS AT EXACTLY SAME TIME THAT YEDRASHNIKOV WAS TALKING WITH USINTOFF. MEETING WAS ARRANGED AT TRUSHIN'S REQUEST.

3. TRUSHIN IS IDENTIFIED AS A SUSPECTED RIS OFFICER, BUT NOT OF THE SAME SERVICE AS YEDRASHNIKOV. THERE IS NO REASON TO DOUBT THAT HE KNOWS AP BUREAU CHIEF IS IN CONTACT WITH USINT.

SMITH

BT
#3074

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONTROL: 56820~~
RECD: 24 SEP 73 6AM

73 SEP 24 AM 11:10
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

LL

O 240945Z SEP 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3816
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 2837

NODIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: APER EG
SUBJECT: DEPARTURE OF USINT ACTING PRINCIPAL OFFICER

1. SEPTEMBER 24 EGYPTIAN PRESS HAS REPORTED MARSHALL WILEY'S DEPARTURE. AHRAM STATES THAT HE HAS BEEN "RECALLED" FOR CONSULTATIONS, WHILE GUMHURIYYA NOTES THAT HE "DEPARTED FOR CONSULTATIONS" SEPTEMBER 23 (WITHOUT SUGGESTING RECALL).

2. LOCAL AP BUREAU CHIEF MINICLIER HAS PICKED UP STORY AND IS FILING NON-SPECULATIVE REPORT ABOUT WILEY'S DEPARTURE. YUGOSLAV NEWS AGENCY (TANJUG) HAS ASKED SPECIFICALLY ABOUT CONNECTION BETWEEN TIMING OF WILEY'S DEPARTURE AND RECENTLY CONCLUDED ROCKEFELLER VISIT.

SMITH

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

'73 SEP 2

SECRET

5.

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
5495Q
SEPT. 22, 1973
4:43 AM

R 220745Z SEP 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3808
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 2823

NODIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: APER, EG
SUBJECT: DEPARTURE OF USINT ACTING PRINCIPAL OFFICER

THOSE FEW MEMBERS OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS WHO HAVE POSED QUESTIONS TO US CONCERNING REASONS FOR MARSHALL WILEY'S DEPARTURE HAVE, FOR THE MOST PART, BEEN SATISFIED WITH ANSWER THAT WILEY WAS OVERDUE FOR HOME LEAVE AND TRANSFER. THERE HAS BEEN NO SPECULATION THAT DEPARTURE WAS ABNORMAL. CAIRO PRESS HAS NOT MENTIONED MATTER, AND WE HAVE RECEIVED NO INQUIRIES FROM JOURNALISTS.

SMITH

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WILEY TO BE DECLARED PNG BY EGYPTIANS.
HAK, SCOWCROFT, LL

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: APER, EG
SUBJECT: GOE REQUEST FOR WILEY TRANSFER

REF: CAIRO 2731

1. AMBASSADOR ALABART TOLD ME TODAY, SEPTEMBER 13, THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN CALLED IN BY FONMIN ZAYYAT AND TOLD THAT HE WOULD BE CALLED IN AGAIN BY ZAYYAT ON SEPTEMBER 20 AND GIVEN FORMAL COMMUNICATION DECLARING ME PNG IF I HAD NOT LEFT EGYPT BY THAT DATE. ZAYYAT COMMENTED THAT USG DID NOT SEEM TO TAKE GOE MESSAGE SERIOUSLY SINCE I HAD MADE NO APPARENT MOVE TO LEAVE EGYPT.

2. NOW THAT GOE HAS, IN EFFECT, TURNED DOWN USG PROPOSAL MADE BY DAVIES TO KHALIL, I RECOMMEND WE PROCEED WITH SCENARIO CONTAINED CAIRO 2731. GOE REFUSAL TO CONSIDER OUR VERY REASONABLE COMPROMISE PROPOSAL CALLS, IN MY OPINION, FOR RECIPROCAL ACTION.

3. I WOULD PREFER TO SPARE ALABART, WHO HAS BEEN REMARKABLY HELPFUL AND DISCREET THROUGHOUT THIS AFFAIR, THE INDIGNITY OF A FORMAL SUMMONS ON SEPTEMBER 20. FOR THAT MATTER, I FIND IT A LITTLE DIFFICULT TO COMPREHEND HOW THE PNG ACTION COULD BE ANY MORE FORMAL THAN IT ALREADY IS.

4. I ALSO NEED SOME TIME TO COMPLETE THE PACKING OF MY HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS, TURN OVER MY RESPONSIBILITIES AS CHAIRMAN OF SCHOOL BOARD, AND TAKE CARE OF INNUMERABLE DETAILS IN THE OFFICE. SINCE IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO DISGUISE THESE ACTIVITIES, I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING HOME LEAVE AND TRANSFER ORDERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I WILL THEN OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCE MY TRANSFER AND PROCEED TO WIND UP MY AFFAIRS.

5. GOE HAS SO FAR AVOIDED ALL PUBLICITY ON THIS MATTER AND I BELIEVE IT IS LIKEWISE IN OUR INTERESTS TO AVOID PUBLICITY AS LONG AS GOE DOES. IN EXPLAINING MY DEPARTURE I WILL SAY THAT MANY PERSONNEL CHANGES ARE UNDER WAY WITH THE ADVENT OF A NEW SECRETARY OF STATE AND THAT I EXPECT TO BE ASSIGNED TO A NEW POSITION IN WASHINGTON.

WILEY

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

CONTROL: 2 4 6 8 Q
SEPTEMBER 12, 1973
9:48 AM

NODIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TATS: APER, EG
SUBJECT: GOE REQUEST FOR WILEY TRANSFER

REF: STATE 171685

1. AT COCKTAIL PARTY EVENING SEPTEMBER 11, ASHRAF GHORBAL ASKED ME ABOUT MY TRAVEL PLANS. IT DEVELOPED THAT HE KNEW FULL STORY AND HE SAID HE WAS VERY SORRY THAT SITUATION HAD WORKED OUT THE WAY IT HAD. HE SAID HE REALIZED I HAD NOT BEEN ENGAGED IN ANY IMPROPER ACTIVITY, AND HE ADDED THAT I HAD MANY FRIENDS WITHIN GOE WHO HAD DONE THEIR BEST TO SUPPORT ME. UNFORTUNATELY THINGS HAD NOW REACHED POINT WHERE GOE HONOR WAS INVOLVED AND IF SUBJECT IS PUSHED, GOE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY TAKE ACTION AGAINST ME. HE RECOMMENDED THAT I BE TRANSFERRED WITHIN ZAYYAT'S DEADLINE (SEPTEMBER 20) FOR MY OWN SAKE.

2. I POINTED OUT TO GHORBAL THAT USG WAS AWAITING REPLY FROM GOE TO REQUEST THAT I BE PERMITTED REMAIN IN EGYPT UNTIL REPLACEMENT FOR JERRY GREENE ARRIVED IN CAIRO. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT ANY CHARGES OF MISBEHAVIOR WERE FALSE AND THE USG DID NOT ACCEPT EGYPTIAN ALLEGATION THAT I HAD DONE ANYTHING WRONG. HOWEVER, IN SPITE OF THIS, IN INTEREST OF MAINTAINING COMMUNICATIONS, USG HAD AGREED TO TRANSFER ME AS SOON AS REPLACEMENT FOR GREENE COULD BE APPOINTED AND COME TO EGYPT. I SAID THIS SEEMED TO ME TO BE A VERY REASONABLE REQUEST.

3. GHORBAL THEN SUGGESTED THAT ONE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE TRANSMITTAL OF NAME OF GREENE'S SUCCESSOR TO GOE PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 20 DEADLINE. I SAID THAT THIS SEEMED VERY UNLIKELY SINCE THE NEW SECRETARY OF STATE HAD STILL NOT BEEN CONFIRMED AND WOULD PROBABLY

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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NOT BE ABLE TO FOCUS ON DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS FOR AT LEAST A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME AFTER SETPEMBER 20. GHORBAL REPEATED THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER IF GOE COULD BE GIVEN THE NAME BY THAT DATE SINCE, IF PUSHED, GOE WOULD CERTAINLY REACT AGAINST ME. GHORBAL ALSO TOLD ME ON INFORMAL AND CONFIDENTIAL BASIS THAT HE HAD SEEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT HAD BEEN SENT TO AHMED KHALIL ORDERING HIM TO HAVE NO MORE DISCUSSION ON THIS TOPIC IN WASHINGTON.

4. AMBASSADOR ALABART HAS BEEN SEEKING APPOINTMENT WITH ZAYYAT FOR ONE WEEK AND INTENDS TO ASK FOR REPLY TO USG'S PROPOSAL. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER ZAYYAT HAS BEEN AVOIDING ALABART OR HAS BEEN TOO BUSY WITH VARIOUS SUMMIT AND FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCES TO SEE HIM. ALABART IS STILL TRYING TO SEE ZAYYAT AND HOPES TO PRESS HIM FOR ANSWER WITHIN COMING TWO DAYS.

5. I BELIEVE OUR PROPOSAL TO GOE WAS VERY REASONABLE. IF EGYPTIANS CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO REPLY OR IF THEY GIVE NEGATIVE ANSWER, I RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT CONSIDER FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. WE ADVISE GOE THROUGH ALABART THAT USG DOES NOT ACCEPT ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING BY MYSELF, BUT SINCE WE DO ACCEPT FACT THAT GOE IS SOVEREIGN IN ITS OWN TERRITORY, WILEY WILL LEAVE CAIRO BY SEPTEMBER 20.

B. DEPARTMENT NOTIFY AHMED KHALIL OF EGYINT THROUGH INDIAN AMBASSADOR THAT HE HAS 30 DAYS TO PACK UP AND LEAVE THE UNITED STATES OR HE WILL BE DECLARED PNG.

C. SMITH BE LEFT IN CHARGE OF USINT FOR A PERIOD OF SEVERAL WEEKS, DURING WHICH TIME SUBSTANTIVE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH GOE BY USINT BE MINIMIZED.

D. AT END OF SEVERAL WEEKS, I BE REPLACED BY AN OFFICER OF APPROXIMATELY SAME RANK AS MY OWN, PREFERABLY A SENIOR FSO-3 WITH ARAB AREA EXPERIENCE WHO COULD BE GIVEN COUNSELOR TITLE. DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS, HOWEVER, BE KEPT WITHIN RELATIVELY LOW PROFILE AND USINT DEVOTE



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Department of State **TELEGRAM**



ITS ENERGIES PRIMARILY TO PRESERVING AND PROTECTING EXISTING US INTERESTS IN EGYPT.

E. APPOINTMENT OF SENIOR OFFICER TO REPLACE GREENE BE INDEFINITELY DELAYED. THIS WOULD SERVE PURPOSE OF CONVEYING MESSAGE TO GOE THAT WE DO NOT APPRECIATE THEIR TREATMENT OF OUR DIPLOMATS IN EGYPT AND WOULD ALSO AVOID CREATING HIGH PROFILE TARGET FOR EGYPTIAN FRUSTRATION AND ABUSE. EVENTUAL REPLACEMENT OF GREENE BY SENIOR OFFICER SHOULD BE MADE IF USG DECIDES:

(1) TO INITIATE NEW MAJOR DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO ACHIEVE ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT, AND
(2) TO GIVE USINT A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THAT DIPLOMATIC EFFORT.

6. IF EGYPTIANS ASK WHY WE ARE DELAYING REPLACEMENT OF GREENE, WE SHOULD POINT OUT TO THEM THAT LAST FOUR HEADS (OR ACTING HEADS) OF MISSION IN CAIRO HAVE HAD UNFORTUNATE EXPERIENCES. IN 1967, AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE WAS ORDERED OUT OF COUNTRY ON BASIS OF FALSE ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING US MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN JUNE, 1967 WAR. IN 1971, BERGUS WAS SERIOUSLY EMBARRASSED BY INTENTIONAL EGYPTIAN MISINTERPRETATION OF HIS INFORMAL MEMORANDUM. IN 1972, GREENE HAD HIS STAFF ARBITRARILY REDUCED FROM 20 TO 12 THREE MONTHS AFTER HIS ARRIVAL. AND IN 1973 WILEY WAS THREATENED WITH PNG ACTION ON BASIS OF FALSE ACCUSATIONS OF IMPROPER CONDUCT CONCERNING EVENTS THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE ALMOST TWO YEARS EARLIER.

WILEY



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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

CONTROL: 98Q
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FOR STERNER NEA/EGY

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: APER EG
SUBJECT: GOE REQUEST FOR WILEY TRANSFER

REF: STATE 174107

1. SINCE SENIOR LEVELS GOE CURRENTLY OCCUPIED WITH WALDHEIM VISIT, WE MAY NOT RECEIVE REPLY TO OUR MESSAGE TO KHALIL ON MY TRANSFER FOR SOME DAYS. I AM THEREFORE ARRANGING FOR MY WIFE MARJORIE AND MY THREE CHILDREN TO RETURN TO UNITED STATES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON ADVANCE HOME LEAVE TRAVEL. MARJORIE CAN INSTALL CYNTHIA IN PREP SCHOOL AND THEN REMAIN WITH OTHER TWO CHILDREN AT HOME LEAVE ADDRESS UNTIL I CAN JOIN THEM. WE WILL EXPLAIN SITUATION TO EGYPTIANS AND OTHER ACQUAINTANCES ON GROUNDS THAT I AM OVERDUE FOR TRANSFER AND EXPECT TO LEAVE EGYPT SOME TIME IN COMING MONTHS. WE THEREFORE THOUGHT IT BETTER THAT CHILDREN BE STARTED IN SCHOOL IN THE UNITED STATES SO THAT THEIR EDUCATION WOULD NOT BE INTERRUPTED.

2. PLEASE ADVISE MY NEW YORK DENTIST, DR. EDWARD S. JUBOJA, 630 FIFTH AVE., NEW YORK, N.Y., TO CANCEL ALL MY DENTAL APPOINTMENTS SET UP FOR SEPTEMBER.

3. WE HAVE ADVANCE HOME LEAVE TRAVEL ORDERS FOR CYNTHIA. WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ADVANCE HOME LEAVE TRAVEL ORDERS FOR MARJORIE AND THE TWO BOYS, DOUGLAS AND STEVEN, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WILEY

BT
#2641

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 20, 1973

Colonel

Attached is a Cherokee.

Do you want it to go to Saunders?

Yes ✓ No _____

Bud

Will do forward EYES ONLY DOCUMENT IN SCHEDULED ENVELOPE

Sent
J.M.

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WA-208

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: APER
SUBJECT: GOE REQUESTS TRANSFER OF ACTING PRINCIPAL OFFICER

1. SPANISH AMBASSADOR ALABART CALLED ME TO HIS OFFICE TODAY, AUGUST 20, AND TOLD ME THAT HE HAD SEEN FOREIGN MINISTER ZAYYAT AT ALEXANDRIA ON AUGUST 18. ZAYYAT HAD ASKED HIM TO CONVEY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN A MESSAGE FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THAT IT WAS THE DECISION OF THE GOE THAT MARSHALL WILEY SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED FROM EGYPT WITHIN ONE MONTH OR THE GOE WOULD DECLARE WILEY PERSONA NON GRATA. ALABART EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND CONCERN OVER THIS MESSAGE AND ASKED ZAYYAT FOR HIS REASONS. ZAYYAT WAS RELUCTANT TO GIVE ANY DETAILS AND SAID ONLY THAT IT WAS A "SECURITY MATTER." ZAYYAT ALSO SAID THAT HE HOPED THE USG WOULD TRANSFER WILEY AND AVOID PUSHING THE MATTER TO A PNG.

2. ALABART SAID HE HAD SENT THE MESSAGE TO HIS GOVERNMENT ON AUGUST 20 AND HE EXPECTED THAT IT WOULD BE PASSED ON TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. IN TELLING ME THIS, ALABART EXPRESSED GREAT REGRET AND SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS ANYTHING PERSONAL.

3. THIS COMES AS A CONSIDERABLE SURPRISE. SINCE GREENE'S DEPARTURE, ZAYYAT HAS BEEN OUT OF THE COUNTRY MUCH OF THE TIME AND I HAVE NOT SEEN HIM. I HAVE HAD APPARENTLY FREE ACCESS TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AS WELL AS OTHER MINISTERS AND PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANTS, AND OUR CONVERSATIONS GAVE NO HINT OF WHAT WAS COMING. IN FACT, DURING MY TALKS WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR HASSAN SABRI AL-KHOLI ON JULY 21, KHOLI HAD BROUGHT UP POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING SIZE OF USINT SOME-

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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TIME THIS AUTUMN AND HAD EXPRESSED HIS APPROVAL OF MY EFFORTS TO OPEN UP MORE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION WITH GOE. I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY SECURITY PROBLEM SINCE THE MUHIB ABDUL GAFFAR CASE WHICH TOOK PLACE MORE THAN A YEAR AGO AND WHICH SEEMED TO BE A DEAD ISSUE (CAIRO 1724, JUNE 13, 1972). LAST TIME I SAW ZAYYAT WAS JUST PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF MOORE AND NOEL IN KHARTOUM. ZAYYAT CALLED ME TO HIS OFFICE WHILE GREENE WAS AT THE (#) CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF THE TERRORISTS AND THEIR HOSTAGES TO EGYPT. OUR CONVERSATION AT THAT TIME WAS FRIENDLY AND AFTER CONSULTING WITH THE DEPARTMENT I INFORMED HIM THAT WE AGREED TO HIS PROPOSAL. I HAD THE IMPRESSION, AS I REPORTED TO DEPARTMENT, THAT ZAYYAT WAS TRYING TO BE HELPFUL. IT IS POSSIBLE HE FELT EMBARRASSED THAT MACOMBER STOPPED AT CAIRO ON THE BASIS OF HIS MESSAGE AND THEN THE EXPECTED TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES DID NOT TAKE PLACE. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, THE SUBJECT WAS NOT RAISED WITH THE GOE AFTER MACOMBER'S ARRIVAL.

4. ALABART EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL OPINION THAT ZAYYAT WAS ANGRY OVER THE SECURITY COUNCIL VETO AND FELT THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY BEEN TREATED BADLY BY THE AMERICAN DELEGATION. ZAYYAT ALSO EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE TO ALABART OVER THE AP STORY OF AUGUST 15 CONCERNING THE NON-REPLACEMENT OF MR. GREENE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

5. I BELIEVE MOST LIKELY EXPLANATION FOR THIS MOVE IS ZAYYAT'S GENERAL ANGER AND FRUSTRATION COMBINED WITH HIS READING OF AP STORY AS A DOWNGRADING OF OUR RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. GIVEN STATE OF GOE-USG RELATIONS IT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, THAT I HAVE AT SOME TIME IN PAST TROD UPON SENSITIVE EGYPTIAN FEELINGS WITHOUT BEING AWARE THAT I HAD DONE SO.

6. COMMENT: RATHER THAN CREATE FURTHER IRRITATION IN USG/GOE RELATIONS BY FORCING GOE TO OFFICIALLY PNG ME, I RECOMMZND THAT I BE TRANSFERRED PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 20. MAKING AN ISSUE OF MY DEPARTURE COULD JEOPARDIZE SUMED CONTRACT AND OTHER PROMISING COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENTS. WE JUST RECEIVED SRF REPORT THAT SADAT HAD TOLD SAUDIS THAT AMERICANS WERE "THROUGH" IN EGYPT AFTER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECURITY COUNCIL VETO BUT SAUDIS HAD CONVINCED SADAT THAT WITH POLITICAL CHANNELS DETERIORATING, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BUILD AMERICAN COMMERCIAL CONTACTS TO OFFSET THIS DETERIORATION. SADAT THEREFORE AGREED TO GIVE SUMED CONTRACT TO THE AMERICAN FIRMS. SINCE I HAVE BEEN IN CAIRO OVER FOUR YEARS, A TRANSFER WOULD NOT SEEM OUT OF PLACE ALTHOUGH WE WOULD NEED TO EXPLAIN AWAY THE RECENT AP STORY INDICATING THAT I AM TO BE LEFT IN CHARGE OF USINT FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD. IF DEPARTMENT AGREES, I WILL SEND MY PREFERENCES FOR ON-GOING ASSIGNMENT BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

WILEY

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#2512

(#) MESSAGE BEING SERVICED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: APER
SUBJECT: GOE REQUESTS TRANSFER OF ACTING PRINCIPAL OFFICER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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-3-CAIRO 2512, AUGUST 20

MENTS. WE JUST RECEIVED SRF REPORT THAT SADAT HAD TOLD SAUDIS THAT AMERICANS WERE "THROUGH" IN EGYPT AFTER SECURITY COUNCIL VETO BUT SAUDIS HAD CONVINCED SADAT THAT WITH POLITICAL CHANNELS DETERIORATING, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BUILD AMERICAN COMMERCIAL CONTACTS TO OFFSET THIS DETERIORATION. SADAT THEREFORE AGREED TO GIVE SUMED CONTRACT TO THE AMERICAN FIRMS. SINCE I HAVE BEEN IN CAIRO OVER FOUR YEARS, A TRANSFER WOULD NOT SEEM OUT OF PLACE ALTHOUGH WE WOULD NEED TO EXPLAIN AWAY THE RECENT AP STORY INDICATING THAT I AM TO BE LEFT IN CHARGE OF USINT FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD. IF DEPARTMENT AGREES, I WILL SEND MY PREFERENCES FOR ON-GOING ASSIGNMENT BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 1549

Ismail says that Egypt is unhappy with the position the USG has taken towards a solution of Egypt's political and economic situation. He says the USG is trying to make Egypt beg by putting on economic pressures. So far this is working. The Russians seem to be using the same words as the USG on the Middle East policy.

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EO 11652: XGDS-
TAGS: PFOR EG
SUBJECT: MARZWELL MEETING WITH ISMAIL, ZAYYAT AND GHORBAL

REF: CAIRO 1640, JUNE 5, 1972

1. NEVILLE MARZWELL CALLED ON USINT OFFICER ON MAY 24 AND SAID GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT WAS STILL INTERESTED IN ATTEMPTING TO USE HIS SERVICES AS "TRANSLATOR" BETWEEN THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS, ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. PREVIOUS CONTACTS WITH MARZWELL WERE REPORTED IN REFTEL AND IN CAIRO A-86, JUNE 20, 1972.

2. MARZWELL STARTED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HAFEZ ISMAIL WHEN ISMAIL HAD GONE TO THE UNITED STATES TO SEE PRESIDENT NIXON AND HAD ASKED ISMAIL IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN AN EXIT VISA FOR HIS FATHER IBRAHIM MARZOUK. (MARZWELL HAD CHANGED HIS NAME FROM MARZOUK.) THE ELDER MARZOUK HAD BEEN A SENIOR EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL AND HAD BEEN THE DIRECTOR OF PROJECTS OF ELECTRIFICATION IN THE ELECTRICITY ORGANIZATION. HE HAD BEEN RETIRED TWO YEARS AGO AND HAS NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO LEAVE EGYPT. ACCORDING TO MARZWELL, THE GOE BELIEVES THAT HE KNOWS TOO MUCH ABOUT EGYPT'S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM AND SINCE HE IS JEWISH, HE WOULD GIVE THIS INFORMATION TO ISRAEL IF HE WERE ALLOWED OUT OF THE COUNTRY. ISMAIL, HOWEVER, SUGGESTED TO MARZWELL THAT HE COME TO CAIRO TO DISCUSS THE MATTER.

3. UPON ARRIVING MARZWELL WAS MET BY A PLAINCLOTHES SECURITY AGENT AND WHISKED THROUGH THE AIRPORT FORMALITIES. HE IS STAYING IN HIS FATHER'S APARTMENT AND TWO DAYS AGO WAS INVITED TO A MEETING WITH ISMAIL, ZAYYAT AND GHORBAL.

4. DURING THIS MEETING ISMAIL DID MOST OF THE TALKING AND WENT INTO CONSIDERABLE DETAIL ON EGYPT'S CURRENT DIFFICULT POLITICAL SITUATION. HE SAID THAT EGYPT IS VERY UNHAPPY WITH BOTH THE AMERICAN AND THE RUSSIAN

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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POSITION. THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT GIVING EGYPT THE SUPPORT IT NEEDS, SUPPLYING ONLY REPLACEMENT MILITARY PARTS AND A LOW LEVEL OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. MORE IMPORTANT, THE RUSSIANS AND AMERICANS ARE GETTING CLOSER TOGETHER ON THEIR MIDDLE EAST POLICIES. THIS IS VERY UPSETTING TO EGYPT. IN FACT, THE RUSSIANS ARE NOW USING THE SAME WORDS THE AMERICANS USE WHEN THEY DESCRIBE THE ADVANTAGES OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION. EGYPT'S ONLY HOPE FOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASSISTANCE IS THE FRENCH, AND EVEN THE FRENCH ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE THE KIND OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE EGYPT NEEDS. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO "MAKE EGYPT BEG" BY KEEPING ON THE ECONOMIC PRESSURE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE UNITED STATES' PLAN IS WORKING. THE COUNTRY IS POORER THAN LAST YEAR. THE CHINESE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN EXTENDING ANY REAL ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT. THEY WILL VOTE WITH EGYPT IN THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT THEIR HELP WILL BE LIMITED TO WORDS. THEY WILL NOT EVEN USE POLITICAL INFLUENCE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND HAVE TURNED DOWN EGYPT'S SUGGESTIONS FOR HIGHER LEVEL VISITORS.

5. ISMAIL CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT THE ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER HAD OFFERED EGYPT ECONOMIC AID INCLUDING A "SECOND CANAL." THE ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER HAD ALSO TOLD THE EGYPTIANS THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAD AGREED WITH THE ITALIANS ON THE AID PROPOSAL AND HAD OFFERED "TOTAL" FINANCIAL SUPPORT. THE EGYPTIANS, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS A TRAP AND ARE "NOT CONSIDERING IT."

6. ISMAIL EXPRESSED DISTRUST OF UNITED STATES' INTENTIONS IN OFFERING AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT. HE SAID THAT THE USG HAD NOT AGREED TO PUT A SPECIFIC CONDITION IN THE SIGNED ARRANGEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT INITIAL STEPS INCLUDING THE OPENING OF THE CANAL WOULD BE PART OF A CONTINUING DISCUSSION LEADING TOWARDS A FINAL SOLUTION. THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT INSISTS THAT THIS BE SPECIFICALLY WRITTEN INTO THE AGREEMENT.

7. ISMAIL ALSO SAID THAT EVEN IF ISRAEL MET EGYPT'S CONDITION FOR A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL, THAT WOULD NOT BE

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-3- CAIRO 1549, SECTION 1 OF 2, MAY 25, NODIS

ENOUGH TO ENABLE EGYPT TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT. A SOLUTION MUST ALSO BE FOUND FOR THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WHOSE LAND IS OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL. NO ARAB LEADER COULD SIGN SUCH AN AGREEMENT ALONE AND SURVIVE. IT WOULD REQUIRE THE SIGNATURE OF THE LEADER OF ALL THREE ARAB COUNTRIES.

8. TIME IS RUNNING SHORT. THE UNITED STATES STILL HOLDS THE KEY AND CAN CONTROL ISRAEL IF IT WISHES TO DO SO. TWO YEARS FROM NOW WILL BE TOO LATE. BY THEN ISRAEL WILL BE MILITARILY INDEPENDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THEY WILL BE ABLE TO MANUFACTURE THEIR OWN MILITARY AIRCRAFT. IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO MOVE RAPIDLY TO WORK OUT A SETTLEMENT WHILE THERE IS STILL TIME. ISMAIL SAID THAT THE SITUATION REQUIRED SOMEONE LIKE MARZWELL WHO CARES PERSONALLY FOR THE REGION AND WHO UNDERSTANDS THE THINKING AND EMOTIONS OF THE PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES AS WELL AS THAT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE MAJOR POWERS CONCERNED WITH THE MIDDLE EAST.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 CAIRO 1549

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9. ISMAIL ALSO SAID THAT SADAT IS VERY SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE. THE STUDENTS IN THE UNIVERSITIES AND HIS CLOSE ADVISORS ARE SAYING EGYPT MUST MAKE PEACE OR WAR. UNFORTUNATELY, SADAT SEES NO HOPE FOR PEACE AT PRESENT AND THE ONLY PATH IS TO INCREASE EGYPT'S MILITARY STRENGTH. EGYPT THEREFORE INCREASED ITS MILITARY BUDGET FROM 550 MILLION POUNDS LAST YEAR TO A BILLION POUNDS THIS YEAR. IF A PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH ALL OF THE ARAB STATES WERE POSSIBLE, EGYPT WOULD STILL HAVE SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH LIBYA. AS LONG AS "GOOD CONDITIONS" WERE OBTAINED FOR ALL ARAB COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONTROL LIBYA.

10. THE THREE PEOPLE AT THE MEETING ADVISED MARZWELL TO AVOID SEEING MOHAMED HEYKAL ON THIS TRIP, EVEN THOUGH MARZWELL HAD SEEN HIM BEFORE. THEY SAID THAT HEYKAL "IS NO LONGER ONE OF THE CHOSEN PEOPLE."

11. MARZWELL SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A PROMISE FROM HAFEZ ISMAIL TO TRY TO CONVINCE SADAT THAT HIS FATHER SHOULD BE GIVEN AN EXIT VISA EFFECTIVE JUNE 25. HE ADVISED MARZWELL TO GET HIS FATHER OUT OF THE COUNTRY WITHIN 15 DAYS ONCE THE VISA IS OBTAINED. ISMAIL SAID THAT SADAT HAD BEEN AGAINST A VISA FOR THE ELDER MARZOUK, BUT THAT HE WOULD POINT OUT TO HIM THAT MARZWELL COULD PERFORM A USEFUL FUNCTION AS "TRANSLATOR" ONLY IF HIS FATHER WERE OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. OTHERWISE, THE OTHER PARTIES WOULD SUSPECT THAT MARZWELL WAS ACTING UNDER COERCION. ISMAIL SAID HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT SADAT WOULD GIVE THE REQUIRED PERMISSION, BUT HE PROMISED TO TRY.

12. ISMAIL ADVISED MARZWELL TO STAY OFF THE STREETS WHILE HE IS IN CAIRO AND ALSO SUGGESTED THAT HIS FATHER STAY OUT OF SIGHT UNTIL HE CAN LEAVE EGYPT. MARZWELL

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-2- CAIRO 1549, SECTION 2 OF 2, MAY 25, NODIS

PLANS TO LEAVE EGYPT ON JUNE 5 AND PROCEED TO FRANCE WHERE HE IS ATTENDING A CONFERENCE IN GRENOBLE FOR THREE DAYS. ON JUNE 15 MARZWELL WILL TAKE UP NEW EMPLOYMENT AT THE CORPORATE RESEARCH CENTER OF HONEYWELL CORPORATION AT MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA. HE SAID HE IS NOT AT ALL INTERESTED IN PLAYING THE "TRANSLATOR" ROLE, BUT HAS GONE ALONG WITH THE EGYPTIANS IN THE HOPES OF GETTING PERMISSION FOR HIS FATHER TO LEAVE EGYPT.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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O 231125Z FEB 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2630
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 0547

7 3 9 0 Q
RECVD:: 23 FEB 73
7:04AM

73 FEB 23 AM 10 45

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY ROGERS

SUBJECT: ZAYYAT ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE

REF: CAIRO 0545

1. AS REFTEL SUGGESTS, ZAYYAT'S INVITATION TO ME TO SEE HIM AT HOME LAST EVENING MAY HAVE BEEN CONCEIVED AS PART OF EFFORT TO SHOW THAT LINES ARE OPEN BETWEEN GOE AND USG DESPITE LIBYAN AIRCRAFT INCIDENT. IN FACT, THAT SUBJECT TOOK ONLY A FEW OF THE 50 MINUTES I WAS THERE. WHILE IT WAS NOT EVIDENT THAT ZAYYAT WAS TRYING TO COMMUNICATE ANYTHING NEW OR SPECIFIC IN CONTEXT OF HAFEZ ISMAIL'S CONVERSATIONS TODAY (WHICH HE NEVER MENTIONED), HE DID COUCH HIS REMARKS ABOUT MIDDLE EAST PEACE IN TERMS OF YOUR INVITATION TO HIM TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOU THROUGH ME AT ANY TIME. I TOLD HIM YOU HAD MENTIONED THIS TO ME DURING MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

2. ZAYYAT'S PREOCCUPATION SEEMED TO BE WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING NEW IN US VIEW OF SITUATION. I REFERRED TO YOUR JANUARY 17 SPEECH IN NEW YORK AND YOUR PRESS CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 15. I SAID I WAS SURE USG ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO THE SUBJECT AND HOPES DOORS WILL BE KEPT OPEN. ZAYYAT ASSERTED EGYPT HAS OPENED MANY DOORS AND AWAITS SIGN THAT EVEN A SHUTTER IS OPENING IN ISRAEL. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A SIGNAL FROM ISRAEL MIGHT, IF IT WERE TO COME AT ALL, HAVE TO COME IN SECRET.

3. HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PROSPECTS FOR US AID TO ISRAEL, BOTH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC, AFTER PRESENT COMMITMENTS ARE FULFILLED DURING CURRENT YEAR. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE RELEVANCE OF EGYPTIAN AND OTHER

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ARAB RHETORIC ABOUT A MILITARY OPTION IN THIS CON-
NECTION AND REFERRED TO HIS RECENT SPEECH IN THE
PEOPLES ASSEMBLY AS INDICATING HOW HE TRIES TO BE MUTED IN
HANDLING THIS QUESTION: HE REFERRED TO THE NEED TO DEFEND
EGYPT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AS WELL AS IN THE REST
OF THE COUNTRY.

4. HE REPEATED POINT I HEAR ALMOST EVERY TIME I SEE
HIM AND WHICH HE MAY HAVE MADE TO YOU, THAT AMERICANS
HAVE A MUCH MORE REASONABLE AND TOLERANT WAY OF DEALING
WITH QUESTIONS OF HONOR THAN DO EGYPTIANS; HE HOPES
AMERICANS WILL UNDERSTAND THIS DIFFERENCE, WHICH HE
ONCE AGAIN ILLUSTRATED WITH HIS LITTLE PARABLE ABOUT
THE UNMARRIED DAUGHTER WHO GETS PREGNANT. HE SAID AN
AMERICAN FAMILY WOULD TRY TO HELP HER AND BE SURE SHE
GOT PROPER CARE, BUT AN ARAB FATHER WOULD KILL HER.

5. ZAYYAT ALSO EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE PREOCCUPATION
THAT EGYPT CANNOT GO ON INDEFINITELY SPENDING EIGHT
AND A HALF MILLION DOLLARS A DAY ON A DEFENSE EFFORT.
THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY IS FEELING THE STRAIN BADLY.
AND YET, HE SAID, MRS. MEIR SEEMS TO THINK THAT THE
PRESENT IMPASSE CAN LAST EVEN BEYOND HER OWN LIFETIME.
ZAYYAT WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT HE DOES NOT
SEE HOW IT CAN.
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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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R 061155Z FEB 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2529
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 0347

CONTROL: 1 6 8 8 Q
FEBRUARY 6, 1973
8:14 AM

73 FEB 3 PM 12:09

NODIS

REF: LONDON 1244, CAIRO 317

SUBJECT: EUROPE, UNITED STATES AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE

1. VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO GHORBAL IN LONDON REFTEL ARE OF A PIECE WITH THOSE WE HAVE REPORTED IN LAST TEN DAYS FROM CAIRO. EVEN IF THERE IS IN MOST RECENT EGYPTIAN EXPRESSIONS CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FORWARD DEFENSE AGAINST HARD ISRAELI LINE AND "NEW AMERICAN INITIATIVE," THE PROSPECTS FOR GOE GOING ALONG WITH AN INTERIM AGREEMENT DO NOT SEEM VERY BRIGHT. REFERENCES BY GOE OFFICIALS TO THE VIETNAM AGREEMENTS ALSO REFLECT THEIR SEARCH FOR PRECEDENTS AND ANALOGIES THERE; ONE THEY HAVE NOT YET MENTIONED BUT THAT MAY SURFACE IS CONCEPT OF LIMITATION ON MILITARY HARDWARE REPLACEMENT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT GOE, AS WAY OF LIMITING WESTERN AND ESPECIALLY US ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL, WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT LIMITS ON END ITEM DELIVERIES TO EGYPT, IN CONTEXT OF A PEACE AGREEMENT.

2. WE ARE NOT, OF COURSE, GIVING ANY ENCOURAGEMENT OR SUSTENANCE TO THESE EGYPTIAN VIEWS AND ARE CONTINUING TO HOLD THE LINE AS SET OUT IN STATE 012943 AND PUBLICLY IN SECRETARY'S JANUARY 17 SPEECH.

3. MEANWHILE, AS GHORBAL MENTIONED TO THE BRITISH, GOE CONTINUES TO CULTIVATE THE EUROPEANS, E.G. ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MEDICI'S JUST CONCLUDED VISIT BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY.

4. ONE SIDELIGHT ON EUROPEAN UNITY (CAIRO DIVISION) HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY NEWLY ARRIVED BRITISH AMBASSADOR ADAMS. LAST WEEK HE AGREED TO GO TO LUNCHEON MEETING OF CHIEFS OF MISSION OF THE NINE HOSTED BY BELGIAN

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AMBASSADOR DE FEVEAUX, WHO PRODUCED DRAFT ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN EGYPT WITH VIEW TO GETTING AGREED DOCUMENT. ADAMS WAS NOT ABOUT TO GET INVOLVED IN THAT KIND OF JOINT EXERCISE AND PLED HIS NEWNESS TO THE SCENE. SOME FAST FOOTWORK BY THE ITALIAN (PLAJA) AND SOME DEFT SURGERY BY THE FRENCH (DE LEUSSE) KILLED THE IDEA.
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FM USINT CAIRO
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BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 0317

599Q
FEB. 2, 1973
8:45 AM

'73 FEB 1 PM 12.25

NODIS

SUBJECT: FURTHER COMMENT ON EGYPTIAN VIEW OF MIDDLE EAST

REF: CAIRO 251, 264 AND 300

1. WHILE IT IS STILL OF COURSE PREMATURE TO REACH ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CURRENT GOE THINKING ON NEXT STEPS IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE, IT IS PERHAPS INSTRUCTIVE TO ADD FAHMY'S COMMENTS (CAIRO 300) TO HAFEZ ISMAIL'S (CAIRO 251) AND OF COURSE TITO'S. WHILE ALL OF THIS SUGGESTS CERTAIN AMOUNT OF EGYPTIAN FLEXIBILITY AND RESOURCEFULNESS IN TRYING TO FIND WAYS OUT OF CURRENT IMPASSE, IT ALSO REFLECTS CONSIDERABLE EGYPTIAN CAUTION. THERE IS STRONG INFERENCE THAT SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES WANT TO BE SURE THEY HAVE SOME SUPPORT FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES BUT EVEN WITH THAT WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO MAKE FIRST MOVE.

2. FAHMY'S COMMENTS SUGGEST WHAT HAFEZ ISMAIL MEANT BY HINTING THAT RESOLUTION 242 MIGHT IN THE END BE BUT ONE OF SEVERAL GUIDES TO SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. INCIDENTALLY, FAHMY GAVE NO RPT NO INDICATION OF AWARENESS THAT I HAD SEEN HAFEZ ISMAIL AND I DID NOT RPT NOT TELL HIM. USUALLY FAHMY IS CLUED IN; VIEWS HE EXPRESSED DOUBTLESS HAVE SOME CURRENCY IN GOE, BUT I DO NOT ASSUME HE HAS AUTHORITY OR MANDATE TO DICKER. THAT AUTHORITY IS IN THE PRESIDENCY.

3. AS HAFEZ ISMAIL INDICATED, IMPORTANT NEXT STEP FOR GOE IS TO SQUARE WITH THE SOVIETS AND THIS IS ONE OF THE THINGS HE WILL TAKE UP DURING FORTH-

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-2- S E C R E T CAIRO 317 NODIS

COMING VISIT TO MOSCOW WHICH HAS JUST BEEN ANNOUNCED. (THE VISIT, NOT THE SUBJECT MATTER, HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED.) PERHAPS WE SHALL KNOW MORE AFTER HE GETS BACK. SOVIET VIEWS AS CONVEYED TO ITALIANS AND BY LATTER TO EMBASSY ROME (STATE 17415 TO CAIRO) SUGGEST THAT THIS IS NO GREAT PROBLEM.

4. ONE THING SEEMS CLEAR: TERRITORIAL ISSUE REMAINS THE CRUNCH AS FAR AS EGYPT IS CONCERNED AND THERE SEEMS LITTLE FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR VIEW OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, TO WHICH ISRAELIS ATTACH SO MUCH IMPORTANCE, UNLESS THEY PERCEIVE SOME SATISFACTION ON THAT ISSUE. AS FAHMY PUT IT (THIS IS INADVERTENTLY OMITTED FROM CAIRO 300), EGYPT ACCEPTS THE CONCEPT OF ISRAEL'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY BUT CAN ONLY DISCUSS OR NEGOTIATE WHAT THAT MEANS IN TERMS OF ACTUAL BORDERS IN A CONTEXT OF ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF EGYPT'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. FAHMY'S ANALOGY TO THE "POLICY UMBRELLA" OF US WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM UNDER WHICH PEACE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDED THERE MAY HAVE ITS IMPERFECTIONS FROM US POINT OF VIEW, BUT IT IS AN ILLUSTRATION OF HOW EGYPT VIEWS THE VITAL QUESTION OF TERRITORY AND WITHDRAWAL.

5. IT IS ALSO, ALAS, EVIDENT THAT OUR ARGUMENTS IN BEHALF OF NEGOTIATIONS OF SOME KIND FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ARE NOT GETTING ANY FURTHER NOW THAN BEFORE. IF ANYTHING, GOE SEEMS TO BE MORE CONCERNED THAN EVER TO GET THE FOCUS ON THE LAST STEP RATHER THAN ON THE FIRST; AS WE HAVE KNOWN, THEY CAN BE FLEXIBLE ON THE MEANS IF THE END IS ACCEPTABLE. THEY STILL LOOK TO OTHERS, AND PARTICULARLY USG, RATHER THAN TO THEIR OWN INITIATIVES, TO SET THE STAGE, MEANING PERSUADE THE GOI AND CARRY OUT MUCH OF THE RESPONSIBILITY.

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6. THE SIGNALS WE ARE GETTING OF RESOURCEFULNESS ARE OF COURSE STILL COMPLETELY SCREENED FROM PUBLIC VIEW, AND WE ESTIMATE THAT SUCH PROSPECT AS THERE MAY BE THAT THEY WILL PROVE VIABLE DEPENDS ON CONTINUING SECRECY. MEANWHILE, PROCESSION THROUGH CAIRO OF VISITING FOREIGN AND OTHER MINISTERS (CZECH, BRAZILIAN, ITALIAN IN LAST TWO WEEKS) HAVE ALL PROVIDED OCCASIONS FOR REPETITION OF STANDARD GOE RHETORIC ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND ITS IMPORTANCE.
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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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P 011245Z FEB 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2505
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 0300

CONTROL: 138Q
RECD: 1 FEB 13 44Z

NODIS

SUBJ: FURTHER EGYPTIAN VIEWS ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE

(NODIS CAPTION UTILIZED PRIMARILY IN CONTEXT RECENT EXCHANGES ON EGYPTIAN VIEW OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE BUT I SUGGEST DEPARTMENT CONSIDER WHETHER CONTENT REQUIRES IT IN THIS CASE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I ALSO LEAVE TO DEPARTMENT DECISION ON WHETHER TO PASS THIS MESSAGE TO OTHER POSTS.)

SUMMARY: IN HOUR'S DISCUSSION FEBRUARY 1, FOREIGN OFFICE UNDER SECRETARY ISMAIL FAHMY REJECTED CONCEPT OF NEGOTIATION WITH ISRAEL AS CURRENTLY EXPRESSED IN US TERMS, BUT REITERATED THAT FOR EGYPT NEGOTIATING MECHANICS ARE NOT IMPORTANT IF PRINCIPLES AND CONTENT OF FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRWEL ARE IDENTIFIED AND ARE HONORABLE FOR EGYPT. AGREEMENT WHICH COVERED ALL THAT THE RECENT VIETNAM AGREEMENTS COVER WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, BUT ANALOGY TO NEGOTIATING PROCESS BY WHICH THAT AGREEMENT REACHED IS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES INVALID, HE SAID, BECAUSE ISRAEL HAS NOT PUBLICLY ESTABLISHED WITHDRAWAL AS THE OBJECTIVE (AS US DID) NOR ESTABLISHED THAT IT IS NOT ISRAELI POLICY TO ANNEX TERRITORY BY FORCE. FAHMY SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT A DOCUMENT INCORPORATING ELEMENTS OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WAS BEING PREPARED IN WASHINGTON WITH A VIEW TO ITS BEING TRIED OUT ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL. I DISCLAIMED KNOWLEDGE OF ANY SUCH DOCUMENT BUT URGED THAT DOOR BE KEPT OPEN. END SUMMARY.

1. AT SOCIAL OCCASION EARLIER IN THE WEEK, FAHMY TWITTED ME ABOUT "HIDING" SINCE MY RETURN FROM WASHINGTON AND NOT COMING AROUND TO SEE HIM. I SAID THEN AND REPEATED WHEN WE MET MORNING OF FEBRUARY 1, THAT AS I HAD NOTHING REALLY VERY NEW TO SAY I HAD NOT WANTED TO IMPOSE ON HIS TIME

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ESPECIALLY WHEN THERE ARE SO MANY FOREIGN MINISTERS VISITING CAIRO. FAHMY SAID IT IS NO IMPOSITION TO KEEP IN TOUCH.

2. AFTER SOME FURTHER CHAFF, I SAID THAT DURING MY CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON IT WAS CLEAR THAT US GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO REGARD PROBLEM OF PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST AS IMPORTANT AND IS NOT DISENGAGING. WE HOPE DOORS WILL BE KEPT OPEN, BUT MEANTIME HOPE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT WILL SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE PROPOSITIONS AND CONCEPTS ALREADY ON THE TABLE. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE HOPE THAT A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION THAT ENGAGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, CAN BE LAUNCHED, AND US CONTINUES WILLING TO PLAY A ROLE IF AGREEABLE TO THE PARTIES. SC RESOLUTION 242 PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK AND GUIDELINES FOR A SETTLEMENT. WE WOULD OFFER IT FOR THE FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF GOE AS OUR JUDGMENT THAT GOI ATTACHES CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ITSELF; WHILE WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT TO PRESS THE FULL ISRAELI POSITION IN THIS RESPECT ON EGYPT, BECAUSE OF OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE EGYPTIAN VIEWPOINT, WE HAVE MADE SERIOUS SUGGESTIONS WHICH WE HOPE MIGHT PROVIDE ROOM FOR ACCOMMODATION OF BOTH POINTS OF VIEW IN GETTING THE PROCESS OF PEACE STARTED. WE SUGGEST GOE ALSO CONSIDER OUR JUDGMENT THAT GOI MAY ALSO REGARD EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO START THE PROCESS AS AN EARNEST OF EGYPTIAN DESIRE TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT; INDEED WE JUDGE THAT ISRAEL MAY BE MORE READY TO CONSIDER CONCESSIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND MOREOVER THAT PROCESS ITSELF WOULD GENERATE A MOMENTUM WHICH WOULD HELP PROGRESS TOWARD A FINAL SETTLEMENT.

3. IN THIS REGARD, WE CONTINUE BELIEVE AN INTERIM OR FIRST STEP INVOLVING SOME ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, ENABLING EGYPT TO OPEN THE SUEZ CANAL, WOULD BE BOTH ATTAINABLE AND REALLY INTERIM; GOI LEADERS HAVE INDICATED THIS BOTH PRIVATELY (AS LONG AGO AS THE DISCUSSIONS IN CAIRO IN 1971) AND PUBLICLY AND HAVE FURTHER INDICATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT REGARD A FIRST WITHDRAWAL AS BEING FINAL. WE HAVE THOUGHT THAT SUCH AN INTERIM MEASURE WAS WHAT SADAT HAD



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PROPOSED IN FEBRUARY 1971. FINALLY, WHILE I RECOGNIZED THAT THE EGYPTIAN AND AMERICAN CONCEPTS OF NEGOTIATION AND WHAT THEY CONSTITUTE MIGHT DIFFER, OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE IN CONCLUDING A VIETNAM AGREEMENT AFTER LONG AND PAINFUL EFFORT REINFORCES OUR VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING NEGOTIATIONS GOING IN WHATEVER WAY THE PARTIES CAN ACCEPT. I SAID WE ALSO ASSUME GOE WOULD PREFER A PEACE AGREEMENT TO CONTINUATION OF THE CONFRONTATION.

4. FAHMY CONFIRMED THIS ASSUMTION AND CONTINUED THAT MY REFERENCE TO SADAT'S PROPOSAL OF 1971 WAS NOT VALID; THE ISRAELI RESPONSE AND OUR WAY OF DEALING WITH IT HAD TURNED IT INTO AN ISRAELI PROPOSAL. WHILE EGYPT MIGHT BE WILLING TO DISCUSS SADAT'S PROPOSAL AS IT ORIGINALLY STOOD, IT WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO DISCUSS AN ISRAFLI VERSION OF IT AS LONG AS ISRAEL OCCUPIES EGYPTIAN TERRITORY AND SAYS IT WILL NOT WITHDRAW TO THE 1967 BOUNDARIES. HE FAU
TED AN ANALOGY TO THE VIETNAM NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON THE GROUND THAT THE CONTEXTS AND OBJECTIVES WERE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT: TWO PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HAD MADE PUBLICLY CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT US POLICY OR INTENTION TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY FORCE IN VIETNAM OR TO SETTLE AMERICANS
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SECRET

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FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2506
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 CAIRO 0300

CONTROL: 157Q
RECD: 1 FEB 14 49Z

NODIS

THERE AND IT WAS UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THIS STATED POLICY THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL WITH HONOR COULD PROCEED. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS NOT ONLY PUBLICLY REFUSED TO CONCEDE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, BUT HAS UNDERTAKEN TO SETTLE AND IN OTHER WAYS ALTER SOME OF THE EGYPTIAN TERRITORY OCCUPIED IN 1967.

5. FAHMY DIGRESSED INTO A DISCUSSION OF PRESIDENT SENGHOR'S EFFORTS. HE SAID THAT SENGHOR, WITH THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF HIS JEWISH CONTACTS BOTH IN EUROPE AND IN ISRAEL, HAD SOUGHT AND THOUGHT HE HAD OBTAINED GOI AGREEMENT TO THE PROPOSITION THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT SEEK THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE. MRS. MEIR THEN, IN FAHMY'S WORDS, PULLED THE RUG OUT FROM UNDER SENGHOR, LEAVING HIM BITTER ABOUT ISRAELI TRUSTWORTHINESS. FAHMY SAID THAT WHILE GOE HAD NOT PUT SENGHOR UP TO THIS, THEY HAD NOT STOOD IN HIS WAY; BUT THE EPISODE SERVED TO ILLUSTRATE TO GOE THAT GOI IS NOT TO BE TRUSTED. FAHMY SAID THAT THE SENEGALESE HAD ALSO PUT THE NON-ACQUISITION-BY-FORCE CONCEPT INTO LAST DECEMBER'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION (PARA 5) ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH FAHMY STOPPED SHORT OF ESTABLISHING A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THIS POINT AND THE REST OF HIS COMMENTS, HIS APPARENT FASCINATION WITH THE "NON-ACQUISITION BY FORCE" RHETORIC IS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER EVIDENCE WE HAVE HAD THAT GOE MIGHT RESPOND FAVORABLY TO THE KIND OF PUBLIC ISRAELI STATEMENT REFERRED TO IN PARA 5 OF THE GA RESOLUTION.) IN ALL THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, FAHMY ASKED, WHAT DOES ISRAEL REALLY WANT? I REPLIED THEY WANT ONE THING EGYPT CAN OFFER AND THAT IS PEACE. FAHMY SAID THE GOE HAS, IN ITS REPLY TO JARRING, ALREADY OFFERED THIS AND A NUMBER OF OTHER THINGS; THE GOE HAS NOT WITHDRAWN AND IS NOT WITHDRAWING ITS REPLY TO JARRING. IT CONTINUES READY TO CONCLUDE A PEACE AGREEMENT EMBODYING THE PRINCIPLES OF THAT REPLY.

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6. RETURNING TO VIETNAM, FAHMY LISTED THE CONTENTS OF THAT AGREEMENT THAT ARE OF INTEREST TO EGYPT: WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION, "GUARANTEES" BY THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (SIC), SELF-DETERMINATION, AND "REPARATION" TO NORTH VIETNAM FOR THE BOMBING. (HE ACKNOWLEDGED MY REJOINDER ON THE LAST POINT THAT WHAT PRESIDENT NIXON IS TALKING ABOUT IS JOINT EFFORTS AT RECONSTRUCTION.) HE SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT COULD ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL THAT INCORPORATED ALL THESE POINTS AND IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WERE IN SIGHT, GOE WOULD NOT HAVE PROBLEMS ABOUT THE MECHANICS OF REACHING IT. IN REPLY TO MY QUERY, HE SAID "SELF-DETERMINATION" IN THE CONTEXT OF A ME PEACE IS IN REFERENCE TO THE PALESTINIANS. THEY CANNOT OF COURSE ABOLISH ISRAEL, HE SAID, BUT THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN A CHOICE BETWEEN RETURNING TO THEIR FORMER HOMES OR ACCEPTING RESETTLEMENT AND COMPENSATION. FAHMY SAID HE BELIEVED A SURVEY THAT HAD SHOWN ONLY ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE PALESTINAINS WOULD OPT FOR REPATRIATION IF GIVEN A CHOICE.

7. FAHMY SAID THAT EGYPTIAN EMBASSIES IN VARIOUS CAPITALS ARE REPORTING THAT US REPRESENTATIVES HAVE TOLD OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT THE USG IS PREPARING SOMETHING NEW. I SAID I COULD NOT SPEAK FOR MY ASSOCIATES IN OTHER AMERICAN EMBASSIES BUT THAT I COULD SPEAK WITH CERTAINTY ALONG THE LINES OF WHAT I HAD ALREADY SAID: WE HOPE DOORS WILL REMAIN OPEN, WE HOPE PROPOSALS ALREADY ON THE TABLE WILL BE FURTHER CONSIDERED, AND WE ARE NOT DISENGAGING.

8. FAHMY SAID HE HAD EVEN HEARD FROM WASHINGTON THAT THE USG IS PREPARING A "FRAMEWORK" OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH IT IN DUE COURSE WOULD SUBMIT TO THE SCRUTINY OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT. HE PROFESSED TO BE ENCOURAGED BY THIS NEWS, OF WHICH I AGAIN DISCLAIMED KNOWLEDGE, AND SAID THAT IF SUCH DOCUMENT WERE TO COVER THE SAME TOPICS THAT THE VIETNAM AGREEMENT AS HE HAD DESCRIBED IT COVERED, IT WOULD BE OF GREAT INTEREST. THERE WOULD BE NO NEED, HE SAID, FOR PROXIMITY TALKS TO ASSURE CONSIDERATION



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OF SUCH A DOCUMENT AND IT WOULD NOT MATTER MUCH WHETHER RESOLUTION 242 WERE EXPLICITLY EMBRACED, SO LONG AS THE CONTENT WERE OTHERWISE RIGHT. I PRODDED HIM GENTLY ON THE TERRITORY ISSUE, AND FAHMY TROTTED OUT A LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES FROM ONE JACK COHEN, PRINTED ON JANUARY 23, WONDERING WHETHER ONE WAY TO SOLVE THE TERRITORY QUESTION MIGHT NOT BE TO SELL SHARM EL SHEIKH AND OTHER REAL ESTATE TO ISRAEL. FAHMY SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT THIS IDEA IS BEING SERIOISLY CONSIDERED, AND HE STOUTLY RULED IT OUT. HE WENT ON TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT IF MINOR RECTIFICATIONS IN THE 1967 BOUNDARY WERE NECESSARY, THEY COULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE KIND OF AGREEMENT HE HAD DESCRIBED; IN THIS CONNECTION HE ASKED WHETHER THE ROGERS PLAN IS STILL US POLICY. IF SO, IT TOO MIGHT PROVIDE USEFUL CONTENTS FOR THE KIND OF PAPER HE INSISTED AGAIN HE UNDERSTANDS IS BEING DRAFTED IN WASHINGTON.

10. I ASKED FAHMY WHY THE GOE DOES NOT DRAFT THE PAPER AND HE SCOFFED. HE SAID "YOU HAVE TO DO IT," AND BEFORE EGYPT "HAS TO" RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION.

11. THE CZECH AMBASSADOR ARRIVED FOR HIS APPOINTMENT AT THAT POINT SO OUR CONVERSATION ENDED.
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2486
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S E C R E T CAIRO 0264

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REF: CAIRO 0251, STATE 016358

SUBJECT: COMMENT ON EGYPTIAN VIEW OF MIDDLE EAST

1. COMPARING WHAT TITO HAS WRITTEN TO PRESIDENT NIXON ABOUT SADAT'S VIEWS, AND WHAT HAFEZ ISMAIL SAID TO ME, WE ARE STRUCK BY THE SIMILARITIEK. SETTING ASIDE THE RITUAL LITANY OF WHAT GOE THINKS US IS DOING WRONG, ONE CAN WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY CONCLUDE THAT SADAT AND COMPANY ARE SERIOUSLY TRYING TO FIND A WAY TO BREAK OUT OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE AND THAT THEY ARE HOPING THEIR FRIENDS (E.G. TITO AND THE SOVIETS) WILL HELP THEM. WHILE THEY CONTINUE TO PROFESS, AND WE SHOULD PROBABLY TAKE THEM SERIOUSLY, INABILITY TO GO ALONG WITH US-PROPOSED INTERIM AGREEMENT AS A WAY OF GETTING STARTED, IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THEY MAY BE SEEKING TO ASSERT ENOUGH PRIDE, NATIONALISM, AND EVEN "POWER" TO PERMIT THEM PLAUSIBLY TO LAUNCH SOME NEW IDEAS OF THEIR OWN WITH ARAB AND OTHER FRIENDLY POWERS' SUPPORT. THESE IDEAS, WE INFER UNTIL WE LEARN MORE, MAY EMBRACE BOTH THE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND THE MODALITIES OF ACHIEVING IT.

2. THE SIXTY FOUR DOLLAR QUESTIONS ARE OF COURSE THOSE OF TERRITORY AND NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS TEMPTING TO READ INTO SADAT'S VIEWS ACCORDING TO TITO, AND HAFEZ ISMAIL'S COMMENTS, THAT TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS ARE NOT RPT NOT EXCLUDED IF EVERYTHING ELSE IS TOLERABLE TO ARABS. (NOTE THAT ISMAIL SAID THERE WOULD NOT BE A SEPARATE DEAL BY EGYPT.) THE COUNTERPART OF AN EGYBTIAN (OR ARAB) PROPOSITION IN THIS REGARD AND EVEN IN REGARD TO NEGOTIATIONS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE ISRAELI CONCESSIONS. THE FIRST STATEMENT OF WHAT THESE MIGHT ENTAIL WOULD NO DOUBT

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BE PRETTY SEVERE AND INVOLVE SUCH MATTERS AS ISRAEL'S RELATIONSHIPS WITH ZIONISM AS WELL AS WITH HER NEIGHBORS. HOW FUNDAMENTAL A FIRST STATEMENT OF WHAT THE ARABS WANT FROM ISRAEL WOULD BE, COULD ONLY BE ASCERTAINED IN A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION IN WHICH, FOR EXAMPLE, EGYPT SOUGHT TO ENGAGE EGYPT'S FRIENDS WHILE ISRAEL ENGAGED ISRAEL'S FRIENDS. SOME OF THE OLD PROPOSALS FOR A CONFERENCE COME TO MIND.

3. BUT ON BALANCE WE THINK IT MOST PRUDENT AT THIS STAGE TO AWAIT FURTHER SIGNALS ABOUT GOE'S POLICIES AND INTENTIONS, WHICH WILL PRESUMABLY BE AVAILABLE, IF ISMAIL IS TO BE CREDITED, ONLY AFTER HIS FORTHCOMING CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW. MEANWHILE, IT WILL BE MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER, AND PROBABLY MORE DIFFICULT, TO DISCERN THROUGH ALL THE RHETORIC, JUST WHAT IF ANYTHING IS COOKING.

4. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT SEEMS SIGNIFICANT THAT HAFEZ ISMAIL HAS NOT RELEASED TO THE PRESS FACT THAT WE MET, AND GOE HAS NOT GIVEN PUBLIC INDICATION OF THE TRAIN OF THOUGHT HE CONVEYED (AND THAT TITO SAYS HE GOT). BASED ON RECENT EXPERIENCE, WE WOULD ESTIMATE THAT WHATEVER CHANCE THERE IS OF GETTING SOME MOVEMENT IN THE EGYPTIAN POSITION DEPENDS ON CURRENT INDICATORS REMAINING SECRET.
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2477
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 CAIRO 0251

NODIS

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH HAFEZ ISMAIL ON ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE

REF: STATE 12943 AND 15710

SUMMARY: IN LONG RELAXED CONVERSATION JANUARY 27, HAFEZ ISMAIL REITERATED MANY WELL-KNOWN ELEMENTS OF GOE'S POSITION ON RESOLUTION ME CONFLICT AND WHAT IT FINDS WRONG WITH USG POLICY. HE HEARD OUT MY PRESENTATION OF CURRENT US THINKING AND SEEMED TO BE TRYING TO CONVEY BOTH THAT DOORS ARE OPEN TO PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE AND THAT GOE MAY BE SEEKING WAYS TO ACHIEVE WHAT IT CAN DEFEND AS SETTLEMENT JUST TO ALL ARABS. HE DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW DESCRIBING WHAT GOE PACKAGE MIGHT CONTAIN. DETAILS OF CONVERSATION ARE SET OUT BELOW; COMMENT FOLLOWS IN SEPTEL. END SUMMARY

1. I SAW PRESIDENT SADAT'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, HAFEZ ISMAIL, AT INDIAN NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION JANUARY 26 AND HE SUGGESTED I COME AROUND NEXT MORNING. WE TALKED FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF MORNING OF 27TH. HIS MR. WAHABA WAS TAKING NOTES AND I MADE EXTENSIVE NOTES MYSELF AS WE WENT ALONG. UNLIKE PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, THIS ONE HAS NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED IN THE PRESS.

2. CONVERSATION WAS SERIOUS AND CORDIAL THROUGHOUT. IT BEGAN WITH EXCHANGE OF EXPRESSIONS ABOUT HOW LONG IT HAD BEEN SINCE WE LAST MET (JULY 17) AND OF SATISFACTION THAT WE NOW HAVE ANOTHER CHANCE TO EXCHANGE THOUGHTS. I SAID I HAD HAD A GOOD LEAVE IN THE

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UNITED STATES AND HAD USEFUL CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON, INCLUDING WITH SECRETARY ROGERS. I HAD FOUND CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN EGYPT, INCLUDING THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION, AND ALSO IN REGARD TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THESE EARLY DAYS OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, ATTENTION HAS NECESSARILY BEEN FOCUSED ON ORGANIZING THE ADMINISTRATION ITSELF AND ON PRESENTING THE PRESIDENT'S DOMESTIC PROGRAMS TO CONGRESS AND THE COUNTRY. IN FOREIGN RELATIONS, VIETNAM HAD HAD FIRST CLAIM ON HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION; NOW OF COURSE THE LONG SOUGHT AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN AT LAST CONCLUDED. (I LEFT COPIES OF THE AGREEMENT, PROTOCOLS AND KISSINGER'S PRESS CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT FOR ISMAIL TO STUDY.)

3. I SAID THAT IN GENERAL I HAD FOUND THE VIEW THAT THE USG CONTINUES TO REGARD IT AS IN ITS OWN INTERESTS AND IN THE INTERESTS OF THE STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AND START WORKING TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. THE USG CONTINUES ALSO TO BE READY TO HELP ACHIEVE THIS TO THE EXTENT SUCH PARTICIPATION IS AGREEABLE TO THE PARTIES. THE PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT AND FOR REACHING IT ARE STILL ON THE TABLE, AND IT IS HOPED THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. IT IS ALSO HOPED THAT DOORS WILL BE KEPT OPEN AND NO POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE FORECLOSED.

4. WHEN I STOPPED THERE, HAFEZ ISMAIL ASKED IF THAT WERE ALL. I SAID I COULD SAY MORE BUT SUGGESTED HE MIGHT HAVE SOME VIEWS. HE SAID THAT IN EGYPTIAN POLICY, FIRST PRIORITY IS NOW, AS IT HAS BEEN, ASSIGNED TO LIQUIDATION OF THE CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL IN ITS MILITARY AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS. FOR THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, THIS ISSUE IS NOT RPT NOT LINKED TO THE PROBLEM OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS, E.G. THEIR FOREIGN RELATIONS OR THEIR ELECTIONS. GOE SEEKS ULTIMATELY A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE M.E. CONFLICT; ADVERTING TO VIETNAM, HE SAID THAT THE RECENT AGREEMENTS HAVE HOPEFULLY ENDED THE FIGHTING, BUT PEACE IN THE END CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY THE PEOPLE

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OF VIETNAM THEMSELVES.

5. THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ISMAIL CONTINUED, ARE NOT ONLY ISRAEL AND EACH OF ITS NEIGHBORS AND OTHER ARAB STATES; INTERNATIONAL ZIONISTS, ARAB NATIONALISTS, PALESTINIANS AND THE GREAT POWERS ARE ALSO PARTIES. THE UNITED STATES HAS A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE OF ITS ROLE IN "CREATING THE PROBLEM" BY ASSISTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. BUT, HE WONDERED, CAN THE USG THESE DAYS REALLY TAKE AN INDEPENDENT OR "UNPREJUDICED" ROLE? THE GOE FRANKLY QUESTIONS WHETHER USG IS QUALIFIED TO PLAY SUCH A ROLE, GIVEN THAT IT IS AN "ALLY" OF ISRAEL. GOE, HE ASSERTED, DOES NOT HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT USG CAN BE TRUSTED TO PRODUCE A FAIR AND JUST PEACE.

6. ON PROPOSED INTERIM AGREEMENT, HE SAID THAT GOE WONDERS WHAT IS IN IT FOR ISRAEL AND IN THIS CONNECTION HAS NOTED THAT DAYAN HAS BEEN QUOTED AS SAYING THAT MOST LASTING SOLUTIONS START OUT AS INTERIM AGREEMENTS.
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 CAIRO 0251

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HE RECALLED A NUMBER OF EPISODES IN THE HISTORY OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT STARTING IN 1948, AND THE WAY "PALESTINIAN RIGHTS" HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH, AND SAID THERE CAN BE NO PEACE WITHOUT A DEFINITION OF THE ZIONIST STATE, THAT IS, A DEFINITION OF WHAT EGYPT AND THE ARABS ARE BEING ASKED TO RECOGNIZE.

7. AS HE HAS MANY TIMES BEFORE, ISMAIL SAID THAT GOE IS NOT RPT NOT INTERESTED IN AN AGREEMENT DEALING WITH THE SUEZ CANAL. THE SUEZ CANAL IS EGYPTIAN PROPERTY TO BE DEALT WITH BY EGYPT AND NOT BARTERED FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL "A FEW TENS OF KILOMETERS" OR FOR ANYTHING ELSE. I INTERJECTED THAT, WHILE I WOULD LIKE TO POSTPONE MOST COMMENT UNTIL HE HAD FINISHED, I WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT USG HAS BEEN TALKING ABOUT SPRANG WE THOUGHT FROM PRESIDENT SADAT'S PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 1971. ISMAIL REJOINED THAT SADAT HIMSELF HAS LONG SINCE CHARACTERIZED THAT AS A "DEAD HORSE" AND IF US IS GOING TO GO BACK TO THAT, GOE WOULD HAVE TO GO BACK TO A NUMBER OF THE THINGS US REPRESENTATIVES SAID TO IT IN '70 AND '71 THAT SEEM TO BE DEAD LETTERS TOO.

8. CONTINUING, ISMAIL SAID THAT THE SITUATION AND THE OUTCOME CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED IN THE CONTEXT OF ALL THE RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS, THE ACCEPTANCE BY OTHER NATIONS OF EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER EGYPTIAN TERRITORY, AND THE LIMITATION OF THE "ABNORMAL RELATIONS" BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JEWISH COMMUNITIES ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. THE GREAT POWERS HAVE TO END THEIR DISCRIMINATION IN FAVOR OF THE JEWS. THE US AND FRANCE, FOR EXAMPLE, MUST WITHDRAW FROM ISRAEL JEWISH PERSONNEL WHO HOLD US OR FRENCH PASSPORTS AND

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FLY US OR FRENCH ORIGIN AIRCRAFT (SIC); THE US MUST TERMINATE THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO ISRAEL-RELATED FUNDS BY US TAXPAYERS; AND THE US MUST SHOW IN PRACTICAL WAY APPRECIATION OF SITUATION GOE FINDS ITSELF IN WHEN ITS FRIENDS WILL ONLY PROVIDE "SHORT-RANGE DEFENSIVE AIRCRAFT" WHILE US IS SUPPLYING TO ISRAEL "PHANTOMS THAT CAN FLY ALL THE WAY TO MALTA." THE US TALKS ABOUT THE M.E. CEASE-FIRE AS IF IT WERE SOMETHING THE AMERICANS ARE DOING. CONCLUDING THIS LITANY OF US MISDEMEANORS, ISMAIL SAID THAT THE USG HAS CONSISTENTLY NEUTRALIZED ALL EFFORTS BY OTHERS TO HELP RESOLVE THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT--BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL, FRANCE, BRITAIN--AND IS "EXERCISING ALL ITS POWERS" AGAINST EGYPT AND EGYPTIAN INTERESTS. EGYPT'S CURRENTLY GRAVE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE THE RESULT OF "THE AMERICAN POLICY OF SQUEEZING AND EXHAUSTING EGYPT" WITH A VIEW TO ULTIMATELY IMPOSING AN AMERICAN PEACE ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

9. THE GOE, HE SAID, IS NOT CLOSING DOORS BUT NEEDS TO KNOW WITH GREATER CONFIDENCE WHERE STAND THOSE TO WHOM IT IS TALKING ABOUT PEACE--"DON'T TELL US THEY ARE DISENGAGING FROM ISRAEL AND ARE EGYPT'S FRIENDS IF THEY ARE NOT." ISMAIL CONTINUED THAT HE SUPPOSED THE US COULD WAIT FOR SOMEONE ELSE TO APPEAR IN THE LEADERSHIP OF EGYPT WITH WHOM IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE THE KIND OF PEACE THAT AMERICA SEEMS TO BE TALKING ABOUT, BUT FOR THE PRESENT HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT THE PRESENT EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT IS SPEAKING FROM THE INDEPENDENT POINT OF VIEW OF EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM. IT WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AN AMERICAN ROLE AS "NICELY BALANCED" AS POSSIBLE, AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE BALANCED RELATIONS WITH THE US AS WELL. IT IS IN THIS KIND OF SPIRIT THAT THE INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT IS DEALING AND WILL CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BUT, HE SAID, THERE WILL BE NO RPT NO CHANGE IN THE EGYPTIAN POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. UNLESS THE US POSITION CHANGES. THE GOE IS NOT LEADING FROM WEAKNESS. THE PEOPLE OF EGYPT HAVE LIVED FOR SEVEN THOUSAND YEARS AND ARE PREPARED TO LIVE WITH THE TRAGEDY OF DEFEAT FOR A LONG TIME IF THEY HAVE TO.

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10. AS ISMAIL PAUSED AT THIS POINT, I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO SOME OF HIS COMMENTS, WHICH I ASSURED HIM I TOOK SERIOUSLY. I HOPED HE WOULD TAKE EQUALLY SERIOUSLY MY OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HOW THE USG CURRENTLY VIEWS SOME OF THE POINTS HE HAD MADE. I SAID THAT I HAD ALREADY NOTED THAT THE USG ACCEPTS THE CONCEPT OF A ROLE FOR ITSELF IN RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST; IT IS NOT DISENGAGING. MOREOVER, I COULD REASSURE HIM THAT THE USG ACKNOWLEDGES AND RESPECTS EGYPT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT.

11. I HAVE ASSUMED AND SO ADVISED USG THAT GOE WANTS A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT THAT IT CAN SUPPORT, AND PREFERS SUCH A RESOLUTION TO PERPETUATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. ISMAIL NODDED. I SAID I HAD FOUND IN WASHINGTON UNDERSTANDING THAT GOE IS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN THE CONTENT AND SUBSTANCE OF A FINAL RESOLUTION; IT IS CONCERNED WITH THE PROCESS OF GETTING THAT RESOLUTION LARGELY IN TERMS OF THE END RESULT. I NOTED THAT UP TO THIS POINT IN OUR CONVERSATION NEITHER OF US HAD MENTIONED SC RES 242; THE USG CONTINUES TO REGARD THAT RESOLUTION AS CONTAINING THE ELEMENTS OF A JUST SETTLEMENT TO BE REACHED BETWEEN PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT. THE PROCESS BY WHICH THIS IS ACHIEVED HAS DIFFERING IMPORTANCE FOR DIFFERENT PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT. IN THIS CONNECTION, AND IN CONNECTION WITH HIS CHALLENGE TO THE USG'S QUALIFICATIONS FOR A ROLE, I SAID THAT THE US,
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AS IS ILLUSTRATED IN THE VIETNAM AGREEMENTS, CONSIDERS THAT PEACE CAN ONLY ULTIMATELY BE ACHIEVED IF PARTIES TO CONFLICT ARE WILLING TO RECONCILE THEIR NATIONAL IMPERATIVES; YOU HAVE TO GIVE A LITTLE TO GET A LITTLE. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD SOUGHT TO INSIST ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AS PART OF THEIR SUBSTANTIVE POLICY; WE HAVE NOT TRIED TO FORCE THAT ON EGYPT. THE GOI HAD IN THE PAST TENDED TO REGARD AN INTERIM AGREEMENT AS HAVING A STANDING OF ITS OWN, BUT THE US HAS STUCK BY THE POINT THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST BE THE FIRST STEP IN A PROCESS LEADING TO THE ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT. MRS. MEIR HAS PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY SAID THE SAME THING. A JUDGMENT WHICH WE ASK THE GOE TO CONSIDER IS THAT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD GENERATE A MOMENTUM AND PRESSURES THAT WOULD HELP KEEP THE PROCESS XOVING TOWARD A FINAL SETTLEMENT, EVEN THOUGH THE LATTER WOULD OF COURSE TAKE TIME AND INVOLVES MANY ISSUES.

12. HAFEZ ISMAIL INTERJECTED THAT THE PROBLEM ABOUT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IS THE RISK OF ITS BECOMING THE AGREEMENT. I SAID THAT IF THE RHETORIC OR THE SEMANTICS ARE BOTHERSOME, PERHAPS WE CAN FIND SOMETHING ELSE TO CALL THE FIRST STEP. HE CAME BACK WITH " 'OPENING PHASE' OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT," AND I SAID, "WELL, SOMETHING LIKE THAT."

13. REGARDING HIS ALLUSIONS TO THE US RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL, I SAID THAT THE AMERICAN BODY POLITIC IS WHAT IT IS. I SUGGESTED ITS HEAD AND NERVOUS SYSTEM NOT BE CONFUSED WITH ITS EXTREMITIES. I URGED THAT EGYPT CONSIDER THE FACTS OF LIFE AS THEY ARE AND HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM RATHER THAN EXPECT AMERICANS TO TRY TO CHANGE ALL OF THEM.

14. FINALLY, I SAID THAT I WAS GLAD TO HEAR ISMAIL SAY THAT "DOORS ARE OPEN" BECAUSE THAT I THE WAY WE TOO

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WANT THEM TO BE. AT SAME TIME, I HOPED THAT GOE WOULD NOT MAKE IT HARDER TO KEEP THEM OPEN, OR FOR USG TO PLAY A ROLE, BY WHAT IT SAYS OR DOES. FOR EXAMPLE, US POLICYMAKERS ARE SOMETIMES PERPLEXED BY HEARING PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE ONE HAND THAT EGYPT EXPECTS US TO DO SOMETHING AND THEN ON THE OTHER THAT THE US IS PARTIAL, THAT EGYPT HAS GIVEN UP ON THE US, ETC. I SAID WE ARE READY TO HELP IF OUR HELP IS WANTED BY ALL CONCERNED, AND THAT WE ARE SOPHISTICATED ENOUGH TO UNDERSTAND THE UTILITY OF RHETORIC WHEN IT IS INTENDED TO CONCEAL PROGRESS TOWARD SERIOUS UNDERTAKINGS, BUT, AGAIN, I HOPED THE RHETORIC WOULD NOT GET IN THE WAY OF THE PURPOSES.

15. ISMAIL SAID HE WANTED TO RESPOND WITH TWO POINTS. FIRST, THE GOE HAS FOLLOWED WITH GREAT INTEREST THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT AND HAS BEEN STRUCK BY WHAT HE CALLED THE ANALOGY BETWEEN WHAT HAPPENED IN VIETNAM LAST DECEMBER AND WHAT HAPPENED TO EGYPT IN 1956 AND AGAIN IN 1967 WHEN, HE SAID, EGYPT THOUGHT A NEGOTIATING PROKESS WAS UNDER WAY. SECOND, AS THE GOE LOOKS AT THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IT SEES THAT ON VIRTUALLY EVERY OCCASION WHEN AMERICA'S ALLY HAS OBJECTED TO A POSITION THE USG HAS TAKEN, THE USG HAS BACKED DOWN.

16. HAVING GOT THOSE TWO OFF HI CHEST (AND I SAW NO POINT IN STIMULATING HIS EMOTIONS BY ARGUING ABOUT THEM), HAFEZ ISMAIL SAID IF WE ALL WANT PEACE, LET US ALL THINK BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, TRY TO FIND A SOLUTION, AND THEN PUT ALL OUR WEIGHT BEHIND IT. IF WE DO NOT DO THIS, HE SAID, ONLY THE PURPOSES OF OTHERS WILL BE SERVED. HE ASSERTED THAT IF EGYPT PERCEIVES A JUST SETTLEMENT THAT IS IN THE INTEREST OF EGYPT AND THE OTHER ARAB PEOPLES, NO FORCE ON EARTH CAN VETO EGYPT'S APPROVAL OF IT. THERE WOULD, HOWEVER, BE NO SEPARATE EGYPTIAN PEACE. RE MY ALLUSION TO 242, HE SAID THIS IS ONE GUIDE TO SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT; THERE MAY BE OTHERS.



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17. HE PAUSED, SO I SAID, "SUCH AS?". HE REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT ANSWER THAT QUESTION UNTIL HE HAD FIRST TALKED TO THE SOVIETS. GOE THINKS BOTH THE GREAT POWERS--US AND USSR--MUST BE ENGAGED IN THE PROCESS OF RESOLVING THE CONFLICT AND HE SAID THIS IS "A CHANGE." WHEN I ASKED HIM TO EXPLAIN HOW, HE SAID THAT EGYPT HENCEFORTH WANTS TO BE IN DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE US AND THE USSR AND NOT LEAVE IT TO ONE OF THEM TO TELL THE OTHER WHAT EGYPT'S VIEWS ARE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED MY REJOINDER THAT AT LEAST IN THE YEAR SINCE I CAME TO EGYPT, THE US HAS NOT RELIED ON THE SOVIETS TO TELL US WHAT EGYPT'S VIEWS ARE; WE HAVE GOT THEM DIRECTLY FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT.

18. IN ANY EVENT, HE IS GOING TO MOSCOW DURING WEEK OF JANUARY 29 (EXACT DATE NOT YET FIXED) AND WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH ME WHEN HE GETS BACK IF THERE IS ANYTHING WORTH TELLING US. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT SADAT IS NOT GOING TO MOSCOW AND HAS NO RPT NO PRESENT PLANS TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE EGYPT.

19. ALMOST AS AN ASIDE, HAFEZ ISMAIL SAID THAT HE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO TALK ECONOMICS WITH THE SOVIETS. ILLUSTRATING THE PLIGHT OF THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE, HE SAID THE PRICE OF FLOUR FOR BREAD IN CAIRO HAS DOUBLED SINCE THE SOVIETS MOVED INTO THE US WHEAT MARKET, "SO MAYBE WE SHALL HAVE TO GROW MORE POTATOES."
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2467
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2339
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 2969
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 905
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 1323
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1186
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1294
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 689
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 616
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2932
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 1173
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 663
RUEHCR/USINT ALGIERS PRIORITY 667
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S E C R E T CAIRO 0222

CN-7071Q
26Jan 73
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'73 JAN 26 PM 12.15

NODIS

SUBJECT: DIALOGUE WITH EGYPT

REF: STATE 012943 AND STATE 014057

1. NOW THAT MY GUIDANCE FOR FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH GOE IS ALSO GUIDANCE FOR ADDRESSEES OF STATE 014057, I ASSUME LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 3 STATE 012943 IS SUPERSEDED. WHILE WE CAN ALL MAKE CLEAR TO THOSE WE TALK TO THAT NO FORMAL DEMARCHE IS BEING MADE, SHARING THE VIEWS OF US POLICY MAKERS SET OUT IN LATTER TEL WITH OFFICIALS OF THIRTEEN OR MORE GOVERNMENTS EFFECTIVELY REMOVES THEM FROM CATEGORY OF "MY PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT MOOD IN WASHINGTON" AND I PLAN TO REFRAIN FROM SO CHARACTERIZING THEM. PRESUMABLY OTHER GOVERNMENTS WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN MY PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ANYWAY.

SECRET

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LIMDIS

2. I WOULD PARTICULARLY ASK THAT RECIPIENTS OF STATE 014057 HOLD OFF ON USE OF GUIDANCE UNTIL I HAVE EFFECTIVELY USED IT WITH GOE. LATTER KNOWS I AM READY TO TALK WHEN CONVENIENT TO THEM, BUT IT WOULD I THINK SERIOUSLY GET IN THE WAY OF OUR PURPOSES HERE IF THEY HEAR ABOUT OUR LATEST VIEWS FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS FIRST. I HAVE THE SAME KIND OF PROBLEM IN COPING WITH INQUISITIVE DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES IN CAIRO.

3. IT IS HARD TO PREDICT AT THIS POINT WHETHER IT WILL BE GOE RECEPTIVITY OR RESISTANCE TO OUR PITCH THAT IS STIMULATED WHEN THEY BEGIN TO GET PLAYBACKS FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS. TO TRY TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING HERE, HOWEVER, I SHALL UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE MAKE CLEAR TO THOSE I TALK TO THAT USG IS SHARING ITS CURRENT THOUGHTS WITH NUMBER OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS IF LATTER ASK ABOUT OUR CURRENT POLICY.
XGDS-3.
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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O 241535Z JAN 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2465
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 0219

CONTROL: 6515Q
RECD: JAN 24, 1973
11:17 A.M.

NODIS

SUBJECT: DIALOGUE WITH EGYPT

REF: STATE 12943; CAIRO 3153

1. GUIDANCE IN STATE 12943 FOR NEXT ROUND OF TALKS WITH GOE CERTAINLY TELLS IT LIKE IT IS AND WILL THUS BE SALUTARY EVEN IF NOT AT FIRST HEARING JUST WHAT THEY WANT TO HEAR. THEY WILL AS YOU NOTE BE LISTENING FOR HINTS OF WHAT IS TO FOLLOW, JUST AS THEY WILL NO DOUBT HAVE READ SECSTATE'S JAN. 17 SPEECH WITH SAME QUERY IN MIND.

2. THERE IS ONE ASPECT OF BOTH PRESENTATIONS THAT I AM SURE GOE WILL NOTE AS A CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS STATEMENTS AND WILL REGARD AS SIGNIFICANT FOR THEIR OWN POLICY: JARRING IS NOT MENTIONED AT ALL. THIS IS IN CONTRAST TO THE MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE OF LAST MAY AND VARIOUS STATEMENTS SINCE THEN, BUT AS MY LAST SUBSTANTIVE TALK WITH THEN FONMIN GHALEB IN AUGUST BROUGHT OUT, GOE HAS WONDERED WHETHER WE REALLY MEANT TO GIVE PRACTICAL EFFECT TO OUR "SUPPORT" FOR JARRING. ZAYYAT IN NOVEMBER STATED, AND I LEFT UNCHALLENGED, THE ASSUMPTION US CONTINUES TO SUPPORT HIM (CAIRO 3153). WHILE I DO NOT KNOW ALL THAT PASSED DURING UNGA DEBATE ON MIDDLE EAST, I AM NOT AWARE THAT USG LET IT BE KNOWN IN THAT CONTEXT THAT THIS IS NO LONGER THE CASE.

3. I NEED NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN FORTHCOMING TALKS TO CONFIRM THAT USG HAS NOW RPT NOW WRITTEN JARRING OFF. I ANTICIPATE, HOWEVER, WITH A KEEN SENSE OF CERTAINTY REINFORCED BY COMMENTS ABOUT FUTILITY OF THE UN ROUTE IN PARA 7, STATE 12943, AND ABSENCE OF HIS NAME, THAT ONCE AGAIN I SHALL BE ASKED WHETHER THAT IS NOT IN FACT WHAT WE ARE DOING. I RECOMMEND YOU AUTHORIZE ME TO CONFIRM THAT IT IS, NOT RPT NOT AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, BUT AS A VERY PRACTICAL MATTER OF JUDGMENT OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE.

SECRET

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4. EVEN THOUGH PRETTY MUCH ANTICIPATED, THIS CONFIRMATION WILL NOT BE WELCOME TO GOE. I AM FAR LESS CERTAIN OF THEIR REACTION THAN OF THEIR INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT, BUT NEVERTHELESS AM SURE THAT WHATEVER CHANCE THERE IS OF ACCOMPLISHING OUR CURRENT TWIN OBJECTIVES DEPENDS ON OUR TELLING IT LIKE IT IS AT EACH STEP OF THE WAY. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IF THEY SEE JARRING OUT OF THE GAME, THEY MAY BE MORE INCLINED TO TRY TO THINK OF WAYS TO RECONCILE THEIR JUDGMENTS OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE WITH OURS: WHEN ALL IS SAID AND DONE, THEY DO NOT WANT TO BE LEFT ALONE IN THE RING WITH GOI.

5. WE MUST ANTICIPATE THAT ONCE THEIR HUNCH IS CONFIRMED, GOE WILL TELL OTHERS--THE RUSSIANS, FRENCH, BRITISH, SOME OR ALL OF THE ARABS. IT WILL GET OUT, AND WE SHALL HAVE TO BE READY WITH A PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. I AM NOT IN A POSITION HERE TO TRY TO SUGGEST A SCENARIO FOR THAT PART OF THE ACTION, BUT ITS DIFFICULTY DOES NOT ALTER MY RECOMMENDATION.

6. ZAYYAT AND/OR HAFEZ ISMAIL ARE PREOCCUPIED WITH VISITORS AND THE ARAB LEAGUE DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING BEGINNING JANUARY 27, BUT ONE OR BOTH MAY WANT TO SEE ME BEFORE THAT. PLEASE LET ME HAVE YOUR GUIDANCE ON JARRING ASAP.
XGDS-3.

GREENE



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


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PAGE 01 STATE 244478

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NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE
NEA/EGY:MSTERNER
S/S - MR. GAMMON

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S E C R E T STATE 244478

ESDIS/DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF
SUBJECT: RULES OF PROCEDURE

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO FROM DAVIES AND POPPER

1. S/S HAS COPY OF MEMORANDUM DATED NOV 30, SUBJECT: ISSUES CONNECTED CONVENING OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE IN GENEVA.

2. THERE IS MERIT, WE BELIEVE, IN LAYING OUT FOR INTERNAL USE AND FOR TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS WITH UN SECRETARIAT OUR CONCEPT OF MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE PROCEDURES, SINCE THIS IS NOT AVAILABLE IN ANY DOCUMENT AT LEAST WITHIN USG. WE SEE NO NEED TO SEEK ADVANCE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES TO FORMAL RULES OF PROCEDURE, WHICH COULD COMPLICATE CONVOCATION OR EARLY STAGE OF CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO GO OVER OUR VIEWS WITH UN SECRETARIAT PRIOR

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TO CONVENING OF CONFERENCE DEC 18 IF POSSIBLE. WOULD PRESUMABLY ALSO BE DESIRABLE REVIEW OUR PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES WITH SOVIETS AT SOME POINT, ALTHOUGH TIME IS SHORT AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY WAIT FOR SOVIET RESPONSE BEFORE APPROACHING UN SECRETARIAT.

3. DRAF GUIDELINES

I. PARTICIPATION

THE CONFERENCE CONVENES IN GENEVA DEC 18 UNDER AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF NEGOTIATING AND ESTABLISHING A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. EGYPT, JORDAN, SYRIA, AND ISRAEL HAVE AGREED TO PARTICIPATE FROM THE OUTSET. THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION OF THE PALESTINIANS AND LEBANON WILL BE DISCUSSED AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE OF HE CONFERENCE.

II. CHAIRMAN

THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE UNDER THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN WILL CHAIR THE OPENING MEETING. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL CHAIR THE SUBSEQUENT PLENARY SESSIONS DAILY IN TURN. THE CHAIRMAN SHALL DECLARE THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF EACH PLENARY SESSION. THE CHAIRMAN SHALL PRESIDE OVER THE SESSIONS, SHALL ENSURE OBSERVANCE OF THE RULES, AND SHALL ACCORD THE RIGHT TO SPEAK.

III. DELEGATION

THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED WILL BE REPRESENTED AT THE OPENING SESSIONS BY THEIR RESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND LATER BY THEIR SPECIALLY APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVES WITH AMBASSADORIAL RANK. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL APPOINT A REPRESENTATIVE TO KEEP HIM FULLY INFORMED AS THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDS.

IV. SECREARIAT

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THE UNITED NATIONS WILL MAKE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR NECESSARY CONFERENCE FACILITIES. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHALL APPOINT THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY BY THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE. THE DUTIES OF THE SECRETARIAT SHALL BE TO PROVIDE ALL ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FOR THE CONFERENCE, RECEIVE, TRANSLATE, PRINT, AND DISTRIBUTE DOCUMENTS, PROVIDE TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION SERVICES, CLASSIFY AND KEEP RECORDS, AND, GENERALLY, INSURE THE REGULAR, PUNCTUAL, AND IMPARTIAL FUNCTIONING OF SERVICES ENTRUSTED TO IT.

V. RULES OF PROCEDURE

THE CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN WILL DRAW ON THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (A/520/REV 11) WHEREVER APPLICABLE, EXCEPT THAT IN SITUATIONS OR WHERE THESE RULES ARE NOT DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO THE SITUATION IN THE CONFERENCE,THE CHAIRMAN'S RULING, SUPPORTED BY A CONSENSUS OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE CONFERENCE, SHALL PREVAIL.

VI. LANGUAGES

THE LANGUAGES OF THE CONFERENCE WILL BE ENGLISH, RUSSIAN AND ARABIC.

VII. CREDENTIALS

CREDENTIALS FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE SEVERAL DELEGATIONS WILL BE PRESENTED TO THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE CONFERENCE AT THE END OF THE FIRST MEETING OR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER.

VIII. AGENDA

THE AGENDA OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH SHALL BE HELD IN PUBLIC AND BE PRESIDED OVER BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL COMPRISE: (A) WELCOMING ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SWISS CONFEDERATION; (B) OPENING ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS; (C) STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND BY THE FOR-

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EIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR; (D) STATEMENTS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND SYRIA; AND (3) DESIGNATION OF CO-CHAIRMEN.

IX. SECOND MEETING

THE AGENDA OF THE SECOND MEETING WHICH WILL BE HELD IN EXECUTIVE SESSION WILL COMPRISE: (A) CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; (B) GENERAL AGREEMENT ON RULES AND PROCEDURES; (C) DESIGNATON OF SPECIAL COMMITTEES AND WORKING GROUPS TO CARRY OUT ASSIGNED FUNCTIONS.

X. COMMITTEES

THE PLENARY CONFERENCE CAN CREATE SPECIAL COMMITTEES AND WORKING GROUPS AND CAN DETERMINE THAT THEY SHALL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IN PERIODS BETWEEN FULL PLENARY SESSIONS.

XI. DOCUMENTS

ALL MEMORANDA, PROPOSALS, AMENDMENTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS INTENDED TO APPEAR IN THE RECORDS OF THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE DISCUSSED BY THE CONFERENCE IN PLENARY SESSION OR IN COMMITTEES. THESE DOCUMENTS SHALL BE PRESENTED TO THE SECRETARIAT BY THE DELEGATION ORIGINATING THEM EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF DOCUMENTS WHICH RESULT FROM CURRENT

DISCUSSION IN A MEETING. THE SECRETARIAT SHALL ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE TRANSLATION AND CIRCULATION OF ALL SUCH MATERIAL AS OFFICIAL CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS.

XII. ORDER OF SPEAKING

THE CHAIRMAN SHALL CALL UPON SPEAKERS IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY SIGNIFY THEIR DESIRE TO SPEAK. NO REPRESENTATIVE MAY SPEAK UNLESS CALLED ON BY THE CHAIRMAN.

XIII. ADJOURNMENT AND RECESS

REPRESENTATIVES MAY REQUEST ADJOURNMENT OR RECESS, AND

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THIS WILL BE ACTED UPON BY THE CHAIRMAN AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OTHER REPRESENTATIVES.

XIV. SEATING

AT PLENARY SESSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE SEATING WILL BE AT A ROUND TABLE. THE TWO CO-CHAIRMEN SHALL SIT AT EITHER SIDE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE. THE PARTIES WILL BE SEATED CLOCKWISE ACCORDING TO THE ENGLISH ALPHABETICAL ORDER OF THE NAMES OF THE STATES WHICH THEY REPRESENT.

XV. SECURITY

ALL MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE AND COMMITTEES UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED WILL BE HELD IN EXECUTIVE SESSION. HE CONTENTS OF DISCUSSIONS WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL. ALL DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE AND COMMITTEES WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL AND, UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED, WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PARTICIPANTS EXCLUSIVELY.

XVI. PUBLIC STATEMENTS

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE CONFERENCE WILL PROVIDE THE INFORMATIONAL MEDIA WITH AGREED COMMUNIQUES ONLY.
RUSH



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PAGE 01 STATE 244140

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DRAFTED BY S/S:PICKERING
APPROVED BY S/S:PICKERING
H - MR. ANDERSON (SUBS)
P - AMB. PORTER
H - MR. ANDERSON (SUBS)
P - AMB. PORTER
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Z 132317Z DEC 73 ZFF4
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EXDIS - HANDLE AS NODIS/TOSEC 132

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION BILL

1. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION BILL SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTIVE WHICH CREATES THAT AGENCY NOW STATES THAT "THE ADMINISTRATOR...SHALL BE THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISOR WITH RESPECT TO...FOREIGN POLICIES RELATING TO ENERGY MATTERS".

2. WORKING WIT' SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE AND COMMITTEE COUNSEL, WE HAVE SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING CHANGE: "THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION SHALL BE THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISOR WITH RESPECT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DOMESTIC POLICY, AND IN COORDINATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE INTEGRAION OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES RELATING TO ENERGY RESOURCES." CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD AND SEVERAL RANKING MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ARE WILLING TO SUPPORT

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PAGE 02 STATE 244140

THIS CHANGE.

3. PLEASE LET US KNOW WHETHER YOU APPROVE THIS CHANGE. IT IS POSSIBLE WE MAY BE ABLE TO GET AN ADDITIONAL CHANGE SHOULD YOU SO DESIRE ALTHOUGH WE WILL NEED TO HEAR BEFORE 9:00 WASHINGTON TIME DECEMBER 14 IN ORDER TO MAKE CHANGE AVAILABLE TO COMMITTEE IN MARK-UP. OMB, WHICH INTRODUCED BILL, APPROVES AMENDMENT NOTED ABOVE. RUSH



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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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TO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5424
BT
S E C R E T STATE 241100

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG, US
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

REF.: CAIRO 3880

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SISCO

1. I APPRECIATE YOUR DESIRE TO HAVE MORE DETAILS REGARDING DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS HERE. I AM LEAVING SHORTLY TO JOIN THE SECRETARY. I WILL TAKE THIS UP WITH HIM. YOU WILL ALSO WISH TO DISCUSS THIS MATER WITH THE SECRETARY WHEN YOU RETURN FOR CONSULTATIONS.
2. I AM REFERRING YOUR 3874 TO BRUSSELS FOR RESPONSE. RUSH
BT
#1100

DRAFTED BY: NEA:JJSISCO
APPROVED BY: NEA:JJSISCO
CLEARANCES: S/S-MR. PICKERING

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Control: 0 8 6 3 Q
Received: December 4, 1973 1:08PM

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TO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5356
BT
S E C R E T STATE 237840

NODIS

E.O. 11652 - XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG
SUBJECT: BAB AL-MANDAB TRANSIT

REF: STATE 236179

1. IN SERIES OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH DEPTOFFS DECEMBER 4, ISRAELI MINISTER SHALEV EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOU WHAT HE TERMED "CONCENTRATION" OF EGYPTIAN NAVAL VESSELS AT BAB AL-MANDAB AND SAID FOR TIME BEING ISRAEL PUTTING HOLD ON ANY SHIP TRANSITS THROUGH BAB AL-MANDAB AND CONSEQUENTLY RECOMMENDED USG DELAY ANY FURTHER NOTIFICATIONS TO EGYPTIANS. ATHERTON SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD SHALEV WE WOULD IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HOLD OFF ON FURTHER NOTIFICATIONS TO EGYPTIANS, BUT WISHED TO REVIEW WITH SHALEV PRECISE STATUS OF OUR NOTIFICATION OF GOE ON VARIOUS SHIPS LEST THERE BE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING OR CONFUSION ON THIS SCORE. ATHERTON SAID FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS WOULD APPEAR INVOLVE FOLLOWING FIVE VESSELS:

A. TANKER PETRA, WHICH WE HAD INFORMED GOE WOULD TRANSIT DECEMBER 3. WE HAD NOT BROUGHT TO GOE ATTENTION SUBSEQUENT ISRAELI INFORMATION THAT PETRA TRANSIT DELAYED UNTIL 2000 DECEMBER 4 (STATE 236172).

B. WE HAVE NOT NOTIFIED GOE ABOUT FREIGHTER DALIA, WHICH ISRAELIS TOLD US SCHEDULED TRANSIT DECEMBER 6.

C. WE HAVE NOT INFORMED GOE THAT FREIGHTER OURANIA CANCELLED.

D. WE HAVE NOT INFORMED GOE OF FREIGHTER ALPHA SCHEDULED TRANSIT DECEMBER 7.

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E. WE HAVE NOT INFORMED GOE OF FREIGHTER TEVERYA SCHEDULED TO TRANSIT DECEMBER 8.

2. ATHERTON SAID WE HAD ALSO NOT NOTIFIED GOE OF FOLLOWING SHIPS FOR WHICH ISRAELIS HAVE NOTIFIED US OF TRANSIT TIMES SOMEWHAT FURTHER IN FUTURE.

A. STONE HAVEN (STATE 233044) SCHEDULED TRANSIT DECEMBER 12.

B. NORTHERN STAR (STATE 233044) SCHEDULED TRANSIT DECEMBER 13.

C. NETA (STATE 236172) SCHEDULED TRANSIT SOMETIME BETWEEN DECEMBER 5 - 10, ON WHICH ISRAELIS PROMISED US MORE DEFINITIVE TRANSIT TIME INFORMATION.

3. SHALEV SAID THIS AGREED WITH HIS OWN RECORD AND THAT HE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH DEPARTMENT DECEMBER 5.

KISSINGER

NEA:ALATHERTON, JR./NEA/EGY:MSTERNER/HLK
12/4/73 EXT 22365
NEA - ALFRED L. ATHERTON

S - MR. EAGLEBURGER | S/S - MR. PICKERING

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EO - Kissinger

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 218561

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TOSEC 88

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A)

SUBJECT: XXXX

REFTEL: SECTO 11

FOR SISCO FROM EAGLEBURGER

I HAVE TALKED TO DINITZ RE PARAS 2 AND 3 OF REFTEL HE UNDERTOOK TO PASS MESSAGE ON TO TEL AVIV, BUT GAVE HIS PERSONAL ASSURANCE THAT GOI WILL NOT INITIATE MILITARY ACTION WHILE SECRETARY IS IN ARAB WORLD, "OR, INDEED, AT ANY OTHER TIME." IN LIGHT OF REPORTS RE EGYPTIAN BUILDUP, DINITZ SUGGESTS A SIMILAR REQUEST FOR RESTRAINT BE PASSED TO GOE. RUSH
BT
#8561

Drafted By: S:LEAGLEBURGER
Approved By: S/S - Mr. Miller

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TO USINT CAIRO FLASH 4649
BT
S E C R E T STATE 201697

NODIS

E.O. 11652 - XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, US, UR
SUBJECT: CONTACT WITH SOVIET IN CAIRO

REF: CAIRO 3052

YOU SHOULD FIND EXCUSE FOR CANCELLING MEETING WITH LEO YEDRASHNIKOV AND AVOID FURTHER SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. WE WANT TO AVOID CROSSING WIRES BY MULTIPLE CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS. YOU SHOWED GOOD JUDGMENT IN NOT SEEKING TO RESPOND TO POINTS YEDRASHNIKOV MADE TO YOU. KISSINGER
BT
#1697

DRAFTED BY: NEA: ALATHERTON, JR.
CLEARANCES: S/S MR. GAMMON

APPROVED BY: NEA: JOSEPH J. SISCO

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
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TO RUESOR/USINT CAIRO PRIORITY 4536
INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3390
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TOSEC 58

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: APER, EG
SUBJECT: DEPARTURE OF USINT ACTING PRINCIPAL OFFICER

REF: CAIRO 2849

1. AS YOU HAVE SEEN, WILEY DEPARTURE WAS SUBJECT OF ROUTINE TREATMENT BY AP TWO DAYS AGO AND THUS FAR HAS GENERATED NO QUESTIONS AT NOON BRIEFING. HOWEVER, IN LIGHT INFORMATION REFTEL, STORY THAT WILEY DEPARTED AT GOE REQUEST SEEMS LIKELY COME TO ATTENTION WESTERN PRESS SOONER OR LATER. IF AND WHEN IT DOES, DEPARTMENT WILL DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE MATTER IN LIGHT OF TREATMENT AND CIRCUMSTANCES THEN PREVAILING. UNTIL THEN DEPARTMENT WILL NOT GO BEYOND LINE CONTAINED STATE 184161 -- I.E. THAT WILEY HAS LEFT CAIRO ON HOME LEAVE AND TRANSFER AND (IF ASKED) REPLACEMENTS FOR HIM AS WELL AS FOR GREENE HAVE NOT YET BEEN SELECTED. SHOULD ALSO ADHERE STRICTLY TO THIS LINE IN CONVERSATIONS WITH NEWSMEN AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATS. WE REALIZE THIS WILL INEVITABLY GENERATE SPECULATION, BUT ANYTHING WE SAY BEYOND LINE IN STATE 184161 ONLY LIKELY TO FUEL SUCH SPECULATION AND MAKE GOE FEEL COMPELLED TO SAY SOMETHING PUBLICLY, WHICH WE WOULD AS SOON AVOID. IF QUERIES RECEIVED IN NEW YORK THEY WILL BE REFERRED TO DEPARTMENT.

2. WE AGREE WITH SUGGESTION PARA 4 REFTEL. YOU SHOULD MAKE APPROACH TO GOE (PERHAPS GHORBAL WOULD BE MOST

EFFECTIVE CONTACT FOR THIS PURPOSE) AND REPORT THAT STORY GOE HAS EXPELLED WILEY LEAKING OUT FROM EGYPTIAN SOURCES IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCUIT. YOU SHOULD SAY OUR ASSUMPTION HAS BEEN, FROM MANNER GOE HAS HANDLED WILEY MATTER THUS FAR, THAT GOE DOES NOT SEEK TO MAKE THIS PUBLIC ISSUE BETWEEN USG AND GOE. THIS IS ALSO OUR PREFERENCE. WE WOULD THEREFORE SUGGEST GOE DO WHAT IT CAN TO DAMPEN SPECULATION AS TO CAUSES OF WILEY DEPARTURE. YOU MAY

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**



INFORM GOE OF LINE DEPARTMENT WILL ADHERE TO IN EVENT QUESTIONS RAISED HERE, BUT SHOULD ALSO POINT OUT OUR ABILITY HOLD TO THIS LINE WILL INEVITABLY BE WEAKENED IF GOE SUBSTANTIATES RUMOR WILEY EXPELLED AT GOE BEHEST. RUSH

NEA/EGY:MSTERNER:CFF
9/25/73 EXT 22365
NEA:JJSISCO

NEA:RPDAVIES
S/S: MR. GAMMON

NEA:ALATHERTON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

73 SEP 17 AM 9:16

SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

O 161721Z SEP 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 4469
BT
S E C R E T STATE 184161

3652Q

16 SEPTEMBER 1 33 PM

NODIS

E.O. 11652 - XGDS-1
TAGS: APER, EG
SUBJECT: GOE REQUEST FOR WILEY TRANSFER

REF: CAIRO 2739

1. GIVEN EGYPTIAN RESPONSE CONTAINED REFTEL, WE HAVE DECIDED TO MOVE YOU OUT PRIOR TO DEADLINE SET BY EGYPTIANS. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE CLOSE OUT YOUR AFFAIRS AND NOTIFY GOE OF YOUR INTENDED DATE OF DEPARTURE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOME LEAVE AND TRANSFER ORDERS COMING TO YOU BY SEPTEL.

2. FYI. FOR TIME BEING WE DO NOT INTEND TO TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST EGYPTIAN DIPLOMATS HERE, ALTHOUGH THIS WILL BE KEPT OPEN. END FYI.

3. YOUR DEPARTURE WILL OF COURSE BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE IN FEW DAYS' TIME. WE PROPOSE TO SAY NOTHING ABOUT REASONS FOR YOUR DEPARTURE BEYOND FACT THAT YOU ARE PROCEEDING ON HOME LEAVE AND TRANSFER TO ANOTHER ASSIGNMENT. IF ASKED ABOUT REPLACEMENT FOR YOU AND/OR GREENE, WE WILL SAY NO ONE HAS YET BEEN SELECTED. YOU SHOULD ALSO ADHERE STRICTLY TO THIS MINIMAL LINE AND INSTRUCT YOUR STAFF TO DO SO SIMILARLY. PRESS SPECULATION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ENSUE, AND ANYTHING ADDITIONALLY THAT MIGHT HAVE TO BE SAID WILL COME OUT OF WASHINGTON. RUSH

DRAFTED BY: NEA:EGY:MSTERNER:HLK

APPROVED BY: D: ACTING SECRETARY

CLEARANCES: NEA: MR SISCO WHITE HOUSE: GEN. SCOWCROFT

NEA: MR. 'ATHERTON S/S: D. MILLER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 AUG 32 AM 8:53

CONTROL: 8 9 1 4Q

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

O 311921Z AUG 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 4370
BT
S E C R E T STATE 174107

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS(1)
TAGS: APER EG
SUBJECT: GOE REQUEST FOR WILEY TRANSFER

REF: STATE 170528, CAIRO 2627

WE HAVE NOT YET HAD REPLY FROM EGYPTIANS ON PROPOSITION WE HAVE PUT TO THEM REFTEL. UNTIL WE DO, WE BELIEVE THERE IS VERY REAL RISK THAT IF YOU TRAVEL OUT OF COUNTRY EGYPTIANS MAY NOT LET YOU BACK IN. WHILE WE UNDERSTAND IMPORTANCE TO YOU PERSONALLY IN YOUR PROPOSED TRIP, WE CANNOT AFFORD TO TAKE THIS RISK AND BELIEVE YOU SHOULD PLAN TO HAVE MARJORIE INSTALL CYNTHIA IN SCHOOL. IF WE RECEIVE REPLY FROM EGYPTIANS IN NEXT FEW DAYS, AND DEPENDING ON ITS TENOR, IT MAY PROVIDE US WITH OPENING TO SEEK GOE AGREEMENT TO YOUR DEPARTURE FOR FEW DAYS ON URGENT BUSINESS ON UNDERSTANDING YOU ARE RETURNING TO POST. IF IT PROVES IMPOSSIBLE FOR YOU TO MAKE TRIP, LET US KNOW IF WE CAN BE OF ASSISTANCE IN ANY WAY TO YOU OR MARJORIE. ROGERS

NEA/EGY:MSTERNER:DD
8/31/73 EXT 22365
NEA:RPDAVIES

S/S - MR. GAMMON

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S E C R E T STATE 171685

NODIS

E.O. 11652:XGDS(1)
TAGS: APER EG
SUBJECT: GOE REQUEST FOR WILEY TRANSFER

REF: STATE 170528

1. ACTING ASSISTSECY DAVIES ASKED EGYPTIAN MINISTER KHALIL TO CALL ON HIM AUG 28. STERNER ALSO PRESENT. DAVIES SAID THAT AS MR. SISCO HAD TOLD KHALIL DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN IN PROCESS OF SEEKING BEST QUALIFIED SUCCESSOR TO MINISTER GREENE. THIS HAD BEEN SUSPENDED WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF DR. KISSINGER AS SECRETARY-DESIGNATE ON ASSUMPTION THAT FOR IMPORTANT POSITION OF THIS NATURE NEW SECRETARY WOULD WISH PERSONALLY TO SURVEY THE CHOICE. BECAUSE OF HIS OTHER PRESSING RESPONSIBILITIES, HE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO GET TO THIS MATTER UNTIL MIDDLE NEXT MONTH AT EARLIEST.

2. MR. DAVIES SAID THAT ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUED TO REPOSE GREATEST CONFIDENCE IN MR. WILEY WE WOULD NEVERTHELESS ACCEDE TO GOE'S REQUEST THAT WE REPLACE HIM. HOWEVER, GIVEN FACT THAT WE HAVE SUCH A SMALL DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT IN CAIRO, AND FACT THAT NEXT RANKING OFFICER WHO WOULD BE IN CHARGE HAS ADMINISTRATIVE RATHER THAN POLITICAL BACKGROUND, WE REQUEST WILEY BE PERMITTED TO STAY ON BOARD UNTIL A NEW PRINCIPAL OFFICER CAN BE APPOINTED. WE COULD ASSURE GOE THAT THIS WILL BE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. SECRETARY-DESIGNATE HAS INDICATED HIS DESIRE TO FILL ALL PRESENT VACANT POSITIONS AS PROMPTLY AS IS BUREAUCRATICALLY POSSIBLE. IN MEANTIME, AND WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO CAIRO, WE CONSIDER IT IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS TO HAVE SOMEBODY IN CHARGE WHO IS FULLY COGNIZANT OF THE COMPLEX MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND ISSUES IN US-EGYPTIAN POLITICAL RELATIONS. WE HOPE FONMIN ZAYYAT WILL ACCEDE TO THIS ARRANGEMENT WITH OUR ASSURANCE THAT WE WOULD MOVE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE IN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**



THE SELECTION OF A NEW PRINCIPAL OFFICER. STERNER ADDED THAT IF THIS ARRANGEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO GOE WE WOULD ALSO CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT WILEY CONTINUE TO HAVE SAME ACCESS TO GOE OFFICIALS THAT HE DOES NOW TO CARRY ON NORMAL BUSINESS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND TO REPORT ACCURATELY AND AUTHORITATIVELY VIEWS OF GOE ON IMPORTANT POLITICAL MATTERS.

3. MINISTER KHALIL SAID HE WAS SURE CAIRO WAS AWARE OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDING FACT THAT A NEW SECRETARY HAD BEEN APPOINTED. HE WISHED TO ASK WHETHER SECRETARY-DESIGNATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT THIS PROBLEM. MR. DAVIES REPLIED HE COULD NOT SAY FOR SURE; HE WAS SPEAKING ON AUTHORITY OF DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH WHO HAD CONSULTED WITH DR. KISSINGER ABOUT APPOINTMENTS IN GENERAL.

4. MINISTER KHALIL DID NOT THINK THAT CAIRO WOULD BE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT A LAME DUCK ARRANGEMENT FOR LONG AND INEVITABLY QUESTION OF TIME WOULD ARISE. MR. DAVIES REPEATED OUR ASSURANCES ABOUT MOVING PROMPTLY TO SELECT NEW PRINCIPAL OFFICER, AND KHALIL SAID HE WOULD REPORT FULLY TO CAIRO.

6. WE INTEND AS MATTER COURTESY TO BRIEF SPANISH EMBASSY ON NATURE OUR PROPOSAL TO GOE. YOU MAY ALSO KEEP AMBASSADOR ALABART INFORMED AS YOU CONSIDER APPROPRIATE. RUSH

NEA/EGY:MSTERNER:CFF
8/28/73 EXT 22365
NEA:RPDAVIES

S/S: MR. GAMMON

D - MR. ROBERTS



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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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TO USINT CAIRO 4347
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S E C R E T STATE 170528

CONTROL: 7 5 1 9Q

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS (1)
TAGS: APER
SUBJECT: GOE REQUEST FOR WILEY TRANSFER
REF: STATE 167283, CAIRO 2573

1. KHALIL CALLED ON ACTING ASSISTSECY DAVIES WITH STERNER ALSO PRESENT AUG 27 TO SAY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED TELEGRAM FROM CAIRO IN RESPONSE TO SISCO DEMARCHE REPORTED FIRST REFTEL. CAIRO HAD GIVEN HIM REPORT OF ORIGINAL ZAYYAT CONVERSATION WITH SPANISH AMBASSADOR. KHALIL COULD CONFIRM THAT CASE INVOLVED SECURITY MATTER INVOLVING WILEY CONNECTION WITH EX-GENERAL MUHIB ABDEL GHAFAR WHO HAD SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN IMPRISONED ON STATE SECURITY CHARGE. KHALIL SAID HE GATHERED FROM ZAYYAT-ALABART CONVERSATION THAT GOE HAD EXPECTED WILEY TO BE TRANSFERRED AT TIME ABDEL GHAFAR CASE FIRST AROSE. KHALIL SAID HIS "PERSONAL THINKING" WAS THAT GOE FELT WILEY MISSION HAD TERMINATED ANYWAY AND CAIRO'S MOTIVE WAS SIMPLY TO BRING THIS ABOUT AS SMOOTHLY AS POSSIBLE WITH MINIMUM OF EMBARRASSMENT. STERNER ASKED WHETHER TRANSCRIPT OF ZAYYAT-ALABART CONVERSATION WAS ONLY INFORMATION KHALIL HAD RECEIVED; HAD CAIRO NOT PROVIDED ANY MORE SPECIFICS ABOUT REASONS FOR REQUEST FOR WILEY TRANSFER? KHALIL SAID HE HAD RECEIVED NO FURTHER INFORMATION. THERE WAS MERELY INDICATION THAT FOREIGN MINISTER WAS AWAITING USG RESPONSE AS TO WHETHER IT WOULD OR WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO TRANSFER WILEY.

2. MR. DAVIES SAID HE HAD WORKED WITH MARSHALL WILEY FOR MANY YEARS AND CONSIDERED HIM HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL AND INTELLIGENT FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER. WE STILL WISHED TO KNOW AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE THE REASONS FOR GOE'S ACTION AGAINST HIM. DAVIES SAID HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH DETAILS OF ABDEL GHAFAR CASE BUT KNOWING WILEY HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT WILEY MUST HAVE CONDUCTED HIMSELF IN THIS CONTACT ENTIRELY WITHIN THE CONFINES OF PROPRIETY. GOE'S RESPONSE WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE, AS MR. SISCO HAD NOTED TO MINISTER KHALIL, SEARCH WAS UNDER WAY FOR

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SUITABLE SUCCESSOR TO MINISTER GREENE.

3. DAVIES SAID HE WOULD CONSULT SENIOR OFFICERS IN DEPARTMENT INCLUDING SISCO WHEN WE COULD REACH HIM AND WOULD BE REPLYING TO MINISTER KHALIL IN DUE COURSE ON DEPARTING KHALIL REMINDED DAVIES OF FONMIN ZAYYAT'S DESIRE TO HAVE EARLY DECISION CONCERNING WILEY. RUSH

NEA/EGY:MSTERNER:CFF
8/27/73 EXT. 22365
NEA:RPDAVIES

S/S: MR. GAMMON



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

White House
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TO: Mr. Bud McFarlane
R. Col. Kennedy

cy sent to S.C. for Scowcroft & cy sent to Hal Saunders

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TO RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO PRIORITY 2854
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RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 7306
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 4084
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RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 5380
RUESTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 6446
RUESKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 3998
RUFNRS/USINT ALGIERS PRIORITY 5637
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NY PRIORITY 9925
BT
S E C R E T STATE 015710

CONTROL: 7 4 1 1Q
RECD: 26 JAN 73 7:45PM

73 JAN 27 AM 10 55

NODIS

REF: CAIRO 222

1. STATE 12943 IS ESSENTIALLY A RECAPITULATION OF WHAT HAS BEEN OUR ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION AND OUR POLICY COURSE FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS. IT WAS NOT DESIGNED OR INTENDED TO FORESHADOW OR LIMIT FUTURE OPTIONS IN ANY WAY BUT MERELY TO UNDERLINE SOME OF THE CONTINUING HARD REALITIES AS WE SEE THEM AND TO FORESTALL ANY TENDENCY TO WISHFUL THINKING IN CAIRO THAT SOME NEW USG DECISIONS ON MIDDLE EAST MAY HAVE BEEN REACHED. WHILE WE OBVIOUSLY HAVE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION UNDER REVIEW, NO REPEAT NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN REACHED. WE VIEW GUIDANCE SENT CAIRO IN STATE 12943 AS STRICTLY A HOLDING ACTION, NOTHING MORE OR LESS.

2. NEVERTHELESS, IN VIEW OF MINISTER GREENE'S CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE FEEDBACK TO CAIRO FROM DISCUSSIONS BASED ON STATE 12943 IN OTHER CAPITALS, OTHER RECIPIENTS OF THAT TELEGRAM SHOULD TREAT IT AS STRICTLY FYI. IF QUERIED RE USG POLICY, YOU SHOULD LIMIT YOURSELF TO POINTING OUT THAT USG HAS CLEARLY BEEN FULLY PRE-OCCUPIED WITH OTHER MATTERS, AND SHOULD SAY THAT YOU ARE AWARE OF NO CHANGES OR NEW DECISIONS ON MIDDLE EAST AS OF NOW IN WASHINGTON.

3. FOR CAIRO: WE BELIEVE FOREGOING SHOULD RELIEVE YOUR CONCERNS AND THAT YOU CAN PROCEED ON BASIS OF STATE 12943

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AS IT STANDS, BEARING IN MIND YOU ARE TO TAKE NO INITIATIVES OR ENGAGE IN ANY FORMAL, SYSTEMATIC PRESENTATIONS BUT MERELY DRAW ON THAT MESSAGE SELECTIVELY AS CIRCUMSTANCES ARISE IN WHICH THIS APPEARS USEFUL IN COURSE YOUR NORMAL CONTACTS.

GDS. IRWIN

NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.:HLK
1/26/73 EXT 29464
NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO

S/S - MR. BARNES

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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WH

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TO USINT CAIRO 0000
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S E C R E T STATE 012943

CONTROL: 5 7 8 8Q
RECD: 22 JAN'73 8:52PM

NODIS FROM SECRETARY

1. FYI. AS YOU RETURN TO CAIRO YOU WILL OF COURSE BE SEEING VARIOUS SENIOR GOE OFFICIALS WHO WILL BE LISTENING CAREFULLY FOR ANY HINTS OF POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS BY THE USG. THIS WILL REQUIRE SOME DELICATE HANDLING SINCE, AS YOU KNOW FROM YOUR CONSULTATIONS BACK HERE, WE HAVE REACHED NO CONCLUSIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE FUTURE M.E. PEACE EFFORTS. WE HAVE TWIN OBJECTIVES DURING THIS PERIOD: TO PERSUADE GOE TO KEEP DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS OPEN; AT SAME TIME, TO KEEP GOE FROM BUILDING UP IN ITS OWN MIND UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS.

2. YOUR CONSULTATIONS HERE PROVIDE A PEG TO TRY TO DO SOME QUIET MISSIONARY WORK ON BEHALF OF INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH EGYPTIANS ALREADY SURMISE IS LIKELY TO REMAIN FOCUS OF OUR POLICY. DURING PAST YEAR SADAT AND HIS ADVISORS HAVE STEADILY RETREATED FROM THIS CONCEPT UNDER CLOUD OF ALMOST PARANOID SUSPICION THAT US HAS "DISTORTED" SADAT'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL INTO SOME KIND OF "TRAP" FOR EGYPT. WE WANT EGYPTIANS TO SEE THAT, WHILE THEY CANNOT EXPECT TO HAVE THEIR CONCEPT OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENT PRECISELY FULFILLED (ANY MORE THAN ISRAELIS CAN THEIRS), ACCOMMODATION WHICH WE BELIEVE POSSIBLE GOES LONG WAY TOWARD MEETING ESSENTIAL EGYPTIAN INTEREST THAT INTERIM AGREEMENT NOT BECOME END IN ITSELF.

3. TALKING POINTS BELOW ARE DESIGNED WITH THESE OBJECTIVES IN MIND AND ALSO INCLUDE SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS AND THE US ROLE. YOU MAY DRAW UPON THEM AS YOU FEEL APPROPRIATE. WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD NOT PRESS FOR EARLY APPOINTMENTS, LEST YOU AWAKEN UNDUE EXPECTATIONS, BUT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FIRST OPPORTUNITIES THAT COME NATURALLY TO HAND. YOUR REMARKS SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT MOOD IN WASHINGTON AND CURRENT VIEWS US POLICY-MAKERS, NOT AS FORMAL DEMARCHE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS. END FYI.

4. BEGIN TALKING POINTS. DURING YOUR LEAVE YOU HAD USEFUL WEEK OF CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON AT THE

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DEPARTMENT WITH THOSE OFFICIALS WHO ARE CONCERNED WITH MIDDLE EAST POLICY, INCLUDING MEETING WITH SECRETARY ROGERS. YOU FOUND VIEW THAT US INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST REQUIRE CONTINUING ACTIVE US DIPLOMATIC ROLE IN SEARCH FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SC RES. 242.D ALTHOUGH THERE IS GRATIFICATION THAT BOTH SIDES PERCEIVE IT IN THEIR INTEREST TO MAINTAIN CEASEFIRE, WASHINGTON IS NOT SATISFIED WITH PRESENT SITUATION AND BELIEVES WE MUST CONTINUE EFFORT TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE SETTLEMENT. YOU FOUND, HOWEVER, THAT SENIOR US OFFICIALS WERE ALSO HEAVILY PREOCCUPIED WITH SITUATION IN VIETNAM AS WELL AS DOMESTIC MATTERS AND PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES.

5. ALTHOUGH WASHINGTON HAS CAREFULLY KEPT OTHER APPROACHES UNDER REVIEW, YOU FOUND A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT IDEA ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT SADAT IN HIS FEBRUARY 4, 1971 SPEECH REMAINS MOST FEASIBLE AVENUE FOR PROGRESS. THERE IS NO HIDDEN MOTIVE FOR THIS; IT IS SIMPLY THAT USG IS INTERESTED IN SEEING SOME TANGIBLE PROGRESS MADE, EVEN IF IT IS MODEST IN THE FIRST STAGE, RATHER THAN CONTINUE THE STERILE PATTERN OF THE LAST 25 YEARS OF SEEING THE PARTIES TALK ABOUT ABSOLUTE POSITIONS WITHOUT ANY CONCRETE RESULTS. INTERIM AGREEMENT AS STAGE IN STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH, IS ONLY PROPOSITION IN SIGHT THAT OFFERS PROSPECT OF REAL PROGRESS AT PRESENT TIME. WE WISH IT COULD BE OTHERWISE, BUT WE CANNOT BE HOPEFUL ABOUT TOTAL APPROACH TO OVERALL SETTLEMENT AT THIS TIME. IN OUR JUDGMENT, PARTIES ARE NOT PRESENTLY PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF FINAL SETTLEMENT TERMS - RECOGNITION AND DETAILED PEACE COMMITMENTS, SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDERS, JUSTICE FOR PALESTINIANS - WITH DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY NECESSARY TO OFFER ANY CONCEIVABLE HOPE OF RESOLUTION. WE SEE NOTHING ON HORIZON THAT IS LIKELY TO CHANGE THIS SITUATION EXCEPT IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME FIRST STEP THAT CREATES MOMENTUM TOWARD PEACE AND CHANGED PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING PROSPECTS FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT. IT IS PRECISELY THIS DYNAMIC THAT MAKES

INTERIM AGREEMENT ATTRACTIVE. ONLY REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE WE SEE IS INDEFINITE CONTINUATION OF STATUS QUO, WHICH WE WOULD REGRET BUT, QUITE FRANKLY, BELIEVE WOULD BE EVEN LESS IN INTEREST OF PARTIES THEMSELVES.

6. YOU FOUND US OFFICIALS REGRETFUL THAT OVER PAST YEAR

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MISCONCEPTIONS HAVE GROWN UP WITHIN GOE ABOUT WHAT USG MEANS WHEN IT SPEAKS OF "INTERIM AGREEMENT". GOE SEEMS TO HAVE PERSUADED ITSELF THAT INTERIM AGREEMENT IS EUPHEMISM FOR ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH NEW STATUS QUO WHICH WOULD FREEZE EXISTING SITUATION INDEFINITELY. FROM YOUR DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY YOU CAN ASSURE EGYPTIANS THIS IS DEFINITELY NOT U.S. CONCEPT. AS WE HAVE TOLD EGYPTIANS IN PAST WE ENVISAGE INTERIM AGREEMENT AS BEING FOLLOWED BY ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RES 242. IN OUR JUDGMENT THERE WOULD BE IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM FOR SUCH ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS ONCE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT CONCLUDED. WE RECOGNIZE THAT PREFERRED EGYPTIAN CONCEPT OF INTERIM AGREEMENT IS THAT IT BE A FIRST PHASE IN PRE-AGREED TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT INCLUDING TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. NEITHER THIS CONCEPT NOR ORIGINAL ISRAELI CONCEPT -- THAT INTERIM AGREEMENT SHOULD STAND COMPLETELY ON ITS OWN AND INVOLVE COMMITMENTS TO PERMANENT CEASE-FIRE -- CAN BE PRECISELY FULFILLED. WE HAVE WORKED HARD ON THIS POINT AND WITH SOME SUCCESS, AS EVIDENCED BY PRIME MINISTER MEIR'S PUBLIC STATEMENT LAST SUMMER THAT INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD BE "TEMPORARY", LINES TO WHICH ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW UNDER SUCH AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE FINAL BORDERS IN PEACE SETTLEMENT, AND THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW TO SUCH FURTHER LINE AS MAY BE SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED TO IN CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS ON AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. (YOU SHOULD REMIND ZAYYAT SISCO WAS AUTHORIZED BY PM MEIR TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT SADAT IN AUGUST 1971 THESE TWO LATTER POINTS AS THE OFFICIAL GOI POSITION. THERE HAS BEEN NO ISRAELI BACKOFF FROM THIS POSITION). WHILE TERMS OF FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT CANNOT BE PRE-DETERMINED AT THIS STAGE, WE DO NOT THINK OUR CONCEPT OF INTERIM AGREEMENT IS IN ITS ESSENTIALS ALL THAT MUCH AT VARIANCE WITH PRESIDENT SADAT'S. LIKE EGYPTIANS, USG ENVISAGES INTERIM AGREEMENT AS INTEGRAL PART OF NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WHICH NEED NOT BE DIRECT OR FACE-TO-FACE, FOR FULL AND COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RES 242. AS NEW OPPORTUNITIES ARISE FOR EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES FOR NEGOTIATIONS, WE HOPE GOE WILL LOOK BEHIND MISCONCEPTIONS THAT HAVE ACCUMULATED AROUND INTERIM AGREEMENT PROPOSAL AND ONCE AGAIN UNEMOTIONALLY WEIGH ADVANTAGES IT OFFERS AGAINST DISADVANTAGES OF ALTERNATIVE COURSE INCLUDING PERPETUATION OF STATUS QUO.

7. THIS MAY ALSO BE OCCASION TO MAKE SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. IT HAS



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DIS NODIS

BEEN WELL-KNOWN THAT ISRAEL OVER THE YEARS HAS INSISTED ON FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE NOT ADOPTED THIS POSITION, EVEN THOUGH WE BELIEVE IT IS THE BEST MEANS, LARGELY IN DEFERENCE TO THE EGYPTIAN VIEW THAT THIS WAS NOT POLITICALLY FEASIBLE AND THAT IN ANY SUCH NEGOTIATION EGYPT FEELS IT WOULD FIND ITSELF AT A DISADVANTAGE SINCE ISRAEL IS IN OCCUPATION OF ITS TERRITORY. WHILE WE DO NOT AGREE WITH THIS JUDGMENT, WE ARE NOT URGING EGYPT TO ENGAGE IN FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS TIME, BUT WE WANT TO SHARE A JUDGMENT WITH THEM. WE KNOW THAT EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI CONCEPTS OF NEGOTIATIONS DIFFER. EGYPT HAS TENDED TO VIEW NEGOTIATIONS AS AN ARENA OF CAPITULATION. WE BELIEVE THIS IS GROSS UNDERESTIMATION OF EGYPT'S CAPACITY TO NEGOTIATE EFFECTIVELY AND TO ACHIEVE FAIR SETTLEMENT BY THIS MEANS. WHAT EGYPT HAS FAILED TO UNDERSTAND IN PAST IS THAT FOR ISRAEL VERY WILLINGNESS ON PART OF EGYPT TO ENGAGE IN FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATION IS MATTER OF MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE DEEPLY EMBEDDED IN ISRAELI PSYCHE. WILLINGNESS OF EGYPT TO SIT DOWN ACROSS TABLE WITH ISRAEL WOULD BE TAKEN BY ISRAELIS AS MOST DECISIVE AND CONCRETE INDICATION THAT IN FACT EGYPT WOULD BE WILLING TO WORK OUT SETTLEMENT WHICH OFFERS REAL HOPE FOR REASONABLE, MUTUAL, CO-EXISTENCE OVER COMING DECADES. IN OUR JUDGMENT, CONCESSIONS ON PART OF ISRAEL ARE MUCH MORE LIKELY IN CONTEXT OF FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATION THAN THEY ARE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THIRD PARTY PRESENCE. THIS IS CRUCIAL POINT WHICH WE FEEL EGYPT SHOULD PONDER. BUT IN DOING SO, WE WANT TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THIS IS EXPRESSION OF JUDGMENT, THAT WE ARE NOT PRESSING EGYPT TO AGREE TO FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS BUT THAT IT IS SOMETHING WHICH THEY THEMSELVES SHOULD WEIGH VERY CAREFULLY ON BASIS OF OUR JUDGMENT THAT THIS IS ROUTE THAT WOULD MOST LIKELY LEAD TO SATISFACTORY RESULTS FOR EGYPT. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT UN ROUTE, FOUR POWER ROUTE, HAVE BEEN TRIED AND FAILED AND DO NOT OFFER FRUITFUL AVENUE OF APPROACH. THE UN CONTEXT OFFERS THE SEMBLANCE OF ACTIVITY BUT UNFORTUNATELY IT DOES NOT OFFER A MEANINGFUL PROCESS. EGYPT SHOULD WEIGH THE REAL AGAINST THE UNREAL. WE SAY THIS NOT AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, BUT AS JUDGMENT THAT AS LONG AS ATTEMPTS ARE MADE IN UN CONTEXT ISRAEL WILL NOT PLAY AND NO SET OF OUTSIDE FORCES CAN FORCE THEM TO PLAY IN THAT ARENA.

8. FINALLY, AS TO U.S. ROLE IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, WE RECOGNIZE THERE HAS BEEN SOME LOSS OF CONFIDENCE AS OUR



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RELATIONSHIPS HAVE ERODED OVER PAST 18 MONTHS. WE ARE NOT GOING TO PRESS OUR ROLE IF IT IS NOT WANTED. WE ARE FRANKLY PERPLEXED BY INCONSISTENT LINE WHICH IS COMING FROM CAIRO, WHICH IN ONE BREATH STRESSES THAT U.S. IS KEY IN BRINGING ABOUT SETTLEMENT AND THAT SOME NEW U.S. MOVE WOULD BE WELCOME, WHILE IN THE SAME BREATH STRESSES THERE IS NO CONTACT WITH U.S., THAT U.S. IS COMPLETELY ONE-SIDED, ANTHAT EGYPT HAS GIVEN UP ON U.S. WE BELIEVE PARTIES THEMSELVES ARE THE KEY BUT THAT U.S. IS INDEED SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IN SITUATION. WE APPRECIATE THAT THIS IS REFLECTION OF A DILEMMA WHICH IS FELT IN EGYPT. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT IN OUR JUDGMENT FOR EGYPT TO SET ASIDE THE QUESTION OF CREDIBILITY AND TRUST. ANY OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST WILL LEAD TO INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION THAT IT IS IN U.S. INTERESTS TO DO WHATEVER IT CAN TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BASED ON 242 BECAUSE THE PRESENT NO-WAR-NO-PEACE SITUATION IS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF STABILITY AND PROGRESS. THIS IS BASIC U.S. APPROACH. END TALKING POINTS.

9. WITH RESPECT CAIRO 192, WE AGREE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO MAKE THESE POINTS IF EGYPTIANS RAISE SUBJECT OF SECRETARY"S SPEECH. SINCE EGYPTIAN REACTION THUS FAR HAS BEEN UNOFFICIAL IN FORM OF PRESS PLAY, WE BELIEVE IT BEST NOT TO RAISE MATTER OURSELVES WITH SENIOR GOE OFFICIALS. IN GENERAL WE WANT TO MAINTAIN POSTURE THAT WHILE WE ARE READY AND WILLING TO RESPOND TO ANYTHING GOE HAS TO SAY TO US THROUGH ITS OFFICIALS, WE WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO DEBATE WITH CAIRO MEDIA.

10. XGDS-CATEGORY 3. ROGERS

NEA/EGY:MSTERNER
1/17/73 EXT 22365
S:THE SECRETARY

NEA:JJSISCO
S/S:MR. ELIOT

NEA:ALATHERTON



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NODIS NODIS

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CODEWORD